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A law professor worries Israel could become the next Hungary
(JTA) — Israel’s new governing coalition has been called the “most right-wing” in the nation’s history. That’s heartening to supporters who want the country to get tough on crime and secure Jewish rights to live in the West Bank, and dismaying to critics who see a government bent on denying rights to Israel’s minorities and undermining any hope for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While the far-right politics of new government ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir have drawn much of the world’s attention, a series of proposed changes to Israel’s judicial system has also been raising hopes and alarms. On Wednesday, new Justice Minister Yariv Levin announced an overhaul that would limit the authority of the High Court of Justice, Israel’s Supreme Court. It would put more politicians on the selection committee that picks judges, restrict the High Court’s ability to strike down laws and government decisions and enact an “override clause” enabling the Knesset to rewrite court decisions with a simple majority.
Levin and his supporters on the right justify these changes as a way to restore balance to a system that he says puts too much control in the hands of (lately) left-leaning judges: “We go to the polls, vote, elect, and time after time, people we didn’t elect choose for us. Many sectors of the public look to the judicial system and do not find their voices heard,” he asserted. “That is not democracy.”
Critics of the changes call them a power grab, one that will hand more leverage to the haredi Orthodox parties, remove checks on the settlement movement and limit civil society groups’ ability to litigate on behalf of Israeli minorities.
To help me make sense of the claims on both sides, I turned to Tom Ginsburg of the University of Chicago, where he is the Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law and co-directs the Comparative Constitutions Project, which gathers and analyzes the constitutions of all independent nation-states. He’s also a Jew who has transformed a former synagogue on the South Side of Chicago into a cutting-edge arts space, and says what’s happening with Israel’s new governing coalition “raises my complicated relationship with the country.”
We spoke on Friday. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: You have written about law in Israel, which lacks a constitution but relies on a series of “basic laws” to define its fundamental institutions. You’ve written that the Israeli judiciary had become “extremely powerful” — maybe too powerful — in imbuing the basic laws with a constitutional character, but worry that the current reforms will politicize the court in ways that will undermine Israeli democracy.
Tom Ginsburg: The proposed reforms were a campaign promise of certain elements of this coalition who have had longstanding grievances against the Israeli judiciary. The Israeli judiciary over the last decades has indeed become extremely powerful and important in writing or rewriting a constitution for Israel, promoting human rights and serving as a check and balance in a unicameral parliamentary system where the legislature can do anything it wants as a formal matter. A lot of people have had problems with that at the level of theory and practice. So there have been some reforms, and the court has, in my view, cut back on its activism in recent decades and in some sense has been more responsive to the center of the country. But there’s longstanding grievances from the political right, and that’s the context of these proposals.
A lot of the concerns about the new government in Israel are coming from the American Jewish left. But in an American context, the American Jewish left also has a big problem with the United States Supreme Court, because they see it as being too activist on the right. So in some ways isn’t the new Israeli government looking to do what American Jewish liberals dream of doing in this country?
Isn’t that funny? But the context is really different. The basic point is that judicial independence is a really good thing. Judicial accountability is a really good thing. And if you study high courts around the world, as I do, you see that there’s kind of a calibration, a balancing of institutional factors which lead towards more independence or more accountability and sometimes things switch around over time.
Israeli Justice Minister Yariv Levin holds a press conference at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, Jan. 4, 2023. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)
You mean “accountability” in the sense that courts should be accountable to the public.
Right. The Israeli promoters of these plans are pointing to the United States, in particular, for the proposals for more political involvement in the appointment process. On the other hand, in the United States once you’re appointed politically, you’re serving for life. There’s literally no check on your power. And so maybe some people think we have too much independence. If these proposals go through in Israel, there will be a front-end politicization of the court [in terms of the selection commission], but also back-end checks on the court [with the override clause that would allow a simple majority to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court]. So in some sense, it moves the pendulum very far away from independence and very much towards accountability to the point of possible politicization.
And accountability in that case is too much of a good thing.
Again, you don’t want courts that can just make up rules. They should be responsive to society. On the other hand, you don’t want judges who are so responsive to society that there’s no protection for the basic rights of unpopular minorities.
What makes Israel either unique or different from some of the other countries you study, and certainly the United States? Part of it, I would guess, is the fact that it does not have a constitution. Is that a useful distinction?
They couldn’t agree on a single written constitution at the outset of the country, but they have built one through what you might call a “common law method”: norms and practices over time as well as the system of “basic laws,” which are passed by an absolute majority of the Knesset, where a majority of 61 votes can change any of those. But while they’re not formally entrenched, they have a kind of political status because of that term: basic law.
