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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government
(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.
The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.
These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem.
For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.
I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides.
Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward?
Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.
And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.
Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?
Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.
The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel.
This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation.
How would that work?
For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land.
The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one.
Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace.
What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?
Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount.
Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)
And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount.
And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.
This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.
When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future.
I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned.
Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank.
I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”
That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road.
And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?
The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.
As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years.
Does Israel even have that capability?
The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.
Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank.
The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?
The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department.
But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank.
There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners.
Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?
The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].
North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.
Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.
We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.
What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?
Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do.
The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset.
We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?
It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter.
If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity.
If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.
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U.S. ambassador calls settlers who sieged Palestinian homes in Qusra ‘terrorists’
(JTA) — TEL AVIV – The West Bank settlement movement’s leadership joined with one of its most prominent defenders, U.S. Ambassador Mike Huckabee, in condemning an Israeli settler outpost set up in a Palestinian family’s yard.
Huckabee’s remarks are a signal of the degree to which a group of radicals is rattling Israeli politics and the U.S.-Israel relationship.
Israelis affiliated with the West Bank’s Tel Talpiot outpost, which is illegal under Israeli law, set up temporary structures at the entrances to Palestinian homes on the outskirts of the village of Qusra on Sunday.
Earlier this week, cables connecting the homes to the electricity grid and to solar panels were cut, and water pipes were damaged, leaving the Palestinian families unable to leave or bring in food. Israeli activists in the area who monitor settler attacks on Palestinians confirmed the account to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Huckabee wrote on X on Thursday that Israeli forces had gone to Qusra at the U.S. Embassy’s request and described the people who set up the outpost as “Israeli terrorists.” He posted that “the IDF & Israel Police have gone at our request to remove the Israeli terrorists doing this.”
The language was a departure for the ambassador, who told Israel’s Channel 14 last September that the United States “respects Israel as a sovereign state and will not tell Israel what to do” regarding sovereignty in the West Bank. Huckabee has also consistently described the territory by its biblical names Judea and Samaria. He routinely takes to social media to dismantle what he says are lies depicting Israelis as unfairly treating Palestinians.
He has condemned settler violence before, but has rarely done so in language as blunt as what he used on Thursday. In July 2025, he visited the Christian village of Taybeh in the West Bank after an arson attack at its fifth-century church and called it an “act of terror and crime.”
The actions of Israeli settler extremists have been a major concern to Democrats in the U.S. Congress in recent months, adding fodder to their calls to condition aid to Israel on its behavior. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists the reports are overblown, and that Palestinian violence is much more serious. President Donald Trump, who has often supported Netanyahu, has called on the prime minister to crack down on the violence, seeing it as an impediment to his hopes for a broader Middle East peace. Huckabee’s intervention suggests that the Trump administration is increasingly concerned about ending the violence.
Yisrael Ganz, who chairs the Yesha Council and governs the Binyamin Regional Council, condemned the outpost.
“The events in Qusra are serious and do not reflect our values or our way of conducting ourselves,” Ganz said. “There is no place for individuals to take matters into their own hands and establish an outpost in someone’s backyard, even when dealing with an illegal home or an attempt to seize control of the land. There is no justification whatsoever for violence against uninvolved civilians or security forces.”
He added that some were “exploiting these events as part of a campaign against the Jewish communities,” but that this “must not obscure the simple truth: What happened in Qusra was wrong and is unacceptable to us.”
Huckabee amplified Ganz’s statement later on Thursday, writing on X, “’Settlers’ are not the problem in Judea/Samaria. ‘Unsettlers’ are,” he wrote, describing them as “very small minority who do great damage to Palestinian families & to Israel.”
The village is located in Area B, territory that is under the civil jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and security control of the Israeli military and where Israeli settlement is not permitted. The Israel Defense Forces called such takeovers illegal and reprehensible on Tuesday. Overnight Wednesday, Israeli security forces said they demolished the structures at Qusra and detained one Israeli.
Marmar Odeh, a village representative, told JTA that the Israeli military remained inside Qusra, and footage circulating on social media showed Israeli soldiers stationed inside the homes of evacuated residents.
