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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government

(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.

The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.

These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem. 

For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.

I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides. 

Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward? 

Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.

And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.

Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?

Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.

The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel. 

This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation. 

How would that work?

For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land. 

The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one. 

Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace. 

What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?

Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount. 

Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)

And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount. 

And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.  

This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.

When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future. 

I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned. 

Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank. 

I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”

That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road. 

And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?

The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.

As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years. 

Does Israel even have that capability?

The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.

Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank. 

The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?

The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department. 

But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank. 

There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners. 

Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?

The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].

North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.

Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.   

We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.

What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?

Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do. 

The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset. 

We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?

It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter. 

If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity. 

If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.

—
The post An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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An Israeli play about Vilna’s ‘Paper Brigade’

אין איינער פֿון די שענסטע סצענעס פֿון אַ נײַער פּיעסע בײַם ייִדישפּיל־טעאַטער אין ישׂראל, זעט מען די חופּה פֿונען פּאָעט אַבֿרהם סוצקעווער און זײַן כּלה פֿריידקע. צוזאַמען מיט זיי שטייען אויף דער בינע די חבֿרים פון „יונג-ווילנע“. פּלוצלינג ווערט אַלץ חושך און רעש, און די צערעמאָניע פֿאַרוואַנדלט זיך אין אַ „שוואַרצער חופּה“: די דײַטשן זײַנען אַרײַן אין ווילנע.

ביזן 19טן יאַנואַר 2027 ווײַזט דער ישׂראלדיקער ייִדישער טעאַטער „ייִדישפּיל“ די אומגלייבלעכע געשיכטע פֿון דער גרופּע אינטעלעקטועלן און שרײַבערס אין ווילנער געטאָ, וואָס די דײַטשן האָבן געצוווּנגען צו סאָרטירן ביכער און כּתבֿ-ידן פֿון די ווילנער ביבליאָטעקן, אַרכיוון און מוזיי, און שיקן זיי קיין דײַטשלאַנד. די מיטגלידער פֿון דער בריגאַדע האָבן אָבער באַהאַלטן אַ סך פֿון די מאַטעריאַלן, אַרויסגעשמוגלט זיי פֿון געטאָ, און אַזוי געראַטעוועט אָן אַ שיעור קולטור-אוצרות.

אין דער פּיעסע, „בריגדת הנייר“ („די פּאַפּירענע בריגאַדע“), שפּילן יונגע אַקטיאָרן די ראָלע פֿון עטלעכע בריגאַדיסטן און זינגען זייערע לידער אויף ייִדיש מיט אַלטע און נײַע מעלאָדיעס. דער דיאַלאָג איז אויף העברעיִש, אָבער פֿון מאָל צו מאָל הערט מען אויך ייִדישע ווערטער. דאָס איז, דאַכט זיך מיר, צום ערשטן מאָל, וואָס די געשיכטע פֿון דער „פּאַפּירענע בריגאַדע“ טרעט אַרויף אויף דער בינע.

אין דער פּיעסע באַקומט סוצקעווער די הויפּטראָלע. ער איז דער וואָס פֿאַרקערפּערט דעם גײַסט פֿון ווילנע, די „קרוינשטאָט“ פֿון ייִדישלאַנד. פֿון אָנהייב אָן שילדערט מען אים ווי דער אויסדערוויילטער פּאָעט פֿון געטאָ, ממש ווי אַ נבֿיא וואָס באַקומט אַ הימלישן באַפֿעל צו שרײַבן. אַ מין מלאך – אַן אַקטריסע אין ווײַסן, שטייט איבער אים ווען ער באַהאַלט זיך אין אַ מאַלינע און זי זאָגט אים בפֿירוש: שרײַב, ווײַל „החיים והמוות ביד הייִדיש-לשון“ (דאָס לעבן און דער טויט זײַנען אין די הענט פֿון לשון-ייִדיש).

