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Are the Houthis a Direct Threat to Israel’s Security?
People gather near burning Israeli and US flags, as supporters of the Houthis rally to denounce air strikes launched by the US and Britain on Houthi targets, in Sanaa, Yemen, Jan. 12, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
The ongoing Israel-Hamas war (dubbed by Israel the Swords of Iron War) has seen the materializing of what has been until now a vague and somewhat imaginary-seeming threat from the Yemeni Houthi regime. The Houthis (or, more precisely, the Houthi movement, which was named after its founder, Hussein Al Houthi) is an extremist Shia Islamist movement that wrested control of the mountainous region of Yemen from the previous pro-Western government by capturing the capital city of Sana’a in 2015.
Following this coup, the Houthi movement proclaimed itself the legal government of the entire country. Like Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the movement has a civilian arm that deals with civil affairs and welfare, as well as a military arm — one that is now indistinguishable from a regular army.
The Houthis practice Yazidi Islam, which is a branch of global Shia Islam. Yazidi Muslims ruled Yemen for nearly a millennium until they were deposed in 1962 by a revolt by an Arab nationalist faction. Thus, the capture of Sana’a by the Houthis and reestablishment of Yazidi control over part of the country can be viewed as a counterrevolution that restored Yemeni Shias to their former position. Yemeni Shias constitute about 65% of the population of northern Yemen.
The extremism of the Houthi movement is reflected in its flag, which, true to its faith, bears no graven images. Instead, it features a five-line slogan: “God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.” It is hardly surprising that the ayatollahs of the Islamic Republic of Iran embraced the Houthi movement from the day of its establishment in 2004, and have supported it ever since with ample funds and arms.
Soon after the capture of Sana’a in 2015, a Sunni Arab coalition of nations headed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates embarked on a military campaign to oust the Houthi regime and reinstate the previous, internationally-recognized government of Yemen (which still controls parts of southern Yemen). The Arab coalition military campaign against the Houthi regime continued until a temporary ceasefire was achieved in April 2022.
During the seven years of warfare, Iran supported the Houthi regime to the hilt, copiously supplying it with money, arms, and military expertise and training by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corp and Lebanese Hezbollah. Circumventing the UN Security Council embargo on arming the Houthi regime, the Revolutionary Guards flooded their protégés with light arms, ammunition, rockets, missiles, and UAVs. Moreover, the Iranians delivered machinery and know-how to the Houthi regime to help it establish local defense industries that now provide the Houthi armed forces with some of its equipment, including UAVs and possibly some types of missiles and rockets.
Iran used the Yemen war to test its indigenously designed weapons systems — but at the same time, showed sensitivity to the UN embargo. This is shown by the lengths to which the Iranian regime went to dissociate itself from its arms supply to the Houthi regime. To this effect, they made efforts to disguise the Iranian origin of their supplied armaments. In some cases, the effort was superficial, like painting Houthi-destined ballistic missiles different colors from the Iranian originals. More frequently, the effort was significant and profound.
The prime example of a sophisticated dissociation effort was the development by Iran of UAVs and rockets tailored specifically for Houthi use — that is, not to be used by Iran’s own armed forces (at least at first). The claim was made that these weapons were indigenous Yemeni designs. A case in point is the rudimentary cruise missile Quds 1, first unveiled at a Sana’a arms expo in July 2019. There is clear evidence that the missile was designed and developed in Iran, but the Houthi regime bragged that the weapon had been indigenously designed and produced in Yemen. The Iranians, meanwhile, surreptitiously used the weapon operationally to attack the Saudi oil industry while avoiding displaying it at their own military parades and expos until 2023, when they finally featured it under a different name. The Iranians continue to maintain the fiction that they are complying with the UN embargo, and that the modern and deadly UAVs and missiles used by the Houthis were indigenously designed and built in Yemen by Yemeni scientists and engineers.
During the seven-year war in Yemen, the Houthis launched a significant campaign against Saudi Arabia that included attacks by rockets, ballistic missiles, and UAVs on population centers, military bases, industrial plants, and state symbols. Most of the attacks targeted the southern provinces of Saudi Arabia that border Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s hinterland also came under attack, and its capital city of Riyadh was hit at least eight times by Iran-supplied, Houthi-operated ballistic missiles and UAVs. Oil installations deep within Saudi territory were also subjected to mainly long-range UAV and cruise missile attacks, including the oil terminals at the port of Jeddah, the oil pipeline that connects the oil fields of northern Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea ports, and to oil fields like Shaiba in the eastern part of the Kingdom.
