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A law professor worries Israel could become the next Hungary
(JTA) — Israel’s new governing coalition has been called the “most right-wing” in the nation’s history. That’s heartening to supporters who want the country to get tough on crime and secure Jewish rights to live in the West Bank, and dismaying to critics who see a government bent on denying rights to Israel’s minorities and undermining any hope for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While the far-right politics of new government ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir have drawn much of the world’s attention, a series of proposed changes to Israel’s judicial system has also been raising hopes and alarms. On Wednesday, new Justice Minister Yariv Levin announced an overhaul that would limit the authority of the High Court of Justice, Israel’s Supreme Court. It would put more politicians on the selection committee that picks judges, restrict the High Court’s ability to strike down laws and government decisions and enact an “override clause” enabling the Knesset to rewrite court decisions with a simple majority.
Levin and his supporters on the right justify these changes as a way to restore balance to a system that he says puts too much control in the hands of (lately) left-leaning judges: “We go to the polls, vote, elect, and time after time, people we didn’t elect choose for us. Many sectors of the public look to the judicial system and do not find their voices heard,” he asserted. “That is not democracy.”
Critics of the changes call them a power grab, one that will hand more leverage to the haredi Orthodox parties, remove checks on the settlement movement and limit civil society groups’ ability to litigate on behalf of Israeli minorities.
To help me make sense of the claims on both sides, I turned to Tom Ginsburg of the University of Chicago, where he is the Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law and co-directs the Comparative Constitutions Project, which gathers and analyzes the constitutions of all independent nation-states. He’s also a Jew who has transformed a former synagogue on the South Side of Chicago into a cutting-edge arts space, and says what’s happening with Israel’s new governing coalition “raises my complicated relationship with the country.”
We spoke on Friday. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: You have written about law in Israel, which lacks a constitution but relies on a series of “basic laws” to define its fundamental institutions. You’ve written that the Israeli judiciary had become “extremely powerful” — maybe too powerful — in imbuing the basic laws with a constitutional character, but worry that the current reforms will politicize the court in ways that will undermine Israeli democracy.
Tom Ginsburg: The proposed reforms were a campaign promise of certain elements of this coalition who have had longstanding grievances against the Israeli judiciary. The Israeli judiciary over the last decades has indeed become extremely powerful and important in writing or rewriting a constitution for Israel, promoting human rights and serving as a check and balance in a unicameral parliamentary system where the legislature can do anything it wants as a formal matter. A lot of people have had problems with that at the level of theory and practice. So there have been some reforms, and the court has, in my view, cut back on its activism in recent decades and in some sense has been more responsive to the center of the country. But there’s longstanding grievances from the political right, and that’s the context of these proposals.
A lot of the concerns about the new government in Israel are coming from the American Jewish left. But in an American context, the American Jewish left also has a big problem with the United States Supreme Court, because they see it as being too activist on the right. So in some ways isn’t the new Israeli government looking to do what American Jewish liberals dream of doing in this country?
Isn’t that funny? But the context is really different. The basic point is that judicial independence is a really good thing. Judicial accountability is a really good thing. And if you study high courts around the world, as I do, you see that there’s kind of a calibration, a balancing of institutional factors which lead towards more independence or more accountability and sometimes things switch around over time.
Israeli Justice Minister Yariv Levin holds a press conference at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, Jan. 4, 2023. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)
You mean “accountability” in the sense that courts should be accountable to the public.
Right. The Israeli promoters of these plans are pointing to the United States, in particular, for the proposals for more political involvement in the appointment process. On the other hand, in the United States once you’re appointed politically, you’re serving for life. There’s literally no check on your power. And so maybe some people think we have too much independence. If these proposals go through in Israel, there will be a front-end politicization of the court [in terms of the selection commission], but also back-end checks on the court [with the override clause that would allow a simple majority to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court]. So in some sense, it moves the pendulum very far away from independence and very much towards accountability to the point of possible politicization.
And accountability in that case is too much of a good thing.
Again, you don’t want courts that can just make up rules. They should be responsive to society. On the other hand, you don’t want judges who are so responsive to society that there’s no protection for the basic rights of unpopular minorities.
What makes Israel either unique or different from some of the other countries you study, and certainly the United States? Part of it, I would guess, is the fact that it does not have a constitution. Is that a useful distinction?
