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India, Israel, and the Rewiring of the Horn of Africa
India’s prime minister, Shri Narendra Modi, addresses the gathering at the Indian Community Reception Event at the Singapore Expo in Singapore on November 24, 2015.
On December 26, 2025, Israel took the dramatic step of becoming the first state to officially recognize the independence of Somaliland and to establish full diplomatic relations with it.
This was not merely symbolic. It was an extraordinary strategic move that could alter the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s geographic significance became more apparent following the direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025, which underscored Tehran’s efforts to move physically closer to Israel by establishing footholds at regional flashpoints. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was also a strategic response to Ethiopia’s existential need — as the world’s most populous landlocked state — for sovereign access to the sea. The Port of Berbera in Somaliland is the key to freeing Addis Ababa from its near-total dependence on Djibouti’s ports, which are under increasing Chinese influence.
The Israeli move targets the pressure points of other actors as well as Iran. These include Turkey, which is deeply entrenching its political and military influence in Somalia and adjacent maritime routes; and China, which maintains infrastructural and security dominance in Djibouti through economic leverage within the BRI framework. Israel is not planning on a heavy military deployment, but rather on using a combination of monitoring, control, intelligence, and digital capabilities — an approach that aligns with India’s emphasis on capacity-building and functional sovereignty enhancement.
Africa as a central axis in India’s maritime statecraft
Over the past decade, New Delhi has redefined Africa as a key arena in shaping the Global South and as a core component of its strategic interests. India views the continent as a neighborhood in which it can implement its concept of maritime statecraft — a security-economic infrastructure, centered around the Indian Ocean, that is aimed at establishing India as a preferred security and development partner. This approach is anchored in the SAGAR and MAHASAGAR doctrines, which provide a strategic framework for integrating security, growth, and connectivity. Africa is also a critical arena in which India hopes to realize its defense export target of $5 billion by 2025 — a goal unattainable without a deep, institutionalized, and long-term presence on the continent.
The continental anchor: The India-Ethiopia strategic partnership
The historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Addis Ababa on December 16-17, 2025, marked a new phase in the political anchoring of India in the Horn of Africa. The elevation of bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership was intended to inject “new energy and depth” into the countries’ cooperation, with a focus on security, technology, and the economy. Ethiopia — a country with a population of over 126 million that is undergoing a demographic and geo-economic transformation — is a key partner in the realizing of India’s vision of the “Global South.”
Israel’s move in Somaliland provides the protective envelope required to safeguard shared interests in the Indian Ocean “maritime neighborhood.” Israeli capabilities in ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), port security, and MDA (maritime domain awareness) are vital tools in the countering of threats from Iran and maritime terrorism in the Red Sea. The security synergy with Israel directly supports India’s goal of reaching $5 billion in defense exports by 2025, the success of which will be contingent on expansion in Africa.
The combined Indian-Israeli presence in the Horn of Africa offers a clear alternative to China’s BRI model. The Chinese model focuses on massive investment in physical infrastructure that often generates financial dependency and debt. The Indian-Israeli model advances a “resilience and redundancy” approach that is based on sovereign trade corridors and strategic autonomy. India contributes capacity-building and digital infrastructure while Israel adds an advanced technological-operational layer.
Somaliland as a laboratory of informal order
Somaliland stands out as a strategic anomaly: it is a stable and functioning entity despite the absence of formal international recognition. This characteristic makes it an ideal testing ground for the Indian-Israeli model.
A central component of the complementary security package offered by the Indian-Israeli axis is ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), which encompasses advanced technological tools like unmanned platforms, satellite systems, and sensor networks that enable continuous data collection and real-time operational intelligence.
While India focuses on physical infrastructure and human-capital training as part of its capacity-building efforts, Israel contributes digital “eyes.” These capabilities are particularly vital for states with extensive Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) but limited monitoring capacity, as they enable effective maritime control without requiring a heavy military presence.