“I won’t be going anywhere. I am staying in my house and on my land,” Odeh said. “I may not be scared, but the children are all the time.”
In a voice memo recorded on August 12 and obtained by JTA, Aisha Abu Rida, a Qusra resident, spoke from inside one of the besieged homes.
“We are surrounded by settlers, but we are steadfast,” she said. “Despite the water and electricity being cut off, we will remain steadfast … and stay in our homes.”
By Thursday, the structures were gone, but settlers remained on the hillsides above the homes, Odeh said, an account supported by footage he provided to JTA. Soldiers had left most of the homes they had entered, residents said Friday, but were informed the military operation could last until Sunday.
One of the affected homes belongs to Loui Ridi, a Toledo, Ohio, business owner who was born in Qusra and has followed the standoff through security cameras installed at the property. JTA attempted to reach Ridi through several channels and was unsuccessful.
Asked whether the State Department shared Huckabee’s characterization and whether the Embassy had requested the Israeli operation, a State Department spokesperson did not directly reply. “We are in regular dialogue with partners about improving stability and security in the West Bank,” the spokesperson said. “We condemn criminal violence by any party in the West Bank. A stable West Bank keeps Israel secure and is in line with this administration’s goal to achieve peace in the region.”
In a statement to JTA, the Israeli military said soldiers had been deployed in Qusra since Thursday morning “to protect the residents and maintain security in the area” and that they had been instructed that “the Qusra residents will remain in their homes.”
It added that troops would not operate inside the Palestinian family’s home near the site “where the tent that was evacuated and dismantled had been erected” and said Civil Administration liaison officers were in contact with Qusra’s local leadership and “working to avoid disruption to the daily lives of the residents in the area.”
Footage circulating earlier in the week appeared to show Israeli soldiers praying alongside the settlers at the outpost. The military said that the incident is under review and that soldiers found to have taken part in illegal activity would be disciplined.
The designation of Area B is the source of the ambiguity, according to Hanan Greenwood, head of the spokesperson and public diplomacy unit at the Binyamin Regional Council.
The council’s jurisdiction covers the settlements themselves, Greenwood said, not Area B land, meaning Qusra sits inside the council’s footprint but outside its authority. Its residents fall under Palestinian Authority civil jurisdiction and pay the council no arnona, the Israeli municipal tax.
“Geographically, Qusra is very much in our area,” Greenwood said. “But in real life, it’s not that we could go there, and it’s not that the residents of Qusra pay us.”
He described the result as a governance vacuum. “It’s ours, it isn’t ours,” he said. “It’s a whole mess, and the reason is that there’s no sovereignty.”
Israeli rights groups reject that framing, arguing that the military has the authority to remove outposts and does not use it.
The Israeli rights group B’Tselem said the events reflect a broader pattern.
“What is happening in Qusra is not an isolated incident,” said Yuli Novak, the organization’s executive director. “Settler militias, backed by the Israeli military, are expanding their attacks into Palestinian villages and towns, seizing land, attacking homes and forcing families out. Israel’s ethnic cleansing of the West Bank is accelerating and expanding in plain sight.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Some young Jews are pulling back from Jewish life over Israel discourse, study finds
(JTA) — Nearly four in 10 Jewish young adults say events affecting Jews in recent years have led them to pull back from Jewish spaces or become more selective about where they participate, with disagreements over how Israel and the Palestinians are discussed as a leading reason, according to a new survey.
The survey, which was conducted by Sense Worldwide and commissioned by the Jim Joseph Foundation, found that 39% of respondents have engaged less, engaged more selectively or disengaged entirely from Jewish spaces due to “events affecting Jewish people in the last few years.”
Among those nearly 40% of respondents, 42% of them said that it was because their “views don’t align with how Israel/Palestine is discussed, and I don’t feel there’s room for nuance,” and 40% said they engaged less because they did not want to “experience biased, one-sided messaging.” Forty-eight percent said it was because “conversations often feel hostile, toxic, or unproductive.”
And among all respondents, when asked what would make Jewish experiences more appealing to them, 30% said that they would be attracted to experiences that were more cultural and less religious, and 26% said “spaces where non-Zionist and anti-Zionist views can be expressed without being labelled antisemitic.”