They couldn’t agree on a single written constitution at the outset of the country, but they have built one through what you might call a “common law method”: norms and practices over time as well as the system of “basic laws,” which are passed by an absolute majority of the Knesset, where a majority of 61 votes can change any of those. But while they’re not formally entrenched, they have a kind of political status because of that term: basic law.
By the way, the Germans are in the same boat. The German constitution is called the Basic Law. And it was always meant to be a provisional constitution until they got together and reunified.
If you don’t have a written constitution, what’s the source of the legitimacy of judicial power? What is to prevent a Knesset from just passing literally any law, including ones that violate all kinds of rights, or installing a dictator? It has been political norms. And because Israel has relied on political norms, that means that this current conflict is going to have extremely high stakes for Israeli governance for many decades to come.
Can you give me a couple of examples? What are the high stakes in terms of democratic governance?
First of all, let me just say in principle that I don’t oppose reforms to make the judiciary more independent or accountable in any particular country. But then you obviously have to look at the local context. What’s a little worrying about this particular example is that several members of this coalition are themselves about to be subject to judicial proceedings.
Including the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
Right. And for example, they need to change the rules so that [Shas Party chairman] Aryeh Deri can sit in the cabinet despite his prior convictions. That indicates to me that maybe this isn’t a good-faith argument about the proper structure of the Israeli, uncodified constitution, but instead a mechanism of expediency.
Any one of these reforms might look okay, and you can find other countries that have done them. The combination, however, renders the judiciary extremely weak. Right now, it’s a multi-stakeholder commission that nominates and appoints judges in Israel, and the new coalition wants to propose that the commission be made up of a majority of politicians. We know that when you change the appointments mechanism to put more politicians on those committees, the more politicized they become.
Think about the United States process of appointing our Supreme Court judges: It’s highly politicized, and obviously the legitimacy of the court has taken a big hit in recent years. In Israel, you’d have politicized appointments under these reforms, but then you also have the ability of the Knesset to override any particular ruling that it wanted. Again, you can find countries which have that. It’s called the “new commonwealth model” of constitutionalism, in which courts don’t have the final say on constitutional matters, and the legislature can overrule them on particular rulings. But I think the combination is very dangerous because you could have a situation where the Knesset — which currently has a role in protecting human rights — can pick out and override specific cases, which really to me goes against the idea of the rule of law.
You mentioned other countries. Are there other countries where these kinds of changes were enacted and we saw how the experiment turned out?
The two most prominent recently are Hungary and Poland, which are not necessarily countries that you want to compare yourself to.
Certainly not if you are Israel.
Right. There’s so much irony here. When the new Polish government came in in 2015, they immediately manipulated the appointment system for the Constitutional Court and appointed their own majority, which then allowed them to pass legislation which probably would have been ruled unconstitutional. They basically set up a system where they were going to replace lower judges and so they were going to grow themselves into a majority of the court. And that’s led to controversy and rulings outside the mainstream that have led to protests, while the European Union is withholding funds and such from Poland because of this manipulation of the court.
In Hungary, Victor Orban was a really radical leader, and when he had a bare majority to change the constitution he wiped out all the previous jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. I don’t think the Israeli government would do that. But still there is this kind of worrying sense that they’re able to manipulate interpretation of law for their own particular political interest.
Another thing I want to raise is the potential for a constitutional crisis now. Suppose they pass these laws and the Israeli Supreme Court says, “Well, wait a minute, that interferes with our common law rules that we are bound by, going back to the British Mandate.” It conflicts with the basic law and they invoke what legal scholars call the “doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments,” which is basically saying that an amendment goes against the core of our democratic system and violates, for example, Israel’s character as a Jewish and democratic society. Israel has never done this, but it is a kind of tool that one sees deployed around the world in these crises. And if that happened, then I think you would have a full constitutional crisis on your hands in Israel.
Supreme Court President Aharon Barak speaks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a ceremony in the Supreme Court marking 50 years of law, Sept. 15, 1998. (Avi Ohayon)
What does a constitutional crisis look like?
Suppose you have sitting justices in Israel who say, “You know, this Knesset law violates the basic law and therefore it’s invalid.” And then, would the Knesset try to impeach those judges? Would they cut the budget of the judiciary? Would they back down?