By the way, the Germans are in the same boat. The German constitution is called the Basic Law. And it was always meant to be a provisional constitution until they got together and reunified.
If you don’t have a written constitution, what’s the source of the legitimacy of judicial power? What is to prevent a Knesset from just passing literally any law, including ones that violate all kinds of rights, or installing a dictator? It has been political norms. And because Israel has relied on political norms, that means that this current conflict is going to have extremely high stakes for Israeli governance for many decades to come.
Can you give me a couple of examples? What are the high stakes in terms of democratic governance?
First of all, let me just say in principle that I don’t oppose reforms to make the judiciary more independent or accountable in any particular country. But then you obviously have to look at the local context. What’s a little worrying about this particular example is that several members of this coalition are themselves about to be subject to judicial proceedings.
Including the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
Right. And for example, they need to change the rules so that [Shas Party chairman] Aryeh Deri can sit in the cabinet despite his prior convictions. That indicates to me that maybe this isn’t a good-faith argument about the proper structure of the Israeli, uncodified constitution, but instead a mechanism of expediency.
Any one of these reforms might look okay, and you can find other countries that have done them. The combination, however, renders the judiciary extremely weak. Right now, it’s a multi-stakeholder commission that nominates and appoints judges in Israel, and the new coalition wants to propose that the commission be made up of a majority of politicians. We know that when you change the appointments mechanism to put more politicians on those committees, the more politicized they become.
Think about the United States process of appointing our Supreme Court judges: It’s highly politicized, and obviously the legitimacy of the court has taken a big hit in recent years. In Israel, you’d have politicized appointments under these reforms, but then you also have the ability of the Knesset to override any particular ruling that it wanted. Again, you can find countries which have that. It’s called the “new commonwealth model” of constitutionalism, in which courts don’t have the final say on constitutional matters, and the legislature can overrule them on particular rulings. But I think the combination is very dangerous because you could have a situation where the Knesset — which currently has a role in protecting human rights — can pick out and override specific cases, which really to me goes against the idea of the rule of law.
You mentioned other countries. Are there other countries where these kinds of changes were enacted and we saw how the experiment turned out?
The two most prominent recently are Hungary and Poland, which are not necessarily countries that you want to compare yourself to.
Certainly not if you are Israel.
Right. There’s so much irony here. When the new Polish government came in in 2015, they immediately manipulated the appointment system for the Constitutional Court and appointed their own majority, which then allowed them to pass legislation which probably would have been ruled unconstitutional. They basically set up a system where they were going to replace lower judges and so they were going to grow themselves into a majority of the court. And that’s led to controversy and rulings outside the mainstream that have led to protests, while the European Union is withholding funds and such from Poland because of this manipulation of the court.
In Hungary, Victor Orban was a really radical leader, and when he had a bare majority to change the constitution he wiped out all the previous jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. I don’t think the Israeli government would do that. But still there is this kind of worrying sense that they’re able to manipulate interpretation of law for their own particular political interest.
Another thing I want to raise is the potential for a constitutional crisis now. Suppose they pass these laws and the Israeli Supreme Court says, “Well, wait a minute, that interferes with our common law rules that we are bound by, going back to the British Mandate.” It conflicts with the basic law and they invoke what legal scholars call the “doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments,” which is basically saying that an amendment goes against the core of our democratic system and violates, for example, Israel’s character as a Jewish and democratic society. Israel has never done this, but it is a kind of tool that one sees deployed around the world in these crises. And if that happened, then I think you would have a full constitutional crisis on your hands in Israel.
Supreme Court President Aharon Barak speaks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a ceremony in the Supreme Court marking 50 years of law, Sept. 15, 1998. (Avi Ohayon)
What does a constitutional crisis look like?
Suppose you have sitting justices in Israel who say, “You know, this Knesset law violates the basic law and therefore it’s invalid.” And then, would the Knesset try to impeach those judges? Would they cut the budget of the judiciary? Would they back down?
When you compare Israel’s judicial system to other countries’ over the years, how does it stack up? Is it up there among the very strong systems or is it known for flaws that might have maybe hobbled its effectiveness?
It’s always been seen around the world as a very strong judiciary. Under the leadership of Aharon Barak [president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006] it became extremely activist. And this provoked backlash in Israeli politics. That led to a kind of recalibration of the court where it is still doing its traditional role of defending fundamental rights and ensuring the integrity of the political process, but it’s not making up norms left and right, in the way that it used to. This is my perception. But it’s certainly seen as one of the leading courts around the world, its decisions are cited by others, and because of the quality of the judges and the complex issues that Israel faces it’s seen as a strong court and an effective court and to me a balanced court.