The United Arab Emirates, too, was a victim of several missile and UAV attacks from Houthi-controlled Yemen. These attacks targeted the construction site of the UAE’s nuclear power reactor and Abu Dhabi as well as the Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports. In the most recent attack in January 2022, Houthi-launched UAVs and missiles caused several casualties in an Abu Dhabi suburb. The Saudi Armed Forces spokesperson disclosed in December 2021 that a total of 851 UAVs and 430 rockets and ballistic missiles had been launched by the Houthis against Saudi targets since the start of the Yemen war in 2015.
The longest range reached by Houthi missiles during the Yemen war was about 1,200 km. How far their UAVs and cruise missiles struck is not precisely known, but it seems that their maximum range was about 1,000 km. At the time of the ceasefire, the Houthi regime had in its possession a significant arsenal of long-range weapons that could threaten the entire territory of Saudi Arabia. Their range was not, however, sufficient to hit Israel, the southernmost point of which is about 1,700 km away from the nearest point in Yemen.
Several Israeli analysts foresaw that once the war with Saudi Arabia abated, the Houthi regime would turn its long-range capabilities against Israel. One clear warning of Houthi intentions was provided by a video clip released by the Houthi regime in 2019 that featured the newly unveiled Quds 1 cruise missile. This propaganda video had Hebrew subtitles threatening Israel, ending with the words — in Hebrew — “In the future, many more (missiles).” It was clear that the range gap could be bridged by extending the reach of the cruise missile and introducing heavier ballistic missiles.
As predicted, extended-range missiles were unveiled at a military parade held in Sana’a on September 22, 2023, barely two weeks before the Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. At the parade, the Houthis unveiled two new missile types: the Quds 4 cruise missile, which has a longer range than earlier variants (the exact range was not specified); and a new, larger ballistic missile dubbed the “Toufan” that was clearly the 1,900 km Iranian Ghader F — an extended-range version of the liquid propellant Shahab 3. Since the Houthis don’t need missiles with ranges beyond 1,200 km to threaten Saudi Arabia, it was clear that the intended target of the two new missiles was Israel.
This threat first materialized on October 19, 2023, when a salvo of UAVs was launched from Yemen towards Israel. This salvo was apparently intercepted and destroyed by US warships stationed in the Red Sea. In another attack on October 27, some Yemeni-launched UAVs reached the Gulf of Aqaba. Two of them struck towns in Egyptian Sinai and others were shot down by Israel Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft. Four days later, a Houthi-launched ballistic missile that targeted Eilat, Israel’s southernmost city, was intercepted and destroyed by the Arrow anti-missile system. Subsequently, two more Houthi-launched ballistic missiles were destroyed by Arrow interceptors well before they could hit Eilat. Further UAV attacks were foiled by the IAF, and from video footage released by the IAF of these interceptions, it seems the intercepted threats were Quds 4 cruise missiles. According to media reports, some of the UAVs launched against Israel were intercepted and destroyed by Saudi Air Defense command.
The impression is that while the nominal range of the Quds 4 cruise missile covers southern Israel, including Eilat and points north, in real life its range is only marginally sufficient to reach Eilat. One clue suggesting this to be true is the debris of a Houthi cruise missile found in the deserts of southern Jordan, about 200 km short of Eilat. It might have failed to reach Eilat because of a technical glitch, but it also might have run out of fuel earlier than anticipated.
It appears that Israel’s Air Defense Command prepared in time to face potential missile threats from Houthi Yemen. This has enabled it (with the help of the US Navy) to parry all Houthi-launched cruise and ballistic missile attacks up to now. At the same time, there is little doubt that the Houthis, aided by their Iranian patrons, will make further efforts to improve their performance and break through the defensive arrays of the US Navy and Israel’s Air Defense Command (and probably that of Saudi Arabia’s air defense too). The Houthi regime formally declared war on Israel on October 31, 2023, so it stands to reason that it will persist in its efforts to hit Israel with its missiles, both to show solidarity with Hamas, a fellow Iranian proxy, and to dilute Israel’s air defenses against the rockets, missiles and UAVs of Hamas and Hezbollah.
