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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government
(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.
The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.
These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem.
For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.
I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides.
Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward?
Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.
And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.
Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?
Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.
The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel.
This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation.
How would that work?
For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land.
The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one.
Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace.
What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?
Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount.
Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)
And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount.
And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.
This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.
When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future.
I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned.
Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank.
I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”
That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road.
And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?
The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.
As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years.
Does Israel even have that capability?
The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.
Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank.
The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?
The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department.
But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank.
There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners.
Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?
The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].
North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.
Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.
We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.
What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?
Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do.
The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset.
We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?
It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter.
If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity.
If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.
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Eight years after Tree of Life shooting, a Jewish burial society’s ranks have nearly doubled
After preparing five victims of the Tree of Life synagogue massacre for burial, members of Pittsburgh’s New Community Chevra Kadisha stood in a circle and held hands.
They had gathered like this before, taking a moment after their work to process what they had done. This time, they were caring for people murdered in their own community.
Volunteers from outside Pittsburgh had come to help. David Zimmer, a longtime member, remembered one visitor bringing a custom from another chevra kadisha.
“He passed around a piece of chocolate,” Zimmer recalled, “so that there should be something sweet.”
Eight years later, NCCK has nearly doubled in size. Before the attack, it had about 38 members, according to records reviewed by Patricia Cluss, one of its founders. Within four months, 11 people had joined. Today, it has 70.
The growth has brought more volunteers into some of the least visible work in Jewish communal life. A chevra kadisha, traditionally translated as a “holy society,” washes and prepares the dead for burial, dresses them in plain white shrouds and helps ensure they are treated with dignity. The work is considered a chesed shel emet, or true kindness, because the dead cannot repay those who care for them.
For NCCK, the aftermath of the attack also revealed another dimension of that care: The people accustomed to supporting others through loss needed support themselves.
Caring for their own
Pittsburgh’s NCCK was founded in 2004 to encourage greater participation in the Jewish tradition of caring for the dead. An Orthodox chevra kadisha already existed, and NCCK’s founders hoped to involve more Jews in the practice, regardless of their level of religious observance.
Cluss was among them. She had encountered an article about Reform Jews reviving Jewish burial practices that had fallen away in some communities. Until then, she had never heard of a chevra kadisha.
“I gotta do that,” she remembered thinking.
Deane Root joined early, too, drawn by an idea: What if Pittsburgh had a chevra kadisha open to anyone in the Jewish community? Root remembered a small group gathering, often in a member’s living room, to figure out the logistics of working with funeral homes and training volunteers.
Then came Oct. 27, 2018.
Root and his wife, Rabbi Doris Dyen, were approaching the Tree of Life synagogue building that Saturday morning when they heard a series of loud noises. They pulled into the parking lot and saw shattered glass.
Two NCCK members had been inside the synagogue, and the dead and wounded included people its members knew. At the Jewish Community Center of Greater Pittsburgh after the shooting, where families and friends gathered and waited for news, Root recalled that “not everybody knew for sure” what had happened to their loved ones.
When the victims were released for burial, NCCK began the work for which it had trained. Members also kept shmira, remaining with the dead and reciting Psalms until burial.
Allen Baum, who coordinates the NCCK men’s members, remembered that by the end, nearly every man in the group had participated in shifts. After the final tahara, the ritual preparation of a body for Jewish burial, they stood in a large circle, joined by women from NCCK as well.
Later, members gathered in a home, bringing food, reading poems and speaking about the people they had lost.Root was carrying the trauma of what he experienced that morning. He described a “video playing in my head constantly.”
Being together helped. “Let the community carry some of that burden,” Root remembered, “rather than keeping it all inside our own emotions and our own minds.”
A growing circle
Following the attack, younger Jews contacted NCCK after reading about its work. Some described joining as something they felt they needed to do as Jews. Others spoke of it as a form of social action.
Elana Glick, who joined NCCK around 2014 after her grandfather died, remembered that the group sometimes struggled to find enough volunteers before the massacre. Afterward, she said, the work became more public, even as members sought to preserve the privacy of the rituals.