דערנאָך זעט מען סוצקעווערן אין פֿאַרשיידענע סצענעס ווי אַ קאָמענדאַנט: ער דערוועגט זיך, למשל, צו שטיין אַנטקעגן דעם נאַצי וואָס באַפֿעלט די בריגאַדע צו פֿאַרניכטן די ביכער און כּתבֿ-ידן. די אַנדערע קולטור־טוער פֿון דער ווילנער געטאָ — ווי דער דיכטער שמערקע קאַטשערגינסקי און דער פֿאַרוואַלטער פֿונעם געטאָ-ביבליאָטעק און מחבר פֿונעם „טאָגבוך פֿון ווילנער געטאָ“, הערמאַן קרוק, –  דינען דאָ בלויז ווי פֿיגוראַנטן.

סוצקעווער איז טאַקע געוואָרן אַ סימבאָל פֿון ווילנע, די „שטאָט פֿון גײַסט און תּמימות“. נאָך דער באַפֿרײַונג איז ער צוריק קיין „ירושלים ד׳ליטא“, וואָס דעמאָלט איז זי שוין געווען אַ טייל פֿונעם ראַטן-פֿאַרבאַנד, און געזוכט די באַהאַלטענע קולטור-אוצרות. אַ סך פֿון זיי האָט ער אַרויסגעשמוגלט, דער עיקר, קיין אַמעריקע און ישׂראל.

נאָכן אַליין באַזעצן זיך אין ישׂראל האָט ער כּל-ימיו איז זינען געהאַט ווײַטער צו פֿירן די ליטעראַרישע טראַדיציע פֿון ווילנע („ווילנע דישראל“). אין תּל-אָבֿיבֿ האָט ער פֿאַרלייגט דעם זשורנאַל „די גאָלדענע קייט“ און ווען ער האָט געשאַפֿן די ווערטער צום באַרימטן ליד זײַנעם: „ווער וועט בלײַבן, וואָס וועט בלײַבן? / בלײַבן וועט אַ טראַף“ – איז דאָס אַ פּנים געווען אַ רמז אויף דעם וואָס אַ טראַף, אַפֿילו נישט קיין פֿול וואָרט, איז געווען כּדאי צו ראַטעווען פֿון יענער וועלט.

די ביידע – די „פּאַפּירענע בריגאַדע“ און סוצקעווער אַליין – זײַנען ראוי צו שטיין ווי העלדן פֿון אַ פּיעסע, און ס׳איז כּדאי צו דערציילן זייער געשיכטע, בפֿרט דאָ אין ישׂראל. אין די ערשטע יאָרן פֿון דער ייִדישער מדינה האָט מען גערעדט וועגן „השואה והגבורה“ (דעם חורבן און דער גבֿורה), אָבער אין פֿלוג האָט מען דער עיקר דערמאָנט נאָר די גבֿורה, און נישט אַזוי דער חורבן. פֿון וואַרשע, למשל, מיט איר העראָיִשן אויפֿשטאַנד, האָט מען אַ סך מער געהאַלטן ווי פֿון ווילנע, וואָס האָט נישט דורכגעפֿירט קיין אויפֿשטאַנד (אַ סך פֿון די קעמפֿערס פֿון דער „פֿאַראייניקטער פּאַרטיזאַנער אָרגאַניזאַציע“ זײַנען אַריבער אין די וועלדער). די סאַברעס, די דרײַסטע קעמפֿערס פֿון צה״ל, האָבן בעסער פֿאַרשטאַנען די קעמפֿערס פֿון געטאָ ווי די אינטעלעקטואַלן, וואָס ס׳רובֿ פֿון זיי זײַנען נעבעך אומגעקומען.

