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As Threats Rise, Israel Must Get Rid of Its Nuclear Ambiguity
Listening to Iran’s repeated threats to initiate aggressive war with Israel, something seems to have been overlooked: Israel is a nuclear power; Iran is not. Iran is hardly in a credible strategic position to make such threats. After all, any actual follow-through on these arguably incoherent threats could produce potentially unendurable Iranian losses.
What is going on here? Why such an ironic disconnect between relative national power capacities and the country issuing existential threats? It seems that in any direct and protracted war with Iran, only Israel would be in a position of “escalation dominance.”
The factor that could substantially change such Israeli superiority would be direct North Korean military involvement. This is because Iran’s belligerent ally in Pyongyang is “already nuclear,” and because Israel is a “fifty target state.” In short, Israel is a geographically small adversary with no meaningful strategic depth. Absent a recognizable nuclear advantage, this is anything but an enviable survival position for an imperiled nation.
The remedy, for Israel, should be an immediate policy shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” (Amimut in Hebrew) to “selective nuclear disclosure.
For decision-makers in Jerusalem, a core commitment of national strategic policy has always been to keep last-resort nuclear assets (aka “The Bomb”) shrouded in the “basement.” Until now, at least, nuclear ambiguity (sometimes called “opacity”) has managed to work. Though this success has seemingly done little to deter ordinary conventional aggressions or criminal acts of terror, it has succeeded in keeping the country’s enemies from launching any conceivable existential aggressions.
How should Israel accurately assess pertinent state and sub-state perils? In all such critical security matters, Israel has no science-based methods to determine useful probabilities. In science, such judgments must stem from the determinable frequency of relevant past events.
There are associated legal issues. Choosing the nuclear option as a last resort would not necessarily be a violation of international law. Among other things, this is because of an International Court of Justice (IJC) Advisory Opinion issued on July 8, 1996. This landmark ICJ ruling concluded that while “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict….,” this finding might not obtain “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”
Nonetheless, the most urgent considerations in any such impending narratives would be broadly operational, not narrowly jurisprudential. In more expressly military nuclear matters, any national security strategy based upon whispered or sotto voce threats would have conspicuous limits. Israel’s longstanding policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity may not remain persuasive. To be reliably deterred, an Iranian nuclear adversary would require readily verifiable assurances that Israel’s nuclear weapons were effectively (1) invulnerable and (2) “penetration-capable.” This second expectation means that Israel’s nuclear weapons would not only be well-protected from adversarial first-strikes, but would also be able to “get through” Iran’s active defenses.
There is more. Any adversary’s judgments concerning Israel’s willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons would depend in good measure upon useable foreknowledge of these weapons as well as their presumptive operational capabilities. There would also be some clarifying ironies.
Looking ahead, Iranian perceptions of only mega-destructive, high-yield Israeli nuclear weapons could effectively undermine the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrence. Expressed formally, in making such calculations, Israel’s strategic deterrence could sometime vary inversely with the perceived destructiveness of its nuclear arms. While seemingly counter-intuitive, this argument suggests not only that Israel should have available a wide range of nuclear retaliatory options, but also that it should take properly refined steps to ensure that such an expansive range of options be instantly recognizable.
In the future, if Iran should decide to share some of its offensive nuclear assets with a surrogate jihadist terrorist group (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis), Jerusalem would need to have prepared for the nuclear deterrence of assorted non-state adversaries. In all such scenarios, what will first need to be calculated, among other things, is the precise extent of subtlety with which Israel should be communicating its nuclear positions, intentions, and capabilities to Iran and various other categories of possible adversaries.
A refined doctrine is necessarily antecedent to any sound nuclear strategy. The core rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure would inhere in the basic and immutable understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel’s security in several specific ways. Once it is faced with a nuclear fait accompli in Tehran or elsewhere, Israel would need to convince its then-relevant enemy or enemies that it possessed both the will and the capacity to make any intended adversarial nuclear aggression more harmful than gainful. By definition, however, no Israeli move from ambiguity to disclosure could help in the unprecedented case of an irrational nuclear enemy.
To protect itself against enemy military strikes, particularly those attacks that could potentially carry authentic existential costs, Israel should quickly and correctly exploit every aspect and function of its still opaque nuclear arsenal. In this connection, the success of Israel’s efforts will depend not only upon its carefully selected configuration of “counterforce” and “counter value” operations, but also on the extent to which this critical choice was made known in advance to Iran and certain Iranian sub-state/terrorist surrogates. The point of any shift from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would be to signal that Israel’s “bomb” (1) is safely beyond any preemptive enemy reach; and (2) is calibrated to variously credible levels of enemy aggression.