A complementary pillar is port security, which involves a multi-layered physical and digital defense of port infrastructure, piers, and logistical facilities against sabotage, maritime crime, and terrorism. In this context, India invests in physical infrastructure at strategic points while Israeli capabilities ensure that the assets function as protected “sovereign trade corridors.” Port security is not merely a narrow security concern but a prerequisite for developing a sustainable blue economy and reshaping intra-African trade patterns.
The third component is MDA (maritime domain awareness), defined as the ability to generate an integrated situational picture of all maritime activity relevant to security, economic, and environmental interests. MDA relies on the synthesizing of raw data into broad intelligence that can be used for real-time decision-making. India’s aspiration to position itself as a “first responder” to disasters and threats in the Indian Ocean depends heavily on such capabilities. Advanced MDA systems will enable effective responses to piracy, illegal fishing, and non-state threats, strengthening India’s standing as a rule-setting maritime power rather than a reactive one.
The integration of ISR, port security, and MDA creates an operational synergy that deepens African states’ positive dependence on the capabilities offered by the Indian-Israeli axis. While India lays the diplomatic, economic, and physical foundations, Israel provides the critical technological edge that turns the partnership into a game changer vis-à-vis the Chinese model, which relies more on centralized control and less on empowering local capabilities.
Strategic synergy: Redefining the rules of the game
The Indian-Israeli partnership in the Horn of Africa is more than a classical security alliance. It represents an attempt to test whether sustained maritime influence can be built through legitimacy, partnership, and sovereignty enhancement rather than coercion. The division of labor is clear: India shapes the normative framework, legitimacy, and connectivity to the Global South, while Israel supplies the operational-technological layer required to counter physical and technological threats. This synergy strengthens both states: India is perceived as a provider of non-colonial security and development solutions, while Israel establishes a presence along a strategic line stretching from the Indian Ocean through Ethiopia to the Horn of Africa.
The promise inherent in Indian-Israeli synergy in the Horn of Africa is not immune to structural failure or geopolitical shifts. For the proposed model to be sustainable, it must address three risk vectors.
The first is the continent’s structural fragility. Somaliland is positioned as a “laboratory of stability,” yet it operates within an African environment marked by chronic instability. There is a tangible risk that population growth will turn from a “dividend” into a socio-economic burden due to inadequate infrastructure. In the short period from 2020 through 2023, nine military coups occurred in seven African countries, illustrating institutional erosion across the continent. Moreover, debt traps and food insecurity further exacerbate risk. Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio has doubled over the past decade (from 30% to approximately 60%), limiting states’ ability to invest in costly defense technologies. Concurrently, severe food insecurity affects around 20% of the continent’s population, potentially triggering internal unrest that could undermine strategic partnerships.
The second challenge is the Indian legitimacy paradox. India seeks to lead the Global South by promoting sovereignty and transparency. However, recognition of a secessionist entity like Somaliland incurs a dual political risk. It may clash with the African Union (AU), as African states are highly sensitive about preserving post-colonial borders. Supporting Somaliland could be perceived as undermining Somalia’s sovereignty, thereby damaging India’s status as a consensual continental hub. There is also the possibility of a Turkish-Somali backlash. Turkey’s model in Somalia is based on a military presence and deep influence. Recognition of Somaliland places New Delhi and Jerusalem on a collision course with Ankara, which may respond by escalating its military footprint at other maritime chokepoints.
The third challenge is technological competition: Israel’s edge versus the Turkish model. Israel offers superior ISR and MDA but faces competition from proven operational models. Turkish defense equipment (such as Bayraktar UAVs) has demonstrated its battlefield effectiveness in Africa (for example, in Ethiopia and Somalia). The Indian-Israeli model must prove that its security package offers operational and economic value superior to that provided by the cheaper and readily available alternatives supplied by Ankara and Beijing.