The Houthi missile threat is clearly destined to become a permanent feature of Israel’s missile threat environment. Israel’s Air Defense Command will probably redeploy its assets for instant readiness against the threat from the south, a threat that has now became as tangible and dangerous as the missile threats from Gaza and Lebanon.
Dr. Uzi Rubin, a senior researcher at The BESA Center, is a former founder and director of the Arrow project in the Defense Ministry and an expert on missile defense systems. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Are the Houthis a Direct Threat to Israel’s Security? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Could Trump’s Trip Offer a New Hope for Israeli-Arab Alliances in the Middle East?
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, then-US President Donald Trump, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed display their copies of signed agreements as they participate in the signing ceremony of the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and some of its Middle East neighbors, in a strategic realignment of Middle Eastern countries against Iran, on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, September 15, 2020. Photo: REUTERS/Tom Brenner/
At an Israeli Independence Day reception in Washington, Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff declared, “On behalf of President Trump, I pledge that we will work tirelessly this year so that next year’s Independence Day is not just a wish for happiness, but a reality of peace, prosperity and for Israel, unity.”
Witkoff’s suggestion of the “reality of peace” came on the eve of the President’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE — the first official foreign trip of his second term.
It came during a time of intense conflict in the Middle East. Just last week, Israel’s security cabinet voted to significantly broaden the military offensive against Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis struck Israel near Ben Gurion Airport, and Israel retaliated, striking key economic and military assets of the terror organization in Yemen. At the same time, the threat of a nuclear Iran becomes more likely with each passing day.
With the horrors of October 7, 2023, continuing to plague Israel and the Arab world, amidst the heartbreak of loved ones lost, and as we await an agreement that will finally bring the remaining hostages home, we must also look towards the future. There are two very different paths before us. One is to continue down the road of perpetual conflict, endless wars, and missed opportunities. The other is to acknowledge that violence and hate cannot and will not lead to a future of peace or prosperity — that force without a political horizon only gets you so far.
Building on the successes and stability of the Abraham Accords, President Trump has a rare opportunity to alter the reality in the Middle East by breathing new life into Israeli-Arab integration efforts. Nearly 600 days since the atrocities of October 7, expanded normalization between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, may be more difficult than it was during talks two or three years ago, but it is still within reach.
The reasons for this are simple. The Middle East and North Africa, with the second youngest population on the planet, is the least economically integrated region in the world, one of the most water-poor, and one of the fastest-warming regions due to climate change. The notion that any one country can successfully confront these challenges alone is a fantasy.
Overcoming the challenges that have emerged post-October 7 is much less straightforward.
For Israel, the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains acceptance and the right to live peacefully in the only homeland of the Jewish people. For Israelis, it is indefensible that the vast majority of the Arab world cannot utter the word Hamas or publicly condemn the October 7 massacre. Israelis do not understand how Egypt, in the fifth decade of its historic peace treaty with Israel, can release a 106-page document about the day-after in Gaza, a plan then endorsed by the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and not mention Hamas. After 19 months, this selective silence has led many across Israel to feel they have no one to turn to as a partner for peace.
But potential partners do exist and have stepped forward.
In June 2020, UAE Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba published an op-ed directly addressing the Israeli public. He warned about the dangers of annexation and extended his hand in peace. The article is credited with being one of the drivers of the US-brokered Abraham Accords.
While it may be more difficult for Arab leaders to address the Israeli public today, President Trump could help create a space in which key voices in the Arab world make clear that Hamas has no future and that all Israeli hostages must be released; that Israel is part of — and a contributor to — the region; that Jews are indigenous to their land; and that Israelis have a right to live in peace and security. Arab leaders could also publicly acknowledge the limitations of Palestinian governance and commit to supporting significant institutional reform and acceptance of their Jewish neighbors.
In the same breath, Arab leaders can also make clear that for this future to be secured, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be addressed. The Israelis could commit to a pathway to self-governance, with necessary security conditions. And while this will not yield statehood tomorrow, the Arab world can help promote new opportunities — political, economic, and civic — for Israelis and Palestinians to work and build trust with one another, while also building recognition of the need to share the sliver of land between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea.