In essence, removing the bomb from Israel’s basement could enhance the imperiled nation’s strategic deterrence only to the extent that it would heighten enemy perceptions of secure and capable Israeli nuclear forces. Any calculated end to deliberate nuclear ambiguity could also underscore Israel’s presumptive willingness to use its nuclear forces in sudden or incremental reprisal for enemy first-strike and/or retaliatory attacks.
In the final analysis, any Israeli shift from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would need to convince Iran of Jerusalem’s ultimate willingness to use nuclear forces against a non-nuclear adversary with exterminatory intentions and capacities.
Though generally misunderstood and inexpertly discussed, a “Samson Option” could gainfully support this obligatory task of Israeli strategic dissuasion. An explicitly-revealed Samson Option would multiply and magnify the survival benefits of selective nuclear disclosure not by threatening gratuitous Israeli spasms of revenge-based harms, but by reminding Iran that Israel’s nuclear force calibrations would be operational even at the 11th-hour.
There is more. In assessing its optimal levels of deliberate nuclear disclosure, Israel should continuously bear in mind the country’s overriding strategic nuclear objective: This goal is deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post.
If, however, nuclear weapons should somehow be introduced into an impending conflict with Iran (most plausibly, via military participation of North Korea), one form or other of nuclear war fighting could ensue. This conclusion would be unassailable so long as: (a) enemy state first strike attacks against Israel would not destroy the Jewish State’s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy state retaliations for Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Israel’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli strikes would not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliations for enemy state conventional first strikes would not destroy enemy state nuclear counter-retaliatory capacities. This means that Israel should promptly take appropriately steps to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b), above, and the reciprocal unlikelihood of (c) and (d).
If for any reason Iranian nuclear deployments were permitted to take place, Israel could forfeit any non-nuclear preemption options. At that stage, Jerusalem’s only remaining alternatives to exercising a nuclear preemption option would be: (1) a no-longer viable conventional preemption; or (2) a decision to do nothing preemptively, thereby choosing to existentially rely upon some form or other of nuclear deterrence and the corollary protections of ballistic missile defense. Ipso facto, any prior decisions having to do with tangible shifts to “selective nuclear disclosure” and also a “Samson Option” would be all important.
For Israel, the time to end its traditional policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” is now. The intellectually lazy argument that it has worked thus far and would therefore work in the future is a classic example of logical fallacy at its worst.
Left unrevised by a more carefully calculated and prudent Israeli nuclear policy, such fallacious reasoning could produce largely unimaginable levels of human harm. As all humans are ultimately creatures of biology, it could even bring millions into the predatory embrace of a “final epidemic.”
Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books, monographs, and scholarly articles dealing with military nuclear strategy. In Israel, he was Chair of Project Daniel. Over recent years, he has published on nuclear warfare issues in Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; and more.
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Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand Slams Mamdani For Defense of ‘Globalize the Intifada’ Slogan as Pressure Mounts on Presumptive Mayoral Nominee
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand speaks during the second night of the first Democratic presidential candidates debate in Miami, Florida, US Photo: June 27, 2019. REUTERS/Mike Segar.
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) has condemned presumptive New York City Democratic mayoral nominee Zohran Mamdani for his defense of the controversial phrase “globalize the intifada.”
During a Thursday appearance on Brian Lehrer’s WNYC radio show, Gillibrand called on Mamdani to distance himself from the phase, arguing that it endangers Jewish citizens of New York City. Gillibrand added that many of her Jewish constituents are “alarmed” at Mamdani’s defense of the slogan.
“As a leader of a city as diverse as New York City, with 8 million people, as the largest Jewish population in the country, he should denounce it,” she said. “That’s it. Period. You can’t celebrate it. You can’t value it. You can’t lift it up. That is the challenge that Jewish New Yorkers have had certainly since … Oct. 7. It is exactly what they have felt.”
Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO of The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) , issued a statement urging all participant in the Big Apple’s mayoral race to forcefully condemn antisemitism and anti-Jewish rhetoric.
“At this time of record antisemitism, our country needs leaders at all levels who are unequivocal in condemning this oldest of hatreds,” Greenblatt said in a news release. “We call on all candidates not only to condemn and avoid using language that is harmful to the Jewish community, but also to disassociate themselves and publicly disavow it.”
Greenblatt stressed that the ADL will be “forthright in calling out antisemitism during this campaign season, whatever the source,” and called on candidates to lay out specific plans to support New York’s Jewish community.
New York City, home to the largest Jewish population outside of Israel, experienced a surge of incidents in 2024 alone, more than any other U.S. metropolitan area, according to ADL’s annual audit.
The organization pointed to phrases like “globalize the Intifada,” the “Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS)” movement, and the slogan “From the River to the Sea” as examples of rhetoric that undermines Jewish safety and legitimacy. According to the ADL, such language invokes a decades-old history of attacks on Jews, denies the Jewish right to self-determination, and often serves to incite violence.
