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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government

(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.

The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.

These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem. 

For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.

I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides. 

Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward? 

Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.

And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.

Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?

Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.

The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel. 

This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation. 

How would that work?

For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land. 

The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one. 

Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace. 

What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?

Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount. 

Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)

And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount. 

And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.  

This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.

When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future. 

I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned. 

Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank. 

I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”

That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road. 

And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?

The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.

As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years. 

Does Israel even have that capability?

The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.

Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank. 

The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?

The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department. 

But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank. 

There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners. 

Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?

The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].

North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.

Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.   

We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.

What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?

Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do. 

The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset. 

We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?

It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter. 

If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity. 

If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.


The post An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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A fortress won’t save American Jews

Jews have found themselves at the center of politics over the past few years — not a place we want to be, at least not like this.

Anton Jäger, a historian at Oxford University, has argued that since the Covid-19 pandemic spurred more government intervention into the lives of ordinary citizens, many Western countries have become “engulfed in a kind of permanent Dreyfus Affair.”

His point was that a contemporary obsession with politics has consumed society in the same way that the conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus on manufactured treason charges sucked up the oxygen in France at the end of the 19th century.

Jäger doesn’t mention the fact that Dreyfus was Jewish. But just as his Jewishness animated the scandal in the Third French Republic, Jews — real and imagined — have also found themselves at the center of today’s toxic political climate.

Jews don’t have the luxury of throwing up our hands in the face of rising antisemitism and deciding to retreat

As many Americans became unmoored from reality during the pandemic, they alternately blamed Jews for creating the virus and described themselves as being victimized like Jews during the Holocaust for refusing to get vaccinated or comply with other public health guidance.

Jews have also found themselves at the center of debates over immigration, with suggestions on the right that George Soros is fueling mass migration intended to displace white Americans even as some on the left think of Jews as too white to be included in the minority coalitions fighting white supremacy.

Joe Biden made countering antisemitism a keystone of his presidency, while simultaneously providing Israel with a blank check after the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack that allowed the country to wreak absolute devastation on Gaza — a military assault drove many Americans toward strident forms of anti-Zionism that teeter into antisemitism.

Donald Trump accelerated the logic of Biden’s fight against campus antisemitism — which held that the intense discomfort some Jewish college students felt over speech targeting Israel was a violation of their civil rights — to decimate elite universities that had long been targets of the conservative movement.

Meanwhile, right-wing media stars like Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens have won massive audiences while inveighing against Jews who they claim are supposedly controlling American politics, and even establishment institutions like the Heritage Foundation have struggled to keep what were once fringe antisemitic views from coming into the mainstream.

The overt kind of antisemitism peddled by the right is far less severe on the left — but the emergence of strident opposition to Israel as perhaps the core litmus test for inclusion in progressive spaces has hit many Jews hard in politics. At workplaces, schools and in social settings, people often fail to make space for any sense of Jewish attachment to Israel even when those Jews share deep outrage over the country’s actions or structure of government. AIPAC has ascended into the pantheon of liberal enemies alongside longstanding and much vaguer villains like “corporations” and “billionaires.”

Israel’s actions, and its apparent impunity to international concerns about its often abhorrent conduct, are an obvious and real explanation for this. But it doesn’t explain everything. Whatever one thinks about Zionism, the almost messianic notion that Palestinian liberation would unlock everything from world peace to Medicare for All is both unserious and, at its worst, part of an ignominious tradition of assigning Jews outsized control over the world.

***

This can make it feel like there is little room for persuasion in the fight against antisemitism. If someone believes that Israelis engineered Covid-19 in a lab to kill gentiles, what can you really say to sway them — and is it even worth it, if they’re just going to move on to a new conspiracy about George Soros or the Rothchilds? And if someone believes that all the allegations against Graham Platner were a plot by Israel and its supporters to sink his candidacy, it’s hard to believe they’re coming from a place of genuine concern about Palestinians.

