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A law professor worries Israel could become the next Hungary
(JTA) — Israel’s new governing coalition has been called the “most right-wing” in the nation’s history. That’s heartening to supporters who want the country to get tough on crime and secure Jewish rights to live in the West Bank, and dismaying to critics who see a government bent on denying rights to Israel’s minorities and undermining any hope for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While the far-right politics of new government ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir have drawn much of the world’s attention, a series of proposed changes to Israel’s judicial system has also been raising hopes and alarms. On Wednesday, new Justice Minister Yariv Levin announced an overhaul that would limit the authority of the High Court of Justice, Israel’s Supreme Court. It would put more politicians on the selection committee that picks judges, restrict the High Court’s ability to strike down laws and government decisions and enact an “override clause” enabling the Knesset to rewrite court decisions with a simple majority.
Levin and his supporters on the right justify these changes as a way to restore balance to a system that he says puts too much control in the hands of (lately) left-leaning judges: “We go to the polls, vote, elect, and time after time, people we didn’t elect choose for us. Many sectors of the public look to the judicial system and do not find their voices heard,” he asserted. “That is not democracy.”
Critics of the changes call them a power grab, one that will hand more leverage to the haredi Orthodox parties, remove checks on the settlement movement and limit civil society groups’ ability to litigate on behalf of Israeli minorities.
To help me make sense of the claims on both sides, I turned to Tom Ginsburg of the University of Chicago, where he is the Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law and co-directs the Comparative Constitutions Project, which gathers and analyzes the constitutions of all independent nation-states. He’s also a Jew who has transformed a former synagogue on the South Side of Chicago into a cutting-edge arts space, and says what’s happening with Israel’s new governing coalition “raises my complicated relationship with the country.”
We spoke on Friday. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: You have written about law in Israel, which lacks a constitution but relies on a series of “basic laws” to define its fundamental institutions. You’ve written that the Israeli judiciary had become “extremely powerful” — maybe too powerful — in imbuing the basic laws with a constitutional character, but worry that the current reforms will politicize the court in ways that will undermine Israeli democracy.
Tom Ginsburg: The proposed reforms were a campaign promise of certain elements of this coalition who have had longstanding grievances against the Israeli judiciary. The Israeli judiciary over the last decades has indeed become extremely powerful and important in writing or rewriting a constitution for Israel, promoting human rights and serving as a check and balance in a unicameral parliamentary system where the legislature can do anything it wants as a formal matter. A lot of people have had problems with that at the level of theory and practice. So there have been some reforms, and the court has, in my view, cut back on its activism in recent decades and in some sense has been more responsive to the center of the country. But there’s longstanding grievances from the political right, and that’s the context of these proposals.
A lot of the concerns about the new government in Israel are coming from the American Jewish left. But in an American context, the American Jewish left also has a big problem with the United States Supreme Court, because they see it as being too activist on the right. So in some ways isn’t the new Israeli government looking to do what American Jewish liberals dream of doing in this country?
Isn’t that funny? But the context is really different. The basic point is that judicial independence is a really good thing. Judicial accountability is a really good thing. And if you study high courts around the world, as I do, you see that there’s kind of a calibration, a balancing of institutional factors which lead towards more independence or more accountability and sometimes things switch around over time.
Israeli Justice Minister Yariv Levin holds a press conference at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, Jan. 4, 2023. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)
You mean “accountability” in the sense that courts should be accountable to the public.
Right. The Israeli promoters of these plans are pointing to the United States, in particular, for the proposals for more political involvement in the appointment process. On the other hand, in the United States once you’re appointed politically, you’re serving for life. There’s literally no check on your power. And so maybe some people think we have too much independence. If these proposals go through in Israel, there will be a front-end politicization of the court [in terms of the selection commission], but also back-end checks on the court [with the override clause that would allow a simple majority to reinstate laws struck down by the Supreme Court]. So in some sense, it moves the pendulum very far away from independence and very much towards accountability to the point of possible politicization.
And accountability in that case is too much of a good thing.
Again, you don’t want courts that can just make up rules. They should be responsive to society. On the other hand, you don’t want judges who are so responsive to society that there’s no protection for the basic rights of unpopular minorities.
What makes Israel either unique or different from some of the other countries you study, and certainly the United States? Part of it, I would guess, is the fact that it does not have a constitution. Is that a useful distinction?
