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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government

(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.

The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.

These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem. 

For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.

I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides. 

Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward? 

Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.

And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.

Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?

Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.

The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel. 

This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation. 

How would that work?

For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land. 

The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one. 

Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace. 

What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?

Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount. 

Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)

And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount. 

And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.  

This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.

When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future. 

I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned. 

Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank. 

I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”

That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road. 

And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?

The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.

As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years. 

Does Israel even have that capability?

The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.

Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank. 

The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?

The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department. 

But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank. 

There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners. 

Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?

The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].

North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.

Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.   

We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.

What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?

Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do. 

The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset. 

We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?

It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter. 

If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity. 

If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.

—
The post An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Knesset elects speaker from ‘change’ bloc opposing Netanyahu

(JTA) — Israeli parliament members elected Matan Kahana of Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition Yashar party to be the next speaker of the Knesset, in a 66-52 vote on Tuesday that portends clashes with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Kahana will serve as speaker of the 26th Knesset, defeating Ofir Katz from Netanyahu’s Likud Party.

A Knesset speaker belonging to the bloc actively seeking the prime minister’s ouster is rare. Last week, Eisenkot got the mandate to form a new government, although he has yet to do so.

Installing his ally Kahana in the powerful speaker’s seat will allow Eisenkot to engineer legislative maneuvers that will undercut Netanyahu’s agenda, at least during the three-to-five remaining weeks Eisenkot has to form a coalition.

One key Eisenkot priority is passing legislation to establish a commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas raids, the worst attack in Israel’s history. Netanyahu, who was prime minister on that day, has until now resisted setting up such an inquiry.

Kahana secured the speaker role on Tuesday with the support of the 48 Knesset members of Eisenkot’s bloc, which includes the Yashar, B’Yachad, Yisrael Beyteinu and Democrats parties. The Arab-majority Ra’am and Joint List parties also voted for Kahana, with just one of their collective 19 members absent.

Eisenkot has insisted that Arab parties must have equal say in the Knesset, even if they are not part of the coalition The Netanyahu bloc’s resistance to any empowerment for the Arab parties – even in the face of their unprecedented success in the Oct. 27 election – fueled much of the vitriol in the debate prior to the vote.

Kahana immediately sounded a conciliatory note toward the Arab Knesset members who voted for him, a signal of the markedly different tone Eisenkot plans to take in contrast to Netanyahu.

“The Knesset is the home of all of Israel’s citizens,” Kahana said in his first address as speaker on Tuesday evening. “I intend to be the speaker for everyone – regardless of religion, race or gender.”

He stressed that “it is possible to hold opposing views while still maintaining respect for state institutions and for those who think differently.” Kahana, 54, has served in the Knesset in multiple parties off and on since 2019.

After hours of filibustering from the Netanyahu bloc, the vote was able to take place when the two camps struck a deal,  according to Israel’s Channel 12: Eisenkot’s bloc agreed to delay votes to repeal bills advanced in the previous Knesset until next week.

Eisenkot has promised that he would put together a coalition based on four guiding principles: recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; embracing the values set forth in Israel’s Declaration of Independence; requiring military or civil service for all and commitment to dismantling Hamas while recognizing the group as a terrorist organization.

Although the Arab-majority parties supported Kahana’s appointment as Knesset speaker on Tuesday, Eisenkot’s path toward forming a government with their involvement would be a formidable task. The leader of Ra’am, Mansour Abbas, has repeatedly condemned the Oct. 7 attack but has not recognized Hamas as a terror organization. Nor has the Joint List, which includes members who are aligned with Palestinian nationalist ideologies.

As for Netanyahu’s bloc, 52 out of the possible 53 Knesset members voted on Tuesday for the Likud’s candidate for speaker, despite fears that certain ultra-Orthodox parties might abstain. Only the Likud’s Nir Barkat was absent from the session – reportedly on a private trip to India to clear his head, according to Israeli journalist Uri Misgav.

Barkat and Netanyahu have had a fraught relationship, ever since Barkat allegedly held consultations about potentially replacing Netanyahu in the days following the Oct. 7 attacks, as originally reported by Channel 12’s Amit Segal.

Chief among the bills that Eisenkot’s bloc plans to repeal is the Netanyahu coalition’s judicial overhaul law, which has sought to shift the balance of power by increasing the influence of politicians on judicial appointments.