It’s a feeling of hopelessness that has ironically animated both the argument that we should stop trying to counter antisemitism, promoted by New York Times columnist Bret Stephens in his State of World Jewry speech earlier this year at the 92nd St. Y, and the Jewish establishment’s turn toward embracing the use of force against perceived enemies of the Jews.

This force is literal in the case of Israel’s campaign in Gaza and more figurative — though sometimes still involving arrests and police violence — when it comes to cracking down on campus protests at home.

Both Stephens and the Anti-Defamation League, which he took target at in his remarks for supposedly spinning its wheels in a hopeless attempt to defeat antisemitism, seem to have adopted a belief that Jews are better off going it alone.

Stephens argued that we should shift the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been invested in countering antisemitism into day schools and other institutions that can cultivate a sense of Jewish belonging and peoplehood.

The ADL, along with much of the Jewish establishment and dozens of new Jewish defense organizations created over the past decade, have abandoned past efforts to combat antisemitism through coalitions with other minority groups in favor of a rhetorical and legal assault on those they contend criticize Israel in unacceptable ways. Their methods — including promoting rigid definitions of antisemitism that include anti-Zionism, sponsoring lawsuits against colleges and universities, and cheering on the Trump administration’s move to deport student activists — seem to accept that they aren’t going to win hearts and minds but can perhaps still bludgeon their enemies into submission.

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But I don’t think Jews have the luxury of throwing up our hands in the face of rising antisemitism and deciding to either completely retreat, as Stephens has proposed, or strategically retreat while launching some rear-guard actions meant to keep the antisemites at bay for as long as possible.

First, there just aren’t enough of us. Jews may collectively have more wealth and resources at our disposal than any other community in the history of the Jewish diaspora, but there are still only a few million of us in the United States. Any fortress we try to build here would be cramped and vulnerable to being overrun by the 98% of the country that is not Jewish.

The community’s strength and power has come from our engagement in the political process and the fact that elected officials and civic leaders across the political spectrum take us seriously as citizens and constituents.

Smaller Jewish communities around the world, including those in Europe, have tried the fortress approach — often faced with little other choice as their numbers have shrunk and hostility has skyrocketed well beyond American levels — with dismal results. Following their lead voluntarily would be a tragic mistake.

Second, many Jews would be left outside the walls of any fortress. That’s because Stephens and his allies in the establishment seem determined to protect Jews not only from neo-Nazis, but also from anti-Zionists, who they often describe as posing the same threat as white supremacists. Where, then, would the roughly 50% of young Jews (and smaller shares of older groups) who oppose Israel’s existence as a Jewish state — preferring a binational one — find protection from those who wish them ill based on their identity?

An insular community that conditioned American Jewish identity on political support for Israel would also serve to legitimize antisemitic arguments that diaspora Jews should be held responsible for the country’s actions.

But the third, and most hopeful, reason to stay in the fight is it’s not a futile one. Antisemitism in the U.S. has receded dramatically since the 1960s, when university quotas and “gentiles only” disclaimers in employment ads were still common. The phenomenon of intermarriage, sometimes held up as an existential threat in its own right, is also a testament to the widespread acceptance of Jews in American society, and Jews remain welcome in the highest echelons of government, corporate and cultural life in this country.

That was not always true — but it became true in part as more Americans got to know Jews, and as Jews forged intentional alliances with other minorities to cultivate a more accepting climate in the country.

Antisemitism never disappeared, and I’m not suggesting that Jews can make it disappear any more than other minorities can make racism disappear or women can make sexism disappear. Prejudices ebb and flow according to factors beyond any of our control.

But if there’s one thing I’ve learned in five years on this beat it’s that we need Jews in the fight. The most effective path to fighting antisemitism is having Jews with credibility who are genuine participants in movements across the political spectrum and have allies who will listen to them when they raise concerns.

This isn’t a panacea. There’s no magic bullet to stop antisemitism and no singular approach that will work. Many people, and many communities, are hurting in this country right now. My appeal is simply that we accept that hurting alongside them — and working with them to lessen the pain — is our best shot at preserving Jewish safety.