אין די לעצטע צענדליקער יאָר האָט מען אויך אין ישׂראל אַנטפּלעקט די אַנדערע גבֿורה, די גײַסטיקע גבֿורה פֿונעם חורבן. אַ ראיה זײַנען די ביכער וואָס מע האָט אָנגעשריבן וועגן דער „פּאַפּירענער בריגאַדע“ ווי למשל די העברעיִשע איבערזעצונג פֿון דוד פֿישמאָנס וויכטיק בוך „די ביכער־שמוגלערס“ (אויף העברעיִש: „מחתרת הנייר“), וואָס איז אַרויס אין עבֿרית אין יאָר 2020; און „דאָס טאָגבוך פֿון ווילנער געטאָ“ פֿון הערמאַן קרוק, וואָס איז לעצטנס אַרויס אין אַ העברעיִשער איבערזעצונג. שוין אָפּגערעדט פֿון אַ ריי נײַע איבערזעצונגען פֿון סוצעקווערס ווערק.

אייגנטלעך איז עס נישט קיין וווּנדער אַז די איניציאַטאָרין פֿון דער נײַער פּיעסע, און דערצו די רעזשיסאָרין און די וואָס האָט געשריבן דעם סצענאַר – צוזאַמען מיט עודד ערליך – איז הדס קלדרון (קאַלדעראָן) — סוצקעווערס אייניקל. אַ סך פֿון אירע אויפֿטוען זײַנען טאַקע געווידמעט איר זיידן.

נאָך דעם ווי מע האָט אָנגעהויבן שפּילן די פּיעסע האָב איך מיט איר געכאַפּט אַ שמועס וועגן דער פּיעסע:

בני מער: פֿאַרוואָס דווקא די „פּאַפּירענע בריגאַדע“? וואָס האָט אײַך דערפֿירט צו דעם?

הדס קלדרון: „מײַן זיידע האָט קיינמאָל נישט גערעדט מיט מיר וועגן דער ׳פַּאפּירענע בריגאַדע׳, האָט הדס קלדרון מיר געזאָגט. „דערפֿאַר בין איך דערשטוינט געוואָרן מיט 15 יאָר צוריק, ווען מען האָט מיר דערציילט וועגן צען נײַע לידער פֿון סוצקעווער וואָס מע האָט אַנטדעקט אין אַ קלויסטער אין ווילנע. שוין דעמאָלט האָב איך געוווּסט אַז מע דאַרף עפּעס טאָן מיט דעם, ווײַל די געשיכטע פֿון דער ׳פּאַפּירענער בריגאַדע׳ קאָן אונדז אינספּירירן אָן אַ שיעור: אַ מעשׂה וועגן אינטעלעקטואַלן וואָס ווערן פּלוצלינג העלדן.

„דאָס איז געווען דער אָנהייב פֿון אַ לאַנגן וועג, וואָס האָט געפֿירט צו דער איצטיקער פּיעסע. מיט זיבן יאָר צוריק האָב איך אָנגעהויבן דאָס שרײַבן, און ווי אַנדערע פּראָיעקטן וואָס האָבן צו טאָן מיט סוצקעווער, האָט עס געדויערט אַ לאַנגע צײַט און געהאַט אַ סך גילגולים“.

בני מער: ווי אַזוי איז געוואָרן די פּיעסע אַ מין מיוזיקל?

הדס קלדרון: „פֿון יאָרן לאַנג אַרבעט איך צוזאַמען מיטן מוזיקער אוהד חיטמן (כיטמאַן), וואָס איז נאָך זוכה געווען צו זינגען פֿאַר סוצקעווערן אַ ליד וואָס ער האָט געשאַפֿן. אינספּירירט פֿון יענעם באַגעגעניש גיט חיטמן הײַנט זײַנע תּלמידים אַן אויפֿגאַבע: קאָמפּאָנירן מוזיק צו ייִדישער פּאָעזיע“.

בני מער: ניצנדיק דעם ייִדישן טעקסט פֿון די לידער אָדער אין דער העברעיִשער איבערזעצונג? 