But, you know, I’m not in Israel, and ultimately, they’re going to figure out the question how balanced it is or where it’s going to go. I do worry that an unchecked majoritarian system, especially with a pure proportional representation model like Israel, has the potential for the capture of government by some minorities to wield power against other minorities. And that’s a problem for democracies — to some degree, that’s a problem we face in the United States.
How correctable are these reforms? I am thinking of someone who says, “These are democratically elected representatives who now want to change a system. If you want to change the system, elect your own majority.” Is the ship of state like this really hard to turn around once you go in a certain direction?
This is an area in which I think Israel and the United States have a lot of similarities. For several decades now, the judiciary has been a major issue for those on the political right. They thought the Warren Court was too left-leaning and they started the Federalist Society to create a whole cadre of people to staff the courts. They’ve done that and now the federal courts are certainly much more conservative than the country probably. But the left didn’t really have a theory of judicial power in the United States. And I think that’s kind of true in Israel: It’s a big issue for the political right, but the political left, besides just being not very cohesive at the moment, isn’t able to articulate what’s good about having an independent judiciary. It is correctable in theory, but that would require the rule of law to become a politically salient issue, which it generally isn’t in that many countries.
How do you relate to what is happening in Israel as a Jew, and not just a legal scholar?
That’s a great question, because it really raises my complicated relationship with the country. You know, I find it to be a very interesting democracy. I like going to Israel because it’s a society in which there’s a lot of argument, a lot of good court cases and a lot of good legal scholars. On one level, I connect with my colleagues and friends there who seem very demoralized about this current moment. And I honestly worry about whether this society will remain a Jewish and democratic one with the current coalition.
The rule of law is a part of democracy. You need the rule of law in order to have democracy function. And I know others would respond and say, “Oh, you’re just being hysterical.” And, “This isn’t Sweden, it’s the Middle East.” But the ethno-nationalist direction of the country bothers me as a Jew, and I hope that the court remains there to prevent it from deepening further.
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Antisemitism speech sparks pushback from Jewish conservatives
(JTA) — When Orit Arfa read political theorist Yoram Hazony’s recent comments on antisemitism on the American right, she decided that her past admiration for him no longer justified staying silent about what she sees as a moral failure.
Arfa, who served until last month as a spokesperson for Hazony, responded Thursday with a deeply personal essay in Tablet magazine titled “Yoram Hazony’s 15 Minutes.” She wrote about her departure after four years from the Edmund Burke Foundation, the organization Hazony founded that is an institutional hub of the national conservatism movement. In her essay, she accused Hazony of erasing work she and others did under his leadership and of publicly faulting Jewish institutions for failures she says he knowingly helped create.
“I have known and admired Yoram for many years,” Arfa wrote, praising his scholarship and describing his 2015 book on the Book of Esther as one of the most influential works in her intellectual life. “It’s with a heavy heart, then, that I feel compelled to set the record straight.”
An Israeli conservative intellectual, Hazony is one of the architects of national conservatism, arguing for a politics grounded in nationalism, religion and tradition. His ideas have gained influence among Republican politicians, donors and movement strategists, particularly within the wing of the party associated with figures like Vice President JD Vance.
Hazony’s influence has placed him at the center of a growing dispute on the Jewish right, as the movement he helped shape confronts allegations of antisemitism in its orbit. Hazony has declined requests for an interview from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in recent months.
Because of Hazony’s prominence, Arfa’s break with him has resonated well beyond their personal history, highlighting a broader debate among Jewish conservatives over how to confront antisemitism when it comes not from political opponents, but from figures embedded in the American right.
That debate was thrust into the open after Hazony’s keynote speech earlier this week at the Second International Conference on Combating Antisemitism in Jerusalem, where he forcefully condemned antisemitic rhetoric aired on the program of conservative media figure Tucker Carlson. Hazony described Carlson’s show as a “circus of aggressive anti-Jewish propaganda,” listing familiar antisemitic tropes aired by guests.
“These aren’t normal political messages, disagreeing with other members of the Trump coalition on legitimate policy issues,” Hazony said. “They’re abusive, wild slanders, and their repeated appearance on Tucker’s show has persuaded almost every Jew I know that the program’s purpose is to drive Jews—along with tens of millions of Zionist Christians—out of the Trump coalition and out of the Republican party.”
