Since October 2023, the State of Israel’s main strategic vector has been a campaign against enemies in the region centered around Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran. This campaign is nearing its end. In the coming months, the open challenges will be decided. Whether by force, agreement, or a combination of the two, the issues of the hostages and Hamas’s full disarmament and removal in Gaza as well as the nuclear project in Iran will reach decisions.

The other challenges are undergoing processes of change that are mostly positive from Israel’s perspective. In Lebanon, a new order is taking shape, influenced by the weakening of Hezbollah. In Syria, a new order – not without risks – is being built without the presence of Iran and its proxies. In Judea and Samaria, the system is converging around the question of the day after Abbas; and the Trump administration is pushing for the promotion and expansion of the Abraham Accords and the integration of Israel into the region.

In this situation – even if the military operation in Gaza continues for several more months or an Israeli or Israeli-American campaign is conducted against Iran – it is clear that within six months to a year at most, Israel will emerge from the war into a reality of the continuous use of force.

It is appropriate to return to the basics of David Ben-Gurion’s national security strategy and realign the national focus from the security level “Strike Force” to the national level “Prime Force,” as Ben-Gurion did after the War of Independence. One of the basic conventions of his strategy is that Israel should strive as much as possible for long periods of national capability-building and reduce as much as possible the time it takes to transform into a “Strike Force” for the purpose of defeating enemies.

The ongoing mobilization and activation of the “Strike Force” since October 2023, along with the clear victory already achieved and its expected completion in the coming months, gives even greater validity to this principle. Unlike in the days of Ben-Gurion, the “Strike Force” will remain in the form of increased regular and permanent service and in the periodic but significantly reduced mobilization of the reserves. This will make it possible to maintain ongoing security efforts across the various arenas.

A significant acceleration of “Prime Force” national efforts – in terms of security, the economy, and society – is needed to place Israel on a path of renewed strength. I will not touch on the regional and international political aspects, though extensive action must also be promoted in these areas. One, for example, is the effort to enlarge Israel’s “Competitive Identity.”

The Israeli government’s work plans for 2025 show noteworthy efforts to accelerate the development of national strengths. The main challenge is the national need to make a substantial leap forward in the arrangement, inclusion, and implementation of core components of the next national strength. To this end, it is important to focus execution on core issues, consolidate existing plans and their completion, allocate executive attention (ministerial committees, teams of Directors General), abolish execution barriers, and move forward vigorously and quickly to execute clear planning goals.

Israel should define a limited number of national efforts, the implementation of which would be led by the executive branch. Without ignoring other important efforts, the focus should be on those that can provide a public and business growth engine for other issues as well. Some, like the housing issue, are already being addressed.

The following are what I consider the top five national projects:

1. National public transportation network: Israel needs to accelerate construction of an integrated network of public transportation solutions that will provide a comprehensive, relevant, and available door-to-door response to the population’s residential, employment and service needs. This network includes the deployment of several international airports, including one additional major airport parallel to Ben-Gurion Airport; a passenger and cargo rail network; (electric) buses; and improvements in maritime access to Israel. This network must connect the periphery to the center in order to expand the connection between housing and employment solutions. In terms of cost, it should be accessible to all segments of the public. Metropolitan transportation authorities will be needed to best adapt the plans. Reducing the scope of vehicle use will also require providing a respectful response to transportation needs on Shabbat.
2. National computer network: Israel must complete both a leap forward in physical communications infrastructure (cellular and fiber optics) in a way that allows for bandwidth tailored to future needs and the full digitization (applications, cloud infrastructure) of national and local services and supporting infrastructure for businesses.
3. Advanced computing infrastructures: Israel must significantly accelerate the establishment of the computing infrastructure required for artificial intelligence needs, the promotion of a national response to the challenge of quantum computing, and the supporting frameworks that enable the implementation of these capabilities. The implementation of national plans for AI is currently too slow to keep pace with developments in the field.
4. Health and welfare response to population growth: The expected growth requires a significant expansion of the pace and scope of construction of response infrastructure. There is already a National Strategic Outline Plan at the Ministry of Health and the Planning Directorate for Health Institutions. There are plans to expand the response to the challenge of an aging population, but the necessary increases in infrastructure and manpower must be accelerated.
5. A relevant and strong security solution over time: Security capabilities are a key component of the “Prime Force,” and in the current period also a significant engine of technologies and exports. During the war, the defense establishment received – and will continue to receive – increased resources to create a robust response after the revelation of insufficiencies in October 2023 and thereafter. The historical phenomenon of waves of increases and decreases in the IDF’s response capacity must be stopped. This time, lessons must be learned and a response built that will create a strong and relevant army and security system while avoiding excessive reductions in investment during periods of apparent calm. The goal is to ensure that the investment is carried out not as a concentrated effort but as an ongoing process over decades. This will require close examination and control by elements within and outside the IDF.

Alongside the five “national projects” will be some “national challenges.” The legislative branch (the Knesset) should lead the handling of these challenges as a basis for strengthening its position (see below), and because they require dialogue, agreements, legislation and control of implementation processes. I have tried to define what I consider the five “national challenges” on which to focus (though this is of course open to discussion):

1. Rebalancing the three branches of government: Defining the relationship between the three branches and returning powers and capabilities to the legislative branch. The executive branch should focus on the efficient execution of processes. One way to do this is to significantly reduce the number of ministers and stop viewing the Knesset as an “employment solution” for legislators. Small ministries should be consolidated into “super-ministries.” A limited number of ministers should serve as horizontal projectors (by, for example, leading the integration of “national projects”). All others should return to essential key roles in the legislative branch. At the same time, the process of transforming the judiciary – mainly the High Court – into a legislative branch (“legislators in judges’ robes”) should be stopped. The determination of norms and principles should be returned to legislators. Judges should focus on examining compliance with the law.
2. Integrating the ultra-orthodox into the economy and sharing the civic burden: The Israeli economy will have difficulty functioning if the growing ultra-orthodox population does not share in the national security effort and the economic burden. A fundamental change in the current situation will require agreements that address the unique needs of this population.
3. Eliminating crime in Arab society: Organized crime is a source of chaos at the national level and hinders the normal development of Arab society. Significant efforts are being made to deal with it, but close monitoring of the effectiveness of these efforts as well as legislation are required.
4. Lowering the cost of living by increasing competitiveness: The cost of living in Israel is a national problem that requires serious solutions. The many efforts in this area do not sufficiently address the main problem: the concentration of power in key industries in the hands of a few corporations and the lack of competitiveness. A legislative and practical leap is needed to increase competitiveness and reduce the control of these corporations.
5. Reconstruction of the South and the North: Considerable efforts are being made on this issue as well, but the depth of national commitment to the issue and the need to assist and develop the population will require dialogue, in-depth monitoring, and legislation.

The next strategic vector of the State of Israel, after stabilizing a desirable security environment and perhaps even a political one for the country in the coming year, is a significant acceleration of national strengths. To this end, Israel should begin a strategic process of defining a limited number of “national projects” and responding to “national challenges” to strengthen its capabilities with a forward-looking vision.

Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Despite the Ongoing War, Israel Must Build Up Its Natural Strengths first appeared on Algemeiner.com.