When you compare Israel’s judicial system to other countries’ over the years, how does it stack up? Is it up there among the very strong systems or is it known for flaws that might have maybe hobbled its effectiveness?
It’s always been seen around the world as a very strong judiciary. Under the leadership of Aharon Barak [president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006] it became extremely activist. And this provoked backlash in Israeli politics. That led to a kind of recalibration of the court where it is still doing its traditional role of defending fundamental rights and ensuring the integrity of the political process, but it’s not making up norms left and right, in the way that it used to. This is my perception. But it’s certainly seen as one of the leading courts around the world, its decisions are cited by others, and because of the quality of the judges and the complex issues that Israel faces it’s seen as a strong court and an effective court and to me a balanced court.
But, you know, I’m not in Israel, and ultimately, they’re going to figure out the question how balanced it is or where it’s going to go. I do worry that an unchecked majoritarian system, especially with a pure proportional representation model like Israel, has the potential for the capture of government by some minorities to wield power against other minorities. And that’s a problem for democracies — to some degree, that’s a problem we face in the United States.
How correctable are these reforms? I am thinking of someone who says, “These are democratically elected representatives who now want to change a system. If you want to change the system, elect your own majority.” Is the ship of state like this really hard to turn around once you go in a certain direction?
This is an area in which I think Israel and the United States have a lot of similarities. For several decades now, the judiciary has been a major issue for those on the political right. They thought the Warren Court was too left-leaning and they started the Federalist Society to create a whole cadre of people to staff the courts. They’ve done that and now the federal courts are certainly much more conservative than the country probably. But the left didn’t really have a theory of judicial power in the United States. And I think that’s kind of true in Israel: It’s a big issue for the political right, but the political left, besides just being not very cohesive at the moment, isn’t able to articulate what’s good about having an independent judiciary. It is correctable in theory, but that would require the rule of law to become a politically salient issue, which it generally isn’t in that many countries.
How do you relate to what is happening in Israel as a Jew, and not just a legal scholar?
That’s a great question, because it really raises my complicated relationship with the country. You know, I find it to be a very interesting democracy. I like going to Israel because it’s a society in which there’s a lot of argument, a lot of good court cases and a lot of good legal scholars. On one level, I connect with my colleagues and friends there who seem very demoralized about this current moment. And I honestly worry about whether this society will remain a Jewish and democratic one with the current coalition.
The rule of law is a part of democracy. You need the rule of law in order to have democracy function. And I know others would respond and say, “Oh, you’re just being hysterical.” And, “This isn’t Sweden, it’s the Middle East.” But the ethno-nationalist direction of the country bothers me as a Jew, and I hope that the court remains there to prevent it from deepening further.
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Argentina rabbi: What can can learn from losing the World Cup?
דעם פֿאַרגאַנגענעם זונטיק, גלײַך נאָכן סוף פֿונעם וועלט־בעכער טורניי 2026 האָב איך אָנגערופֿן אַ גוטן פֿרײַנד אין אַרגענטינע, כּדי צו הערן ווי עס גייט אים.
איך בין ממש צעבראָכן — האָט ער געזאָגט — פֿאַרוואָס האָט דער אויבערשטער דאָס געטאָן?!
האָב איך אים געענטפֿערט: — איך בין נישט דעם אויבערשטנס בוכהאַלטער, און זיכער נישט זײַן אַדוואָקאַט. איך ווייס נישט פֿאַרוואָס ער טוט וואָס ער טוט, און פֿאַרוואָס ער טוט נישט וואָס ער טוט נישט. איך מיין אַז די וויכטיקסטע פֿראַגע איז נישט: „פֿאַרוואָס איז דאָס געשען“? נאָר גיכער: „וואָס איצט? וואָס קענען מיר זיך דערפֿון לערנען?“
האָט ער מיך געפֿרעגט, וואָס איך האַלט איז דער מוסה־השׂכּל. האָב איך אים געפֿרעגט צי ער געדענקט די מעשׂה פֿון יונה.
— אַוודאי. דער פֿיש האָט אים אײַנגעשלונגען.