They couldn’t agree on a single written constitution at the outset of the country, but they have built one through what you might call a “common law method”: norms and practices over time as well as the system of “basic laws,” which are passed by an absolute majority of the Knesset, where a majority of 61 votes can change any of those. But while they’re not formally entrenched, they have a kind of political status because of that term: basic law.
By the way, the Germans are in the same boat. The German constitution is called the Basic Law. And it was always meant to be a provisional constitution until they got together and reunified.
If you don’t have a written constitution, what’s the source of the legitimacy of judicial power? What is to prevent a Knesset from just passing literally any law, including ones that violate all kinds of rights, or installing a dictator? It has been political norms. And because Israel has relied on political norms, that means that this current conflict is going to have extremely high stakes for Israeli governance for many decades to come.
Can you give me a couple of examples? What are the high stakes in terms of democratic governance?
First of all, let me just say in principle that I don’t oppose reforms to make the judiciary more independent or accountable in any particular country. But then you obviously have to look at the local context. What’s a little worrying about this particular example is that several members of this coalition are themselves about to be subject to judicial proceedings.
Including the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
Right. And for example, they need to change the rules so that [Shas Party chairman] Aryeh Deri can sit in the cabinet despite his prior convictions. That indicates to me that maybe this isn’t a good-faith argument about the proper structure of the Israeli, uncodified constitution, but instead a mechanism of expediency.
Any one of these reforms might look okay, and you can find other countries that have done them. The combination, however, renders the judiciary extremely weak. Right now, it’s a multi-stakeholder commission that nominates and appoints judges in Israel, and the new coalition wants to propose that the commission be made up of a majority of politicians. We know that when you change the appointments mechanism to put more politicians on those committees, the more politicized they become.
Think about the United States process of appointing our Supreme Court judges: It’s highly politicized, and obviously the legitimacy of the court has taken a big hit in recent years. In Israel, you’d have politicized appointments under these reforms, but then you also have the ability of the Knesset to override any particular ruling that it wanted. Again, you can find countries which have that. It’s called the “new commonwealth model” of constitutionalism, in which courts don’t have the final say on constitutional matters, and the legislature can overrule them on particular rulings. But I think the combination is very dangerous because you could have a situation where the Knesset — which currently has a role in protecting human rights — can pick out and override specific cases, which really to me goes against the idea of the rule of law.
You mentioned other countries. Are there other countries where these kinds of changes were enacted and we saw how the experiment turned out?
The two most prominent recently are Hungary and Poland, which are not necessarily countries that you want to compare yourself to.
Certainly not if you are Israel.
Right. There’s so much irony here. When the new Polish government came in in 2015, they immediately manipulated the appointment system for the Constitutional Court and appointed their own majority, which then allowed them to pass legislation which probably would have been ruled unconstitutional. They basically set up a system where they were going to replace lower judges and so they were going to grow themselves into a majority of the court. And that’s led to controversy and rulings outside the mainstream that have led to protests, while the European Union is withholding funds and such from Poland because of this manipulation of the court.
In Hungary, Victor Orban was a really radical leader, and when he had a bare majority to change the constitution he wiped out all the previous jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. I don’t think the Israeli government would do that. But still there is this kind of worrying sense that they’re able to manipulate interpretation of law for their own particular political interest.
Another thing I want to raise is the potential for a constitutional crisis now. Suppose they pass these laws and the Israeli Supreme Court says, “Well, wait a minute, that interferes with our common law rules that we are bound by, going back to the British Mandate.” It conflicts with the basic law and they invoke what legal scholars call the “doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments,” which is basically saying that an amendment goes against the core of our democratic system and violates, for example, Israel’s character as a Jewish and democratic society. Israel has never done this, but it is a kind of tool that one sees deployed around the world in these crises. And if that happened, then I think you would have a full constitutional crisis on your hands in Israel.
Supreme Court President Aharon Barak speaks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a ceremony in the Supreme Court marking 50 years of law, Sept. 15, 1998. (Avi Ohayon)
What does a constitutional crisis look like?
Suppose you have sitting justices in Israel who say, “You know, this Knesset law violates the basic law and therefore it’s invalid.” And then, would the Knesset try to impeach those judges? Would they cut the budget of the judiciary? Would they back down?
When you compare Israel’s judicial system to other countries’ over the years, how does it stack up? Is it up there among the very strong systems or is it known for flaws that might have maybe hobbled its effectiveness?
