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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government
(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.
The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.
These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem.
For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.
I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides.
Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward?
Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.
And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.
Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?
Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.
The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel.
This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation.
How would that work?
For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land.
The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one.
Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace.
What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?
Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount.
Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)
And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount.
And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.
This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.
When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future.
I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned.
Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank.
I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”
That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road.
And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?
The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.
As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years.
Does Israel even have that capability?
The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.
Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank.
The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?
The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department.
But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank.
There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners.
Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?
The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].
North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.
Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.
We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.
What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?
Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do.
The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset.
We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?
It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter.
If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity.
If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.
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Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel
Rep. Hakeem Jeffries of New York, who is set to become the next speaker of the House, said in an interview published over the weekend that he plans to advance legislation targeting violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank when the new Congressional term begins in January, offering an early indication of how he intends to manage the growing divide over Israel within the Democratic Party.
“What I have made clear is that within the first 100 days, I think the most decisive step that we can take relative to the situation in the West Bank is to move the West Bank Settler Violence Protection and Prevention Act,” Jeffries said in an interview with The New York Times published Saturday. At least 225 incidents of settler violence were documented during 2025 and part of 2026 by Israeli watchdog Yesh Din.
The bill was introduced last year by Rep. Jerry Nadler, co-chair of the Congressional Jewish Caucus, who is retiring at the end of the year. It has 174 Democratic co-sponsors. France and the U.K. are among the countries that have already imposed sanctions on violent Israeli settlers. Former President Joe Biden announced similar measures in 2024, but President Donald Trump reversed them shortly after taking office in 2025.
At the same time, Jeffries stopped short of endorsing a pair of bills to block some U.S. weapons sales to Israel, a demand of progressive Democrats. “I haven’t articulated a position one way or the other with respect to any of these bills,” Jeffries said, “because we’re going to have a conversation about the steps that we need to take together as a caucus.”
The distinction is important for Jeffries, a longtime supporter of Israel, as he’s preparing to lead a Democratic majority that is increasingly divided over Israel. His approach suggests he wants to address concerns about Israeli government policies without endorsing measures to end some U.S. military support for Israel. Many Jewish Democrats have also criticized the policies of the current right-wing Israeli government, particularly on settlement expansion and violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
The party’s divide over Israel goes deeper
The Democratic Party’s sweeping midterm victories have given Jeffries considerable room to manage the debate over Israel without depending on the votes of its most progressive members. Jeffries was nominated Wednesday by an overwhelming majority of his Democratic colleagues to become speaker, pending a House floor vote when the new Congress convenes on Jan. 3. Only 11, including the six newly elected members affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America, voted against.
Rep. Ro Khanna of California, a Democrat who has pushed for restrictions on military assistance to Israel, acknowledged that political reality, saying that progressives “have not succeeded in getting any commitments yet on Gaza or Israel.”
The debate is unlikely to end with one vote. Jeffries will still face pressure from a growing movement inside Congress to end all U.S. military aid to Israel, including defensive and offensive weapons sales.
On Election Day earlier this month, President Donald Trump said that the U.S. would halt roughly $4 billion in annual aid to Israel by the end of 2026. He was unclear how he would implement that, given the current memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Israel runs through 2028.
Earlier this year, 103 of 212 Democrats supported a measure to eliminate the annual military assistance to Israel and another 10 abstained. Dozens also co-sponsored a pair of measures – the Block the Bombs Act and Ceasefire Compliance Act – that would restrict certain offensive arms sales to Israel and increase oversight of Israel’s policies in the West Bank and in Gaza. The DSA said in a post-election event that it is planning to use its growing influence to push for a full arms embargo against Israel and ultimately “break” the longstanding alliance between the U.S. and the Jewish state.
Jeffries’ long record of supporting Israel
Jeffries, 56, has consistently defended the U.S.-Israel relationship since his election to the House in 2012, even as other Democrats have become more critical of Israel’s government.