At the same time, Hazony argued that Jewish and Christian Zionist activists had failed to persuade Republican leaders to distance themselves from Carlson — not because Carlson was too powerful, but because critics had not presented their case professionally. He mocked the absence of a concise, evidence-based “15-minute explainer video” that could persuade conservatives unfamiliar with Carlson’s program, calling this a sign of “extreme incompetence” by what he labeled the “antisemitism-industrial complex.”
That claim became the focal point of Arfa’s response.
“The truth, as Yoram well knows, is that there is such a video,” she wrote. According to Arfa, she and other Edmund Burke Foundation staff members worked with Hazony to produce exactly such an explainer — a 14-minute, 57-second compilation of examples of antisemitic rhetoric aired on Carlson’s program.
Hazony, she said, chose not to make it public.
“He kept it unlisted in an obscure account,” Arfa wrote, adding that she was “flabbergasted” to hear Hazony publicly insist no such work existed. “It saddens me that he would diminish the work of his dedicated employees by erasing our efforts.”
A spokesperson for Hazony did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The dispute over Hazony’s speech has become a proxy for a larger argument about responsibility and strategy. Hazony is urging Jews to focus on building alliances with what he describes as the dominant nationalist wing of the Republican Party, arguing that moralistic confrontations risk alienating potential allies and entrenching antisemitism.
“What would you find if you actually invested the time and effort, and opened those doors?” Hazony said in his speech. “Mostly, you’d discover that nationalist Republicans are not anti-Semites. That they are strongly committed to having Jews in their coalition. That they would like to have closer relations with the Jewish community. That many of them see Israel as an inspiration and wish America were more like Israel. In short, you’d discover that most of them are potential friends and allies.”
Critics counter that this approach shifts responsibility away from political leaders who tolerate antisemitism. Several commentators on the right have argued that treating antisemitism as a communications problem, rather than a moral red line, risks normalizing it.
Tablet, where Arfa’s essay was published, issued an unusually scathing response on social media, accusing Hazony of effectively blaming Jews for their own marginalization.
In a post on X directly responding to a Hazony, Tablet wrote, “Tucker Carlson could goose-step down Pennsylvania Avenue butt-naked with a swastika carved into his forehead and it would be the fault of ‘the anti-semitism industrial complex’ for not making the case ‘clear enough’ to ‘Republican nationalists.’”
Tablet’s post added, “The fault doesn’t lie with the Jews for being targeted by political arsonists. It lies with those people themselves, and with those who have given them political and intellectual cover, yourself included.”
The post went on to accuse Hazony of importing European-style ethnonationalist ideas into an American context defined by constitutional liberalism and religious pluralism, warning that such thinking risked alienating both Jews and the broader electorate.
Others focused less on ideology than on political accountability. Max Abrahms, a political scientist who studies extremism and political violence, argued that Hazony’s framing functioned as a defense of powerful allies who have declined to distance themselves from Carlson.“I interpret this as a defense for your political allies, especially J.D. Vance and Kevin Roberts who won’t ditch Tucker,” Abrahms wrote.
A broader critique came from Saul Sadka, a conservative writer and analyst, who accused Hazony of minimizing antisemitism in service of what he considered a marginal political project. Writing on X, Sadka argued that Hazony mischaracterized the Republican Party, overstated the influence of nationalist conservatives, and pressured Jews to align themselves with forces that, he said, are both electorally weak and tolerant of antisemitic rhetoric.
For her part, Arfa,wrote in Tablet that she’d prefer to stay out of the conversation now that’s stopped working for Hazony. Her focus is on studying to become a rabbi at the Abraham Geiger College in Potsdam, Germany, a seminary affiliated with Reform and liberal Judaism.
The post Antisemitism speech sparks pushback from Jewish conservatives appeared first on The Forward.
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What’s missing in our Jewish high schools
ווען איך בין געווען אַ קינד אין די 1960ער און 70ער יאָרן זענען געווען גאָר ווייניק טאָגשולן פֿאַר ייִדישע קינדער. האָבן ס׳רובֿ משפּחות געשיקט די קינדער אין די עפֿנטלעכע שולן, און ווי אַ צוגאָב — אין אַ תּלמוד־תּורה אָדער ייִדישער נאָכמיטאָג־שול צו קריגן אַ ביסל ייִדישע בילדונג.
הײַנט זענען אָבער דאָ אַ סך ייִדישע טאָגשולן, פֿון פּראָגרעסיווע ביז חרדישע. אין דעם אַרטיקל וועל איך זיך קאָנצעטרירן אויף די מאָדערן־אָרטאָדאָקסישע מיטלשולן, כאָטש מע וואָלט עס געקענט אויך ווענדן אויף אַלע שולן וואָס שטרעבן אײַנצופֿלאַנצן אין די תּלמידים אַ טיפֿע פֿאַרבינדונג מיט זייערע ייִדישע וואָרצלען.