The post A fortress won’t save American Jews appeared first on The Forward.

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As Christopher Nolan revives ‘The Odyssey,’ a scholar finds links between Homer and the Hebrew Bible

(JTA) — Even before its release on Friday, buzz over Christopher Nolan’s much-anticipated film adaptation, “The Odyssey,” is introducing a new generation to Homer’s tale of shipwrecks, monsters, gods and the long road home. But what does an ancient Greek epic have to do with Jewish readers — or with the Hebrew Bible?

Quite a bit, says Jacob Howland, a philosopher and classicist who has spent much of his career exploring what has been called the conversation between Athens and Jerusalem. His 1998 book “Plato and the Talmud” was inspired in part by a Talmud study group at his synagogue in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he was a professor of philosophy at the University of Tulsa from 1988 to 2020.

Howland is currently a distinguished visiting professor in the School of Civic Leadership at the University of Texas, founded in 2023 to put Western civilization and “the American idea” at the center of academia in the Lone Star State. Howland has written extensively on the Greeks, the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud for Mosaic, the online magazine of the conservative Jewish think tank and educational philanthropy Tikvah.

In the first of a recent series of essays on the “Odyssey” for Mosaic, Howland asks, “Should Jews Read Homer?” His answer, no surprise, is “yes”: The “Odyssey” and the Hebrew Bible, he writes, “illuminate the enduring questions of human life, including how to bring order and common purpose to the otherwise chaotic relationships between men and women, fathers and sons, familiars and strangers, clans and nations.”

To recap: The “Odyssey” follows the Greek hero Odysseus (Matt Damon in the film) on his 10-year journey home after the Trojan War. Delayed by storms, nymphs, temptations and the whims of the gods, he survives encounters with the Cyclops, the Sirens and the sorceress Circe before finally returning to Ithaca. There, disguised as a beggar, he reunites with his faithful wife, Penelope (Anne Hathaway), and son, Telemachus (Tom Holland), and (spoiler alert) reclaims his kingdom from the suitors who have overrun his household.

As Nolan’s blockbuster brings Odysseus back into the cultural conversation, we spoke with Howland about what Homer and the Bible have in common, how they differ and why both epics are at the center of the conservative discourse around “Western civilization.”

Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.

As someone who reads the “Odyssey” professionally, are you excited about a new movie production of this?

I am going to see the film. I’ve been encouraged, actually — there’s been an incredible amount of controversy, which is funny, because no one’s seen it yet. But I read that a number of people, including the historian Tom Holland — the “Rest Is History” podcast host, not the actor playing Telemachus — have seen it and given it strong reviews.

I’m fairly confident we won’t get something like “300” — that film about Thermopylae, with its computer-generated monsters, which younger audiences oddly loved but which was, historically, terrible. I think there has to be some attempt, if not at full historical accuracy, then at least a semblance of it in costuming, ships and so on — at a minimum, a gritty reality that transports you into another time and place, even if a hypercritical viewer could point out an anachronistic helmet or two.

I want to talk a little about Athens and Jerusalem, which is how the 20th-century German-Jewish philosopher and conservative icon Leo Strauss described the tension in Western civilization between the Bible and classical Greek philosophy. The “Odyssey” was written down somewhere between 725 and 675 BCE, and the Hebrew Bible was composed primarily between the eighth and second centuries BCE. How aware are these two cultures of each other?

If you’re asking about the time of Homer, it’s all speculation. But I can talk to you about the Talmudic period [roughly the first through fourth centuries CE]. According to Warren Zev Harvey at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the rabbis seemed to have known a lot about Greek philosophy. They just didn’t make that clear in the Talmud. They didn’t want to say, “We’ve studied the Greeks.”

I think it’s safer to talk about the Homeric and the biblical as two fundamentally different approaches — different understandings of the world, of human life, of the divine — and then ask how they differ, how they interact and what overlap they have.

In other words, what are the fruitful comparisons for understanding the differences and similarities between these cultures?