Kahana expressed his hope on Tuesday evening “that the incoming government will work to implement all necessary improvements to the system of checks and balances among the three branches of government – and will do so with broad consensus.” He also pledged that the Knesset would “unequivocally abide by the rulings of the courts.”

“The eyes of Israeli citizens are upon us, yet in recent years, we have caused them to lower their gaze in embarrassment,” Kahana added, noting that the social media era has fueled a surge in extreme discourse. “It is our responsibility to change and fix this.”

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post Knesset elects speaker from ‘change’ bloc opposing Netanyahu appeared first on The Forward.

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Italian gelato champion shrugs off anti-Israel backlash fears as chain expands in Israel

(JTA) — TEL AVIV — When Gelalucci opened its first Israeli gelateria in Tel Aviv earlier this year, the lines were staggering.

Now, the venture with Italian gelato champion Sergio Colalucci, who shrugged off fears of an anti-Israel backlash in Europe, is expanding, with a second branch opening Thursday in Kiryat Ono, a Tel Aviv suburb.

The initial frenzy surrounding the first branch was no one-day wonder. Weeks after the Tel Aviv opening, customers were still queuing outside the shop on leafy Masaryk Square, off King George Street.

One elderly customer, eating vanilla from a cup, said he had already found what set it apart. “This is the only ice cream in Israel that is not overly sweet. You can taste that it’s good quality,” he said.

Amit Cohen, the branch manager and son of Pini Cohen, a longtime food industry figure and partner in the venture, said the man’s return to the store was more important than any first-day rush.

“When people come back again and again, that’s the biggest victory for us,” he said.

The Tel Aviv and Kiryat Ono stores are the first of several Israeli branches planned for Gelalucci, a portmanteau of gelato and Colalucci. The new chain represents a surprising overseas expansion for the entrepreneur, who has operated primarily in Italy and Spain — where anti-Israel sentiment is intense.

Colalucci served scoops himself on an opening day that drew thousands of customers with an offer of free gelato for the first 500. Before the opening, Ronen Nimni, owner of the Cafe Cafe Group, which partnered with Colalucci to bring Gelalucci to Israel, had been worried that anti-Israel reactions could hurt the Italian gelato maker, whose business also operates in Europe. There are eight branches in Spain, where the backlash against Israel has been especially visible.

A line forms outside of Gelalucci, Tel Aviv, April 2026. (Courtesy Amit Cohen)

But according to Cohen, Colalucci was not deterred.

“He fell in love with Israel,” Cohen said. “He’s become a kind of ambassador for us.”

Even missiles did not appear to shake him. On one visit, Colalucci was driving with Cohen when a siren sounded. The two stopped the car, got out and lay on the ground with their hands over their heads, following Home Front Command instructions, Cohen recalled. Colalucci, he said, remained calm.

“I mean, it was the Houthis, but what does he know?” Cohen quipped, referring to the almost blasé attitude many Israelis have developed toward missiles from Yemen, which are usually intercepted and often regarded as more of a nuisance than a threat.

Colalucci’s son, Francesco, 21, who is also involved in the Israeli launch, stayed in Israel after his father left and found himself caught in a brief flare-up with Iran. Like his father, he did not panic when the missiles came. Nor, he said, was he troubled by criticism of the decision to open in Israel.

“Why would I have a problem to open here? I see a beautiful place with beautiful people,” he said.

Sergio Colalucci also serves as president of the Gelato World Cup. In 2006, he was a member of the Italian team that won with an entry that included his flavor “Pistachio 26.”

It is one of 26 flavors offered in the Tel Aviv shop, alongside tiramisu, salted caramel, fig and orange ricotta, sorbets and sugar-free scoops, and some added to cater to local preferences, including vanilla and an Oreo-style flavor made with cookies prepared in-house.

The author’s son assists her, breaking ground as an investigative reporter, Tel Aviv, June 12, 2026. (Deborah Danan)

The company has entered a crowded market in a city where frozen treats are widely available. Unlike most local ice cream businesses, Gelalucci’s Israeli operation is built around a fully imported product. The gelato is made at the Colalucci family factory in Nettuno, a seaside town south of Rome, using Italian raw materials and the family’s original recipes, then shipped to Israel for sale.

The gelato is made without nonkosher ingredients, Cohen said, and any additives are plant-based. The Tel Aviv store, however, does not have Israeli kosher certification because it is open on Shabbat. Cohen said the partners may later seek certification from a kosher authority in Rome or another body that could accommodate the brand’s import-based model, particularly for subsequent branches.