At its annual dinner, Glick has watched the group grow. There have been “more and more tables added year after year because of people who have found this and wanted to be a part of this work,” she said.
“Being part of the chevra is one of the ways I feel most attached to my Judaism,” Glick said.
Sarit Wishnevski, executive director of Kavod v’Nichum, a national organization supporting chevrot kadisha and Jewish burial practices, has watched the movement become increasingly multigenerational. At the organization’s November 2025 gathering in Ojai, California, participants ranged from their 20s to their 80s, with one in their 90s.
The Jewish phrase l’dor v’dor is usually understood as passing something “from generation to generation.” Wishnevski suggested it can also mean practicing a tradition with generations alongside one another.
NCCK has also become a resource for other communities. Wishnevski called it a “really strong model,” citing materials its members have shared and their help with questions ranging from starting a group to making the work more inclusive of gender diversity.
The possibility of mass-casualty events has prompted other questions, too. “How will we be prepared?” Wishnevski said. “How will we show up if God forbid this happens here?”
Kavod v’Nichum is developing an emergency preparedness pilot effort. Wishnevski said the goal is not for a chevra kadisha to respond “in a silo,” but to build relationships with first responders, government agencies and other Jewish organizations.
Earlier this month, three NCCK members traveled to Chicago to teach other volunteers about something none would ever want to need: developing tahara liturgy for young children.
But most of the chevra kadisha’s work remains unseen, and the calls come without warning. “The only predictable thing is the unpredictability,” Baum said.
One summer, the men’s group went 11 weeks without a tahara. More recently, Cluss said, the women’s group performed 11 in two weeks. Sometimes volunteers arrive at a funeral home for one person and are asked whether they can stay for another. In recent years, NCCK has performed roughly 90 taharot annually.
For Cluss, the work had long been meaningful. After Tree of Life, she struggled to explain how that meaning had changed. Her daughter noticed something she hadn’t.
“Mom, do you ever notice when you’re talking about the chevra you always put your hand on your heart?”
Cluss hadn’t noticed.
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When a black hat and a toothbrush take on deeper meanings
דניאל גלאַיס באַנד „דער פֿאָיע און אַנדערע פּיעסעס“ (ה. לײוויק־פֿאַרלאַג, תּל־אָבֿיבֿ, 2026), נעמט אַרײַן צוועלף דראַמאַטישע ווערק אין פֿאַרשײדענע זשאַנערס: מעלאָדראַמעס, מאָנאָדראַמעס, משפּחה־דראַמעס און פּאָליטישע סאַטירעס.
די ווערק זײַנען פֿאַרשיידענע, אָבער זײ װערן צונױפֿגעקניפּט דורך אַ בשותּפֿותדיקן מאָטיװ פֿון זכּרון און זײַן כּוח פֿון תּיקון.
גלאַי איז געבוירן געוואָרן אין 1945 אין בוענאָס־אײַרעס, בײַ אַ משפּחה פֿון ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן. אין שטוב, אויף משפּחה־שׂימחות און אױף דער גאַס האָט ער געהערט ייִדיש, העברעיִש און שפּאַניש, װי אױך די קלאַסישע מוזיק, כּלי־זמר און טאַנגאָ.
זײַן טאַטע, זישע גאָלדוואַסער, איז געווען אַ שנײַדער און אַן אַמאַטאָרישער ייִדישער אַקטיאָר. דורך אים האָט דער יונגער דניאל אײַנגעזאַפּט די קלאַנגען, עמאָציעס און אינטאָנאַציעס פֿונעם ייִדישן טעאַטער.
צו פֿינף יאָר האָט גלאַי אָנגעהויבן זיך לערנען מוזיק, לכתּחילה אין בוענאָס־אײַרעס און דערנאָך אין תּל־אָבֿיבֿ. שפּעטער האָט ער באַקומען אַ מאַגיסטער אין קאָמפּאָזיציע פֿונעם שיקאַגע־אוניווערסיטעט.