Yes. Athens and Jerusalem are the two oldest, greatest roots of Western civilization. I don’t always agree with everything Leo Strauss says, but he regards those two as a coiled spring, a tension from which the West itself grows. These texts, if we look at their fundamental view of the world, pose a question we have to decide for ourselves — and in some sense the future of our civilization depends on how we decide it.

What are some of the major episodes in the “Odyssey” we can expect to see in Nolan’s film that bear these kinds of comparisons to Jewish texts, and what questions and answers can we derive from them?

One thing that will probably show up is the recognition of Odysseus by his nurse Eurycleia when he returns to Ithaca in disguise — that’s where Homer tells the story of how Odysseus got his scar. As a youth — mid-teens, or thereabouts — Odysseus goes out to hunt a boar. The ordinary way the ancient Greeks hunted a boar: You get about five guys with javelins and a bunch of dogs and a net. The dogs locate the boar, drive it into its lair, and keep it at bay, barking. You set up the net, unleash the dogs, and they harass the boar until it runs out and gets caught in the net. Then a group of men comes in and stabs it.

Instead, Odysseus jumps out in front and rushes the boar himself, to stab it on his own, and that’s when the boar gashes him and gives him his scar.

In my view, this charging, wounding boar is a Homeric image of reality, at least from Odysseus’ perspective. Reality will wound you, and how do you confront it? You go out, and you fight. That’s a premise that explains Odysseus’s behavior through much of the “Odyssey.”

What’s the Hebrew counterpart? 

Fundamentally, trust in God — trust that there is an Almighty Creator who has fashioned a world habitable and suitable for human beings, and who will support them if they trust in Him. It’s not that the Hebrews didn’t know reality is wounding — it’s that there’s something above that wounding reality. The boar is an animal; the highest thing for Homer is essentially nature. There are the gods, but what exactly are they?

It’s not that the Jewish tradition doesn’t understand realpolitik. Abraham is a great warrior as well as a man of God. They understand it. But the starting point is trust. Odysseus does not trust. Odysseus is a man of disguises, cunning, cleverness — leveraging every trick.

Along with the charging-boar business, there’s a famous essay by a scholar named George Dimock called “The Name of Odysseus.” Dimock’s essential point: There’s a Greek verb, odusasthai, that means to cause pain to oneself and others, and to be willing to do so. Dimock points out that Odysseus does this in many ways — the Cyclops, whose eye he takes; the suitors, whom he kills; all of it.

By the end of the story, hasn’t he basically sacrificed his entire entourage?

This is incredible, if you look at it. Odysseus leaves Troy with 12 ships, which means around a thousand men. One way or another, they all die. So he takes a generation of young men to Troy and comes back with zero.

Twenty years later, you have the next generation — the noble cream of the crop, 108 suitors from Ithaca and the outlying islands. He kills all of them. So: Another generation of young people gone. Then the fathers of those suitors want revenge, so they make war against him. He would have killed them all too, except that Zeus had Athena intervene, essentially averting a civil war, with a pact of peace afterward.

Now, this begins to get at the real difference between the “Odyssey” and the Bible. After the universal history of Genesis 1 through 11, we get to the patriarchs. God is, in effect, saying: All right, I’m going with this guy Abraham — and remarkably, astonishingly, He says, “Come with me, leave your ways and customs behind, leave your gods, leave your family — we’re just going to go.” At that point, you’re dealing with God’s desire to form community, starting with a family, and it builds from there. Odysseus, by contrast, wants to get back home, but he’s a loner, a man of pain who must endure the world’s harsh reality to find fulfillment.

Let’s talk about the Cyclops, an episode that reveals a lot about the character of Odysseus. A one-eyed giant imprisons Odysseus’s men in a cave and rolls a stone against the entrance so they can’t get out — even if they kill him, they’d still be trapped inside.