In recent weeks, progressive activists have resurfaced clips of Jeffries and Sen. Chuck Schumer expressing strong support for Israel in speeches each made to Jewish groups, arguing that the leadership is out of step with voters’ changing perspectives.
Among them: declaring, “Israel today, Israel tomorrow, Israel forever,” at a 2014 rally in support of Israel; in 2023, describing Jerusalem as New York City’s sixth borough; and, in 2025, saying that the U.S. “can’t take our foot off the gas pedal until Iran is brought to its knees.”
In the Times interview, Jeffries said the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza was “unacceptable, unsustainable and un-American.” He also said the early moves made by the incoming Congress will make a two-state solution more viable. In a new memoir published last week, Biden warned Israelis they may not be able to count on the same level of support from future American leaders if the status quo continues. “I hope Israel wakes up,” he writes. “The days of American leaders like me — passionate defenders of Israel to the core — are passing.”
Even if the House passes the settler sanctions bill, it could face a Republican filibuster in the Senate or a veto from Trump.
For now, Jeffries has the votes and the political standing to set the agenda on settler violence, but without making major concessions to the Democratic Party’s most outspoken Israel critics.
The post Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel appeared first on The Forward.
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Mark Ruffalo opposes Schumer for Senate leader, citing “religious beliefs and loyalties”
(JTA) — Actor Mark Ruffalo, an outspoken progressive and Israel critic, cited concerns over “entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties” in endorsing U.S. Sen. Chris Van Hollen for Senate majority leader over U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer, the current Democratic caucus leader and a Jewish lawmaker from New York.
In a Saturday post on X, Ruffalo framed his endorsement of Van Hollen – and concerns about religious beliefs and loyalty – as being more than just about Israel.
“Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times,” Ruffalo posted. “We need Justice, we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties.”
Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times. We need Justice , we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties. Does not follow entrenched fossil fuel and corporate interests, nor throws a blind eye to the hard realties we face today. Van Hollen has showed he is willing to face these difficult times with the law, with integrity and the strength and spirit to fight the social and moral corruption that has set in with age old presumptions and the comfort that comes with unchecked power over decades. We have absolutely nothing to lose by replacing Sen Schumer. We can only gain more justice and freedom. Put pressure on your senators. Now is the time. Keep the momentum of this election going. Thank you, Senator Schumer, but it’s time to move aside.
https://t.co/GkpK4YG7dF
— Mark Ruffalo (@MarkRuffalo) November 21, 2026
Schumer is the highest-ranking Jewish elected official in U.S. history and has led the Senate’s Democratic caucus since 2017, including as majority leader from 2021 until 2025. Since the midterm elections, Schumer, the pro-Israel stalwart, has faced a chorus of progressive voices who are seeking a change in the leadership of the Democratic caucus.
Three veteran senators – Vermont independent Sen. Bernie Sanders, Democratic Sens. Elissa Slotkin of Michigan and Jeff Merkley of Oregon –have endorsed Van Hollen of Maryland for majority leader. Van Hollen also has the support of two newly elected senators who will take office in January, Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan and Peggy Flanagan of Minnesota.
Van Hollen is an outspoken critic of Israel who has led efforts to investigate the country’s human rights practices and pressure its right-wing government. He has drawn blowback from some Jewish leaders in recent years over his criticism of Israel and of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group.
Schumer, who has longstanding ties to AIPAC and the pro-Israel community, has described himself as a “Shomer Yisrael” (“guardian of Israel”), noting that his surname derives from the Hebrew word shomer. Still, he has become increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent years, going so far as giving a speech from the Senate floor in 2024 calling for new elections and leadership in Israel.
Ruffalo, known for his work in “The Avengers” franchise, “Spotlight” and “The Kids Are All Right,” has been a divisive figure in the Jewish community. In an August Instagram Story, he linked Skydance CEO David Ellison, the chief driver of the then-proposed Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, to tech giant Oracle, which Ruffalo accused of powering “an apartheid system of oppression” in Gaza.