אין 2013 האָט דער „פּיו‟־פֿאָרום פּובליקירט די רעזולטאַטן פֿון אַן אַרומנעמיקער שטודיע וועגן די אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן, וואָס האָט באַוויזן, שוואַרץ אויף ווײַס, עטלעכע בפֿירושע טענדענצן אין דער אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישער קהילה. איינס פֿון די געפֿינסן איז געווען דער ממשותדיקער וווּקס פֿון דער אָרטאָדאָקסישער באַפֿעלקערונג, בפֿרט אין ניו־יאָרק און ניו־דזשערזי.
איין סיבה פֿאַרן וווּקס, האָבן די פֿאָרשער משער געווען, איז ווײַל 48% אָרטאָדאָקסישע ייִדן האָבן פֿיר אָדער מער קינדער, בעת בלויז 9% אַנדערע ייִדישע עלטערן האָבן גרויסע משפּחות. אַ צווייטע סיבה: 98% אָרטאָדאָקסישע ייִדן האָבן אַ ייִדישן מאַן אָדער פֿרוי, בעת בײַ די קאָנסערוואַטיווע ייִדן האָבן 73% אַ ייִדישן זיווג, און בײַ רעפֿאָרם־ייִדן — 50%. אַ קינד וואָס ווערט דערצויגן בײַ צוויי ייִדישע עלטערן וועט געוויינטלעך זיך גיכער אידענטפֿיצירן ווי אַ ייִד איידער איינס בײַ וועמען איינער פֿון די עלטערן איז נישט קיין ייִד.
דער פּועל־יוצא פֿון דעם אַלץ איז אַז די ייִדישע טאָגשולן און מיטלשולן, בפֿרט די אָרטאָדאָקסישע, האָבן הײַנט מער תּלמידים ווי זיי האָבן ווען אַ מאָל געהאַט. עלטערן פֿון די פֿרומע שולן האָפֿן אַז דורכן שיקן די קינדער אַהין וועלן זייערע קינדער קריגן אַ געראָטענע ייִדישע בילדונג און במילא פֿאַרבלײַבן פֿרומע ייִדישע קינדער.
נישט תּמיד אַרבעט זיך עס אָבער אויס אַזוי. הינטער די קוליסן שושקען זיך די עלטערן, לערער און שול־דירעקטאָרן — גיכער בײַ די מאָדערן־אָרטאָדאָקסישע מיטלשולן איידער בײַ די חרדישע — וועגן אַן אָנגעווייטיקטן ענין: נישט געקוקט אויף זייערע גרעסטע באַמיִונגען, גייען געוויסע גראַדואַנטן פֿון די מיטלשולן „אַראָפּ פֿון דרך‟; דאָס הייסט — זיי היטן מער נישט קיין פֿרום לעבן.
ווען איך רעד וועגן דעם ענין מיט נישט־רעליגיעזע מענטשן, סײַ ייִדן סײַ נישט־ייִדן, וועלן זיי אָפֿט קוועטשן מיט די אַקסלען און זאָגן: „וואָס איז דאָ דער חידוש? מיר וווינען אין אַ פֿרײַער געזעלשאַפֿט, וווּ קינדער קענען אויסקלײַבן זייער אייגענעם לעבן־שטייגער. אויב דאָס קינד איז צופֿרידן מיטן לעבן וואָס ער האָט פֿאַר זיך אויסגעקליבן, דאַרפֿן די עלטערן אויך זײַן צופֿרידן.‟
ענטפֿער איך זיי, אַז ווען עלטערן גלייבן שטאַרק אין אַ געוויסער אידעאָלאָגיע, איז נאַטירלעך אַז זיי וועלן אַנטוישט ווערן אויב זייער קינד וואַרפֿן עס אָפּ. אַ מאַמע וואָס איז, למשל, זייער איבערגעגעבן צו געוויסע פּראָגרעסיווע אידעאַלן, וואָס מאַרשירט מיט אירע פֿרײַנד אויף פּאָליטישע דעמאָנסטראַציעס און ברענגט אַפֿילו מיט איר קינד — וועט זיכער אַנטוישט ווערן אויב דאָס קינד שליסט זיך שפּעטער אָן אין דער רעפּובליקאַנער פּאַרטיי. בײַ איר וואָלט דאָס אויך געהייסן אַז ער איז „אַראָפּ פֿון דרך‟.