It’s always been seen around the world as a very strong judiciary. Under the leadership of Aharon Barak [president of Israel’s Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006] it became extremely activist. And this provoked backlash in Israeli politics. That led to a kind of recalibration of the court where it is still doing its traditional role of defending fundamental rights and ensuring the integrity of the political process, but it’s not making up norms left and right, in the way that it used to. This is my perception. But it’s certainly seen as one of the leading courts around the world, its decisions are cited by others, and because of the quality of the judges and the complex issues that Israel faces it’s seen as a strong court and an effective court and to me a balanced court.
But, you know, I’m not in Israel, and ultimately, they’re going to figure out the question how balanced it is or where it’s going to go. I do worry that an unchecked majoritarian system, especially with a pure proportional representation model like Israel, has the potential for the capture of government by some minorities to wield power against other minorities. And that’s a problem for democracies — to some degree, that’s a problem we face in the United States.
How correctable are these reforms? I am thinking of someone who says, “These are democratically elected representatives who now want to change a system. If you want to change the system, elect your own majority.” Is the ship of state like this really hard to turn around once you go in a certain direction?
This is an area in which I think Israel and the United States have a lot of similarities. For several decades now, the judiciary has been a major issue for those on the political right. They thought the Warren Court was too left-leaning and they started the Federalist Society to create a whole cadre of people to staff the courts. They’ve done that and now the federal courts are certainly much more conservative than the country probably. But the left didn’t really have a theory of judicial power in the United States. And I think that’s kind of true in Israel: It’s a big issue for the political right, but the political left, besides just being not very cohesive at the moment, isn’t able to articulate what’s good about having an independent judiciary. It is correctable in theory, but that would require the rule of law to become a politically salient issue, which it generally isn’t in that many countries.
How do you relate to what is happening in Israel as a Jew, and not just a legal scholar?
That’s a great question, because it really raises my complicated relationship with the country. You know, I find it to be a very interesting democracy. I like going to Israel because it’s a society in which there’s a lot of argument, a lot of good court cases and a lot of good legal scholars. On one level, I connect with my colleagues and friends there who seem very demoralized about this current moment. And I honestly worry about whether this society will remain a Jewish and democratic one with the current coalition.
The rule of law is a part of democracy. You need the rule of law in order to have democracy function. And I know others would respond and say, “Oh, you’re just being hysterical.” And, “This isn’t Sweden, it’s the Middle East.” But the ethno-nationalist direction of the country bothers me as a Jew, and I hope that the court remains there to prevent it from deepening further.
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A last-ditch effort to dismantle Israeli democracy
As Israelis prepare for what may be the most consequential election in the country’s history on Oct. 27, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition has launched an extraordinary legislative blitz before the Knesset’s coming summer recess, which begins at the end of this week. Already the coalition has passed a pair of laws legitimizing Haredi draft evasion; the plan also includes a series of bills weakening democratic oversight.
Viewed individually, these initiatives appear to be about technical legal questions that might appear arcane to anyone not steeped in Israeli constitutional law. Viewed together, they’re clearly a coordinated attempt to weaken nearly every independent institution capable of restraining executive power.
That includes the civil service and the office of the attorney general, as well as independent regulators and the mechanism by which the greatest governmental failure in Israeli history, the Oct. 7 massacre, will eventually be investigated.
The legislative package is, in other words, a constitutional project meant to entrench elected autocracy.
The comparison many Israelis now invoke is Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not abolish elections. Instead, he gradually weakened the institutions capable of constraining executive power while maintaining democratic forms. Today Turkey ranks 163rd out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index.
Critics don’t fear that Israel will become Turkey overnight. But they understand that democracies can erode incrementally through legal mechanisms enacted by elected governments.
The Basic Law: Torah Study
The cornerstone of the legislative effort recognizes long-term Torah study as a meaningful service to the state and the Jewish people. This is critical for entrenching the support of the Haredi community for Netanyahu; without them, he has no hope of a majority.
It was passed into law late Monday, despite wall-to-wall opposition by parties not in Netanyahu’s coalition.
Few Jewish Israelis dispute the historic importance of Torah study. Critics object instead to the law’s practical purpose, which is to provide constitutional protection for the continued exemption of huge numbers of Haredi yeshiva students from military service, making future judicial intervention far more difficult.
The law also aims to ensure such students will receive the same amount of financial support as military veterans.
In nearly three years of war, reservists have repeatedly returned to the front — sometimes for hundreds of days a year — while tens of thousands of Haredi youth have remained exempt. In that context, it’s no surprise that the vast majority of Israelis oppose the exemptions. Only about a fifth support them — just slightly more than the country’s Haredi population.