President Trump fostering new diplomatic and social engagement will also allow him to pick up where his first administration left off, bringing new life to the economic possibilities of a more interconnected region — which could create four million new jobs and more than $1 trillion in new economic activity over a decade, according to a 2021 Rand study. Equally important, renewing the process of regional integration will move the area toward becoming a necessary bulwark against — instead of a seething generator of — hate and extremism.
President Trump is making this visit at a time that requires Israelis and Arabs to be more interdependent in ways not previously imaginable. So while the challenges in the Middle East are clear, so too are the unprecedented opportunities. President Trump has a rare opportunity to once again make history in this too-long-troubled region.
Benjamin Rogers is the Director of Middle East and North Africa Initiatives for American Jewish Committee (AJC).
The post Could Trump’s Trip Offer a New Hope for Israeli-Arab Alliances in the Middle East? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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UK/France to Recognize Palestinian State: Palestinians See it as a Reward for Oct. 7 Massacre
Britain’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy leaves Downing Street, following the results of the election, in London, Britain, July 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville
Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, David Lammy, confirmed last week that the UK is in talks with France to recognize a Palestinian state. Palestinian thought leaders, publications, and speakers throughout the Arab world see this as a reward for the horrific massacre of October 7, 2023, and an inducement to increase rather than decrease the level of violence and terrorism.
While Israel has long contended that this is the case, for the first time, we are able to provide proof: from Palestinian thought leaders in their own words.
Many European nations believe that recognizing Palestinian statehood will bring an end to war and terrorism, and will result in widespread peace. This flawed notion is based in part on European memory of negotiating the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, which ended decades of conflict. Indeed, even Israel and the United States adopted similar historical views during the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. Yet this analogy is flawed, as can be seen from events of the past year.
In May of 2024, Spain, Ireland and Norway officially recognized a Palestinian state, followed shortly thereafter by Slovenia.
Palestinian society, and the Arab world at large, declared this recognition to be a successful result of the October 7 massacre against Israel, and an indication that such massacres are the appropriate direction for Palestinian society.
For example:
Then Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh boasted that, “Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa [the October 7 massacre] raised the Palestinian cause to an unprecedented level” and that it “opened the door to recognition of the Palestinian state.”
Palestinian society, and the Arab world at large, widely agreed.
Dr. Mahmoud Samir Al-Rantisi, writing in Al Sharq, a major Arabic newspaper out of Qatar, echoes a commonly held belief that unilateral recognition through massacre is preferable to peace talks because it will result in “liberating” all “Palestinian lands” from Israel, rather than having to settle for a mere “two state solution.” By way of support for this prediction, Al-Rantisi cites the May 2024 recognition of Palestinian statehood by several European countries, and he (accurately) notes that, “[the] Spanish Deputy Prime Minister clearly announced that the Palestinians will regain their land from the river to the sea [a reference to the entirety of Israel] and will liberate their country and return to it.”
Alghad TV, a London-based Arab language television network broadcasting to the Middle East and North Africa, credits the October 7 massacre as bringing about Palestinian statehood via “blood and martyrs.”
Popular news site Arab21 credits the October 7 massacre (which it calls “the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa”) for “[bringing] the Palestinian cause back to the international stage after years of international silence” including “recognition of the State of Palestine … an event that has been absent from current generations.”
Al Jazeera describes the recognition of Palestinian statehood as a sign of the “disintegration of the European position supporting Israel,” stating that “the acceptance of the Palestinian state is not only due to what happened during the Al-Aqsa Intifada [the October 7 massacre] … rather, there is a desire among the world’s countries to punish the entity [Israel].”
Popular news site Palestinian Information Center (PIC) credits European recognition of a Palestinian state to the October 7 massacre, which it refers to as “the blessed Flood of Al Aqsa,” noting “the Flood of Al Aqsa alone turned the scales and restored the Palestinian cause to the top of the agenda of the unjust world.”
PIC included similar quotes by numerous Palestinian thought leaders, among them Majid Al-Zir, CEO of the Brussels-based “Palestinian Council for Political Relations” and president of the General Assembly of the Popular Conference of Palestinians Abroad, as well as writers and political analysts Yasser Al-Zaatara, Ibrahim Al-Madhoun, and Hazem Ayad.
