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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government

(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.

The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.

These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem. 

For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.

I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides. 

Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward? 

Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.

And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.

Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?

Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.

The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel. 

This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation. 

How would that work?

For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land. 

The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one. 

Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace. 

What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?

Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount. 

Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)

And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount. 

And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.  

This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.

When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future. 

I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned. 

Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank. 

I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”

That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road. 

And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?

The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.

As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years. 

Does Israel even have that capability?

The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.

Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank. 

The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?

The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department. 

But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank. 

There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners. 

Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?

The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].

North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.

Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.   

We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.

What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?

Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do. 

The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset. 

We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?

It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter. 

If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity. 

If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.

—
The post An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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I’ve been chanting my bar mitzvah Torah portion annually for 40 years. It keeps me grounded in a polarized world.

The Phantom of the Opera had a run of 13,981 Broadway shows across 35 years. Baltimore Orioles legend Cal Ripken Jr., played in 2,632 consecutive baseball games over 17 seasons. The District of Columbia has voted for a Democratic candidate for president in 15 consecutive presidential elections. And this Thanksgiving weekend, I will chant my bar mitzvah Torah parsha (the weekly Torah portion), Vayishlach, for the 40th straight year.

As streaks go, mine certainly will not make a list of history’s greatest. Yet for four decades, I have leined (chanted) it in Israel, the Czech Republic, Vermont, California, Tennessee, Illinois, New York, D.C., and many other international and domestic cities. Whether home or away, every synagogue and Jewish community where I read Torah welcomed me as a fellow Jew as I chanted the ancient words: “וַיִּשְׁלַ֨ח יַֽעֲקֹ֤ב מַלְאָכִים֙ לְפָנָ֔יו אֶל־עֵשָׂ֖ו אָחִ֑יו אַ֥רְצָה שֵׂעִ֖יר שְׂדֵ֥ה אֱדֽוֹם – Jacob sent messengers ahead to his brother Esau in the land of Seir, the country of Edom.”

This 40th year will be particularly memorable because I will return to the place my streak started – Kesher Israel in Washington, D.C. – where I will read Vayishlach as my 94 year-old father sits in the front row of the synagogue and corrects any mistakes I make.  After 40 years, I do not make many, but he still catches every one.

Vayishlach recounts the reunion of estranged brothers Jacob and Esau, as well as the failed unification of the children of Jacob and Hamor after a son of Hamor raped a daughter of Jacob. The parsha’s themes resonate strongly today.  The first lesson is that brothers, no matter the distance between them, should never forget the family ties that bind them.  The second lesson is that when one community commits an act of extreme violence against another, it is extraordinarily difficult to forget and make peace.  These stories teach us that we Jews must always welcome our brothers and also protect ourselves from others who would do us harm.

Three chantings in my streak best reflect Vayishlach’s lesson of brotherly love: my second anniversary when I was living in Northern Israel on a kibbutz; my eighth anniversary when I was a college senior in rural Vermont; and my approximately twentieth anniversary when I was traveling with my father in the Czech Republic.

When I was 15 years old, I lived for a year on Kfar Blum in Israel’s Hula Valley.  There was a small non-denominational synagogue on the kibbutz which struggled to get a minyan.  I approached the lay leader of the synagogue – there was no rabbi – and asked if I might be permitted to chant my bar mitzvah portion on Shabbat.  He seemed skeptical – after all, what American Jew knew enough Hebrew and the Torah “trope” (the musical melody used when chanting Torah) to read an entire parsha?  Fortunately, my on-the-spot practice for him proved my credentials, and he permitted this young American to lead their Shabbat minyan.  While I cannot say that I became a regular attendee, whenever I saw the older synagogue members around the kibbutz, they always had a smile and a nod for the young American Jew who could chant Torah.

Six years later, as a student at Middlebury College in Vermont, there was no Shabbat minyan on campus or in the nearby towns.  So I called the historic Ohavi Zedek Synagogue (“OZ”) in Burlington, Vermont.  OZ was founded in 1885 and is one of Vermont’s oldest and largest Jewish congregations.  Again, after convincing the synagogue chazan (prayer leader) that I could read Torah, I drove an hour from Middlebury to Burlington to chant Vayishlach before a much larger congregation than I was used to.  When I finished and briefly joined the kiddush after services, I awkwardly accepted Mazel Tovs from my Jewish elders.  They expressed pride in my chanting and their hope that I would read Torah again in their shul.