דער ביאָגראַפֿישער הינטערגרונט העלפֿט פֿאַרשטיין די טיטל־פּיעסע „דער פֿאָיע“. דעם הױפּטהעלד פֿישעלעס פֿאָטער איז — ווי גלאַיס אייגענער טאַטע איז געווען — אַ שנײַדער, װאָס איז פֿאַרליבט אינעם טעאַטער.
דער טעאַטער, און בפֿרט דער פֿאָיע, װערט פֿאַרװאַנדלט אין אַ זכּרון־קאַמער, װוּ עס װערט אױסגעשפּילט די דראַמאַטישע ליבע־געשיכטע פֿון פֿישעלע און זײַן געליבטער רײזעלע. זײ באַװײַזן זיך אױף דער בינע אין דרײַ געשטאַלטן — װי קינדער, יונגע לײַט און דערװאַקסענע.
דער פֿאָיע איז מער ווי אַ טייל פֿונעם טעאַטער־בנין. דאָס אין אַ פּונקט װוּ דער זכּרון טרעפֿט זיך מיט דער ווירקלעכקייט. דער דערוואַקסענער פֿישל עקשטיין שטייט דאָ ווי אַ רואה ואינו נראה, אַן אומזעעוודיקער אָבסערוואַטאָר װאָס פּרוּווט צו פֿאַרבינדן „צוויי פּונקטן אין דער צײַט“.
בײַ גלאַין איז די קינדהײט ניט קײן אַלטע מעשׂה־שהיה, נאָר זי פֿאַרמאָגט אַ שליסל צום הײַנט: „דער סוד פֿון וואָס איך בין הײַנט, מײַנע טרוימען, ליבע און פּײַן, שטעקט אין אָט די נאָענטע קינדעריאָרן“, זאָגט פֿישל אינעם פֿאָיע.
ווען דער קליינער פֿישעלע קען ניט ענטפֿערן אויף אַ פֿראַגע פֿונעם כּפֿל־טאַבעלע, שרײַט ער אויס: „דרײַצן טויזנט מיליאַרד!“ דער קלאַס לאַכט אים אױס, אָבער פֿאַר אים שטעקט אין דער דאָזיקער צאָל אַ סוד, אַן „עניגמע“.
שפּעטער ווערט ער אַ באַרימטער פֿיזיקער. עס גײט דאָ ניט סתּם וועגן אַ שלעכטן תּלמיד, וואָס איז געקומען צום שׂכל. די עניגמאַטישע ריזיקע צאָל איז אַ סימן פֿון אַ שטאַרקן כּוח־הדמיון. די שול קען ניט דערקענען זײַן טאַלאַנט, אָבער דװקא אָט דער כּוח דערמעגלעכט זײַן אױפֿטו אין װיסנשאַפֿט.
אַן ענלעכע דינאַמיק שטעקט הינטער רייזעלעס דערפֿאָלג װי אַ טעאַטער־שטערן. פֿישעלע טרעפֿט זי אױפֿן מאַרק װוּ זי זינגט שטײענדיק אויף אַ פֿרוכטן־קעסטל. זי זאָגט צו אים: „זאָלסט װיסן…קונסט שטייט העכער פֿון אַלץ!“
דאָס קעסטל איז איינער פֿון גלאַיס בינע־חפֿצים מיט אַ סימבאָלישן באַטײַט. אַ פּשוטער טאָגטעגלעכער אָביעקט איז אַ מין זכּרון־פּושקע װאָס פֿאַרבאַהאַלט דעם חלום פֿון די קינדעריאָרן. דאָס קעסטל באַװײַזט זיך װידער אינעם פֿאָיע, װען די דערװאַקסענע רײזל זעצט זיך אַנידער כּדי אָפּצוגעבן זיך אַ דין־וחשבון פֿון איר לעבן.
אַזאַ מין פֿונקציע האָבן די בינע־חפֿצים אויך אין אַנדערע פּיעסעס. אין „באַכס פּאַרטיטע אין רע מאַזשאָר“ איז דאָס דער שוואַרצער הוט, װאָס די מאַמע טראָגט װען זי קומט צו איר טאָכטערס פּיאַנע־קאָנצערט.