ריכטיק — האָב איך געזאָגט — אָבער דאָס איז בלויז דער ערשטער טייל פֿון דער מעשׂה. נאָך דעם וואָס יונה האָט אין נינווה איבערגעגעבן די נבֿואה, מיט וועלכער דער אויבערשטער האָט אים געשיקט, איז ער אַרויס פֿון שטאָט און זיך אַוועקגעזעצט צו זען וואָס עס וועט ווערן.
דער אויבערשטער האָט דעמאָלט געמאַכט אויפֿוואַקסן אַ קיקיון, וואָס האָט אים געגעבן שאָטן, און יונה האָט זיך זייער געפֿרייט. אָבער אויף מאָרגן האָט דער אויבערשטער געשיקט אַ וואָרעם, וואָס האָט פֿאַרדאָרבן דעם קיקיון, און דער בוים איז פֿאַרטריקנט געוואָרן.
ווען די זון האָט שטאַרק געברענט, האָט יונה געליטן פֿון דער היץ און איז געוואָרן גאָר פֿאַרצווייפֿלט. האָט אים דער אויבערשטער געפֿרעגט: טרויערסטו איבערן קיקיון?
און יונה האָט געענטפֿערט: יאָ, ביז צום טויט.
האָט דער אויבערשטער געזאָגט: דו באַדויערסט אַ קיקיון, וואָס דו האָסט נישט פֿאַרפֿלאַנצט און נישט אויפֿגעהאָדעוועט. אין איין נאַכט איז ער אויפֿגעקומען, און אין איין נאַכט איז ער פֿאַרגאַנגען.
און זאָל איך דען נישט רחמנות האָבן אויף דער גרויסער שטאָט נינווה, וווּ עס וווינען מער פֿון צוועלף טויזנט מענטשן?“…
די מעשׂה שטעלט אונדז פֿאָר אַ פּשוטע אָבער טיפֿע פֿראַגע: וואָס פֿאַרדינט טאַקע אונדזער גרעסטע זאָרג?
און דאָ קומען מיר צוריק צום וועלט־בעכער. עס איז גאָר פֿאַרשטענדלעך, אַז אַן אַרגענטינער זאָל זײַן אַנטוישט ווען זײַן מאַנשאַפֿט פֿאַרשפּילט. ספּאָרט רופֿט אַרויס שטאַרקע געפֿילן, און דאָס איז דווקא איינע פֿון די סיבות, פֿאַרוואָס מענטשן האָבן עס אַזוי ליב.
— דײַן טרויער איז נישט קיין חסרון — האָב איך אים געזאָגט — פֿאַרקערט. עס ווײַזט, אַז דו ביסט אַ מענטש מיט געפֿיל. און געפֿיל איז אַ טײַערע מידה.
אָבער ווען די ערשטע אַנטוישונג הייבט שוין אָן זיך אָפּצושוואַכן, איז כּדאַי זיך צו פֿרעגן: וואָס נאָך אין לעבן פֿאַרדינט אַזאַ מאָס פֿון דײַן איבערגעגעבנקייט?
באַטראַכט נאָר אַ מאָמענט. דו האָסט נישט געקענט ברענגען דעם נצחון, און דו האָסט אויך נישט גורם געווען די מפּלה. און דאָך האָט דער רעזולטאַט, וואָס איז בכלל נישט געווען אין דײַנע הענט, אַזוי שטאַרק באַווירקט דײַנע געפֿילן.
אפֿשר וואָלט זיך געלוינט אַרײַנצולייגן די זעלבע עמאָציאָנעלע ענערגיע אין אַן אַנדער מין „פֿאַרמעסט“ — אין אַזאַ, וווּ דײַנע באַשלוסן און דײַנע מעשׂים קענען טאַקע מאַכן אַן אמתן חילוק.
וואָס פֿאַר אַ פֿאַרמעסט מיין איך? דאָ קומט אַרײַן אַן אויסערגעוויינטלעכע הוראה פֿונעם רמב״ם.
דער רמב״ם שרײַבט, אַז יעדער מענטש דאַרף שטענדיק זען זיך אַליין און די גאַנצע וועלט ווי פּונקט באַלאַנצירט צווישן זכות און חובֿה.
איין מצווה. איין גוט וואָרט. איין מעשׂה פֿון חסד. אַפֿילו איין גוטער געדאַנק.