About a decade later, I traveled with my father to the Czech Republic.  It was a business trip for him and a vacation for me.  Early on a Thursday morning, we went to the Old-New Synagogue in Prague’s Jewish Quarter for morning minyan.  I knew this might be my only chance to keep my bar mitzvah streak alive, so before the Torah service, my father and I approached one of the leaders to ask if I might lein.  In the spirit of detente, we negotiated an agreement: They would let me chant as long as one of their members stood next to me in case I could not, in fact, read Torah.  I surprised them again, reading smoothly and earning an invitation to another post-service kiddush and a l’chaim.

Today, when Jews neither feel safe in our communities nor welcome in others, my 40-year bar mitzvah Torah reading streak motivates me to build bridges across our Jewish faith and with others.  After all, our survival throughout history depended on maintaining our Jewish traditions while also being thoroughly engaged in contemporary society.  When I chant this verse – “וַיָּ֨רׇץ עֵשָׂ֤ו לִקְרָאתוֹ֙ וַֽיְחַבְּקֵ֔הוּ וַיִּפֹּ֥ל עַל־צַוָּארָ֖ו וַׄיִּׄשָּׁׄקֵ֑ׄהׄוּׄ וַיִּבְכּֽוּ; Esau ran to greet Jacob, embraced him, fell on his neck, kissed him, and they wept” – I choose the uplifting interpretation that the two brothers reunited in love.  I will continue to be inspired by the lessons of Vayishlach that have never been more important to our Jewish communities, in cities and countries, large and small.

The post I’ve been chanting my bar mitzvah Torah portion annually for 40 years. It keeps me grounded in a polarized world. appeared first on The Forward.

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NFL suspends star wide receiver Puka Nacua following allegations of antisemitism, assault

(JTA) — The NFL suspended Los Angeles Rams star wide receiver Puka Nacua for three games on Thursday, months after he faced a lawsuit from a woman who alleged that he had made an “unprovoked antisemitic statement.”

But Nacua — who led the league in receptions last season — won’t miss any additional games, as the league is allowing him to serve the suspension while he recovers from an injury.

Madison Atiabi, who is Jewish, alleged that Nacua, 25, said “f— all the Jews” at a dinner in L.A. last New Year’s Eve. According to the lawsuit, Atiabi said she “immediately felt uncomfortable and emotionally distressed.”

Atiabi also alleged that Nacua “forcibly” bit her on the left shoulder, “leaving a circular imprint of his teeth on her body,” and that he bit her friend’s thumb “with such force that her companion screamed in acute pain.”

Nacua’s attorney, Levi McCathern, said in a statement at the time that Nacua denied the antisemitism allegations “in the strongest possible terms.” McCathern characterized the biting as “horseplay.”  No charges were filed, and the civil case is ongoing.

The NFL allows players to serve suspensions while on the injured list. But the timing of the suspension for Nacua — who previously got in trouble for making an antisemitic gesture on a livestream — raised questions about whether the NFL intended for one of its brightest young stars to miss any game time.

After Nacua sustained a knee injury Nov. 8, the Rams placed him on injured reserve, stipulating that he would miss at least four games but leaving open the possibility of a return before the playoffs. He underwent surgery to repair a sprained MCL on Tuesday, ruling him out until next season.

By waiting until Nacua returned from injury to announce its decision, the NFL could have ensured that Nacua missed games he would otherwise have played. The league also could have levied a more significant fine.

Nacua, who is still on his rookie contract, will reportedly lose $950,000 in lost game checks. He is expected to sign a lucrative free-agent contract after the season, meaning that he would have been in line to forfeit a much heftier sum — potentially several million dollars — had the league levied the suspension upon his return.

The NFL also reportedly told Nacua that future violations of the league’s personal conduct policy could lead to significant discipline, including a permanent ban.

The March lawsuit came a few months after another high-profile antisemitism scandal involving Nacua.

Last December — roughly two weeks before the alleged New Year’s Eve incident — Nacua appeared on Jewish influencer Adin Ross’ livestream show, where he was encouraged by Ross to perform an antisemitic touchdown dance during his next game. The dance recreates an infamous gesture known as “The Happy Merchant” that depicts Jews as greedy. Nacua performed the dance on the livestream, but never during a game.