די סיבות פֿאַר וואָס אַ קינד פֿון אַ פֿרומער היים וואָלט פֿאַרלאָזט אַזאַ לעבן־שטייגער זענען אָפֿט זייער קאָמפּליצירטע און אַ רעזולטאַט פֿון עטלעכע פֿאַקטאָרן. דורך מײַנע אייגענע שמועסן מיט מיטלשול־גראַדואַנטן האָב איך אַנטדעקט פֿיר מעגלעכע סיבות דערפֿאַר:
- נאָכן גראַדויִרן, פֿאָרט דער סטודענט אַוועק שטודירן אין אַ סעקולערן קאָלעדזש און דאָרט דערפֿילט ער אַז דאָס רעליגיעזע לעבן האַלט אים אָפּ פֿון זיך אויסלעבן ווי אַ פֿרײַער פֿויגל (ענלעך צום ייִנגל וואָס באַשרײַבט די דערשטיקנדיקע ליבשאַפֿט פֿון דער מאַמען אין איציק מאַנגערס ליד, „אויפֿן וועג שטייט אַ בוים‟).
- ער אָדער זי גלייבט נישט אין גאָט און זעט דערפֿאַר נישט קיין זינען אין היטן די מיצוות.
- ער אָדער זי האָט געליטן פֿון אַן אומגליקלעך משפּחה־לעבן און האָט דערפֿאַר נעגאַטיווע אַסאָציאַציעס מיט דער משפּחה, אַרײַנגערעכנט איר פֿרומקייט,
- ער אָדער זי איז „גיי‟ (האָט ליב דעם זעלבן מין) און פֿילט זיך אַרויסגעשלאָסן פֿונעם פֿרומען ציבור צוליב דער תּורהס פֿאַרווערן אַזוינע באַציִונגען.
שטעלט זיך די פֿראַגע: איז דאָ עפּעס וואָס די מיטלשולן וואָלטן געקענט טאָן פֿאַר יענע תּלמידים איידער זיי פֿאַרלאָזן דאָס רעליגיעזע לעבן? אויב מע האָט שוין אויסגעפּרוּווט אַלע קירובֿ־מיטלען און עס העלפֿט ווײַטער נישט, זאָל מען זיך פּשוט אונטערגעבן? איך האַלט אַז ניין. יעדעס קינד וואָס גראַדויִרט פֿון אַ ייִדישער מיטלשול, וואָלט געדאַרפֿט אַרויסקומען ווי אַ שטאָלצער ייִד, אַפֿילו אויב ער דריקט עס אויס אויף אַ נישט־רעליגיעזן אופֿן. און טאַקע דערפֿאַר דאַרפֿן די שולן אַנטוויקלען די ייִדישע אידענטיטעט פֿון די תּלמידים נישט בלויז אינעם רעליגיעזן זינען אָבער אויך אינעם נאַציאָנאַל־קולטורעלן.
איין אופֿן, וואָס ס׳רובֿ טאָגשולן טוען שוין, איז דורכן פֿאַרשטאַרקן די קינדערס אידענטיפֿיקאַציע מיט מדינת־ישׂראל. דאָס העלפֿט אויב דער בחור אָדער מיידל וועט שפּעטער טאַקע עולה זײַן. אין דער אמתן אָבער וועלן ס׳רובֿ תּלמידים זיך נישט באַזעצן אין ישׂראל, אַזוי אַז דאָס אַליין איז נישט קיין לייזונג.
וואָס מע דאַרף יאָ טאָן איז לערנען דעם תּלמיד די פֿילפֿאַרביקייט פֿון זײַן ייִדישן אָפּשטאַם, וואָס בײַ ס׳רובֿ ייִדן אין אַמעריקע איז דאָס אַ מזרח־אייראָפּעיִשער. אַחוץ די געוויינטלעכע ייִדישע לימודים ווי חומש, נבֿיאים און גמרא, דאַרף מען אויך אײַנפֿירן קורסן וואָס באַקענען די קינדער מיט דער רײַכקייט פֿון דער ייִדישער קולטור. ווען דער תּלמיד וועט זיך דערוויסן אַז ייִדישקייט נעמט אַרײַן נישט בלויז רעליגיע אָבער אויך די ייִדישע שפּראַך (ווײַל העברעיִש וועלן זיי זיך שוין במילא אויסלערנען), די געשיכטע, מאכלים און מוזיק פֿון אַמאָליקן ייִדישלאַנד, גיט עס אים אַ בעסערן פֿאַרשטאַנד פֿון וואָס עס הייסט צו זײַן אַ ייִד.