הדס קלדרון: „אויף ייִדיש! די תּלמידים האָבן אָנגעהויבן אויך זיך לערנען ייִדיש. דעמאָלט האָב איך פֿאַרשטאַנען אַז איך קאָן – ד״ה, איך מוז – באַנוצן די נײַע מעלאָדיעס און אַרײַנברענגען זיי אין דער פּיעסע. אַזוי האָבן יונגע מוזיקערס געשריבן מוזיק צו טעקסטן וואָס יונגע שרײַבערס האָבן פֿאַרפֿאַסט מיט מער ווי אַכציק יאָר צוריק, און געגעבן זיי אַ נײַ לעבן. דאָס הייסט טאַקע באַשערט.“

אין שייכות מיטן ענין „באַשערט“ דאַרף מען דאָ דערמאָנען די יונגע אַקטריסע, וואָס זינגט אין דער פּיעסע סוצקעווערס ליד „אונטער דײַנע ווייסע שטערן“ — איינער פֿון די רירנדיקסטע מאָמענטן אין דער פֿאָרשטעלונג. רותּם שרעבי (שאַראַבי), וואָס שטאַמט פֿון תּימנער ייִדן, זינגט דאָס ליד מיט חן און כּוונה. איר פֿעטער, אלי שרעבי, האָט פֿאַרלוירן זײַן ווײַב און צוויי טעכטער אין קיבוץ בארי דעם 7טן אָקטאָבער 2023. נאָך דעם האָבן די טעראָריסטן פֿאַרשלעפּט אלי שרעבין קיין עזה, וווּ ער איז געבליבן אין געפֿענקעניש, אין שרעקלעכע באַדינגונגען, במשך פֿון 491 טעג.

ווען רותּם שרעבי זינגט די ווערטער „נאָר אין קעלערן און לעכער / וויינט די מערדערישע רו, / לויף איך העכער, איבער דעכער, / און איך זוך: וווּ ביסטו וווּ?“ – האָב איך זיך געטראַכט אַז אָט די תּפֿילה פֿון סוצקעווערן איז סוף-כּל-סוף אַרײַן אינעם ייִדישן, און אַפֿילו אינעם ישׂראלדיקן, קאָלעקטיוון סידור.

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America’s Jewish population is shrinking as Israel’s is growing, new Pew research shows

A new Pew Research Center report released Wednesday projects America’s Jewish population will shrink by about 1.2 million between 2020 and 2070. That means the U.S. share of the world’s Jews would fall from 39% to 26%.

American Jews have long planned for the future around children who haven’t been born yet. A congregation raises money for a new wing because it expects the families to keep coming, for example. The Jewish population rose from 6.1 million in 2000 to 6.5 million in 2010, according to The American Jewish Year Book. And between 2013 and 2020, Pew estimated an increase from 6.7 million American Jews to 7.5 million.

This projected demographic downshift could force a reckoning with the slow growth Jews in the U.S. may have taken for granted.

Israel faces the opposite challenge: making room. Its Jewish population is projected to grow from 6.8 million to 11.1 million, bringing its share of global Jewry to 62%. By 2070, more than six in 10 Jews would live in Israel. Decisions made in Jerusalem, like who has to serve in the army, would affect the majority of the world’s Jews.

American Jews have built their lives as a small minority in a diverse country, and Israeli Jews as a majority in a country of their own. The balance between those communities will continue changing.

The next generation: The main force behind the shift is what demographers call “natural increase”: births outnumbering deaths. Israeli Jews are younger and have larger families, with estimated fertility of three children per household, compared with 1.5 among American Jews. Israel’s growth would more than offset declines elsewhere, bringing the worldwide Jewish population from roughly 15 million to 18 million. In the U.S., the implications will arrive long before 2070, like when a congregation downsizes or closes. For the first time in American history, more synagogues are closing each year than opening.