Oracle was co-founded by Ellison’s father, Larry Ellison, one of the world’s richest men; both Ellisons are Jewish and prominent Israel supporters. Oracle also owns a stake in the social media network TikTok’s U.S. operations, and has long been a target of progressives who point to the company’s links to, and public support for, Israel.
In a social media post that was reported in September to be no longer available, Ruffalo described Larry Ellison as a “classic oligarch” who is “crushing workers and consolidating the wealth of the world for their own power and concentrated dominance.”
Ruffalo drew criticism from Jewish organizations, including the Jewish Federation Los Angeles, which said the actor’s comments “combined Jewish wealth, media control, secret technology and sinister global power,” drawing on “recognizable antisemitic tropes with a long and dangerous history.”
In response to the criticism, Ruffalo denied being antisemitic or anti-Israel, and said “criticizing the actions of the Israeli prime minister, a military technology contract, or the executives who supply it is not the same as criticizing Jewish people.” He added that “my views come from my own political convictions and should never be interpreted as hostility toward Jewish people, for whom I have deep love and respect.”
Some 170 notable Jewish personalities signed an open letter supporting him.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Israel does not need fake ‘unity’ with Netanyahu – it needs to move forward
For Israelis exhausted by years of political upheaval, bitter polarization and war, the appeal of national unity might seem obvious. Surely a country facing so many challenges would benefit from leaders putting aside their differences and working together.
Naftali Bennett breathed new life into this enduring hope by meeting last week with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently without coordinating with his presumed opposition partners. But this revived discussion of a government that united the opposition and Netanyahu’s Likud party was short-lived. Bennett has since advocated a broad government under former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, with Netanyahu as a junior partner or more.
Except that Netanyahu has so dramatically upset many Israelis that the possibility of him having any role in the next government has sparked a very animated discussion.
It begs questions: What exactly is a national unity government? Why has Israel repeatedly resorted to one? And when did the understandable yearning for national solidarity become confused with the notion that elections need not produce winners and losers?
Israel’s unity governments
Unity governments are largely an Israeli invention. Germany, whose parliamentary system resembles Israel’s in important respects, has repeatedly been governed by grand coalitions between its principal center-right and center-left parties. This tends to happen when there are many splinter formations who are so radical that the centrists on either side would rather “reach across the aisle.”
Israel’s experience with unity has taken on an additional significance. Its history of war and national emergency has imbued political unity with an almost sacred quality, drawing on the deeply rooted Jewish ideal of achdut or solidarity. But an agreement between rival politicians to share power is not the same thing as national solidarity.
Israel’s first national unity government was formed on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, when Menachem Begin’s opposition movement joined a Labor-led administration that already enjoyed a parliamentary majority. It was an emergency arrangement rather than a political necessity.
The defining precedent came in 1984, seven years after Begin’s historic election victory ended nearly three decades of Labor dominance. Israel had developed a competitive two-bloc system, with Labor on one side and Likud, supported by right-wing and religious parties, on the other.
Unlike Americans, Israelis do not directly elect their head of government. Also unlike Americans – where a vote in Wyoming is worth many votes in California – each vote counts the same. Israelis elect a 120-member Knesset, and the decisive question is which parties can assemble a parliamentary majority. The largest individual party is not necessarily the one that governs. In 2009, for example, Kadima won more seats than Likud, but Netanyahu formed the government because he could assemble a coalition.
In 1984, the rival blocs were effectively tied, 60–60. Neither could govern independently. Labor’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir therefore agreed to share power, rotating the premiership after two years.
The results were remarkable. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, retaining a security zone in the south, and implemented an economic stabilization program that brought runaway inflation under control. Peres honored the rotation agreement in 1986.
Yet unity had its limits. In 1987, Peres reached an understanding with Jordan’s King Hussein that might have opened an important diplomatic path toward resolving the Palestinian question. Shamir blocked it. The episode demonstrated how a government capable of making difficult decisions could also prevent them.