After facing backlash — including calls for the Rams to cut Nacua — the wide receiver apologized in an Instagram post that featured the branding of the “Stand Up To Jewish Hate” campaign, the advocacy group founded by New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft. That post is no longer visible.

“When I appeared the other day on a social media livestream, it was suggested to me to perform a specific movement as part of my next touchdown celebration,” Nacua wrote in the now-removed post. “At the time, I had no idea this act was antisemitic in nature and perpetuated harmful stereotypes against Jewish people.

“I deeply apologize to anyone who was offended by my actions as I do not stand for any form of racism, bigotry or hate of another group of people.”

The NFL and the Rams also released statements at the time, neither of which named Nacua.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post NFL suspends star wide receiver Puka Nacua following allegations of antisemitism, assault appeared first on The Forward.

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Why this Jewish reporter takes bagel journalism seriously

When I tell people I’m a reporter at the Forward, they usually ask what I cover. I could say something like “all things Jewish news,” but that’s a little boring. So I’ve come up with a one-liner that packs a punch: “I cover bagels one day and neo-Nazis the next.”

The statement is meant in jest, but there’s some truth to it, too. For example, I wrote these two stories on the same day: Schmear campaign: Andrew Cuomo’s bacon bagel blunder bothers NY Jews and Holocaust survivor burned in Boulder attack speaks out.

As a very scholarly and schmearious journalist, why devote my energy to bagel coverage? The case for writing about antisemitism is straightforward, but the mandate for a Jewish reporter to cover bagel business is less so.

Still, I’ve returned to the subject more than a few times. Back in June 2025, I ranked the New York City mayoral candidates based on their bagel orders. Last December, I reported on the reopening of Absolute Bagels on the Upper West Side, a year after the shop’s closure had caused New York Jews to sit shiva. Most recently, I trekked out to Park Slope to report on Brooklyn’s new “lard bagel” — delicious sacrilege.

I’d be lying if I said I hadn’t occasionally questioned whether spending hours coming up with bagel puns was the best use of my journalism school degree. (Though I do think I’m on a roll.)

I have my personal reasons. Growing up, my local bagel shop was Bethesda Bagels. I have fond memories of biking there on Sundays with my parents, then sitting on a bench to enjoy everything bagels and sip orange juice out of cartons. Bagels and lox were the food of choice at bat mitzvah luncheons, holidays and family gatherings. To me, they conjure memories of all things Jewish and warm and toasty.

But nostalgia isn’t the only reason I write about bagels. There are journalistic reasons to cover them, too.

For one, the range in my coverage reflects the breadth of Judaism. Jewish life is religion, food, humor, antisemitism and everything in between.

More symbolically, the evolution of the bagel speaks to one of the central tensions in modern American Jewish life: How does a diaspora community preserve its history and identity while also becoming a part of the broader culture?

The bagel, in particular, offers an opening through which you can see the American Jewish experience of assimilation.

Bagels had humble beginnings in the U.S. The boiled-then-baked comestible, whose name derives from the Yiddish word beygl, meaning ring or bracelet, was brought to the U.S. in the late 1800s by immigrant Polish Jews. For decades, bagels remained largely confined to immigrant Jewish communities. That began to change in the 1950s and 1960s, when Lender’s Bagels in New Haven, Connecticut, began freezing bagels and shipping them across the country. The company marketed what it called the “Jewish English muffin” to the masses.

Today’s trendiest bagels are stuffed with bacon, egg and cheese, owned by private equity — and yes, sometimes even contain lard.

These bagels may make purists’ eyes roll, but they’re also a testament to just how ubiquitous the bagel has become.

I won’t pretend that all of my bagel stories carry profound symbolism. Sometimes, writing about bagels is just plain fun.

“News fatigue” describes the mental burnout that comes from constantly following current events. Readers feel it, and reporters like me do, too. That exhaustion can be especially acute while reporting on tragedies in your own community.

The bagel beat is a welcome reminder that meaningful journalism isn’t always about chasing the most dense stories. Sometimes, you just have to follow the dough.

The post Why this Jewish reporter takes bagel journalism seriously appeared first on The Forward.

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