יעדער איינער פֿון זיי קען איבערוועגן די גאַנצע וואָג לטובֿה — נישט נאָר פֿאַר זיך אַליין, נאָר פֿאַר דער גאַנצער וועלט.
מיר טראַכטן אָפֿט: וואָס מאַכט אויס וואָס איך׳ל טאָן? איך בין דאָך בלויז איין מענטש צווישן אַכט ביליאָן? דער רמב״ם בעט אונדז צו קוקן אויף דער וועלט מיט אַנדערע אויגן:
שטעל זיך פֿאָר אַ וואָג. אויף איין זײַט שטייען פֿיר ביליאָן מענטשן. אויף דער צווייטער זײַט — נאָך פֿיר ביליאָן. די וואָג איז פּונקט באַלאַנצירט. איצט שטעל זיך פֿאָר, אַז דו טרעטסט צו און באַשליסט אויף וועלכער זײַט זיך צו שטעלן. אין יענער רגע ווערט דײַן באַשלוס דער באַשליסנדיקער. דו ביסט דער וואָס האָט איבערגעוואָגן די גאַנצע וואָג.
אויב דאָס קלינגט צו אַבסטראַקט, לאָמיר זיך אומקערן צום וועלט־בעכער.
דער גאַנצער טורניר — נאָך וואָכן פֿון שפּילן, צענדליקער נאַציאָנאַלע מאַנשפֿאַטן און הונדערטער שפּילער — איז דער סוף באַשלאָסן געוואָרן דורך איין איינציקן מאָמענט.
איין שפּילער. איין גאָל. אַזוי איז אויך אין דער רוחניותדיקער וועלט.
דער גרויסער געראַנגל צווישן גוטס און שלעכטס, וואָס באַגלייט די גאַנצע געשיכטע פֿון דער מענטשהייט, קען אויסזען ווי עפּעס צו גרויס, כּדי אַ יחיד זאָל קענען אײַנווירקן דערויף.
אָבער אויב די וואָג איז טאַקע באַלאַנצירט, ווי דער רמב״ם באַשרײַבט, קען דער גאַנצער סוף־רעזולטאַט אָפּהענגען פֿון איין מענטש. פֿון איין מצווה. פֿון איין גוט וואָרט. פֿון איין גוטן געדאַנק.
און יענער מענטש קען זײַן דווקא דו אַליין. מיט דעם באַשלוס וואָס ליגט הײַנט אין דײַנע הענט.
עס איז דאָ נאָך אַן ענין, וואָס דער וועלט־בעכער קען אונדז לערנען. די נבֿיאים באַשרײַבן אַ צײַט, ווען די וועלט וועט דערגרייכן איר אמתן ציל. דעמאָלט וועט דער משיח קומען און ברענגען אַן עפּאָכע פֿון שלום, גערעכטיקייט און אַלגעמיינער דערקענונג פֿון גאָט.
קען מען זיך פֿרעגן: ווי אַזוי איז עס מעגלעך, אַז איין מענטש זאָל אינספּירירן די גאַנצע וועלט?
אָבער טראַכט צוריק וועגן דעם וואָס מיר האָבן פּונקט איצט מיטגעזען. ביליאָנען מענטשן האָבן אין איין אויגנבליק זיך צוגעקוקט אויף איין מענטש: ליאָנעל מעסי.
פֿאַר אַ קורצן מאָמענט איז ער געוואָרן דער צענטער פֿונעם אויפֿמערק פֿון ביליאָנען מענטשן!
אויב דאָס איז מעגלעך אין דער וועלט פֿון ספּאָרט, איז עס נאָך מער פֿאַרשטענדלעך, אַז עס וועט קומען אַ טאָג, ווען די גאַנצע מענטשהייט וועט זיך ווענדן צו אַ פֿירער, וועמענס כּוח וועט נישט ליגן אין זײַנע פֿיס, נאָר אין זײַן רוח.
משיח וועט נישט פֿאַראייניקן מענטשן אַרום אַ פּילקע. ער וועט פֿאַראייניקן זיי אַרום אמת. אַרום גוטסקייט. אַרום גערעכטיקייט. אַרום שלום. און אַרום דער ידיעה פֿון ג-טליכקייט.
