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India, Israel, and the Rewiring of the Horn of Africa

India’s prime minister, Shri Narendra Modi, addresses the gathering at the Indian Community Reception Event at the Singapore Expo in Singapore on November 24, 2015.

On December 26, 2025, Israel took the dramatic step of becoming the first state to officially recognize the independence of Somaliland and to establish full diplomatic relations with it.

This was not merely symbolic. It was an extraordinary strategic move that could alter the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s geographic significance became more apparent following the direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025, which underscored Tehran’s efforts to move physically closer to Israel by establishing footholds at regional flashpoints. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was also a strategic response to Ethiopia’s existential need — as the world’s most populous landlocked state — for sovereign access to the sea. The Port of Berbera in Somaliland is the key to freeing Addis Ababa from its near-total dependence on Djibouti’s ports, which are under increasing Chinese influence.

The Israeli move targets the pressure points of other actors as well as Iran. These include Turkey, which is deeply entrenching its political and military influence in Somalia and adjacent maritime routes; and China, which maintains infrastructural and security dominance in Djibouti through economic leverage within the BRI framework. Israel is not planning on a heavy military deployment, but rather on using a combination of monitoring, control, intelligence, and digital capabilities — an approach that aligns with India’s emphasis on capacity-building and functional sovereignty enhancement.

Africa as a central axis in India’s maritime statecraft

Over the past decade, New Delhi has redefined Africa as a key arena in shaping the Global South and as a core component of its strategic interests. India views the continent as a neighborhood in which it can implement its concept of maritime statecraft — a security-economic infrastructure, centered around the Indian Ocean, that is aimed at establishing India as a preferred security and development partner. This approach is anchored in the SAGAR and MAHASAGAR doctrines, which provide a strategic framework for integrating security, growth, and connectivity. Africa is also a critical arena in which India hopes to realize its defense export target of $5 billion by 2025 — a goal unattainable without a deep, institutionalized, and long-term presence on the continent.

The continental anchor: The India-Ethiopia strategic partnership

The historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Addis Ababa on December 16-17, 2025, marked a new phase in the political anchoring of India in the Horn of Africa. The elevation of bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership was intended to inject “new energy and depth” into the countries’ cooperation, with a focus on security, technology, and the economy. Ethiopia — a country with a population of over 126 million that is undergoing a demographic and geo-economic transformation — is a key partner in the realizing of India’s vision of the “Global South.”

Israel’s move in Somaliland provides the protective envelope required to safeguard shared interests in the Indian Ocean “maritime neighborhood.” Israeli capabilities in ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), port security, and MDA (maritime domain awareness) are vital tools in the countering of threats from Iran and maritime terrorism in the Red Sea. The security synergy with Israel directly supports India’s goal of reaching $5 billion in defense exports by 2025, the success of which will be contingent on expansion in Africa.

The combined Indian-Israeli presence in the Horn of Africa offers a clear alternative to China’s BRI model. The Chinese model focuses on massive investment in physical infrastructure that often generates financial dependency and debt. The Indian-Israeli model advances a “resilience and redundancy” approach that is based on sovereign trade corridors and strategic autonomy. India contributes capacity-building and digital infrastructure while Israel adds an advanced technological-operational layer.

Somaliland as a laboratory of informal order

Somaliland stands out as a strategic anomaly: it is a stable and functioning entity despite the absence of formal international recognition. This characteristic makes it an ideal testing ground for the Indian-Israeli model.

A central component of the complementary security package offered by the Indian-Israeli axis is ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), which encompasses advanced technological tools like unmanned platforms, satellite systems, and sensor networks that enable continuous data collection and real-time operational intelligence.

While India focuses on physical infrastructure and human-capital training as part of its capacity-building efforts, Israel contributes digital “eyes.” These capabilities are particularly vital for states with extensive Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) but limited monitoring capacity, as they enable effective maritime control without requiring a heavy military presence.