In addition to calling out antisemitic speech, the ADL is pressing candidates to explain how they will ensure the safety and security of the Jewish community while upholding their constitutional rights. This includes protecting the ability of Jewish New Yorkers to live, worship, work, and gather without fear of harassment, and to guard against the demonization of Jews, including Israelis.
“Antisemitic rhetoric should have no place in our electoral discourse,” Greenblatt said. “We need to know the specific plans of candidates to support the Jewish community. This is an issue for all candidates to explain in detail where they stand.”
Mamdani, a progressive representative in the New York State Assembly, has also sparked outrage after engaging in a series of provocative actions, such as appearing on the podcast of anti-Israel, pro-Hamas influencer Hasan Piker and vowing to arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he visits New York.
During an event hosted by the UJA-Federation of New York last month, Mamdani also declined to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state.
“I believe that Israel has a right to exist with equal rights for all,” Mamdani said in a carefully worded response when asked, sidestepping the issue of Israel’s existence specifically as a “Jewish state” and seemingly suggesting Israeli citizens do not enjoy equal rights.
Then during a New York City Democratic mayoral debate, he once again refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, sparking immediate backlash among the other candidates.
In 2023, while speaking at a Democratic Socialists of America convention in New York, Mamdani encouraged the audience to applaud for Palestinian American community activist Khader El-Yateem, saying “If you don’t clap for El-Yateem, you’re a Zionist.”
High-profile Democratic leaders in New York such as Sen. Chuck Schumer, Gov. Kathy Hochul, and Rep. Hakeem Jeffries have congratulated and complemented Mamdani, but have not yet issued an explicit endorsement. Each lawmaker has indicated interest in meeting with the presumptive Democratic mayoral nominee prior to making a decision on a formal endorsement.
The post Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand Slams Mamdani For Defense of ‘Globalize the Intifada’ Slogan as Pressure Mounts on Presumptive Mayoral Nominee first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Iran Rejects US Talks, Signals It May Block UN From Nuclear Sites as Trump Leaves Door Open to Future Bombings
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi addresses a special session of the Human Rights Council at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, June 20, 2025. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse
Iran announced Friday that it will not engage in nuclear talks with the United States, rejecting a two-week deadline set by US President Donald Trump for renewed negotiations aimed at resolving the ongoing standoff over Tehran’s nuclear program.
In a televised speech, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned what he described as Washington’s “complicity in the Israeli regime’s war of aggression against Iran,” and slammed recent US military strikes as a betrayal of diplomacy and a blow to any prospects for dialogue.
“Americans want to negotiate and have sent messages several times, but we clearly said that as long as [the Israeli] aggression doesn’t stop, there’s no place for dialogue,” the top Iranian diplomat said in an address on state television.
“No agreement has been made on the restart of negotiations. There has not even been any talk of negotiations,” Araghchi continued. “The subject of negotiations is out of question at present.”
However, he reassured that Tehran remains committed to diplomacy, but the decision to resume negotiations with Washington must be carefully evaluated.
“It is still early to say that the conditions are right for negotiations,” Araghchi said.
Meanwhile, Trump said he would consider carrying out further strikes on Iran if US intelligence reveals new concerns about the country’s uranium enrichment program.
“Sure, without question, absolutely,” Trump said Friday during a press briefing when asked if a second wave of bombings was possible.
During his speech, he also addressed the recent American and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, acknowledging that the damage was significant but adding that the regime is still assessing its full extent.
For its part, US intelligence officials have reported that Tehran’s nuclear sites were “severely damaged” during the American airstrikes last weekend.
Araghchi’s comments came as he met on Friday with his counterparts from Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union’s Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in Geneva — marking their first meeting since the Iran-Israel war began.
Europe is actively urging Iran to reengage in talks with the White House in an effort to avert any further escalation of tensions.
In a post on X, Araghchi also announced that Iran may reject any requests by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog, to visit the country’s nuclear sites.
He said this latest decision was “a direct result of [IAEA Director-General, Rafael Grossi]’s regrettable role in obfuscating the fact that the Agency — a full decade ago — already closed all past issues.”
“Through this malign action, he directly facilitated the adoption of a politically-motivated resolution against Iran by the IAEA BoG [Board of Governors] as well as the unlawful Israeli and US bombings of Iranian nuclear sites,” the Iranian top diplomas said in a post on X.
“In an astounding betrayal of his duties, Grossi has additionally failed to explicitly condemn such blatant violations of IAEA safeguards and its Statute,” Araghchi continued.
The Parliament of Iran has voted for a halt to collaboration with the IAEA until the safety and security of our nuclear activities can be guaranteed.
