Before beginning my “deep dive” into Gaza, here’s the long and short of it:

1. Israel, the United States, and Arab powers in the region all want the war in Gaza to end; but

2. every element of peace, including international stabilization forces and reconstruction is impossible until Hamas disarms and dismantles its power structure; and
3. Hamas is ideologically incapable of doing so voluntarily.

All of this leads to an inescapable conclusion: the path to peace may very well lie on the other side of renewed combat.

Here’s the full story:

US President Donald Trump, speaking before the Israeli Knesset on October 13, announced the end of the war in Gaza and the “historic dawn of a new Middle East.”

All remaining live Israeli hostages held by Hamas returned home, and the Israeli people responded with an elation that continues to this day. Yet that euphoric moment marked only the beginning of a train of problems, obstacles, and deadly battles that seem to be growing only worse over time.

This doesn’t mean the end of Trump’s self-named “Great Peace,” but merely the beginning of a very Middle Eastern process.

During the two weeks since Trump’s declaration of peace, Hamas failed to return the bodies of many of the deceased hostages as it had agreed to, launched attacks against IDF positions resulting in several injuries and deaths, and brutally executed dozens of Palestinians, many of them publicly, while blindfolded and kneeling in the street.

For its part, Israel responded with limited but severe air strikes. Nonetheless Trump, Israel and Hamas all continue to insist that a ceasefire is still in effect, a sentiment that Trump summed up succinctly, “They [Hamas] killed an Israeli soldier. So the Israelis hit back. And they should hit back… Nothing is going to jeopardize the ceasefire.”

So it seems we have a ceasefire – but one that includes, well … firing.

Given how the Middle East works, returning to combat may actually be a necessary step toward achieving genuine, regional peace.

Trump’s “Great Peace,” aka “the Deal,” is meant to occur in two phases. Phase 1 involves:

• an immediate ceasefire,
• the return of all Israeli hostages (living and dead),
• a partial pullback of IDF forces, and finally, the release of nearly 2,000 Palestinian security prisoners from Israeli jails, including many convicted and high ranking terror operatives.

Phase 2, which has yet to be fully negotiated, is meant to include:

• Hamas completely disarming and giving up control over Gaza,
• further IDF withdrawals,
• and the implementation of some kind of international governing force that will oversee reconstruction.

Strictly speaking, we are still in Phase 1: Israel has fulfilled its obligations, but Hamas continues to hold the bodies of deceased Israeli hostages, which is of high emotional importance to Israelis. Hamas insists that the bodies are hard to find, yet Israeli intelligence claims that the terror organization has custody of most of the remains. The Israeli claim was evidenced the other day by drone footage which showed Hamas operatives removing an Israeli body from a building, burying it under rubble, and then calling the Red Cross to report their “discovery.”

Trump threatened on October 25 to take some kind of action against Hamas if it did not return the Israeli bodies within 48 hours, yet that deadline has passed, and bodies continue to return only in a trickle.

Phase 1 problems notwithstanding, the disarmament of Hamas presents a critical barrier to Phase 2.

In the wake of October 7, 2023, the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, Israel will not tolerate a Hamas controlled enclave on its border. In a further obstacle, neither neighboring Arab countries nor local Palestinian clans will take responsibility for Gaza’s future if that means having to fight against an armed and active Hamas.

Yet the terror group is already refusing to disarm, saying (at best) that the agreement is ambiguous, and in some cases, expressing outright refusal.

Both Jerusalem and Washington seem quite aware of this sticking point: speaking from the White House last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed disarmament with the warning, “This can be done the easy way or it can be done the hard way, but it will be done.”

President Trump later echoed the sentiment more bluntly, saying, “If Hamas continues to kill people in Gaza, which was not the Deal, we will have no choice but to go in and kill them.” Trump added further threats against the terror group in recent days, including, “If they don’t disarm, we will disarm them. And it will happen quickly and perhaps violently.”

Some headlines claimed that the United States is pressuring Israel against violating the ceasefire, including comical terms like “Bibi-sitting,” yet the rhetoric coming out of Washington is actually far more aggressive than that coming from Jerusalem. According to non-public sources inside the Israeli government, much of the pressure against resuming combat stems not from America, but from Israel’s desire to return the remains of as many deceased hostages as possible before engaging in an operation that might put them forever beyond reach.

Indeed, events on the ground seem to demonstrate a high degree of coordination between the two countries — a coordination based on the shared understanding that peace requires appropriate enforcement, and that it may prove impossible to remove Hamas’ influence by any means other than combat.

There is precedent for this approach.

Beginning with the famous “pager” operation last year, Israel conducted a series of strikes that devastated the Hezbollah terror organization in Lebanon, finally resulting in a November 2024 “ceasefire” agreement. Under the terms of this “ceasefire,” Israel retained the right to continue firing against Hezbollah as necessary, and has carried out several hundred strikes since that time. Both the government of Lebanon as well as the United States have generally accepted these strikes as being not only consistent with the ceasefire agreement, but also a necessary step toward building a peaceful Lebanese government, safe from Hezbollah’s violent control.

Another example began last April, when Trump gave Iran a 60 day deadline to negotiate the dismantling of its nuclear program. The deadline expired on June 11, and was followed immediately by a devastating Israeli air operation, which culminated in the famous American B-2 bombardment of Iran’s most deeply buried nuclear facilities. The result was a quick and decisive end to what Trump named “The Twelve Day War,” followed by a period of sustained quiet, though Iran is rumored to be rebuilding its capabilities.

The current phase in Gaza is reminiscent of the 60 day Iran negotiation: there is a slim possibility that Hamas might agree to disarm and depart peacefully, but if not, the parties have been clear that combat remains not only an option, but a functional tool for achieving eventual peace.

It is relatively rare that an aggressive dictatorship transforms into a safe and prosperous neighbor, but there are at least two historical examples: Germany and Japan after World War II. In both cases, the previous regime had to be completely defeated and entirely disarmed before reconstruction, much less any hope of a better future. Can one imagine that today’s prosperous, modern Germany would exist if the allies had given the Nazis a role in reconstruction? Can one imagine international partners physically entering Germany to help govern and rebuild, while under the threat of an armed and active Nazi regime?

Until October 13, Hamas held living Israeli hostages — they were enduring abuse, starvation, and rapidly running out of time. Under these circumstances, Israel entered a deal to return the live hostages immediately, while delaying the deconstruction of Hamas, and the reconstruction of Gaza, until later. Yet in many other respects, the situation in Gaza parallels post-war Germany: before the region can hope to imagine a better future, the existing regime must be disarmed, dismantled, and dismissed. The fate of the entire Middle East, and Trump’s “Great Peace,” depend on it.

Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.