A linked proposal blocking arrests of Haredi draft evaders passed Tuesday, again in the face of massive mobilization by the opposition and howls of protest from chiefs of the security establishment. Israel Defense Forces chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir warned that the move would encourage evasion and, in a rare direct rebuke to the government, said it was “clearly and unequivocally inconsistent with the IDF’s needs.”
The government’s argument is that criminal law cannot resolve a social dispute decades in the making. But the practical consequence is to create two classes of citizens: those who face legal consequences for refusing military service, and those who do not. During the Israeli military’s gravest manpower crisis in generations, that distinction is both morally and constitutionally corrosive.
Weakening legal safeguards
Another proposal would split the Attorney General’s dual function as legal adviser to the government and chief public prosecutor.
Supporters note that several democracies separate those roles. But Israel’s institutional structure is unusual, and that the Attorney General has long served as one of the principal safeguards against executive abuse. This office, critics contend, is essential in a country that has no constitution, no bicameral parliament, no federal structure, and no legislators beholden to voters directly instead of party leadership.
Weakening that office becomes especially troubling when the sitting prime minister remains on trial.
At the same time, the coalition has advanced legislation that would weaken legal advisers to cabinet ministers. Right now, those advisers must answer primarily to professional legal standards. The coalition wants them to become substantially more accountable to the ministers themselves — transforming lawyers whose job is to prevent unlawful government action into political employees expected to facilitate it.
All these bills are related to Netanyahu’s wider effort to weaken Israel’s judiciary in 2023, which sparked a spasm of protests that ended only with the Oct. 7 Hamas invasion and massacre. If Netanyahu wins another term in office in October, expect the most contentious parts of that overhaul to be revived, including a massive politicization of judicial appointments, and an “override” allowing parliament to overrule judicial decisions.
The Oct. 7 inquiry
Also related to the judicial overhaul — although it may not appear to be — is the inquiry over Israel’s security and intelligence failures on Oct. 7.
Rather than establishing the traditional independent state commission chaired by a retired Supreme Court justice, the coalition has promoted a political alternative — which is part and parcel of its efforts to undermine the Supreme Court by painting it as a tool of the liberal opposition.
Under the government’s proposal, which last week passed the first of three required readings, the inquiry would be made up equally by coalition and opposition supporters, but controlled by the coalition. That is meant to sound fair, but it politicizes the procedure by definition, and guarantees that findings would be disputed.
The principle is simple: A government should not exercise decisive influence over investigations into their own failures. The very purpose of an independent inquiry is to establish facts without interference by political interests. That is what happened in the wake of previous government failures, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre in Lebanon.
This trick comes after years in which Netanyahu insisted that no commission could exist while warfare continued, which raised concerns that this incentivized a forever war. At the same time, the Netanyahu social media machine has promoted the so-called “internal betrayal” conspiracy theory, claiming Israel’s security establishment purposely allowed the massacre in order to harm Netanyahu — a baseless claim that about a third of Israelis now actually believe. This, too, factors into Netanyahu’s culture war. Inciting against the security establishment, set up by Israel’s founding generations to be apolitical, is key to his plan to establish an autocracy.
In the background is the precedent set by the government last week when the cabinet announced that it would refuse to recognize the practical consequences of a binding Supreme Court ruling involving the Second Authority for Television and Radio. The move — again seemingly arcane — created a shocking precedent for future refusals to heed court challenges of all the above reforms and decisions.
That’s the real point of this plan: to set up the coming election as a battle between elected politicians and the court. If the Supreme Court strikes down any of this legislation while Netanyahu remains in power, he will spin their rulings to try and further delegitimize them, and entrench his own rule.
The good news is that Israel’s democratic traditions run deep. During the 2023 protests, millions of Israelis demonstrated that they are prepared to defend liberal democratic institutions with extraordinary persistence. And opposition leaders have vowed to repeal all these laws should they win the October election.
Netanyahu’s coalition has devoted enormous political capital not to rebuilding shattered public confidence, but rather to reshaping the institutions designed to hold them accountable. That is why Israelis must understand that what’s at stake isn’t one or two offputting laws. It’s about nothing less than whether Israel will remain a democracy.
The post A last-ditch effort to dismantle Israeli democracy appeared first on The Forward.