This is a direct result of @rafaelmgrossi‘s regrettable role in obfuscating the fact that the Agency—a full decade ago—already…
— Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi) June 27, 2025
Iran’s critique of Grossi comes as the Iranian parliament voted this week to suspend cooperation with the IAEA “until the safety and security of [the country’s] nuclear activities can be guaranteed.”
“The IAEA and its Director-General are fully responsible for this sordid state of affairs,” Araghchi wrote in his post on X.
The post Iran Rejects US Talks, Signals It May Block UN From Nuclear Sites as Trump Leaves Door Open to Future Bombings first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Argentina to Try Iranian, Lebanese Suspects in Absentia Over 1994 AMIA Bombing in Historic Legal Shift
People hold images of the victims of the 1994 bombing attack on the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) community center, marking the 30th anniversary of the attack, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Irina Dambrauskas
A federal judge in Argentina has ordered the trial in absentia of ten Iranian and Lebanese nationals suspected of orchestrating the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.
The ten suspects set to stand trial include former Iranian and Lebanese ministers and diplomats, all of whom are subject to international arrest warrants issued by Argentina for their alleged roles in the country’s deadliest terrorist attack, which killed 85 people and wounded more than 300.
In April, lead prosecutor Sebastián Basso — who took over the case after the 2015 murder of his predecessor, Alberto Nisman — requested that federal Judge Daniel Rafecas issue national and international arrest warrants for Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei over his alleged involvement in the attack.
This legal action marks a significant departure from Argentina’s previous stance in the case, under which the Iranian leader was regarded as having diplomatic immunity.
Since 2006, Argentine authorities have sought the arrest of eight Iranians — including former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who died in 2017 — yet more than three decades after the deadly bombing, all suspects remain still at large.
Thursday’s ruling marks the first time Argentina will try suspects in absentia, following a legal change in March that lifted the requirement for defendants to be physically present in court.
This latest legal move comes amid a renewed push for justice, with President Javier Milei vowing to hold those responsible for the attack accountable.
Among those accused of involvement in the terrorist attack are Ali Fallahijan, Iran’s intelligence and security minister from 1989 to 1997; Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign minister; Mohsen Rezai, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps between 1993 and 1994; and Hadi Soleimanpour, former Iranian ambassador to Buenos Aires.
Also implicated are former Al Quds commander Ahmad Vahidi; Iranian diplomat Ahmad Reza Asghari; Mohsen Rabbani, the former cultural attaché at Iran’s embassy in Argentina; and Hezbollah operatives Salman Raouf Salman, Abdallah Salman, and Hussein Mounir Mouzannar.
According to Judge Rafecas, the defendants were declared in contempt of court years ago, remain fully informed of their legal standing, and have consistently disregarded multiple extradition requests.
He said that trying the suspects in absentia would give the courts a chance to “at least uncover the truth and piece together what happened.”
This latest decision acknowledges “the material impossibility of securing the defendants’ presence and the nature of the crime against humanity under investigation,” Rafecas said.
“It is essential to proceed … to prevent the perpetuation of impunity,” he continued.
Despite Argentina’s longstanding belief that Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah terrorist group carried out the devastating attack at Iran’s request, the 1994 bombing has never been claimed or officially solved.
Meanwhile, Tehran has consistently denied any involvement and has refused to arrest or extradite any suspects.
To this day, the decades-long investigation into the terror attack has been plagued by allegations of witness tampering, evidence manipulation, cover-ups, and annulled trials.
In 2006, former prosecutor Nisman formally charged Iran for orchestrating the attack and Hezbollah for carrying it out.
Nine years later, he accused former Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner — currently under house arrest on corruption charges — of attempting to cover up the crime and block efforts to extradite the suspects behind the AMIA atrocity in return for Iranian oil.
Nisman was killed later that year, and to this day, both his case and murder remain unresolved and under ongoing investigation.
The alleged cover-up was reportedly formalized through the memorandum of understanding signed in 2013 between Kirchner’s government and Iranian authorities, with the stated goal of cooperating to investigate the AMIA bombing.
Last year, Argentina’s second-highest court ruled that the 1994 attack in Buenos Aires was “organized, planned, financed, and executed under the direction of the authorities of the Islamic State of Iran, within the framework of Islamic Jihad.” The court also said that the bombing was carried out by Hezbollah terrorists responding to “a political and strategic design” by Iran.
The court additionally ruled that Iran was responsible for the 1992 truck bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, which killed 29 people and injured 200 others.
Judges determined that the bombing of the Israeli Embassy was likely carried out in retaliation for then-President Carlos Menem’s cancellation of three agreements with Iran involving nuclear equipment and technology.
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