Odysseus comes away from the war with Troy into a postwar world, a political crisis, He’s now a grizzled veteran of a bloody, horrible 10-year war. And the first thing he does is sack the city of the Cicones — an actual historical people — killing all the men and enslaving the women. He’s in a nasty mood. Very shortly after, they spot the Cyclops’s island — smoke rising — and decide to go see. They realize a monster must live there: Everything is enormous, racks of cheese stacked way up high. Odysseus says, “Let’s wait and meet this guy.” His men say, “No — let’s just take the stuff and go.” He insists on sitting inside the cave, waiting. It’s insane — he wants to measure himself.

The Cyclops episode is really the antithesis of what’s happening with Abraham and the patriarchs, who are building a family, a tribe, a nation, looking forward. Odysseus just wants to test himself. When the Cyclops returns, Odysseus uses his cleverness, blinds him, and they sneak out under the rams. Then he shouts his own name — which is what gets all his men killed, because the Cyclops is Poseidon’s son, and Poseidon is furious. He identifies himself completely: “I’m Odysseus, I live in Ithaca, here’s my address.” That episode is clearly one in which Odysseus is giving birth to himself — an act of absolute hubris.

So Odysseus has two competing desires. One is to make his name — to achieve glory and fame through his exploits. The other becomes: I have to get home.

Is there a biblical character who’s a useful compare-and-contrast for this notion of what it means to be a man, or a hero?

There’s Jacob, but let me start with David. The David and Goliath scene is fantastic, because Goliath is a Philistine, and the Philistines came from the Aegean — probably Greek speakers, though some think Crete. So Goliath, in effect, is a Greek. He’s described as enormous, fantastic — and he’s bested by David. David killing Goliath is a version of what scholars of myth call the “wily lad” story — another version is Odysseus with the Cyclops, another big, bad opponent. Interestingly, David hits Goliath right in the middle of the forehead, which is where, on Greek vases, the Cyclops’ eye is depicted.

So Goliath is big and bad, and then there’s Saul, a doofus who says, “You have to wear my armor.” David says, no, I’m not going to do that. David trusts in the Lord. When Odysseus defeats the Cyclops, he says, in effect, “I did this — I am Odysseus.” David says, “No — I trust in the Lord; the Lord protects me.”

And Jacob?

Odysseus is a wrestler, and Jacob is very Odyssean — fighting with Esau, leveraging Esau’s hunger to steal his birthright, scheming with his mother Rebecca, who is also an Odyssean figure, telling him to dress in skins to deceive Isaac. Then Esau wants to kill him, and we get the scene where Jacob wrestles at the Jabbok [River], the night before he has to confront Esau. He’s worried, he’s wounded, he fights this “ish” — this figure, angel, whatever it is — and he’s vulnerable. He’s feeling fear, feeling guilt. He’s holding on and fighting because only if Esau blesses him — which happens the next day — can Jacob let go. In other words: “I have to make it right with my brother.” Then he’s told his name will be Israel — because he strives with God.

So to sum this up: The Jewish hero is vulnerable and trusts in God; the Greek hero can show no vulnerability and can only trust in himself. And yes, there’s Athena and the other gods, but the Greek gods are fickle.

Are there similar comparisons between a female heroine in the “Odyssey” and a biblical character — perhaps Penelope and what she represents versus one of the matriarchs?

Penelope and Rebecca are two strong but very different women. Both are capable, like Odysseus, of enduring deep and lasting pain. Penelope seems more passive, but she has a kind of Odyssean cunning and steely determination. She holds the suitors at bay for three years by delaying marriage until she’s finished weaving the funeral shroud for Odysseus’s father Laertes. Besides her trick of weaving by day and unraveling by night, the shroud is not just for Laertes. It is for the suitors, and it signifies the burial of an entire epoch — a past slain by the violent passions of the younger generation, no longer constrained by ancestral ways.