A complementary pillar is port security, which involves a multi-layered physical and digital defense of port infrastructure, piers, and logistical facilities against sabotage, maritime crime, and terrorism. In this context, India invests in physical infrastructure at strategic points while Israeli capabilities ensure that the assets function as protected “sovereign trade corridors.” Port security is not merely a narrow security concern but a prerequisite for developing a sustainable blue economy and reshaping intra-African trade patterns.

The third component is MDA (maritime domain awareness), defined as the ability to generate an integrated situational picture of all maritime activity relevant to security, economic, and environmental interests. MDA relies on the synthesizing of raw data into broad intelligence that can be used for real-time decision-making. India’s aspiration to position itself as a “first responder” to disasters and threats in the Indian Ocean depends heavily on such capabilities. Advanced MDA systems will enable effective responses to piracy, illegal fishing, and non-state threats, strengthening India’s standing as a rule-setting maritime power rather than a reactive one.

The integration of ISR, port security, and MDA creates an operational synergy that deepens African states’ positive dependence on the capabilities offered by the Indian-Israeli axis. While India lays the diplomatic, economic, and physical foundations, Israel provides the critical technological edge that turns the partnership into a game changer vis-à-vis the Chinese model, which relies more on centralized control and less on empowering local capabilities.

Strategic synergy: Redefining the rules of the game

The Indian-Israeli partnership in the Horn of Africa is more than a classical security alliance. It represents an attempt to test whether sustained maritime influence can be built through legitimacy, partnership, and sovereignty enhancement rather than coercion. The division of labor is clear: India shapes the normative framework, legitimacy, and connectivity to the Global South, while Israel supplies the operational-technological layer required to counter physical and technological threats. This synergy strengthens both states: India is perceived as a provider of non-colonial security and development solutions, while Israel establishes a presence along a strategic line stretching from the Indian Ocean through Ethiopia to the Horn of Africa.

The promise inherent in Indian-Israeli synergy in the Horn of Africa is not immune to structural failure or geopolitical shifts. For the proposed model to be sustainable, it must address three risk vectors.

The first is the continent’s structural fragility. Somaliland is positioned as a “laboratory of stability,” yet it operates within an African environment marked by chronic instability. There is a tangible risk that population growth will turn from a “dividend” into a socio-economic burden due to inadequate infrastructure. In the short period from 2020 through 2023, nine military coups occurred in seven African countries, illustrating institutional erosion across the continent. Moreover, debt traps and food insecurity further exacerbate risk. Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio has doubled over the past decade (from 30% to approximately 60%), limiting states’ ability to invest in costly defense technologies. Concurrently, severe food insecurity affects around 20% of the continent’s population, potentially triggering internal unrest that could undermine strategic partnerships.

The second challenge is the Indian legitimacy paradox. India seeks to lead the Global South by promoting sovereignty and transparency. However, recognition of a secessionist entity like Somaliland incurs a dual political risk. It may clash with the African Union (AU), as African states are highly sensitive about preserving post-colonial borders. Supporting Somaliland could be perceived as undermining Somalia’s sovereignty, thereby damaging India’s status as a consensual continental hub. There is also the possibility of a Turkish-Somali backlash. Turkey’s model in Somalia is based on a military presence and deep influence. Recognition of Somaliland places New Delhi and Jerusalem on a collision course with Ankara, which may respond by escalating its military footprint at other maritime chokepoints.

The third challenge is technological competition: Israel’s edge versus the Turkish model. Israel offers superior ISR and MDA but faces competition from proven operational models. Turkish defense equipment (such as Bayraktar UAVs) has demonstrated its battlefield effectiveness in Africa (for example, in Ethiopia and Somalia). The Indian-Israeli model must prove that its security package offers operational and economic value superior to that provided by the cheaper and readily available alternatives supplied by Ankara and Beijing.