איך האָב דעמאָלט צוגעגעבן מיט ַא שמייכל: „ס׳איז דאָ אַ טשיקאַווער צופֿאַל. דער נאָמען Messi קלינגט ַא ביסל ענלעך צו Messiah.
אַוודאי איז דאָס בלויז אַ לשון־צופֿאַל. אָבער אַ מאָל קען אַ קליינע צופֿעליקייט דינען ווי אַ בריק צו אַ גרעסערן געדאַנק. און דער געדאַנק איז פּשוט:
אויב די גאַנצע וועלט קען זיך פֿאַראייניקן אַרום אַ פֿוסבאָל־פֿינאַל, אויב ביליאָנען מענטשן קענען זיך טיילן די זעלבע האָפֿענונג, די זעלבע שפּאַנונג און די זעלבע באַגײַסטערונג, דערמאָנט דאָס אונדז, אַז די מענטשהייט איז פֿעיִק זיך צו פֿאַראייניקן.
די פֿראַגע איז נאָר: אַרום וואָס?
די נבֿיאים זעען פֿאָרויס א טאָג, ווען די וועלט וועט זיך פֿאַראייניקן נישט אַרום קיין שפּיל, נאָר אַרום אַ ציל. נישט אַרום אַ געווינער, נאָר אַרום אמת. נישט אַרום אַ גאָל, נאָר אַרום דעם אויבערשטן.
און ביז עס קומט יענער טאָג, האָט יעדער איינער פֿון אונדז זײַן אייגענע ראָלע. מיר דאַרפֿן נישט וואַרטן אויף אַ פֿולן סטאַדיאָן. מיר דאַרפֿן נישט וואַרטן אויף אַ וועלט־פֿינאַל. און מיר דאַרפֿן זיכער נישט וואַרטן ביז אַלע אַנדערע וועלן טאָן וואָס זיי דאַרפֿן טאָן.
די געלעגנהייט ליגט פֿאַר אונדז יעדן טאָג. יעדער באַשלוס. יעדער גוט וואָרט. יעדע מצוה. יעדער אַקט פֿון חסד. זיי אַלע זײַנען מער באַטײַטנדיק, ווי מיר שטעלן זיך פֿאָר.
אפֿשר וועלן מיר קיינמאָל נישט וויסן, ווי ווײַט די השפּעה פֿון אַן איינציקער מעשׂה האָט זיך פֿאַרשפּרייט. אָבער לויט דעם רמב״ם דאַרפֿן מיר לעבן מיט דעם באַוווּסטזײַן, אַז עס איז זייער מעגלעך, אַז דווקא יענע מעשׂה האָט איבערגעווויגן די גאַנצע וואָג.
מיר קענען אפֿשר נישט באַשליסן ווער עס זאָל געווינען דעם וועלט־בעכער. אָבער מיר קענען יעדן טאָג באַשליסן וואָס פֿאַר אַ וועלט מיר העלפֿן בויען.
אויב יעדער פֿון אונדז וועט טאָן זײַן טייל, וועלן מיר אַלע צוזאַמען העלפֿן ברענגען דעם טאָג, ווען די וועלט וועט דערגרייכן איר אמתן נצחון — די גאולה האמתית והשלימה, מיט ביאת משיח צדקנו במהרה בימינו, ממש.
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Trump’s messy new deal with Saudi Arabia shows how far Israel has fallen
The American decision to sign a deal granting Saudi Arabia a pathway toward a civilian nuclear program is a terrible development for Israel — not just because Riyadh could one day turn nuclear infrastructure developed with the United States into a weapons capability.
The agreement reflects the collapse of Israeli strategy under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023; the erosion of Israel’s influence in the U.S.; and Israel’s descent toward the status of a pariah state.
A day after the deal was announced, Trump — seemingly rattled by the flood of criticism that ensued — said it was dependent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. But he did not clarify what aspect of the Accords he meant; there’s no indication that such a requirement is included in the already-signed deal; and Riyadh has made clear that it will do no such thing until there is concrete progress toward a Palestinian state, which is a fantastical notion under the current Israeli government.