אַ צאָל מיטלשולן טוען דאָס שוין, אָבער בלויז אויפֿן שפּיץ מעסער. אינעם ענגליש־קלאַס, למשל, וועט דער לערער הייסן די תּלמידים לייענען אַן איבערזעצונג פֿון אַ באַשעוויס־דערציילונג. ליטעראַטור איז אָבער בלויז איין אַספּעקט פֿון קולטור. כּדי באמת אײַנצופֿלאַנצן אַן אינטערעס און ליבשאַפֿט צום עטניש־קולטורעלן אַספּעקט פֿון ייִדישקייט דאַרף מען אײַנפֿירן קורסן פֿון פֿאַרשיידענע מינים. למשל:
- אַ קלאַס וועגן דער געשיכטע פֿון די ייִדן אין מיזרח־אייראָפּע — און נישט בלויז וועגן דער ציוניסטישער באַוועגונג און דעם חורבן (דאָס לערנט מען שוין), נאָר וועגן די גרויסע אויפֿטוען במשך פֿון דער טויזנט־יאָריקער געשיכטע פֿון די ייִדן אין מיזרח־אייראָפּע: דער געבורט פֿון דער חסידישער באַוועגונג, די צעבליִונג פֿון דער ייִדישער און העברעיִשער ליטעראַטור, דער פּאָליטישער אַקטיוויזם פֿון די מזרח־אייראָפּעיִשע בונדיסטן, ציוניסטן און ייִדישיסטן, און ווי די ייִדן האָבן מיטגעבראַכט אָט די קולטור־ירושה קיין אַמעריקע.
- אַ קורס וועגן ייִדישן קינאָ, וווּ די קינדער קוקן אויף קלאַסישע ייִדישע פֿילמען ווי „דער דיבוק‟, „טבֿיה‟ און „ייִדל מיטן פֿידל‟ און דיסקוטירן סײַ דעם קולטור־היסטאָרישן קאָנטעקסט, סײַ די קונסט פֿונעם פֿילם.
- אַ קלאַס פֿון קלעזמער־מוזיק, און אַפֿילו אַ וואַרשטאַט וווּ די קינדער ברענגען זייערע אינסטרומענטן און לערנען זיך ווי אַליין צו שפּילן די אַלטע ייִדישע מעלאָדיעס (אָדער אַ קלאַס פֿון פֿאַרשידענע מינים ייִדישן פֿאָלקסמוזיק, אַרײַנגערעכנט די ספֿרדישע און תּימנער טראַדיציעס).
- אַ קאָכקלאַס וווּ די קינדער לערנען זיך אויס ווי צוצוגרייטן היימישע מזרח־אייראָפּעיִשע מאכלים ווי בלינצעס, קניידלעך און ראָגעלעך.
- ייִדיש־לעקציעס, ניצנדיק דעם אויסערגעוויינטלעכן קאָמפּיוטער־קורס, „ייִדיש פּאַפּ‟ וווּ קינדער לערנען זיך די שפּראַך דורך קוקן אויף די חנעוודיקע ייִדישע קאַרטונס פֿון נאָמי מיט איר ראָבאָט מאָבי— און וואָס איז, אַגבֿ, פֿרײַ פֿון אָפּצאָל.
געוויסע לערער און פּרינציפּאַלן וועלן טענהן, אַז צוליב דעם שוין געפּאַקטן לערנטאָג פֿון אַ ייִדישער מיטלשול (בפֿרט צוליב די אַוואַנסירטע סעקולערע לימודים וואָס די עלטערן פֿאָדערן כּדי זייערע קינדער זאָלן קענען אַרײַן אין די בעסטע אוניווערסיטעטן), איז פּשוט נישטאָ קיין צײַט צוצוגעבן אַזוינע קורסן. דאָס איז אָבער אַ תּירוץ פֿאַר די בענטשליכט. יעדער ווייסט אַז דאָס לערנען אַוואַנסירטע גמרא, למשל, איז נישט פֿאַר אַלעמען. אין דער זעלבער צײַט פֿונעם גמרא־קלאַס קען מען גיבן איינעם אָדער מער פֿון די קולטורקלאַסן ווי אַ ברירה.