An alliance of sovereignty and resilience

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not an end in itself but a first step in a broader alliance aimed at reshaping the regional rules of the game. The real contest is not over declarations but over the building of durable networks of influence and alliances capable of controlling trade, information, and intelligence flows. For Israel and India, this constitutes a process of strategic rewiring in which they are positioning themselves as rule-setting powers through partnership, resilience, and functional sovereignty. This represents an alternative model for the regional — and potentially global — order, one that respects the sovereignty of Global South states and strengthens their resilience against external threats.

Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum and a lecturer and a teaching assistant in the Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program at Bar-Ilan University. She specializes in Indian foreign policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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Dismantling the Iranian Zombie State: Washington’s Strategic Imperative

Smoke rises as protesters gather amid evolving anti-government unrest in Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan province, Iran, released on Jan. 10, 2026, in this screen grab obtained from a social media video. Photo: SOCIAL MEDIA/via REUTERS

The statement delivered by President Donald Trump this week, was more than just another warning to a rogue state. By declaring that the Iranian regime had finally begun to cross “very strong” red lines, and noting that “people are being killed who aren’t supposed to be killed,” the administration signaled the end of a long, failed experiment in managed containment.

We are no longer witnessing a typical cycle of civil unrest in the Middle East. Instead, we are watching the mechanical, violent twitching of what can only be described as a “zombie state” — a clerical establishment that died economically and morally years ago, but continues to walk, fueled only by the survival instincts of its security apparatus and the blood of its own citizens.

To understand why Washington must now move from rhetoric to reality, one must look past the regime’s propaganda and into the overwhelmed wards of Tehran’s hospitals.

On the night of January 8, 2026, as the regime pulled the “kill-switch” on the nation’s Internet, reducing connectivity to a mere one percent, a concentrated slaughter was unleashed in the capital. Reports from medical professionals, risking their lives to smuggle out data, confirm a horrific tally: 217 deaths across just six hospitals in a single night. At Milad and Imam Hossein hospitals, doctors counted 70 bodies each, many arriving with gunshot wounds to the head and eyes — the unmistakable signature of a deliberate shoot-to-kill policy. These victims were not collateral damage in a riot; they were targets of a state that has forgotten how to lead and only knows how to execute.

This “zombie” nature of the Iranian government is not just a metaphor. It is a structural reality. In political analysis, a zombie institution is one that persists long after its social utility has vanished, now driven solely by the primary motivation to survive regardless of the cost to the world. Since the brief but intense “12-Day War” in June 2025, which saw the US and Israel puncture Iran’s aura of deterrence by striking nuclear and military sites, the regime has been in a terminal tailspin. The economy is in a “survival phase,” marked by a currency collapse and a banking system so hollowed by corruption that Bank Melli, the nation’s largest lender, recently faced a massive bank run and suspended cash withdrawals. 

Rather than addressing these failures, the clerical elite has retreated into a bunker mentality, labeling every protester a “terrorist” and an “enemy of God” — a charge that carries the mandatory death penalty in their warped legal system. Sensing that the local Law Enforcement Command was “balking” at the order to massacre their own neighbors, the regime has now unleashed the IRGC Ground Forces. Even more telling is the regime’s reliance on foreign muscle; approximately 800 fighters from Iraqi Shiite militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, have been flown in to do the work that even some Iranian soldiers are refusing to do. A regime that must hire foreign mercenaries to kill its own people is a regime that has already lost its soul.

For Washington, the strategic interest is clear: a nuclear-armed zombie is a threat to the world. President Trump’s “very strong options” must address the current “deterrence gap” in the Persian Gulf, where the absence of a US carrier strike group has encouraged Tehran to test American resolve. But the true solution lies in empowering the living movement that is already challenging the dead regime. The Iranian people are no longer asking for reform; they are flying the pre-1979 flag and calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty to restore their national identity.