The meaning of home: After Oct. 7 and the rise in antisemitism that followed, these trends carry an emotional weight beyond their numbers. Pew’s migration assumptions cannot tell us if fear will drive more people to Israel, as it draws largely on patterns from 2010-2020.

Growing pains: Israel’s highest Jewish birthrates are among Haredim, or ultra-Orthodox Jews. Our Tel Aviv-based columnist Dan Perry has warned about the consequences of an education system that leaves many boys without preparation in math, English and other subjects needed for modern employment. Most ultra-Orthodox men are exempt from army service, an issue in the recent Israeli election, and only about half hold jobs. The larger their community gets, the harder that is for Israel to ignore.

Islam is projected to overtake Christianity as the world’s largest religion by 2035, driven largely by Muslims’ younger population and higher birthrates, according to the new Pew Research Center report.

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Pro-Palestinian activists protest the arrival of Yoav Gallant in NYC

(JTA) — Several dozen pro-Palestinian activists gathered Wednesday to protest the arrival of former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant, who was scheduled to at an Israel policy organization’s event in midtown Manhattan.

 Gallant was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s defense minister at the time of Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attacks and during Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, serving until Netanyahu fired him in November 2024. He and Netanyahu have outstanding arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Protesters urged consequences for Gallant — and for the MirYam Institute, the pro-Israel institute based in Great Neck, New York, that hosted him.

“While far-right Zionist think tanks platform Israeli war criminals, the people of New York are here with a message for our federal government: We demand that you uphold international law and (that) the federal government arrests Yoav Gallant and all genocidaires that step into our city,” one protest leader shouted into a megaphone.

Chants of “Yoav Gallant you can’t hide, we charge you with genocide” and “Zionists not welcome here” rang out to the sound of thumping drums, as well as pots and pans. Demonstrators waved signs as they picketed outside Penn Station, displaying messages such as, “Sanction Israel: Zionist delegation out of NYC” and “War criminals not welcome.” About a dozen members of the anti-Israel, ultra-Orthodox Neturei Karta sect participated.

One passerby wearing tzitzit approached the Neturei Karta protesters, yelling in Hebrew, “Mah zeh,” meaning “What is this?” and “HaShem yishmor!”, a phrase that literally translates to “May God protect” but can convey dismay, similar to “God help us.” A handful of pro-Israel counterprotesters, including Ross Glick, a former director of the far-right Zionist group Betar US, showed up and argued with demonstrators. No arrests were made.

Many signs in the demonstration were labeled with the name of the Palestinian Youth Movement, which led the protest, and the Party for Socialism and Liberation. Anti-Zionist group Jewish Voice for Peace also promoted the protest on social media.

Demonstrators called for the prosecution of Gallant. One sign called for New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani and New York state Attorney General Letitia James to revoke the MirYam Institute’s federal tax-exempt status, although revoking that status is the responsibility of the IRS.

The MirYam Institute did not respond to a request for comment.

Mamdani vowed during his mayoral campaign to arrest Gallant’s former boss, Netanyahu, should he enter New York City, citing the ICC arrest warrant. Mamdani later acknowledged that he did not have the legal authority to do so, but has criticized Netanyahu and accused him of genocide.

Mamdani did not return a request for comment about Gallant’s visit to New York.

Wednesday’s event was billed as the MirYam Institute’s annual security briefing, where Gallant was slated to speak in addition to former Mossad director David Barnea and Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States, according to MirYam’s website.

On Tuesday, the Hind Rajab Foundation said it filed a request for the U.S. Department of Justice to prosecute Gallant “for authorizing war crimes in Gaza and Lebanon, and for the crime of genocide in Gaza.”

Michigan Rep. Rashida Tlaib reposted the foundation’s post and wrote on Tuesday that we “cannot normalize war criminals walking freely in our cities.”

“He belongs in the Hague, not on a speaking tour. Our government continues to support genocide,” Tlaib wrote.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

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