Al-Zaatara emphasized that credit goes to the Hamas terror organization and not to the “catastrophic” official leadership of the Palestinian Authority, which has “abandoned future generations,” while Ayad described the international recognition as a “step towards comprehensive war of liberation.”
These views are nothing new.
The 1990s saw widespread Israeli and Palestinian support for the Oslo peace process but there was a critical difference between the two sides: whereas Israelis envisioned the peace process as bringing an end to the conflict, both Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as well as over 72% of Palestinians did not.
To this day, according to Arab research sources, 74.7% of Palestinians desire a Palestinian-only state that entirely supplants Israel, while 72% support the October 7 massacre.
In short, the prevailing opinion within the Arab world, including within Palestinian society, is that recognition of a Palestinian state is a reward for the October 7 massacre. European countries are therefore sending a dangerous message: one that Palestinian society understands to be not only support for the October 7 massacre, but also encouragement to carry out even more bloodshed in the future.
Daniel Pomerantz is the CEO of RealityCheck, an organization dedicated to deepening public conversation through robust research studies and public speaking.
The post UK/France to Recognize Palestinian State: Palestinians See it as a Reward for Oct. 7 Massacre first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Why a ‘Demilitarized’ Palestinian State Will Not Work and Conflicts with International Law
The signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington, DC, Sept. 13, 1993. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.
On May 6, 2025, National Unity leader Benny Gantz reaffirmed the obvious: the establishment of a Palestinian state would seriously undermine Israel’s security. Gantz concluded correctly, “… anyone who talks about a Palestinian state or [Gaza] withdrawal is simply delusional.”
Most importantly, the idea of a “demilitarized” Palestinian state seems absurd given current conditions.
In 1995 and 1998, Zalman Shovel (Israel’s former ambassador to the United States) and I published several law journal articles clarifying the “demilitarization” trap. In essence, we argued that even if an impressive number of states could argue convincingly for recognition of “Palestine,” these arguments would not satisfy the authoritative expectations of international law.
Among other things, the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1934) — the treaty that defines legal requirements of statehood — explicitly identifies all pertinent criteria. These binding standards do not include recognition.
In principle, at least, national declarations of support for Palestinian “self-determination” could be reasonable if the Palestinian side were authentically committed to a “Two-State Solution.” Yet the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas, and other regional “liberation movements” still insist that there should be only one legitimate state in the area and that this state must be “Palestine.”
Reflecting jihadi underpinnings of their expected state, Palestinian leaders in the West Bank (Judea/Samaria), Gaza and elsewhere continue to support the view that Israel represents an irremediable abomination of the Dar al-Islam (the world of Islam).
In this non-negotiable and annihilationist view, all of Israel remains nothing more than “Occupied Palestine.” It follows, inter alia, that anyone still seeking a “Two-State Solution” would be urging the creation of a criminal aggressor state, one for which the barbarism of October 7, 2023, represents a suitable template for future violence against Israeli noncombatants.
Earlier, this manipulative urging had stemmed from a diplomatic framework known as The Road Map for Implementation of a Permanent Solution for Two States in the Israel-Palestinian Dispute. Together with the Palestinian refusal to reject the genocidal “Phased Plan” (Cairo) of June 1974 and the correlative Palestinian jihad to “liberate occupied Palestine” in increments, the Road Map revealed a largely- unforeseen peril. Even certain well-intentioned states favoring Palestinian sovereignty were being misled by contrived promises of “demilitarization.”
On June 14, 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to accept another enemy state. but made such agreement contingent on verifiable Palestinian demilitarization. Presently, Netanyahu, once again prime minister, opposes Palestinian statehood in any form, even if accompanied by demilitarization. This is the only correct and rational position because Israel’s survival could not plausibly coincide with any such bestowal of Arab sovereignty given the current reality.
In law, functioning as a presumptively sovereign state, Palestine would not be bound by any pre-independence compacts. Might this be different if the new Arab state were somehow willing to consider itself bound by pertinent pre-state agreements? Not at all. Even in such relatively favorable circumstances, the new government of an irredentist Palestinian terror state would retain grounds to implement lawful treaty terminations.
The relevant particulars are unhidden. Palestine could withdraw from agreements because of a “material breach,” an alleged violation by Israel that credibly undermined the object and/or purpose of the accord. Alternatively, it could point toward what international law calls rebus sic stantibus, a “fundamental change of circumstances.”