An alliance of sovereignty and resilience
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not an end in itself but a first step in a broader alliance aimed at reshaping the regional rules of the game. The real contest is not over declarations but over the building of durable networks of influence and alliances capable of controlling trade, information, and intelligence flows. For Israel and India, this constitutes a process of strategic rewiring in which they are positioning themselves as rule-setting powers through partnership, resilience, and functional sovereignty. This represents an alternative model for the regional — and potentially global — order, one that respects the sovereignty of Global South states and strengthens their resilience against external threats.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum and a lecturer and a teaching assistant in the Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program at Bar-Ilan University. She specializes in Indian foreign policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel
Rep. Hakeem Jeffries of New York, who is set to become the next speaker of the House, said in an interview published over the weekend that he plans to advance legislation targeting violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank when the new Congressional term begins in January, offering an early indication of how he intends to manage the growing divide over Israel within the Democratic Party.
“What I have made clear is that within the first 100 days, I think the most decisive step that we can take relative to the situation in the West Bank is to move the West Bank Settler Violence Protection and Prevention Act,” Jeffries said in an interview with The New York Times published Saturday. At least 225 incidents of settler violence were documented during 2025 and part of 2026 by Israeli watchdog Yesh Din.
The bill was introduced last year by Rep. Jerry Nadler, co-chair of the Congressional Jewish Caucus, who is retiring at the end of the year. It has 174 Democratic co-sponsors. France and the U.K. are among the countries that have already imposed sanctions on violent Israeli settlers. Former President Joe Biden announced similar measures in 2024, but President Donald Trump reversed them shortly after taking office in 2025.
At the same time, Jeffries stopped short of endorsing a pair of bills to block some U.S. weapons sales to Israel, a demand of progressive Democrats. “I haven’t articulated a position one way or the other with respect to any of these bills,” Jeffries said, “because we’re going to have a conversation about the steps that we need to take together as a caucus.”
The distinction is important for Jeffries, a longtime supporter of Israel, as he’s preparing to lead a Democratic majority that is increasingly divided over Israel. His approach suggests he wants to address concerns about Israeli government policies without endorsing measures to end some U.S. military support for Israel. Many Jewish Democrats have also criticized the policies of the current right-wing Israeli government, particularly on settlement expansion and violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
The party’s divide over Israel goes deeper
The Democratic Party’s sweeping midterm victories have given Jeffries considerable room to manage the debate over Israel without depending on the votes of its most progressive members. Jeffries was nominated Wednesday by an overwhelming majority of his Democratic colleagues to become speaker, pending a House floor vote when the new Congress convenes on Jan. 3. Only 11, including the six newly elected members affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America, voted against.
Rep. Ro Khanna of California, a Democrat who has pushed for restrictions on military assistance to Israel, acknowledged that political reality, saying that progressives “have not succeeded in getting any commitments yet on Gaza or Israel.”
The debate is unlikely to end with one vote. Jeffries will still face pressure from a growing movement inside Congress to end all U.S. military aid to Israel, including defensive and offensive weapons sales.
On Election Day earlier this month, President Donald Trump said that the U.S. would halt roughly $4 billion in annual aid to Israel by the end of 2026. He was unclear how he would implement that, given the current memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Israel runs through 2028.
Earlier this year, 103 of 212 Democrats supported a measure to eliminate the annual military assistance to Israel and another 10 abstained. Dozens also co-sponsored a pair of measures – the Block the Bombs Act and Ceasefire Compliance Act – that would restrict certain offensive arms sales to Israel and increase oversight of Israel’s policies in the West Bank and in Gaza. The DSA said in a post-election event that it is planning to use its growing influence to push for a full arms embargo against Israel and ultimately “break” the longstanding alliance between the U.S. and the Jewish state.
Jeffries’ long record of supporting Israel
Jeffries, 56, has consistently defended the U.S.-Israel relationship since his election to the House in 2012, even as other Democrats have become more critical of Israel’s government.