While Penelope patiently awaits Odysseus’s return and prepares to bury a dying epoch, Rebecca looks forward, toward the great nation that God had promised to make of Abraham’s offspring. Isaac, doubtless traumatized by his near sacrifice, is the passive partner in their marriage; he stays put when Abraham sends his servant to find a wife for him, while Rebecca jumps at the chance to leave her home. She is physically vigorous (she endures a breach birth of twins, and carries water for all the servant’s camels) and strong in will, and it is she who is endowed with Odyssean cunning. She perceives that it is Jacob, not Esau, who has the toughness and ambition needed to be the bearer of the covenant. It is she who instructs Jacob how to disguise himself as Esau so that Isaac’s blessing will go to him; who takes on herself whatever curse Isaac may put on Jacob; and who instructs Jacob to flee to Beersheba, knowing that she will probably never see him again.

Those are really useful comparisons. But it raises a question, which maybe a rabbi would answer differently than a scholar: Is there a temptation, reading the “Odyssey” and the Bible, to conclude that one worldview, not the quality of the literature but the worldview, is simply better than the other? Does Homer have something to teach Jews about how to be a hero, or a lover, or how to be clever?

I was just teaching Exodus, and we got to the scene where Moses punishes the Israelites for the sin of the Golden Calf — a very Homeric episode, morally messy. Were any of the Levites who did the killing themselves involved in making the calf? Are they only killing people who deserve it, or will innocent people die too? My students find it extreme — 3,000 men killed. My response is: Read Machiavelli, where he says armed prophets succeed and unarmed prophets fail — and that 3,000 is about half a percent of the roughly two million Israelites there. If Moses doesn’t get this under control, they’re all going to die. That’s Greek — that’s realpolitik. But it’s already there in the Jewish tradition too, going back to Abraham.

So — is the Jewish tradition superior? I think so, and especially for today, because of our circumstances. The United States was at its height after World War II, and now our institutions are collapsing. What do we need? Trust. We need to rebuild. So if you ask which tradition is better, here’s one criterion: What’s the advantage of trust? It’s a kind of youthfulness, a kind of fertility, a kind of generativity — the capacity of the Jews to rebuild what’s been broken, to regrow, to reestablish themselves at every civilizational crisis, is unparalleled in history. The Greeks have a parallel of sorts — there’s a capacity to find a new way forward there too. But it seems to me what we need today is trust — because people are withdrawing their energy from the task of mending the world, because they don’t want to invest their time, energy and hope in something they believe might fail.

If we’re going to save Western civilization, which I do think is in crisis, we need to renew ourselves by looking to the Jewish tradition in particular.

Many people today, especially on the political right, argue that Western civilization is under siege, and the key to its revival is reclaiming its roots in the Ancient Greeks and Christian traditions. I think some Jewish thinkers and think tanks — including Tikvah, where some of your work has appeared — have a lot invested in including Judaism and Jewish ideas among the cornerstones of Western civilization. Is that a natural fit, or was Judaism more of a counterculture that was constantly challenging classical and Christian ideas?

I was a senior fellow at Tikvah, and they brought me on to design Greek and Jewish courses. When I got to the University of Austin [the pro-free inquiry, “anti-woke” liberal arts college whose founders include the Jewish journalist Bari Weiss] I designed their intellectual foundations program — their liberal-education core — and set it up with Genesis, Exodus and so on. I think what Tikvah is trying to do — and what UT Austin is doing too, in the School of Civic Leadership, where I’ll be teaching Genesis and Exodus this fall — and what other universities are trying to do, is give the Jewish tradition its rightful place.

From the founding fathers onward, there’s this notion that America is a chosen land — that we are, in some sense, a chosen people, engaged in a moral, spiritual, political mission. Lincoln, I think, brings this to a kind of perfection — he turns it into a civil religion, speaking to a people who’ve read the Bible, without pushing any particular sectarian version of it. We don’t know which side God is on, but the project isn’t going to work unless we understand ourselves to be on a kind of collective mission, knowing we’ll make mistakes and need to be forgiven.

You’ve written that the Hebrew Bible, like Homer, is one of the “taproots of the great branching oak of Western civilization.” Do you worry about the Christian nationalists who insist Western civilization is intrinsically tied to the Christian faith, and denotes a specifically Christian civilization?