דערצו קען מען אָפּהאַלטן די קלאַסן נאָך די געוויינטלעכע שול־שעהען. פּונקט ווי די מער אַטלעטישע תּלמידים גייען טרענירן אויף ספּאָרטמאַטשן, זאָלן תּלמידים מיט אַן אינטערעס צו קולטור זיך דערוויסן וועגן דער פֿילפֿאַרביקער קולטור־ירושה פֿונעם ייִדישן פֿאָלק און אַפֿילו גיין אויף שײַכותדיקע עקסקורסיעס צוזאַמען. די סטודענטן וואָס וווינען אין דער ניו־יאָרקער געגנט קענען, למשל, פֿאָרן צוזאַמען אין ייִדישן טעאַטער.
בקיצור, ווען מע פֿלאַנצט אײַן בײַ קינדער אַ ליבשאַפֿט צו זייער עטניש־קולטורעלן אָפּשטאַם, גיט עס זיי אַ געלעגנהייט צו בלײַבן שטאָלצע, גוט־אינפֿאָרמירטע ייִדן. נאָכן גראַדויִרן וועלן זיי קענען אויסדריקן זייער ייִדישע אידענטיטעט נישט בלויז דורך גיין אין שיל שבת און יום־טובֿ, נאָר דורכן ווײַטער זיך לערנען ייִדיש, זיך פֿאַרנעמען מיט אַקאַדעמישע פֿאָרשונגען פֿאַרבונדן מיט דער ייִדישער געשיכטע אָדער ליטעראַטור און גיין אויף ייִדישע קאָנצערטן, פֿעסטיוואַלן און קאָנפֿערענצן. דערבײַ וועלן אויך יענע קינדער, וואָס פֿאַרלאָזן דאָס רעליגיעזע לעבן, ווײַטער אָנהאַלטן אַ שטאַרקע פֿאַרבינדונג מיט ייִדן און ייִדישקייט און במילא וועלן זיי, כאָטש אינעם קולטורעלן זינען, קיין מאָל נישט אַראָפּ פֿון דרך.
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Russia’s Medvedev Praises Trump But Questions US Submarine Threat
Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev attends an interview with Reuters, TASS and WarGonzo in the Moscow region, Russia January 29, 2026. Photo: Dmitry Medvedev’s Secretariat/Handout via REUTERS
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, praised US President Donald Trump as an effective leader who was seeking peace but added that Moscow had seen no trace of nuclear submarines Trump said he moved to Russian shores.
Trump, who has said he wants to be remembered as a “peacemaker” president, has repeatedly said that a peace deal to end the Ukraine war is close, and a new round of US-Russian-Ukrainian talks is scheduled for this week in Abu Dhabi.
Asked if Trump was positive or negative for Russia and about unproven speculation that Trump was some sort of Russian agent, Medvedev said the American people had chosen Trump and that Moscow respected that decision.
Medvedev lauded Trump’s courage in resisting the US establishment and said the US president’s sometimes “brash” style was “effective.”
“He is an emotional person, but on the other hand, the chaos that is commonly referred to, which is created by his activities, is not entirely true,” he told Reuters, TASS and the WarGonzo Russian war blogger in an interview at his residence outside Moscow and authorized for publication on Sunday.
“It is obvious that behind this lies a completely conscious and competent line,” said Medvedev, who served as Russian president from 2008 to 2012.
President Vladimir Putin remains the final voice on Russian policy, though Medvedev, an arch-hawk who has repeatedly goaded Trump on social media, gives a sense of hardliners’ thinking within the Russian elite, according to foreign diplomats.
“Trump wants to go down in history as a peacemaker – and he is really trying,” Medvedev said. “He is really trying to do that. And that is why contacts with Americans have become much more productive.”
TRUMP’S SUBMARINE THREAT
Medvedev said the key to understanding Trump was his business background, quipping that there was no such thing as a former businessman – a play on an old Russian joke that there is no such thing as a former KGB agent.
Trump in August said he had ordered two US nuclear submarines to move closer to Russia in response to what he called “highly provocative” comments from Medvedev about the risk of war after what appeared to be an ultimatum from Trump.
“We still have not found them,” Medvedev said of the US submarines.
After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Medvedev has repeatedly hurled invective at Kyiv and Western powers while warning of the risks of an escalation of the war towards a nuclear “apocalypse.”
Medvedev said Russia would “soon” win military victory in the Ukraine war but the key thing was to prevent any further conflict, adding: “I would like this to happen as soon as possible.”
“But it is equally important to think about what will happen next. After all, the goal of victory is to prevent new conflicts. This is absolutely obvious.”
Russia currently controls a fifth of Ukraine but has so far been unable to take the whole of the eastern Donbas region, where Ukrainian forces hold about 10%, or 5,000 square km (1,900 square miles), according to open-source maps of the war.