At the same time, the study found that young Jews have hardly abandoned Jewish life. Three-quarters of Jewish young adults in the United States say they regularly do something Jewish, though most are finding their connections outside of synagogues and traditional Jewish institutions, according to the study.
A small group of participants, 4%, also offered an explanation of the lasting impact that Jewish experiences had had on them. The study found that the clearest negative theme among those respondents was disillusionment around Israel and Zionism and the way it was presented in Jewish education or community spaces.
“A negative legacy I have been reflecting on is what I now understand to be a biased education/perspective on Israel,” one respondent wrote.
The study surveyed 2,071 Jewish adults aged 22 to 40 from December 2025 through April 2026. Respondents were sampled from panels created by NORC and GenLabs, and the margin of error was +/- 3.4%.
The survey found that 75% of Jewish young adults say they regularly do something Jewish in their lives, with 45% saying their only form of participation was informally, often at home with family or friends.
Just 30% said they regularly participate formally in Jewish life, including through institutions or organizations.
That divide was also reflected in where respondents said they most often feel a sense of Jewish connection. Fifty-five percent cited family and 44% cited Jewish friends, compared with 19% who cited Jewish community organizations or groups.
Sixteen percent said they found connection through social or political causes connected to Jewish identity, and 13% said they felt most connected through experiences related to Israel.
“The research gives us a much fuller and accurate understanding of where, how, and why Jewish young adults seek out and experience Jewish life,” said Stacie Cherner, the director of research and learning at the Jim Joseph Foundation, in a statement. “Now, importantly, we can begin to translate these insights to action.”
Another study of Jewish engagement across generations by the Jewish Federations of North America in March found that 40% of Jewish American adults describe themselves as engaged with their local Jewish community, while 60% were unengaged.
When asked how often they take part in “anything that feels Jewish,” 20% of respondents said very often or often, while 24% said sometimes, 33% said rarely and 22% said never, the new survey found. Those without earlier Jewish experiences were much less likely to participate at all.
Among those who rarely or never participate in Jewish life, 52% said it was because they “don’t feel a strong connection to Jewish life,” while 38% said it “feels too religious” and 36% said it “doesn’t feel relevant to my life right now,” the survey found.
Among the 11% who have engaged more with Jewish spaces in recent years, the most common reason was wanting to feel a stronger sense of solidarity with the Jewish community, cited by 71%.
And of that 11%, 61% said they wanted to “be around people who understand what I’m feeling,” and 54% said Jewish spaces felt safer or more supportive than other spaces. Eight percent said they sought spaces where non-Zionist and anti-Zionist views can be expressed without being labelled antisemitic.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post Some young Jews are pulling back from Jewish life over Israel discourse, study finds appeared first on The Forward.
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There’s a new Judaism in town — or maybe it’s very, very old
In a townhouse in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, a gathering for Tu B’Av was underway. There was chanting and breathwork, singing and ceremony. Several Brooklyn-based Jewish communities, including Temple of the Stranger and Lab/Shul, had come together for the experience.
These vibes are usually associated with Eastern traditions, paganism or indigenous American practices; most Westerners who want that form of spirituality go looking for it at Buddhist meditation centers or ayahuasca retreats, forms of engagement more often associated with the 1960s or ’70s counterculture movement than with a synagogue.
But a group of rabbis, leaders and spiritual seekers believe drum circles, chanting, meditation and mysticism are, in fact, just as core to Judaism as any rabbinic text — a sort of lost magic that has impeded vibrant, direct spiritual experience.
“I get this sense that my family believed God is dead, God died 2000 years ago when the Temple burned. Everything could only be archaeology,” said Rav Jericho Vincent, who grew up Haredi and now leads Temple of the Stranger, a Brooklyn based Ivri community. “I don’t accept God’s death.”
Instead, Vincent wants to teach a Judaism that is more alive, and more connected to the divine — one that can offer wisdom to Jews and non-Jews alike. To that end, at the Tu B’Av event, Becca Goldstein, a 34-year-old cultural entrepreneur and spiritual practitioner who is helping to build the new movement, announced a new name for what they were doing to those gathered for the ceremony: Ivri.