Here, if a Palestinian state were simply to declare itself vulnerable to previously unforeseen dangers, even from forces of other Arab or Islamist armies, it could lawfully end its previously “guaranteed” commitments to stay demilitarized.
There is another method by which a treaty-like arrangement obligating a new Palestinian state to accept demilitarization could lawfully be invalidated. Here, the usual grounds that can be invoked under domestic law to invalidate contracts would apply as well to treaties and treaty-like agreements under international law. This means that a new state of Palestine could point to alleged “errors of fact” or “duress” as appropriate grounds for terminating any negotiated pacts with Israel.
Per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), any treaty or treaty-like agreement is void if, at the time it was entered into, it conflicts with a “peremptory” rule of general international law. This means a rule accepted and recognized by the international community of states as one from which “no derogation is permitted.” Because the right of all sovereign states to maintain military forces essential to “self-defense” is precisely such a rule, Palestine, depending on the particular form of its institutionalized authority, could be within its rights to abrogate any prior arrangements to accept demilitarization.
In crafting a comprehensive post-Gaza war accord, Israel should draw no reassurance from earlier Palestinian promises to demilitarize. Should the government of a new state of Palestine ever choose to invite foreign armies or terrorists onto its territory (possibly after the original government authority were displaced or overthrown by more militantly Islamist forces), it could do so without practical difficulties and without violating international law.
In concept, any plan for Palestinian statehood would still be built on the long-moribund Oslo Accords, ill-founded agreements destroyed by persistent Arab violations. For the Palestinians, Oslo-mandated expectations were never anything more than a cost-effective method of dismantling Israel. For the Israelis, these expectations were taken as a more-or-less unavoidable way of averting future terror crimes and war-level aggressions.
What does all of this ultimately mean for any Palestinian demilitarization “remedy” and Israel’s national security? Prima facie, the Arab world and Iran still have only a “One-State Solution” for the Middle East. This “solution” eliminates Israel altogether. Unassailably, it is a “final solution.” Even today, official maps of “Palestine” show a new state comprising all of the West Bank (Judea/Samaria), all of Gaza, and all of the State of Israel.
Back on September 1, 1993, Yasser Arafat affirmed that the Oslo Accords would remain an integral part of the PLO’s 1974 Phased Plan for Israel’s destruction: “The agreement will be a basis for an independent Palestinian State, in accordance with the Palestinian National Council Resolution issued in 1974.” This PNC Resolution calls for “the establishment of a national authority on any part of Palestinian soil from which Israel withdraws or is liberated.”
Later, on May 29, 1994, Rashid Abu Shbak, then senior PA security official, remarked straightforwardly: “The light which has shone over Gaza and Jericho will also reach the Negev and the Galilee.”
Since these early declarations, nothing has changed in authoritative Palestinian definitions of Israel and “Palestine.” This is true for the leaderships of both Hamas and the PA. It makes no tangible difference whether one jihadi terror group or another is in power. Both would intend a State of Palestine that is irredentist and violence-centered. To be sure, the egregious crimes of October 7, 2023, would remain a proud symbol of Palestinian “self-determination.”
Those who would still consider accepting Palestinian statehood in some form should recall the following: The Islamic world contains 50 states with more than one billion people. Islamic states comprise an area 672 times the size of Israel. Israel, together with Judea/Samaria, is less than half the size of San Bernardino County in California. The Sinai Desert, transferred by Israel to Egypt in the 1979 Treaty, is three times larger than the State of Israel. Israel is less than half the size of America’s Lake Michigan.
There is one last noteworthy point. The many-sided threat of Palestinian statehood is part of a much larger and more portentous enemy threat. This suggests, ipso facto, that any crime-based jihadi state would become a significant “force-multiplier” for Israel’s adversaries, both state and sub-state. In a worst-case but fully realistic scenario, the creation of “Palestine” would heighten the probability of a catastrophic war in the region. At some foreseeable point, such a war could become unconventional.
Prof. Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books and scholarly articles dealing with international law, nuclear strategy, nuclear war, and terrorism. In Israel, Prof. Beres was Chair of Project Daniel (PM Sharon). His 12th and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed., 2018).
The post Why a ‘Demilitarized’ Palestinian State Will Not Work and Conflicts with International Law first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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