אײן בליק אױף דעם הוט ברענגט די טאָכטער פֿון די כּלים אַרױס און מאַכט קאַליע דעם קאָנצערט. דער הוט איז דאָ אַ סימן פֿון דער מוטערס קאָנטראָל איבער דער טאָכטערס פּערזענלעכקײט — אַ פּראָבלעם, װאָס זײ בײדע מוזן לײזן.
אַ פּשוטער חפֿץ איז אָפֿט מאָל חשובֿער אײדער אַ בכּבֿודיקער. „דאָס ציינבערשטל און די כּתובֿה“ איז אַ פּיעסע װעגן אַ משפּחה־ברוגז. דער מאַן װאַרפֿט מיט כּעס זײַן טעלעפֿאָן אין דער װאַנט אַרײַן און צעברעכט על־פּי־צופֿאַל די כּתובֿה. דאָס צעבראָכענע גלאָז איז אַן אָנזאָגער פֿונעם משפּחה־קריזיס.
דער מאַן ציט זיך אַריבער אין אַן אַנדער דירה, אָבער קען ניט געפֿינען זײַן ציינבערשטל. אין צװישן געפֿינט די פֿרױ אָט דעם צײנבערשטל און דאָס גיט איר אַ תּירוץ צו טעלעפֿאָנירן דעם מאַן. דער סוף איז גוט; שלום־בית װערט אױפֿגעשטעלט.
גלאַי האָט געשריבן מוזיק צו די לידער פֿון פֿאַרשײדענע ייִדישע און העברעיִשע דיכטער. אין זײַן טעאַטער איז מוזיק ניט קיין באַפּוצונג, נאָר אַן אייגנאַרטיקע בינע־שפּראַך. אױך טאַנץ איז פֿאַר גלאַי, ווי ער האָט געזאָגט אין אַן אינטערוויו, „די שפּראַך פֿונעם גוף“, װאָס איז וויזועל, דינאַמיש און פֿאַרשטענדלעך פֿאַר אַלעמען.
אַ סינטעז צװישן װאָרט, קלאַנג און באַװעגונג קומט פֿאָר אין „אַ פֿריילעכס פֿאַר איסאַ“. אין דער פּיעסע, װאָס איז געװידמעט דער באַרימטער זינגערין איסאַ קרעמער, װערן איבערגעפֿלאָכטן לידער, טענץ, ביאָגראַפֿישע פּרטים, אַרכיוואַלע דאָקומענטן און חלומות.
אַ װיכטיקער זשאַנער אין גלאַיס דראַמאַטורגיע איז די גראָטעסקע סאַטירע. „ווי מאַכט מען חרובֿ אַ פֿאָלק“ איז אַ בינע־עקספּערימענט: חיים װיל װײַזן זײַן חבֿר יאַנקל װי אַזױ צו „צערײַסן אױף שטיקער“ גוטע אָרנטלעכע מענטשן דורך דעמאַגאָגיע און געװאַלט.
חיימס װערטער „מען האָט אַ מאָל גרינטלעך מתקן געװען דאָס פֿאָלק. איצט קומט די ריכטיקע שעה מאַכן פֿון אים אַש און פּאָרעך“ קלינגען ספּעציעל אַקטועל אין דער הײַנטיקער געשפּאַנטער פּאָליטישער אַטמאָספֿער סײַ אין אַמעריקע סײַ אין ישׂראל.
אין אַן אינטערוויו האָט גלאַי געזאָגט, אַז אַ קינסטלער דאַרף ניט בלויז שילדערן די װירקלעכקײט, נאָר אויך אָנווײַזן אויף אַ בעסערער וועלט מיט מער יושר און ליבע. זײַנע פּיעסעס זאָגן אָבער ניט צו, אַז קונסט קען ברענגען אַ תּיקון־עולם. צװישן זײַנע פּערסאָנאַזשן זײַנען ניטאָ קײן אידעאַלע העלדן. זײַן טעאַטער איז אַ פֿאָיע, װוּ מען טרעפֿט זיך פּנים־אל־פּנים מיט זיך אַלײן, מיט אַלע זײַנע שװאַכקײטן און חסרונות.