In recent weeks, progressive activists have resurfaced clips of Jeffries and Sen. Chuck Schumer expressing strong support for Israel in speeches each made to Jewish groups, arguing that the leadership is out of step with voters’ changing perspectives.
Among them: declaring, “Israel today, Israel tomorrow, Israel forever,” at a 2014 rally in support of Israel; in 2023, describing Jerusalem as New York City’s sixth borough; and, in 2025, saying that the U.S. “can’t take our foot off the gas pedal until Iran is brought to its knees.”
In the Times interview, Jeffries said the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza was “unacceptable, unsustainable and un-American.” He also said the early moves made by the incoming Congress will make a two-state solution more viable. In a new memoir published last week, Biden warned Israelis they may not be able to count on the same level of support from future American leaders if the status quo continues. “I hope Israel wakes up,” he writes. “The days of American leaders like me — passionate defenders of Israel to the core — are passing.”
Even if the House passes the settler sanctions bill, it could face a Republican filibuster in the Senate or a veto from Trump.
For now, Jeffries has the votes and the political standing to set the agenda on settler violence, but without making major concessions to the Democratic Party’s most outspoken Israel critics.
The post Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel appeared first on The Forward.
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Mark Ruffalo opposes Schumer for Senate leader, citing “religious beliefs and loyalties”
(JTA) — Actor Mark Ruffalo, an outspoken progressive and Israel critic, cited concerns over “entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties” in endorsing U.S. Sen. Chris Van Hollen for Senate majority leader over U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer, the current Democratic caucus leader and a Jewish lawmaker from New York.
In a Saturday post on X, Ruffalo framed his endorsement of Van Hollen – and concerns about religious beliefs and loyalty – as being more than just about Israel.
“Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times,” Ruffalo posted. “We need Justice, we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties.”
Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times. We need Justice , we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties. Does not follow entrenched fossil fuel and corporate interests, nor throws a blind eye to the hard realties we face today. Van Hollen has showed he is willing to face these difficult times with the law, with integrity and the strength and spirit to fight the social and moral corruption that has set in with age old presumptions and the comfort that comes with unchecked power over decades. We have absolutely nothing to lose by replacing Sen Schumer. We can only gain more justice and freedom. Put pressure on your senators. Now is the time. Keep the momentum of this election going. Thank you, Senator Schumer, but it’s time to move aside.
https://t.co/GkpK4YG7dF
— Mark Ruffalo (@MarkRuffalo) November 21, 2026
Schumer is the highest-ranking Jewish elected official in U.S. history and has led the Senate’s Democratic caucus since 2017, including as majority leader from 2021 until 2025. Since the midterm elections, Schumer, the pro-Israel stalwart, has faced a chorus of progressive voices who are seeking a change in the leadership of the Democratic caucus.
Three veteran senators – Vermont independent Sen. Bernie Sanders, Democratic Sens. Elissa Slotkin of Michigan and Jeff Merkley of Oregon –have endorsed Van Hollen of Maryland for majority leader. Van Hollen also has the support of two newly elected senators who will take office in January, Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan and Peggy Flanagan of Minnesota.
Van Hollen is an outspoken critic of Israel who has led efforts to investigate the country’s human rights practices and pressure its right-wing government. He has drawn blowback from some Jewish leaders in recent years over his criticism of Israel and of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group.
Schumer, who has longstanding ties to AIPAC and the pro-Israel community, has described himself as a “Shomer Yisrael” (“guardian of Israel”), noting that his surname derives from the Hebrew word shomer. Still, he has become increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent years, going so far as giving a speech from the Senate floor in 2024 calling for new elections and leadership in Israel.
Ruffalo, known for his work in “The Avengers” franchise, “Spotlight” and “The Kids Are All Right,” has been a divisive figure in the Jewish community. In an August Instagram Story, he linked Skydance CEO David Ellison, the chief driver of the then-proposed Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, to tech giant Oracle, which Ruffalo accused of powering “an apartheid system of oppression” in Gaza.