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The past engagement of Yiddish with Communism and its legacy today
דער „אינטערנאַציאָנאַלער אַרבעטער אָרדן“ איז געװען אַ מין יוצא־דופֿן צװישן אַמעריקאַנער עפֿנטלעכע און פּאָליטישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, צום גרויסן טייל — צוליב זײַן פֿילשפּראַכיקײט. ער האָט געהאַט ניט ווייניקער ווי זעכצן שפּראַך־בראַנזשעס פֿאַר פֿאַרשײדענע אמיגראַנטישע עדות. זײַן הױפּטצװעק איז געװען צו באַזאָרגן אַרבעטער מיט פֿינאַנציעלער פֿאַרזיכערונג און העלפֿן זײ אין זײער קאַמף פֿאַר בירגערלעכע און פּאָליטישע רעכט.
דער אָרדן האָט אויך געהאַט אַ ספּעציעלע בראַנזשע פֿאַר אַפֿריקאַנער אַמעריקאַנער ווײַל דער ענין פֿון ראַסע־יושרדיקײט איז געװען פּונקט אַזױ חשובֿ װי אַלע אַנדערע באַוועגונגען פֿאַר גערעכטיקייט.
די מחברים פֿונעם זאַמלבוך „פֿונעם פֿאָלקספֿראָנט צו דער קאַלטער מלחמה“, רעדאַקטירט פֿון עליסאַ סאַמפּסאָן און ראָבערט זעקער, באַהאַנדלען די טעטיקײט פֿון צוויי בראַנזשעס אינעם „אָרדן“: דער ייִדישער און דער אַפֿריקאַנער־אַמעריקאַנער. דאָס רובֿ פֿאָרשונגען אינעם בוך שעפּן מאַטעריאַל פֿון דער אַרכיװאַלער זאַמלונג בײַם קאָרנעל־אוניװערסיטעט.
דער אָרדן איז געגרינדט געוואָרן אין 1930. נאָך דער פּאָליטישער שפּאַלטונג אינעם ייִדישן „אַרבעטער רינג“, האָבן אַרום 500 מיטגלידער פֿאַרלאָזט די אָרגאַניזאַציע און געשאַפֿן אַן אײגענע פּאָליטישע גרופּע, באַקאַנט ווי „די לינקע“. די דאָזיקע גרופּע איז געװאָרן די ייִדישע בראַנזשע אינעם נײַעם „אינטערנאַציאָנאַלן אַרבעטער אָרדן“.
פֿון סאַמע אָנהײב איז דער אָרדן געװען נאָענט פֿאַרבונדן מיט דער אַמעריקאַנער קאָמוניסטישער פּאַרטײ, און די פּאָליטישע ליניע פֿון דער דאָזיקער פּאַרטײ איז דיקטירט געװאָרן פֿונעם קאָמוניסטישן אינטערנאַציאָנאַל אין מאָסקװע.
אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָט סטאַלין בדעה געהאַט צו שאַפֿן אַ ברײטן פֿאָלקספֿראָנט (פּאָפּולערן פֿראָנט), װאָס זאָל אַרײַננעמען כּלערלײ פּראָגרעסיװע אָבער ניט אױסגעשפּראָכן קאָמוניסטישע קולטורעלע, עפֿנטלעכע און פּראָפֿעסיאָנעלע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, כּלומרשט ניט קײן קאָמוניסטישע, אָבער סימפּאַטעטישע פֿאַרן סאָװעטן פֿאַרבאַנד.
דער אָרדן איז געװען אַזאַ מין אָרגאַניזאַציע. ער האָט צוגעצױגן מאַסן אַרבעטער, דער עיקר אימיגראַנטן, צוליב צוטריטלעכע פֿאַרזיכערונגען און פֿאַרשײדענע אַקטיװיטעטן אױף זײערע שפּראַכן.
לרובֿ זײַנען די מיטגלידער ניט געװען קײן קאָמוניסטן און האָבן געהאַט אַ קנאַפּן אינטערעס אין דער קאָמוניסטישער אידעאָלאָגיע, הגם די אָנפֿירער פֿונעם אָרדן, אַזעלכע װי משה אָלגין, זײַנען טאַקע יאָ געװען פּאַרטײ־מיטגלידער.
דערבײַ האָט די אַמעריקאַנער קאָמוניסטישע פּאַרטײ ניט געװאָלט שאַפֿן אַן אײַנדרוק, אַז זי איז אַן אָרגאַניזאַציע פֿון אימיגראַנטן. דערפֿאַר האָט די פּאַרטײ ניט אונטערגעהאַלטן נאָענטע באַציִונגען מיטן אָרדן.