The decision to open in Israel had the backing of the whole family, Francesco Colalucci said, fitting for a business that is very much a family affair. His grandfather opened the first shop in 1974, his father now leads the company and serves as its public face, Francesco runs the flagship store in Nettuno, and his mother, sister and aunt are also involved.

“My mother always said to my father, you have to remember, we don’t sell gelato, we sell happiness for the people,” he said. “We want to give this same product to the Tel Aviv people. For this, the whole family has to be involved.”

Francesco Colalucci said his father never pushed him into the family business and told him he could choose his own path. But gelato was the atmosphere he grew up in. Mauro Petrini, his father’s mentor, known in the industry as “the engineer of ice cream,” was a formative presence in his childhood.

“Mauro was like an uncle to me,” he said. “When I was around 10, he told me, the more you learn, the more you have learned nothing. From this moment, the passion for it grew inside me.”

It took three years to turn the idea of a Tel Aviv branch into an operating store, slowed by transport, logistics, certification issues and the bureaucracy that foreign businesses often encounter when entering Israel. Francesco Colalucci shrugged off the delays, saying Israel was hardly alone in that respect.

“Bureaucracy is very terrible also in Italy,” he said.

With unmistakable Italian features and an athletic build, Colalucci does not look like a cautionary tale about growing up around ice cream. He says it comes down to balance — protein, fat and sugar in the right proportions — plus restraint.

“If it’s good gelato you’re not going to get fat,” he said, before adding with a smile, “Just don’t eat too much.”

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post Italian gelato champion shrugs off anti-Israel backlash fears as chain expands in Israel appeared first on The Forward.

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Britain sanctions Israeli settlement builders and a group that blocked Gaza aid

(JTA) — Britain on Tuesday imposed new sanctions on eight Israeli companies involved in West Bank settlement construction, and an activist group that has repeatedly blocked Gaza-bound humanitarian aid convoys.

“We said we would act, and we are,” British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said in a video address posted on X. “Illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank is destroying the prospects of a two-state solution. So today we are sanctioning companies involved in that activity and disrupting their access to the finance that enables it.”

Tuesday’s sanctions package is the first such concrete step taken since Britain announced in September that it would reset its approach to Israeli actions in the West Bank and overhaul its Global Human Rights sanctions program. It joined Canada and France in announcing plans to target settlements.

The Foreign Office said Tuesday that the package targets eight firms, ahead of final tender deadlines for the massive E1 settlement project – which would add 3,401 housing units east of Jerusalem and bisect the West Bank. The sanctions freeze assets and bans individuals from forming or managing companies in Britain.

“Our warning to companies thinking about being part of settlement expansion, including the unconscionable E1 project, is clear: we will clamp down on you,” Miliband said in his address.  Anti-settlement advocates have for years maintained that building in E1 would foreclose the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian entity in the disputed territory.

The sanctions also singled out the activist group Tzav 9, which the Foreign Office accused of having “organized and carried out blockades to prevent humanitarian aid convoys entering Gaza as recently as October.” The group’s name means “Order 9” in Hebrew, a play on Tzav 8, Israel’s emergency military reserve call-up order.

“Aid must be allowed to reach civilians in desperate need, and those who obstruct it must be prepared to face the consequences,” Miliband said. “The British people do not want businesses to be supporting illegal occupation, and they desperately want to see aid enter Gaza.”

In June 2024, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Tzav 9, after its members conducted multiple attacks on aid convoys. The U.S. State Department at the time labeled Tzav 9 a “violent extremist” organization, noting that it looted and set fire to two trucks bound for Gaza. The Trump administration lifted sanctions on Israeli individuals and entities, including Tzav 9, that the Biden administration had deemed extremist.

In response to the British Foreign Office’s sanctions announcement, Tzav 9 released a lengthy statement in English on X, demanding that Hamas be “disarmed and DISMANTLED, so it can no longer seize that aid for its own purposes.”

The group asserted that 2.4 million tons of food and 26,000 tons of medicine and supplies have entered Gaza since the October 2025 ceasefire, adding that Israel’s Foreign Ministry places no restrictions on the types of medicine allowed in.

“Tzav 9 is a movement of [law] abiding citizens from all the political spectrum, and we’ve always protested peacefully,” the group stated. “This is our democratic right, and your attempts to portray us as extremists will not succeed. We are ordinary Israeli citizens concerned about our children’s future.”

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post Britain sanctions Israeli settlement builders and a group that blocked Gaza aid appeared first on The Forward.

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