For sure, I think it’s a huge problem. As with anything involving the Jews, I’m horrified by the antisemitism I’ve seen building on the left, now mirrored on the right. Young people in particular are being memed into antisemitism.

It does seem to me that the only way forward is to keep having these conversations — to say, here’s what we’ve inherited, here’s how these texts have shaped who we are as Americans, how we understand things, even if you’re a staunch atheist, the Bible has shaped your thinking about all of this. Only then can we get to a point where more people than just the Jews might say, “Your Christian nationalism, which imagines Christianity came out of nowhere with no real relationship to the Jews except rejection, is fundamentally ill-informed and destructive.”

To return to Nolan’s version of the “Odyssey”: What do you hope it gets right — or, if you’d rather answer the other way, what do you dread it might do to a story of such antiquity and power?

Odysseus, as I’ve indicated, has some questionable qualities as a leader, but he’s a much more complicated, flexible person, better suited to a new reality. I think that’s part of why Homer centered him. He’s a character who can hold two things together at once — maybe more than two: “I want to be an outstanding individual, but my duty is to the community; I want to protect my family and make a name for myself, but I’m willing to do what’s necessary.”

That’s true of the Hebraic heroes too — Abraham surely didn’t think it was a great idea to say his wife Sarah was his sister [when threatened by Pharaoh and King Abimelech] not once but twice, but he had to; otherwise they weren’t getting out of there. You have to hold the necessary and the good together. That requires a complicated person who can juggle both.

And I think it’s such a primal story, from the point of view of the human soul and human history. On the individual level, it’s the shape of a life — leaving home and coming back. And it’s the shape of a community too. Biblically, we’re all exiles, all trying to get back to Eden, if you like. The story of human life is trying to make, or recover, or return to a home — on both the individual and the communal level — and it’s a never-ending task. I think Homer knew what he was doing: Read the last page of the “Odyssey”, and you sense there’s a lot of work still to be done. Because it doesn’t end. This is what life is about — and then going forward too, having children, being concerned with their home, helping them make one.

I hope the film shows that.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post As Christopher Nolan revives ‘The Odyssey,’ a scholar finds links between Homer and the Hebrew Bible appeared first on The Forward.

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AOC urges Clavicular, who visited Tel Aviv, to ‘shed some light’ on the plight of the Palestinians

(JTA) — Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez said the influencer Clavicular should be informing his followers about the plight of Palestinians, in a sign of how widely Clavicular’s trip this week to Tel Aviv has registered among both Israelis and Israel’s critics.

Ocasio-Cortez, who has been sharply critical of Israel, was asked about Clavicular by a reporter from TMZ, the celebrity news site, on Tuesday in Washington, D.C.

“We should be focusing on Palestinians and the fact that many of them have been displaced,” she told the outlet, adding, “I hope maybe he uses his platform to give also some light to that issue as well.”

Clavicular sharply divided pro-Israel influencers during his time in Tel Aviv, with some arguing that his presence was a boon to Israel at a time when the country faces global approbation over its military operations in Gaza and others saying that Israelis should not embrace a celebrity with a record of objectifying women and engaging in antisemitism. Earlier this year, Clavicular, whose real name is Braden Peters, was part of a group of influencers who sang along to the Ye song “Heil Hitler” at a Miami nightclub.

One Israeli who appeared in Clavicular’s livestream, which appears on the platform Kick that is known for allowing content prohibited by other services, has faced penalties for doing so. Shira Braun has lost her job in the army spokesman’s unit and has been given a suspended jail sentence by the military after posing as the influencer’s girlfriend on air, according to Israeli media.

The end of Clavicular’s trip has prompted a new round of social media posts about him. The Instagram account Olim in TLV, which appeals to young immigrants in Tel Aviv, riffed on the country’s missile alerts in a graphic published on Wednesday.

“The event has ended — it is possible to exit the Protected Space,” the graphic said. “Clavicular has left Israel.”

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post AOC urges Clavicular, who visited Tel Aviv, to ‘shed some light’ on the plight of the Palestinians appeared first on The Forward.

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