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Israel’s future: What will actually change if Netanyahu loses?
Israel’s election on Tuesday could mark a dramatic turning point for a country battered by war, political turmoil and growing international isolation. If the opposition manages to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the consequences could extend far beyond a change of leadership. A new government could reverse the assault on democratic institutions, investigate the catastrophic failures of Oct. 7, end the extraordinary military exemptions enjoyed by the ultra-Orthodox, curb Jewish extremism in the West Bank and begin repairing Israel’s shattered relations with much of the world. For many Israelis, the stakes are nothing less than the country’s long-term survival.
The polls suggest that Netanyahu’s coalition will lose its parliamentary majority, but that may be the easy part. The opposition, led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, faces a potentially crippling contradiction: it seems like that it will be capable of commanding a majority in the 120-member Knesset only with the support of Arab parties, yet several of its leaders have promised not to rely on them. Unless they find a way around that commitment, Israel could emerge from the election with a clear majority opposed to Netanyahu but no alternative government capable of taking power.
For much of Israel’s secular, educated and economically productive population, the desperation to remove Netanyahu is palpable. Tens of thousands living abroad have been streaming home to vote, amid estimates that more than a quarter-million Israelis left during his current term. After Oct. 7, years of warfare, immense loss of life, democratic erosion and international isolation, another Netanyahu victory would convince many that Israel has crossed a point of no return. The spectacle of far-right figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich representing the country has compounded their humiliation.
The fear is of a monumental brain drain, the damage could be irreversible.
Talk of Israel’s survival is therefore not necessarily hysterical. A country weakened by emigration, threatened with European sanctions and declining American support could lose the technological and military superiority on which its security depends, inviting aggression. An Israel increasingly dominated by ultra-Orthodox communities that largely reject military service and modern secular education would face further difficulties. It is an astonishing predicament for a technological powerhouse whose GDP per capita exceeds that of France, Britain and Germany.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, has responded to unfavorable polls with apocalyptic warnings. On Sunday, he shared an AI-generated image of a nuclear explosion engulfing Tel Aviv, suggesting his defeat could expose Israel to a second Holocaust at Iran’s hands. Days earlier, he raised the prospect of international banking sanctions and proposed using cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology to circumvent them. The Bank of Israel rejected the idea as unworkable, while economists warned of potentially disastrous consequences.
In another reflection of Netanyahu’s apparent desperation, CNN reported that he tried to persuade President Trump to launch a joint attack on Iran before the election. Netanyahu’s government denies the report. But what is extraordinary is how readily the allegation is believed in Israel. The notion that a prime minister might deliberately trigger a war for political advantage should be staggering – and disqualifying. That so many Israelis consider it plausible speaks volumes about the almost unbearable tension gripping the country ahead of Tuesday’s vote.
What, then, would actually change if the opposition managed to take power and govern?
Democracy: Reversing the march toward autocracy
The central domestic issue is Netanyahu’s attempt to transform Israel from a liberal democracy, in which citizens enjoy guaranteed rights and the government faces institutional checks, into something resembling an elected autocracy. His coalition has pursued an extensive program to weaken the judiciary, undermine independent legal authorities and concentrate power in the government. Supporters describe this as a necessary correction to excessive judicial power; critics see a transparent power grab – and a plot to end Netanyahu’s corruption trials.
Some measures have been enacted, including legislation weakening the attorney general’s position. Others have been blocked by the Supreme Court, notably the attempt to eliminate the judicial doctrine of reasonableness, which allows courts to review certain government decisions. Still others have been delayed or disrupted by the Gaza war. The broader ambition has included giving politicians decisive control over judicial appointments and enabling the Knesset to override Supreme Court rulings by a simple majority, potentially leaving few meaningful constraints on government power.