For years, nuclear cooperation represented one of Washington’s greatest sources of leverage over Saudi Arabia. It was long believed that prospect would be used to anchor some kind of pact involving normalization with Israel, binding nuclear safeguards, a regional defense architecture and a united front against Iran. Under such an arrangement, Israel would have established formal relations with the Arab world’s most influential power, and gained both a central role in a new regional security system and enforceable Saudi commitments against pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Washington has now at least begun giving Riyadh the prize — no matter what Trump says, amending the deal post-facto will be at best extraordinarily difficult — without Israel receiving any of the benefits.
That dire truth is the outcome of nearly three years in which Israel has confused military brilliance with strategy, and abandoned almost all public diplomacy as its status in the world plummeted.
No one can deny the extraordinary capabilities displayed by Israel’s armed forces and intelligence services since the Oct. 7 massacre. Hezbollah absorbed devastating blows. Iranian military assets suffered setbacks. Hamas lost thousands of fighters and much of its military infrastructure.
But a sense of true strategy is needed to convert military achievement to political outcomes. Strategy can strengthen alliances, expand legitimacy and leave a country in a stronger geopolitical position than the one in which it entered a conflict.
That seems to be completely beyond Netanyahu’s ability.
In the months immediately following Oct. 7, Israel possessed something extraordinarily rare: overwhelming international legitimacy. Hamas had committed an atrocity that horrified much of the democratic world. Moderate Arab governments viewed Hamas as a dangerous extension of the same Islamist forces that threatened their own stability. Former President Joe Biden’s administration recognized that extraordinary alignment, and sought to build upon it, working toward an ambitious regional framework.
In the early months of war, Hamas faced near-unanimous global pressure to hand over Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority, backed by moderate Arab governments. Arab states appeared ready to help marginalize Hamas politically and financially, and make life uncomfortable for its leaders.
For a moment, it was easy to see a path forward in which Saudi Arabia would normalize relations with Israel, with other countries following. A U.S.-led regional alliance facing Iran might integrate Israel into the Middle East more deeply than was ever previously imaginable.
That framework offered Israel the chance to translate the trauma of Oct. 7 into a strategic transformation of the region. Instead, Netanyahu chose an open-ended war whose nebulously defined goals were not achievable by military means alone, amid a reasonable and growing suspicion in the public and around the world that he was doing so to preserve his hold on power.
Every few weeks Israelis heard that Hamas stood on the verge of collapse. Each extension of the war was presented as the last before “complete victory” — which Netanyahu kept claiming was “a step” away. Victory remained perpetually on the horizon as Israel’s international standing collapsed.
Now, Netanyahu is wanted at the Hague. Diplomatic isolation has deepened and economic pressure mounted as boycott movements — including many informal ones — expanded.
And critically, American public opinion has shifted sharply, particularly among younger Americans, threatening the bipartisan foundation upon which Israel’s relationship with Washington has rested for generations.
Recent credible polls show that more Americans now sympathize with Palestinians than with Israelis.
Israelis think this happened because of a propaganda campaign against them on social media, because of antisemitism in Europe, or because of hostile journalists. That is partly true but mostly wrong. These shifts are mostly a result of the posture of the Israeli government.
The reality is that Israel killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, accepted that toll with remarkably little public reflection or regret, and relied on the trauma of Oct. 7 to justify it. Around the world, that proved politically devastating. It is especially absurd considering that Israel paid this extraordinary price without achieving its central objective of removing Hamas from Gaza — which was foreseeable and infuriating.
Things might change if the opposition comes to power in October. The idiotic demonization of the Palestinian Authority might end. Jewish terrorism in the West Bank might be stamped out. Settlement construction beyond the fence line, and certainly illegal outposts, might stop.
Israel might again at least be trying to find a solution to the festering Palestinian issue — or at least prefer to lower the flames. That might, in the long term, bring Saudi Arabia back to the table.
But the U.S, has stopped waiting. That the Saudi deal was signed at all, no matter what Trump says now, suggests that Washington is now basically indifferent to the loss of leverage for a deal favoring Israel.
How to resolve the muddle Trump has made? The key: the agreement appears to not include the possibility of enrichment on Saudi soil, but just general assistance to create a program for nuclear energy. So Trump will be able to say that enrichment must await Saudi normalization with Israel. But Saudi Arabia will still be able to claim the symbolic victory of entering into nuclear collaboration with the U.S.