Oracle was co-founded by Ellison’s father, Larry Ellison, one of the world’s richest men; both Ellisons are Jewish and prominent Israel supporters. Oracle also owns a stake in the social media network TikTok’s U.S. operations, and has long been a target of progressives who point to the company’s links to, and public support for, Israel.
In a social media post that was reported in September to be no longer available, Ruffalo described Larry Ellison as a “classic oligarch” who is “crushing workers and consolidating the wealth of the world for their own power and concentrated dominance.”
Ruffalo drew criticism from Jewish organizations, including the Jewish Federation Los Angeles, which said the actor’s comments “combined Jewish wealth, media control, secret technology and sinister global power,” drawing on “recognizable antisemitic tropes with a long and dangerous history.”
In response to the criticism, Ruffalo denied being antisemitic or anti-Israel, and said “criticizing the actions of the Israeli prime minister, a military technology contract, or the executives who supply it is not the same as criticizing Jewish people.” He added that “my views come from my own political convictions and should never be interpreted as hostility toward Jewish people, for whom I have deep love and respect.”
Some 170 notable Jewish personalities signed an open letter supporting him.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Israel does not need fake ‘unity’ with Netanyahu – it needs to move forward
For Israelis exhausted by years of political upheaval, bitter polarization and war, the appeal of national unity might seem obvious. Surely a country facing so many challenges would benefit from leaders putting aside their differences and working together.
Naftali Bennett breathed new life into this enduring hope by meeting last week with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently without coordinating with his presumed opposition partners. But this revived discussion of a government that united the opposition and Netanyahu’s Likud party was short-lived. Bennett has since advocated a broad government under former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, with Netanyahu as a junior partner or more.
Except that Netanyahu has so dramatically upset many Israelis that the possibility of him having any role in the next government has sparked a very animated discussion.
It begs questions: What exactly is a national unity government? Why has Israel repeatedly resorted to one? And when did the understandable yearning for national solidarity become confused with the notion that elections need not produce winners and losers?
Israel’s unity governments
Unity governments are largely an Israeli invention. Germany, whose parliamentary system resembles Israel’s in important respects, has repeatedly been governed by grand coalitions between its principal center-right and center-left parties. This tends to happen when there are many splinter formations who are so radical that the centrists on either side would rather “reach across the aisle.”
Israel’s experience with unity has taken on an additional significance. Its history of war and national emergency has imbued political unity with an almost sacred quality, drawing on the deeply rooted Jewish ideal of achdut or solidarity. But an agreement between rival politicians to share power is not the same thing as national solidarity.
Israel’s first national unity government was formed on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, when Menachem Begin’s opposition movement joined a Labor-led administration that already enjoyed a parliamentary majority. It was an emergency arrangement rather than a political necessity.
The defining precedent came in 1984, seven years after Begin’s historic election victory ended nearly three decades of Labor dominance. Israel had developed a competitive two-bloc system, with Labor on one side and Likud, supported by right-wing and religious parties, on the other.
Unlike Americans, Israelis do not directly elect their head of government. Also unlike Americans – where a vote in Wyoming is worth many votes in California – each vote counts the same. Israelis elect a 120-member Knesset, and the decisive question is which parties can assemble a parliamentary majority. The largest individual party is not necessarily the one that governs. In 2009, for example, Kadima won more seats than Likud, but Netanyahu formed the government because he could assemble a coalition.
In 1984, the rival blocs were effectively tied, 60–60. Neither could govern independently. Labor’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir therefore agreed to share power, rotating the premiership after two years.
The results were remarkable. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, retaining a security zone in the south, and implemented an economic stabilization program that brought runaway inflation under control. Peres honored the rotation agreement in 1986.
Yet unity had its limits. In 1987, Peres reached an understanding with Jordan’s King Hussein that might have opened an important diplomatic path toward resolving the Palestinian question. Shamir blocked it. The episode demonstrated how a government capable of making difficult decisions could also prevent them.