The 1988 election produced a different situation. Likud and its right-wing and religious allies had approximately 65 seats, enough to govern without Labor. Shamir nevertheless formed another unity government, this time without rotating the premiership. It collapsed in 1990.
Later unity governments under Ariel Sharon arose amid the trauma of the Second Intifada and, subsequently, to facilitate Israel’s disengagement from Gaza.
These experiences illustrate an important distinction. Some unity governments were born of parliamentary necessity, others of national emergency, and still others of a desire to implement policies that would otherwise be politically impossible. None demonstrated that bringing opposing parties into the same cabinet was generally pratical.
The most recent experiment came in 2020, when Netanyahu and Benny Gantz agreed to rotate the premiership after three inconclusive elections. Netanyahu would serve first, followed by Gantz. But the government collapsed over the failure to pass a budget, long before Gantz’s turn arrived. Gantz’s supporters accused Netanyahu of deliberately exploiting a loophole in the agreement; Netanyahu disputed responsibility.
The contrast with 1986, when Peres honored his commitment to Shamir, helps explain, in part, why Netanyahu has become so toxic.
Unity today?
That history raises questions about the present enthusiasm for unity. The first is whether there is a pressing karmic need for Netanyahu to be banished. The second is whether any new unity agreement could be sustained. The third, and perhaps the most fundamental, is what such a government could actually accomplish.
Israel faces profound disagreements over accountability for Oct. 7, judicial independence, military obligations for the ultra-Orthodox, the future of the West Bank and the place of Arab citizens in its democracy. These are not merely disputes over the pace of reform. They concern the direction in which the country should move.
A unity government that postponed these questions would not necessarily reconcile the country. It might simply institutionalize paralysis.
There is also a peculiar asymmetry in the Israeli discussion of unity.
When Netanyahu’s right-religious bloc won 64 Knesset seats in 2022, he formed a government without inviting his opponents to participate. Nobody seriously argued that the millions of Israelis who voted for opposition parties were thereby entitled to representation in the cabinet. Netanyahu had won a parliamentary majority and proceeded to govern.
That is how parliamentary democracy works.
Yet when the possibility arises that Netanyahu’s opponents might assemble a majority, the argument for unity frequently resurfaces. The implication is that the votes of Likud supporters must somehow be honored through Netanyahu’s continued participation in government, even if a different parliamentary majority is available.
The present situation is admittedly complicated. Netanyahu’s bloc lacks a majority, while Eisenkot and his prospective partners face difficult choices concerning cooperation with Arab parties and the ultra-Orthodox. A broad coalition may be one way to overcome those obstacles.
But political difficulty is not the same as democratic necessity. A parliamentary majority that includes Arab parties, or depends on their support, is no less legitimate than one that includes Likud. Nor does respecting the millions of Israelis who support Netanyahu require that he remain in government.
This is where the language of national unity becomes misleading. Reconciliation among citizens is an essential national objective. Sharing cabinet positions among politicians is a particular political arrangement, whose merits depend on the policies it can implement.
Israel’s history demonstrates that unity governments can accomplish extraordinary things when their participants share an urgent purpose. It also demonstrates how fundamental disagreements can turn them into mechanisms for mutual veto.
Bennett’s intervention has made the possibility of another such government a serious political question. But the discussion should not begin and end with the distribution of ministries, the order of a rotation or the reassuring symbolism of rival leaders sitting around the same cabinet table.
It should begin with what the government intends to do.
Democratic elections exist to allow citizens to choose between competing political programs. Sometimes the result makes cooperation between rivals unavoidable. Sometimes a national emergency makes it desirable. But unity cannot become a substitute for accepting that elections have consequences.
Israel needs national solidarity. Whether it needs another national unity government is an entirely different question. My answer is a categorical no. So extreme is Netanyahu’s chicanery that any deal with him would be a terrible mistake that would be a tragedy for Zionism itself. If Israel is to survive it needs Netanyahu out.
The post Israel does not need fake ‘unity’ with Netanyahu – it needs to move forward appeared first on The Forward.