For some of the attendees, this was a word they’d already been using to describe their spiritual identity, and the announcement was met with celebrations. For others, it was confusing. Ivri is one the oldest words in the Torah for the ancestors of the Jewish people; it’s the Hebrew word for Hebrew. Weren’t they already Ivri?
Defining the term is complicated, not least because the burgeoning movement is more of a loose web of teachers and spiritual seekers than a clearly defined organization with official values or tenets; every single person I spoke to for this story used the word “mycelial” to describe it. (A mycelium is the underground network of thread-like connections between mushrooms.)
“There’s been something happening, certainly in American Judaism for a while now,” said Vincent, who has a book on Ivri Judaism coming out next year. “This mycelial network of a different way of doing and being Jewish that’s embodied and mystical.”
Because of this diffuse nature, it can be hard to pinpoint exactly what Ivri is; there are commonalities — a desire to cultivate a more spiritual and mystical Judaism, an emphasis on the feminine aspect of the divine, a tendency toward participatory rituals, and a strong sense that they are reaching back to ancient or lost Jewish practices. But there’s no central structure meting out decisions or defined set of tenets, and each group operates independently.
There is Vincent, and their Brooklyn-based community, Temple of the Stranger, and Amichai Lau-Lavie and Shira Kline of fellow Brooklyn-based Lab/Shul; their organizations lean into queerness and often incorporate theater into their services. There is Rabbi Zvika Klein in Berkeley, the spiritual leader of the congregation Chochmat HaLev in Berkeley, and Adena Phillips, founder of a group called Kimu that serves “Jewish spiritual seekers” — both also lead Shabbat at the Burning Man festival as part of a camp called “Milk and Honey.” There is Rabbi Jill Hammer, who co-founded the Kohenet Institute, which ordained Jewish priestesses from 2005 until it closed in 2024 due to leadership changes and the pandemic; she now leads Beit Kohenet, an organization offering classes and retreats on Jewish witchcraft and the divine feminine. There is Shefa, an organization that cultivates psychedelic use and exploration for Jews.
But whatever the throughline is, it’s magnetic, powerful and popular.
Chochmat HaLev’s membership has tripled in the past three years, regularly maxing out their sanctuary’s 300 person capacity on Friday nights. Their yearlong intensive Jewish learning course, “Go Deeper,” planned for 30 participants, had to cap its first cohort at 90.
The Big Jewish Gathering, a sort of coming-out event for the Ivri movement in Brooklyn, organized by Goldstein, sold out with a waiting list of well over 100 people. The Burning Man Shabbat draws at least a thousand festivalgoers each year to pray in the dust. Vincent has nearly 20,000 followers on Instagram.
Yet Ivri offerings are also controversial. The rituals are so unrecognizable to what people expect Judaism to be that several people I spoke to wondered whether the Ivri movement was really Jewish at all — or whether they wanted to be.
“It’s a totally post-halachic model,” said Shaul Magid, professor of modern Jewish studies at the Harvard Divinity School. (He attended, spoke at and wrote about the Big Jewish Gathering.) “If you write something about this, people will be scratching their heads like, ‘This is crazy.’”
Roots and branches

At the Big Jewish Gathering in January, dozens of Jewish thought leaders and groups came together for a weekend event in Brooklyn. Though the event didn’t advertise the term Ivri, in practice, it was a kind of coming out party for the movement.
The event had some more familiar forms of engagement, such as panel discussions. But there was also drumming and breathwork. Hammer led “Heelooleem,” a vineyard ritual based on biblical descriptions of ancient Jewish celebrations; participants sang and danced as they stomped grapes in a wooden basin.
These rituals may sound New Age-y, but Ivri practitioners argue they are in fact callbacks to Jewish practice that was lost.
“We can read about the libations in the temple. They’re like, ‘OK, why don’t we just do them — if they’re so powerful and so important, then why don’t we just do them?’” said Magid by way of example.
It’s clear that Jewish practice has changed over time. Women’s rituals and folk rituals were rarely recorded, meaning they were lost over the years. Centuries of persecution forced Jews to gather more quietly. And, after the Temple’s destruction, rabbis had to form a new tradition that could survive without being anchored to a particular land; in creating a new, portable religion, they shaped Jews into the people of the book.