And so, the regional architecture envisioned in the first months after Oct. 7 has vanished because of the forever-wars Netanyahu has pursued — which also resulted in the deaths of dozens of hostages and more than 1,000 soldiers, badly damaged Israel’s economy, and left the country’s international standing in shambles.
And the strategic alliance between Israel and the U.S. — without which Israel’s very existence will be in danger — is falling apart in front of our eyes, not because of Trump but because we are losing the American people.
This is what you get when you are all brawn and no brain, and all tactics and no strategy.
That realization should define Israel’s coming election far more even than arguments over judicial reform or the Haredi draft. Those who have led Israel into this disaster deserve to be punished. Not just removed from power, but decisively repudiated. They have become a danger to the Zionist project itself.
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Harvard students have questions after Hillel withdraws its brief against Trump
Jewish Harvard students are still trying to make sense of a baffling turn of events, after Hillel International weighed in on the university’s lawsuit against the Trump administration seeking restoration of federal funding withheld over alleged campus antisemitism — and then just as suddenly withdrew its brief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Hillel International had filed an amicus brief Wednesday supporting Harvard’s suit against the federal government, which seeks to restore roughly $2.7 billion in federal research funding. In its brief, Hillel International acknowledged that antisemitism is an issue at Harvard and other universities, but that “campus life for Jewish students has meaningfully improved” following actions taken by the school.
Less than 24 hours later, Hillel International confirmed that it was withdrawing the brief, citing an error in its internal review process, according to the student newspaper, the Harvard Crimson.
What’s more, Hillel International filed the brief without the knowledge of Harvard Hillel, a campus organization that operates independently, the paper reported.
Hillel’s reversal followed sharp criticism of the brief on social media from some Jewish public figures. Among them was Shabbos Kestenbaum, a Harvard Divinity School graduate who filed a Title VI lawsuit against the university for ignoring antisemitism. He wrote on X that he was “shocked” by the decision.
“Rather than take responsibility for their failure to respond to the explosion of antisemitism on American campuses post October 7th, Hillel has instead decided to support the perpetrators,” Kestenbaum wrote. He encouraged donors to stop giving to Hillel and choose organizations like Chabad or Jewish day schools instead.
Kestenbaum told the Harvard Crimson that Hillel International President Adam Lehman had not seen the brief before the organization filed it. Hillel International did not respond to an inquiry from the Forward to confirm this.
Hillel’s withdrawal of the brief disappointed Tova Kaplan, a recent graduate who testified at a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights hearing on campus antisemitism. The brief cited her testimony.
“While I’m not sure what factors led to this decision, it feels like a prioritization of politics over Jewish students,” Kaplan wrote in a statement to the Forward.
“The Trump administration’s attacks aren’t even designed to help Jewish students — instead, they’re designed to instrumentalize our voices and pain to achieve their own political goals,” she wrote.
Siding with Harvard along with numerous other groups, including civil liberties organizations across the ideological spectrum and 18 other American universities, the withdrawn brief argued that cutting research funding is not a productive way to halt university antisemitism. Harvard’s improvement measures, following recommendations from its own Task Force on Combating Antisemitism and Anti-Israel Bias, have been more effective than what the brief called the “draconian one-size-fits-all approaches of the sort the government here pursues.”
These measures, the withdrawn brief said, “do not help Jewish students or improve the campus climate” but instead, “they disproportionately impact the very Jewish students and Jewish researchers the government purportedly seeks to help.”
But another recent graduate who said he did not want to be identified, sees Hillel’s opposition to the Trump administration’s actions as taking the wrong side of the fight. He believes the federal defunding of Harvard pushes the university to protect Jewish students.
“I think a major reason Harvard’s been making changes is because they’re under threat,” he said.
He also contends Hillel International’s evidence to back its claim that Harvard’s efforts have improved antisemitism are weak — lacking measurable results.
Dani Kobrick, a rising senior, said she is perplexed by Hillel International’s actions.
“I don’t think Hillel needed to submit anything to begin with,” she said. “But I do think that withdrawing it makes a very big statement.”
The post Harvard students have questions after Hillel withdraws its brief against Trump appeared first on The Forward.