The 1988 election produced a different situation. Likud and its right-wing and religious allies had approximately 65 seats, enough to govern without Labor. Shamir nevertheless formed another unity government, this time without rotating the premiership. It collapsed in 1990.
Later unity governments under Ariel Sharon arose amid the trauma of the Second Intifada and, subsequently, to facilitate Israel’s disengagement from Gaza.
These experiences illustrate an important distinction. Some unity governments were born of parliamentary necessity, others of national emergency, and still others of a desire to implement policies that would otherwise be politically impossible. None demonstrated that bringing opposing parties into the same cabinet was generally pratical.
The most recent experiment came in 2020, when Netanyahu and Benny Gantz agreed to rotate the premiership after three inconclusive elections. Netanyahu would serve first, followed by Gantz. But the government collapsed over the failure to pass a budget, long before Gantz’s turn arrived. Gantz’s supporters accused Netanyahu of deliberately exploiting a loophole in the agreement; Netanyahu disputed responsibility.
The contrast with 1986, when Peres honored his commitment to Shamir, helps explain, in part, why Netanyahu has become so toxic.
Unity today?
That history raises questions about the present enthusiasm for unity. The first is whether there is a pressing karmic need for Netanyahu to be banished. The second is whether any new unity agreement could be sustained. The third, and perhaps the most fundamental, is what such a government could actually accomplish.
Israel faces profound disagreements over accountability for Oct. 7, judicial independence, military obligations for the ultra-Orthodox, the future of the West Bank and the place of Arab citizens in its democracy. These are not merely disputes over the pace of reform. They concern the direction in which the country should move.
A unity government that postponed these questions would not necessarily reconcile the country. It might simply institutionalize paralysis.
There is also a peculiar asymmetry in the Israeli discussion of unity.
When Netanyahu’s right-religious bloc won 64 Knesset seats in 2022, he formed a government without inviting his opponents to participate. Nobody seriously argued that the millions of Israelis who voted for opposition parties were thereby entitled to representation in the cabinet. Netanyahu had won a parliamentary majority and proceeded to govern.
That is how parliamentary democracy works.
Yet when the possibility arises that Netanyahu’s opponents might assemble a majority, the argument for unity frequently resurfaces. The implication is that the votes of Likud supporters must somehow be honored through Netanyahu’s continued participation in government, even if a different parliamentary majority is available.
The present situation is admittedly complicated. Netanyahu’s bloc lacks a majority, while Eisenkot and his prospective partners face difficult choices concerning cooperation with Arab parties and the ultra-Orthodox. A broad coalition may be one way to overcome those obstacles.
But political difficulty is not the same as democratic necessity. A parliamentary majority that includes Arab parties, or depends on their support, is no less legitimate than one that includes Likud. Nor does respecting the millions of Israelis who support Netanyahu require that he remain in government.
This is where the language of national unity becomes misleading. Reconciliation among citizens is an essential national objective. Sharing cabinet positions among politicians is a particular political arrangement, whose merits depend on the policies it can implement.
Israel’s history demonstrates that unity governments can accomplish extraordinary things when their participants share an urgent purpose. It also demonstrates how fundamental disagreements can turn them into mechanisms for mutual veto.
Bennett’s intervention has made the possibility of another such government a serious political question. But the discussion should not begin and end with the distribution of ministries, the order of a rotation or the reassuring symbolism of rival leaders sitting around the same cabinet table.
It should begin with what the government intends to do.
Democratic elections exist to allow citizens to choose between competing political programs. Sometimes the result makes cooperation between rivals unavoidable. Sometimes a national emergency makes it desirable. But unity cannot become a substitute for accepting that elections have consequences.
Israel needs national solidarity. Whether it needs another national unity government is an entirely different question. My answer is a categorical no. So extreme is Netanyahu’s chicanery that any deal with him would be a terrible mistake that would be a tragedy for Zionism itself. If Israel is to survive it needs Netanyahu out.
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