אָפֿיציעל האָט די פּאַרטײ באַװיליקט די קולטורעלע און לינגװיסטישע אַמעריקאַניזאַציע פֿון אימיגראַנטן, בעת דער אָרדן האָט געפֿירט די אַרבעט אױף די שפּראַכן פֿון זײַנע מיטגלידער: ייִדיש, איטאַליעניש, פֿיניש, סלאָװאַקיש, פּױליש און אַנדערע, און דערבײַ אַ ביסל אָפּגעשוואַכט זײער אַסימילאַציע.
די פּראָ־סאָװעטישע פּאָליטיק פֿונעם אָרדן אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָט ניט דערלאָזט זײַנע ייִדישע מיטגלידער מיטאַרבעטן מיט אַנדערע ייִדישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, בפֿרט ציוניסטישע. דאָס האָט זיך אָבער געביטן בעת דער צװײטער װעלט־מלחמה, שרײַבט סאַמפּסאָן. אַ היפּשע ראָלע האָט דערבײַ געשפּילט דער באַזוך פֿון די אָנפֿירער פֿונעם מאָסקװער ייִדישן אַנטי־פֿאַשיסטישן קאָמיטעט שלמה מיכאָעלס און איציק פֿעפֿער אין אַמעריקע אין 1943. פֿעפֿער האָט ספּעציעל באַזוכט דעם קעמפּ „קינדערלאַנד“.
צוליב דער נײַער „אַחדות“־פּאָליטיק איז די ייִדישע בראַנזשע פֿונעם אָרדן אַרײַנגענומען געװאָרן אין דער הױפּטשטראָמיקער „אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישער קאָנפֿערענץ“, װוּ זי האָט מיטגעאַרבעט אַפֿילו מיט די ציוניסטן.
אין 1944 איז די ייִדישע בראַנזשע געװאָרן אַ מין אומאָפּהענגיקע אָרגאַניזאַציע — דער „ייִדישער פֿראַטערנאַלער פֿאָלקס־אָרדן“. דער נײַער אָרדן האָט זיך דערװײַטערט פֿון זײַן קאָמוניסטישן עיזבֿון און זיך אָפּגעגעבן, דער עיקר, מיט ייִדישע ענינים. נאָך 1945 האָבן זײ זיך אָפּגעגעבן מיט דער הילף פֿאַר דער שארית־הפּליטה אין אײראָפּע.
די קאַלטע מלחמה איז געװען אַ טאָפּלטע מפּלה. אין אַמעריקע האָבן זיך אָנגעהױבן רדיפֿות אױף קאָמוניסטן, בעת אינעם סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד האָט סטאַלין צו נישט געמאַכט די גאַנצע ייִדישע קולטור. סוף־כּל־סוף איז דער אַמעריקאַנער „פֿאָלקס־אָרדן“ ליקװידירט געװאָרן אין 1955.
בילדונג איז געװען אַ װיכטיקער טײל פֿון זייער פּאָליטישער אַרבעט. אין 1926 האָבן די לינקע ייִדישיסטן אין ניו־יאָרק געשאַפֿן דעם „ייִדישן אַרבעטער אוניװערסיטעט“, װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו דערציִען אַ נײַעם דור פּאָליטישע אַקטיװיסטן, װאָס זאָלן זײַן באַהאַװנט סײַ אין דער ייִדישער קולטור און סײַ אין דער מאַרקסיסטישער טעאָריע.
דאָס איז געװען „אײנע פֿון די אַנשטאַלטן אינעם גערעם פֿונעם ברײטערן פּראָיעקט פֿון ייִדישע קאָמוניסטן צו שאַפֿן אַן אײגענע קולטור־װעלט“, שרײַבט דילאַן קאַופֿמאַן־אָבסטלער. צו דעם דאָזיקן פּראָיעקט האָבן געהערט אױך קעמפּ „קינדערלאַנד“, דער װױנונג־קאָאָפּעראַטיװ אין דער בראָנקס — די „אַמאַלגאַמייטעד“ — און די קאָמוניסטישע צײַטונג „מאָרגן־פֿרײַהײט“.
אַלע ייִדישע קאָמוניסטישע פּראָיעקטן, און דער אוניװערסיטעט בתוכם, האָבן געהאַט אַן אינערלעכע סתּירה אין זײער תּוך. פֿון אײן זײַט איז זײער ציל געװען אָפּצוהיטן ייִדיש און די װעלטלעכע ייִדישע קולטור אינעם אַמעריקאַנער „שמעלצטאָפּ“. פֿון דער אַנדערער זײַט האָט מען געגלױבט אינעם אַלװעלטלעכן קאָמוניסטישן אינטערנאַציאָנאַל אָן קײן שום נאַציאָנאַלע גרענעצן.