Washington should immediately move to provide the material tools of resistance. This means bypassing the regime’s digital iron curtain with “direct-to-cell” technologies and thousands of additional Starlink terminals, ensuring the next Internet blackout fails to hide the regime’s crimes. It means facilitating financial channels that allow the global diaspora to fund nationwide strikes, effectively starving the zombie state of the resources it uses to fuel its machines of war. If military force is used, it must be surgical, targeting the specific IRGC units responsible for the hospital massacres, thereby providing the Iranian people the breathing room they need to reclaim their sovereignty.

The 217 martyrs of Tehran’s hospitals — and the many others that have since joined them — have already paid the entry fee for a new Iran. They have proven that the clerical establishment rules only through violence, an observation President Trump echoed on his return from Mar-a-Lago. The time for bargaining with a corpse is over. The “Greatest Peace” the Middle East has ever seen will not come through negotiations with a criminal regime; it will come when the Iranian people are given the support to finally bury the zombie state and build a free, stable, and democratic future.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx

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Israel to Compete in First Semifinal of 2026 Eurovision Song Contest, Organizers Announce

Israel’s representative to the Eurovision Song Contest, Yuval Raphael, a survivor of the deadly Oct. 7 2023, attack by Hamas on the Nova festival in Israel’s south, holds an Israeli flag in this handout photo obtained by Reuters on Jan. 23, 2025. Photo: “The Rising Star,” Channel Keshet 12/Handout via REUTERS

Israel will participate in the first semifinal of the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest in Vienna, Austria, in May and will perform during the second half of the competition, the European Broadcasting Union announced on Monday.

The first semifinal will be held on May 12, followed by the second semifinal on May 14. Based on the results of the audience and jury vote, the top 10 countries from each semifinal will move on to compete in the grand final on May 16. All portions of the 2026 Eurovision will take place at the Wien Stadthalle in Vienna. The lineup for the semifinals was decided by a draw, conducted during a live broadcast by the Austrian broadcaster ORF and on the official Eurovision Song Contest YouTube channel.

The countries competing in the first half of the semifinal on May 12 are Georgia, Portugal, Croatia, Sweden, Finland, Moldova, and Greece. Israel is competing in the second half along with Montenegro, Estonia, San Marino, Poland, Belgium, Lithuania, and Serbia. The order of performances for the two semifinals will be announced by the end of March, according to the EBU.

A total of 35 countries will participate in the 70th Eurovision Song Contest, but only 30 will compete in the semifinals because five countries are pre-qualified for the grand final on May 16. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and last year’s winner Austria automatically qualify for the grand final, but are still required to broadcast and vote in one of the semifinals. Germany and Italy will perform and vote in the first semifinal.

“The Eurovision Village at Rathausplatz – in the heart of our city – will send a visible message of unity to the world – something very important in these turbulent times,” said Vienna Mayor Michael Ludwig in a released statement. “Vienna will become the world stage of entertainment once more and do everything possible to ensure that all visitors can celebrate a wonderful and safe festival together. Vienna will once again show that it is a great host for people from all over the world, where everyone can feel welcome and safe.”

“Together with ORF, Vienna is ready to welcome Europe and the world for the 70th Contest to celebrate music, creativity and connection,” said Martin Green CBE, director of the Eurovision Song Contest. “With broadcasters from across Europe and beyond taking part, and a global audience that continues to grow, the Eurovision Song Contest remains a truly unique live event. We can’t wait to see the stage come alive in May and to share an extraordinary celebration of 70 years of international music and creativity with hundreds of millions of viewers worldwide.”

Spain, Ireland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Slovenia announced they will not compete in the 2026 Eurovision after it was ruled in early December that Israel is allowed to participate. The countries are protesting Israel’s military actions in the Gaza Strip during the Israel-Hamas war. Other countries, like Belgium and Italy, have been facing pressure to withdraw from the song contest because of Israel’s involvement. Two previous Eurovision winners also returned their trophies to the EBU in protest of Israel’s participation in the 2026 Eurovision: 2024 Swiss winner Nemo and Charlie McGettigan, who won the 1994 Eurovision with fellow Irish singer Paul Harrington.