Those in the Ivri movement feel that something important was lost in that process, including the wisdom of women, an ecstatic joy in prayer and Judaism’s connection to the earth. And, to critics who believe they are departing too far from tradition, they say that Judaism has always changed; they’re simply participating in that custom.
“When I hear those kinds of questions, I imagine them being asked of the rabbis who were forming what became rabbinic Judaism. How can you not have animal slaughter? How can you not have priests?” said Vincent. “I imagine the rabbis must have gotten that pushback, because they remade Judaism more than anything.”
The Ivri movement doesn’t want to get rid of existing wisdom — “I’m always trying to balance like, give me that quote from Rabbi Akiva, and also give me the wisdom of the mothers and aunties,” said Vincent. But they do want to add to it.
That said, many of the teachers I spoke to voiced a deep suspicion of preserving what was done purely for the sake of preservation, a tendency toward nostalgia-driven practice that they believe has reified.
“Too many people say, ‘I come to prayer services not because the prayer services are meaningful in any way but because it reminds me of the prayer services of my youth — even though I was bored out of my mind as a kid, and remain bored out of my mind,’” Krieger said. “I’m saying no, spiritual practice should be meaningful! It’s not just preserving tradition for the sake of preserving tradition.”
Hammer voiced a similar stance. “Ultimately rituals survived to support people. They exist to help people live in meaningful ways. And what can happen if you hold the rituals too tightly is that they become a kind of museum, like we’re going to do this thing to remember what our ancestors did,” she said. “And we forget what that was meant to do. We forget that the ritual was meant to transform.”
Making the old new again
Some of the boldness these leaders feel in designing rituals that are so different from what most Jews might expect may spring from the fact that many of them grew up more religious than the average American Jew. Krieger grew up Orthodox, as did Adena Phillips, who leads the Burning Man Shabbat with him. Goldstein went to a Conservative day school and an Orthodox synagogue. Vincent grew up Haredi.
Each felt unsatisfied with the Judaism they were raised with — restrictions around gender norms and limitations, a culture of social conservatism. And they felt the Judaism they were given was too cerebral, focused on studying texts instead of practicing them.
As Goldstein put it, “My experience is that it’s very hard to have a direct experience of the divine from your mind.”
Yet they also didn’t feel as though established progressive movements, like Reform Judaism, had the depth they were seeking.
“Their way of being progressive is watering down Judaism and making it as thin and vanilla as possible,” said Krieger. “There’s this myth that if you want to make Judaism accessible to people, lower the bar of what you’re asking of them.”
But, he pointed out, plenty of Jews and non-Jews alike are seeking a demanding spiritual practice, turning to rigorous practices like meditation or yoga that require specific diets and strict observance but also offer a deep experience of the divine. The issue isn’t that kashrut or Shabbat are too difficult; the issue, Krieger said, is that these people aren’t finding the transcendent experiences they crave in Judaism. But they want to.
“The folks I think of as being involved in this movement are folks who really don’t want the weak tea Judaism, the bagels and lox Judaism, or summoning in Native American teachers because we don’t have our own wisdom,” said Vincent. Instead, those drawn to the Ivri movement want to find that kind of spirituality within Judaism, without having to be an outsider appropriating or visiting another practice.

This has emboldened Ivri thinkers to look to the past, mining from folk tales, Kabbalah and biblical descriptions of celebrations to find what they seek within Judaism. On Shavuot, Krieger led a grief ritual based on the Shalosh Regalim, part of ancient Temple pilgrimage rituals in which pilgrims circled those grieving and ostracized. It was deeply based on real practices, but innovated to fit the modern moment; participants chanted the words to an ancient mourning song, stopping to share their stories and embrace. For Rosh Hashanah last year, Vincent designed a ceremony around the story of the binding of Isaac in which participants put Abraham on trial to interface with the tale’s traumatic themes.
And Magid pointed out that however woo-woo these rituals — often full of theater, witchiness and connection to the spirit world — might seem, they could arguably be seen as part of a Hasidic ultra-Orthodox tradition. To most people, an image of the black-hatted Orthodox Jew symbolizes the most Jewish kind of Jew, the most religious form of practice. But, the professor pointed out, the Judaism practiced in Hasidic sects is full of spirits and magic.