די דאָזיקע סתּירה האָט גורם געװען שפּאַנונגען אין דער ייִדישער קאָמוניסטישער סבֿיבֿה. אין די 1930ער יאָרן זײַנען זײ נאָך געװען ביכולת צו געפֿינען אַ פּשרה. מען האָט געטענהט, אַז ייִדיש איז געװען דער סאַמע פּאַסיקסטער מיטל צו פֿאַרשפּרײטן קאָמוניסטישע אידעען בײַ די ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן.
אָבער די דאָזיקע סתּירה איז געװאָרן נאָך שאַרפֿער בעת דער צװײטער װעלט־מלחמה, װען די טראַגעדיע פֿונעם ייִדישן חורבן איז געװאָרן װיכטיקער פֿאַר אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן אײדער דער קאָמוניסטישער חלום.
װי אַקטועל איז די דאָזיקע געשיכטע װעגן דעם שידוך צװישן ייִדישקײט און קאָמוניזם פֿאַרן הײַנטיקן פּאָליטישן סדר־היום? אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָבן ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן פֿון מזרח־אײראָפּע לרובֿ געהערט צו דעם אַרבעטער־קלאַס. זײ האָבן נאָך געהאַט זײער שפּראַך, ייִדיש, און פֿאַרמאָגט אַ שטאַרקע עטנישע אידענטיטעט. דערצו האָבן זײ געליטן פֿון אַנטיסעמיטיזם, װאָס איז געװען פֿאַרשפּרײט, דער עיקר, צװישן װײַסע אַמעריקאַנער נאַציאָנאַליסטן. אױף דעם דאָזיקן יסוד האָט מען געקענט בױען אַ ברײטע מאַסן־באַװעגונג, װאָס זאָל פֿאַראײניקן אימיגראַנטן און די אַפֿריקאַנער אַמעריקאַנער.
דער איצטיקער מצבֿ איז אַנדערש. הײַנט געהערן ייִדן אין אַמעריקע לרובֿ צו דעם מיטלשטאַנד, און זײער עטנישער אָפּשטאַם איז אַן ענין פֿאַר נאָסטאַלגישע מעשׂיות. אָבער זײער סאָציאַלער אױפֿקום האָט ניט בטל געמאַכט דעם אַנטיסעמיטיזם.
נאָך מער, הײַנט איז אַנטיסעמיטיזם פֿאַרשפּרײט אי בײַ די רעכטע „מאַגאַ“־נאַצינאַליסטן אי בײַ די ראַדילאַקע לינקע. כּדי צו װערן אַן „אײגענער“ בײַ די לינקע, מוז אַ ייִדישער אַקטיװיסט זיך אָפּלײקענען פֿון ציוניזם און מדינת־ישׂראל.
דאָ קומט צו נוץ די אַלטע ירושה פֿונעם ייִדישיסטישן קאָמוניזם. מען זעט דערין אַ מין אַלטערנאַטיװע ייִדישקײט, װאָס איז אי פּראָגרעסיװ אי אַנטי־ציוניסטיש. אָבער װי אַזױ קען מען מחיה־מתים זײַן די לעבעדיקע ייִדישע סבֿיבֿה פֿון יענער תּקופֿה? אין יענע יאָרן האָבן די ייִדן — ניט געקוקט אױף זייערע טיפֿע פּאָליטישע חילוקי־דעות —פֿאָרט געהאַט אַ וויכטיקע זאַך בשותּפֿות: די אײגענע שפּראַך און קולטור.
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‘The Winter’s Tale’ is one of Shakespeare’s most confounding plays; was it also his most Jewish?
We all know about Shakespeare’s anti-Jewish play. But did he also write a Jewish play? Well, not explicitly or consciously, but The Winter’s Tale, which begins performances July 25 at the Public Theater’s Delacorte Theater in Central Park, appears to be full of Jewish motifs — themes from the Hebrew Bible (filtered through the Christian Bible, of course).
The play is a tale of exile, the abandonment of a child, years in the wilderness, repentance, homecoming and redemption. It is reminiscent at least in part of the stories of Moses in Egypt and the Exodus, as well as Joseph and his brothers.