Austria’s broadcaster ORF said last month it will not ban Palestinian flags from the audience or drown out booing during Israel’s performance in the Eurovision this year.

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Trump’s Iran Tariff Threat Risks Reopening China Rift

US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping react as they hold a bilateral meeting at Gimhae International Airport, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, in Busan, South Korea, Oct. 30, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein

US President Donald Trump’s threat to slap a 25% tariff on countries that trade with Iran risks reopening old wounds with Beijing, Tehran’s biggest trading partner.

Iran became a flashpoint in US-China ties during Trump’s 2017-21 first term as president as Washington tightened sanctions on Tehran and put China‘s Huawei, accused of selling technology to the Islamic Republic, in its crosshairs.

The arrest of Meng Wenzhou, the daughter of Huawei’s founder, in Canada at Washington’s request sparked retaliation and a hostage crisis, with bitter recriminations lingering for the remainder of Trump’s first administration.

With Iran in his sights once again, the duty would see Chinese shipments to the US incurring levies exceeding 70%, higher than the effective 57.5% tariffs in place before Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping struck a deal in October to de-escalate their trade war.

It remains unclear which countries with Iranian business links Trump might target, and he has not named China. The US president has also made offhand remarks that threatened to upend US foreign policy without acting on them before.

China will call [Trump’s] bluff. I can assure you that Trump has no guts to impose the extra 25% tariffs on China, and if he does, China will retaliate and he will be punished,” said Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, “just like in Meng Wenzhou’s case.”

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Some Chinese experts questioned why Trump seemed intent on revisiting one of the most contentious foreign policy issues from his first term, despite having already made Beijing think twice about providing economic support to Tehran.

China and Iran are not as close as in the public imagination,” said a Beijing-based Chinese academic who advises the foreign ministry on Iran policy, and requested anonymity as they were not authorized to speak to media.

China has sharply reduced Iranian imports in recent years, according to Chinese customs data, with Chinese companies wary of being sanctioned by the US government. China bought just $2.9 billion of Iranian goods in the first 11 months of last year, the latest customs figures show, compared with a peak of $21 billion in 2018 during Trump’s first presidency.

That said, Beijing moves around 80% of Iran‘s shipped oil through small independent refiners trading off the books to skirt US sanctions over the country’s nuclear ambitions.

China‘s state-backed oil majors have not done any business with Iran since 2022. Some analysts say the independents’ shipments means the total value of China‘s purchases remains in the tens of billions of dollars.

China is just an excuse, a kind of disguise for the Trump administration, to impose new pressure [on] Iran,” said Wang Jin at the Beijing Club for International Dialogue think tank.

When asked at Tuesday’s regular press conference on Trump’s tariff threat, China‘s foreign ministry said that Beijing would “resolutely safeguard its legitimate rights and interests.”

HIGH STAKES

Still, Iran remains substantially bigger business for China than Venezuela, where Trump acted to curb Beijing’s stake with a commando raid to capture President Nicolas Maduro to face drug charges in the United States.

Analysts said Trump’s renewed push to cut off Iran from global trade flows is likely to deepen scrutiny of Xi’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, where Iran is a strategic hub for the passage of Chinese goods to the Middle East.

It also raises uncertainty over whether Trump will visit Beijing in April as expected, with analysts anticipating the announcement of a sweeping trade agreement with Xi.

“Whether Trump’s tariffs are enforceable remains a question,” said Xu Tianchen, a Beijing-based analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

“Last year he announced tariffs related to ‘illicit’ Russian oil trade, but their implementation was patchy.”

“Trump is also the kind of person who likes bullying the weak,” Xu said. “He should manage his actions to avoid these tariffs escalating into direct confrontation with China.”

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