“If you grow up in a modern Orthodox world or a Conservative world, it’s very different. It doesn’t have that very aesthetic, mythical flavor to it,” he said. “The ultra-Orthodox world is a very magical world — all of these mythic stories about demons floating around.”
But Vincent, for their part, rejects a framework of comparison; they don’t want to cede an automatic legitimacy to the Judaism of the Haredi world.
“There is this pandemic of a spiritual inferiority complex. Even rabbis will tell me: ‘I don’t know enough, I’m not a good Jew,’” said Vincent. “We’re letting it be defined by ultra-Orthodoxy. Those of us who have seen the wizard behind the curtain understand that actually ultra-Orthodoxy is a post-Holocaust version of Judaism. We understand the ways in which it is different than the Judaism of a hundred years ago.”
The birth of a name

The Ivri movement is far from the first to try to build a new, more spiritual, more embodied, more radically open practice of Judaism. Many of the hallmarks of what the Ivri teachers point to in their spiritual practice might be familiar from both the Renewal movement, the Kohenet movement and even the neo-Hasidut of Martin Buber or Abraham Joshua Heschel.
Indeed, many of the Jewish communities and teachers in the greater Ivri movement identify, or previously identified at least loosely, with Renewal Judaism; Krieger and Vincent were both ordained through ALEPH and Vincent has studied with Hammer, of Beit Kohenet. So why the need for a new name?
To Hammer, the difference between Ivri and what came before is a cultural one. Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, the founder of the Renewal movement, died over a decade ago and his work grew out of 1960s counterculture. The Kohenet movement, too, was born decades ago now. Ivri feels like the product of a new generation.
“I also identify as a Kohenet, and I also identify as part of the Jewish Renewal movement. It’s not that Ivri would define me as a person or practitioner, but I’m finding it helpful,” she said. “Maybe if you think of a movement more as pieces of music that go together, but one comes after the other.”
Goldstein, who organized the Big Jewish Gathering, said meeting the cultural moment is a big focus of the movement — and one that draws funders.
“My bubbie’s voice comes to mind, she always says: ‘Why does your generation think so much and ask so many questions? Why can’t you just be and live and let live?’” she said. “We’re forced to right now because of identity. The Jewish identity signifiers that held up in our parents generation and grandparents generation aren’t working right now.”
Hammer echoed the sentiment, saying that many American Jews are too focused on “replicating the spiritual practice exactly,” becoming so rigid about both identity and prayer that they have forgotten that religion is supposed to be a living vehicle to create meaning and transformation.
Goldstein wants to find a Judaism that can speak not only to Jews, but show the rest of the world that Judaism has more to offer than the highly politicized identity that dominates today, an identity which is breaking down as Jews debate what their relationship to Israel, to the Holocaust and to persecution really should be. She believes the growing Ivri movement — which she is working to find funding and create new events and avenues to develop — can offer Jews a new way to relate to their Judaism that they feel joyous and proud to participate in.
Showcasing Jewish practices that have a spiritual appeal, and speak to today’s concerns — like climate change, a non-dual understanding of gender and a need for meaning — could make Judaism more accessible and appealing to Jews and non-Jews alike. (Most Ivri spaces welcome non-Jews to participate.) And it could give Jews a new way to relate to their Jewish identity, one that isn’t rooted in a Judaism these teachers see as rooted in a closely-held trauma that is doing damage.
Of course, the emerging school of Ivri Judaism won’t speak to everyone; however well-grounded in ancient traditions and practices it may be to stomp on grapes or chant in a circle, it just feels too woo-woo for some.
“Ideally we want people to follow a practice because it is transformative, and we can only find out what’s transformative if we experiment,” Hammer said. Even the changes that don’t end up sticking or stay on the fringes, she believes, get shape Judaism over time.
Of course, every Ivri leader acknowledged, not everyone wants to experiment. But that’s fine — there are already plenty of people who do. Their biggest problem is finding a space to fit them all in one room.
The post There’s a new Judaism in town — or maybe it’s very, very old appeared first on The Forward.