Daniel Sullivan, the play’s director at the Delacorte, told me over the phone that he thought the biblical connection was an interesting idea — “certainly a possibility,” he said. Sullivan, 86, was less certain whether Shakespeare had explored these biblical themes “knowledgeably or whether it was something he simply shared” with the time. A version of those themes can be found, for example, in the source of the play’s plot, the 1588 tragic pastoral romance novella Pandosto: The Triumph of Time by Robert Greene.
Scholars have written about these biblical allusions. But The Winter’s Tale is of course about much more than that. “I’ve always been amazed by it,” Sullivan said. “It’s a play that’s sort of impossible. It’s a difficult piece in terms of both its tragic and comic elements. But it’s also one of the most moving of all of Shakespeare’s plays and one of the most human.”
The play’s first half lurches into utter Shakespearean tragedy, then miraculously changes direction and turns into Shakespearean comedy. Leontes, king of Sicilia, becomes insanely jealous, believing his pregnant wife, Hermione, has been unfaithful with his longtime and childhood friend, the king of Bohemia. He imprisons her, she gives birth in prison, she is tried and collapses in court and it is announced that she has died.
Leontes and Hermione’s young son, Mamillius, dies of grief. Leontes exiles his newborn daughter, who is taken to the kingdom of Bohemia, where she is abandoned and discovered by a shepherd, who raises her as his own. Sixteen years pass before she returns to Sicilia, as the play begins its surprising metamorphosis. Hermione — magically — reappears and there is an (almost) happy denouement.
The opening part of the play is an intensely detailed —especially for the time it was written — example of irrational psychology, of Leontes’ jealousy and delusion — it is, Sullivan said, “very challenging” to direct.
And then, when you think all will be lost, as in King Lear, or Hamlet, or Othello, the playwright reverses the course of his tragic source material. (Things do not end happily for King Pandosto of Pandosto.)
Why does Sullivan think Shakespeare decided to veer away from his play’s, and Pandosto’s, disastrous path? One possibility, he said, is that Shakespeare could see that he could create “a fantastical element in it — that for 16 years Hermione has been hiding somewhere.” (In Pandosto the queen just dies.) “It’s sort of wonderfully out there in terms of a plot device. And I think that Shakespeare gloried in that. It goes from extremely tragic to very charming, and there aren’t a lot of Shakespeare’s plays that are like that,” Sullivan said.
But there’s something else. The play is, after all, a tale of redemption and forgiveness. It’s a late play, written around 1609-1611 — Shakespeare died in 1616 — and, Sullivan said, the play’s late birth perhaps had something to with its theme. “I think whether he knew the end was coming or not, certainly the idea of redemption is sort of the undergirding of this play.”
Even so, the ending is not a completely happy one. Mamillius, the royal family’s son, does not return. “That’s one of the elements of the play that Shakespeare buries a little bit,” Sullivan said.
Could Shakespeare have been thinking of his own young son, Hamnet, who died of the plague at age 11? “I think that’s probably true,” said Sullivan.
Still, Sullivan has managed in a way to bring back the king’s son. “One of the things we do with this,” he said, “is when the character of Time comes out to tell us what’s happened,” that 16 years have passed in the story, “we actually use the character of Mamillius as a sort of angel to tell us.”
Sullivan has been directing professionally for more than a half-century and has helmed more than 30 plays on Broadway. He won the directing Tony Award for David Auburn’s Proof in 2001, and has received seven other Tony nominations. He is also very much a Shakespeare maven. This is his 12th production for Free Shakespeare in the Park.
Directing Shakespeare has long been, and remains, special for Sullivan. “ I just love being around it more than anything else,” he said. “I love getting deeply into it, and researching it as much as I possibly can. I’ve done a lot of the plays more than once, and every time I come back to them they always seem completely different to me. I think about my own life and, in the way that I see things differently than I did 20 years ago, I see these plays differently.”
The Winter’s Tale contains perhaps the most famous stage direction in all of Shakespeare — “Exit, pursued by a bear.” This summer, will the Delacorte, long a home to scene-stealing raccoons, bear witness to a much larger stage creature?
“The one thing I really didn’t want to do was have a man in a bear suit chasing the actor across the stage. It’s just too funny. It’s possible that Shakespeare wanted it to be rather comic. But we find it rather tragic. So we’re doing it in a way that I think will be somewhat surprising. I’m not going to tell you. People will have to come and see.”
Performances of The Winter’s Tale run through Aug. 23 at the Delacorte.
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