An opposition victory would mean dismantling this project. That would not preclude judicial reform: Israel’s notoriously slow courts, lengthy trials and cumbersome judicial appointments require attention. But the distinction would be between improving the judiciary and subordinating it to politicians.
Oct. 7: The investigation that never happened
The Hamas-led invasion on Oct. 7, 2023, was the greatest security catastrophe in Israel’s history. Thousands of attackers breached the Gaza border, massacring some 1,200 people and taking hundreds hostage. Communities were overrun while the military response was disastrously delayed. Yet Netanyahu’s government has resisted establishing an independent state commission of inquiry into the failures that made the disaster possible. It has even been quietly promoting conspiracy theories that a “leftist” security establishment helped Hamas. And, of course, it has dared to actually run again.
All this has become politically radioactive. Critics accuse Netanyahu of trying to evade responsibility and prolong wars as a distraction, while hoping public anger will eventually dissipate. The issue is not simply accountability but national survival: understanding how the country’s defenses collapsed is essential to preventing another catastrophe. The opposition is committed to establishing such an inquiry promptly, with a mandate that could implicate military and intelligence leaders as well as the political leadership, including Netanyahu himself.
Netanyahu’s trial: Closing the loophole
Israel’s legal system contains a remarkable anomaly. Politicians facing serious criminal proceedings can be barred from ministerial and certain other public offices, yet an indicted politician can serve as prime minister. The Supreme Court allowed Netanyahu to form a government while standing trial, subject to conflict-of-interest restrictions – which he agreed to in an affidavit – to prevent his legal predicament from influencing his exercise of power.
His subsequent campaign to reshape the judiciary has made a mockery of that commitment. Opposition politicians intend to close the loophole through legislation restricting the ability of politicians under criminal indictment to serve as prime minister, preventing another situation in which a leader facing prosecution exercises authority over the institutions administering justice.
The ultra-Orthodox: Ending a system of exemptions
Perhaps the most consequential long-term domestic challenge involves Israel’s rapidly growing ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, population. The Haredim constitute roughly one-sixth of Israel’s population, with families averaging more than six children. Many boys receive little or no secular education in mathematics, English or science. Male workforce participation is relatively low, and many families depend heavily on public assistance. Given the community’s rapid demographic growth, the implications for Israel’s economy and society are enormous.
But the most politically explosive issue is military service. For decades, ultra-Orthodox men studying in religious seminaries have enjoyed sweeping draft exemptions or deferments, even as other Jewish Israelis face compulsory military service. The arrangement creates a perverse incentive: remaining in religious study is the path to avoid conscription, while leaving the seminary – and entering the labor market – exposes a young man to the draft. The result is a system that discourages employment and places an increasingly unequal military burden on the rest of society. Adding insult to injury, the Israeli taxpayer is forced to pay subsidies to the yeshiva students – rather than the students paying tuition as those in university do.
After Oct. 7 and the prolonged wars that followed, public tolerance for this arrangement has diminished sharply. Polls have repeatedly shown overwhelming support for ending the exemptions. Netanyahu seeks to formalize the arrangement for his Haredi coalition partners, while the principal opposition parties are committed to ending it. Broader changes to education, employment incentives and public subsidies are also needed, but ending the draft exemption system would be the immediate test.
The Palestinians: A change in methods, not an immediate peace process
Historically, Israel’s center-left has been more receptive to partitioning the land and establishing a demilitarized Palestinian state in much of the West Bank and Gaza than the right. Israeli governments made far-reaching proposals in 2000–2001 and again in 2008, without achieving a final agreement. Oct. 7, however, has profoundly changed the political atmosphere. Even many Israelis who once supported territorial compromise are unwilling to contemplate further withdrawals while Hamas remains an armed force capable of threatening Israel.
An opposition government would therefore be unlikely to launch an ambitious peace initiative in the near term. But significant changes could still follow.
An alternative government could be expected to crack down on violent Jewish extremists in the West Bank, curb the settlement expansion encouraged by Netanyahu’s far-right partners, and restore some credibility to the prospect of an eventual political settlement. It would also continue efforts to prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself as an armed force in Gaza or the West Bank.
The difference would be less about immediate territorial concessions than about abandoning the ideological extremism and permissiveness toward settler violence that have characterized the present government.
Iran and Hezbollah: Tough security policies, different diplomacy
A change of government would not necessarily mean a softer Israeli approach to Iran or Hezbollah. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons commands broad support across Israel’s political spectrum, as does the determination to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military threat along Israel’s northern border. Netanyahu’s military campaign against Hezbollah enjoyed substantial domestic support, including among his opponents (and, in fact, is aligned with the ultimate goals of the government of Lebanon). An opposition government would be expected to maintain pressure on the organization and insist on effective security arrangements in Lebanon.
The change would be in diplomatic style and strategic coordination. Rather than treating international criticism as a badge of honor, an opposition government would be more inclined to coordinate with partners, combining military resolve with greater diplomatic engagement.
The world: Repairing Israel’s shattered relationships
Netanyahu’s government has left Israel increasingly isolated internationally, particularly because of the Gaza war, settlement policies and the conduct of its far-right ministers. Relations with European governments have deteriorated amid growing pressure for sanctions. Netanyahu’s close identification with the American Republican right has damaged Israel’s traditional bipartisan standing in Washington. Many liberal American Jews have become deeply alienated by the government’s religious nationalism and the rhetoric of ministers such as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.
An opposition government would attempt a major diplomatic reset. That would not eliminate disagreements over the Palestinians or Israel’s military operations, but it would offer a government more interested in rebuilding alliances than antagonizing its critics, and more capable of making Israel’s case to democratic partners whose support remains strategically indispensable.
For Israel’s business and technology sectors, whose prosperity depends on access to international markets, investment and financial institutions, the restoration of normal relations with the world is an absolute economic necessity.
Coalition negotiations: Winning may be the easy part
None of these changes is guaranteed, even if Netanyahu loses his parliamentary majority. An Oct. 23 Maariv poll projected 48 seats for Netanyahu’s coalition, 58 for non-Arab parties outside it, and 14 for the Arab parties – and most other credible polls painted a similar picture. That would give Netanyahu’s opponents a commanding 72-seat majority in the 120-member Knesset, where a majority of 61 is needed to confirm a government — but only if the Arab parties are counted.
If the polls are right – and historically this has roughly been the case – the simplest route to an alternative government would be a coalition of Jewish opposition parties governing with outside parliamentary support from Arab parties.
Such an arrangement would not necessarily require Arab parties to hold ministries or participate in national security decisions. But Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman have rejected dependence on Arab parties, while other opposition figures have shown greater flexibility.
Other scenarios include persuading ultra-Orthodox parties to abandon Netanyahu, attracting defectors from Likud, or constructing a broader coalition of right-wing and centrist parties. Liberman and other leaders could use the uncertainty to demand powerful ministries, major policy concessions or even a rotation agreement for the premiership. Because an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is unlikely to be on the immediate agenda, cooperation between the center and parts of the nationalist right may prove easier than in previous eras. But judicial reform, the Haredi draft and Netanyahu’s legal future could become major stumbling blocks.
There is, though, a precedent. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor-Meretz bloc won only 56 seats, but the support of five Arab legislators gave the anti-Likud camp a majority. Rabin ultimately formed a coalition with the ultra-Orthodox Shas party rather than bringing Arab parties into government. Something similar could happen again. Alternatively, coalition deadlock could lead to another election — or leave Netanyahu in charge of a temporary “caretaker government” despite an electoral majority opposed to him.
That is the drama facing Israel. For millions of Israelis who believe their country’s future is at stake, there might be an extraordinary possibility of national recovery after years of trauma and division. But to accomplish any of it, the opposition’s leaders may first have to abandon their refusal to rely on the votes of Israel’s Arab citizens — roughly one-fifth of the population.
The promise was understandable. The opposition needs to attract former Netanyahu voters; they overwhelmingly do not trust the Arabs, and some are simply racists. But rarely have democratic politics produced a promise that more clearly needs to be broken.
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