There were reasons for Israel to have accepted an American-authored “ceasefire” agreement with Hezbollah.

First, Iran is Israel’s chief security priority, not Hezbollah. In addition, Israel has been fighting the longest war of its modern existence, and its forces are being stretched. During that war, Hezbollah has been helping Hamas by diverting Israel’s military capability and attention; this ceasefire will allow Israel to put the focus of its deployment back on Gaza.

And not to be underestimated is the US “soft embargo” on weapons to Israel. There are rumors that the Biden administration has said that it will ensure deliveries on time if Israel agrees to the Lebanon plan. It would not be in Israel’s interest to further aggravate the outgoing administration.

There were also reasons for Israel to reject the current incarnation of a “ceasefire,” beginning with the way the signatories are positioned. Israel and the US have an agreement; the US and Lebanon have a separate one, although the language is the same; and there is an “authorized” non-Hezbollah representative as a third party.

The US tried the same fiction during the “Maritime Border Agreement” talks — separate US-Israel and US-Lebanon agreements, and a nod from Hezbollah. It failed when Hezbollah decided to break it.

Hezbollah had control not only of territory in the south, in which it had buried its arsenal, but also of the government in Beirut. Its control of territory is — happily — diminished, but it retains its place in Beirut. There is no assurance that Hezbollah will do other than what it chooses to do, and no assurance that the “Government of Lebanon” can operate independently.

According to the agreement, “both nations” — meaning Lebanon and Israel — retain their “inherent right of self-defense.” The kindest way to look at Lebanon is to say that it is occupied by Hezbollah, in which case, it has no ability to defend itself and requires rescue from its occupier. Neither the UN nor the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have that capability. Israel might, but only if the international community agrees that Hezbollah has to go. No such policy has been articulated.

Moving through the terms, they are precisely those of the failed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006. Reports say that both Israel and Lebanon simply “reaffirmed” their commitment to the resolution. Hezbollah, it seems, simply reaffirmed its commitment to a “ceasefire.” Under the terms of 1701, the LAF was charged with enforcing conditions including, “Any other armed groups will be disarmed, and unauthorized military facilities or weapons caches will be dismantled.”

The LAF failed to do this in 2006, and there is no reason to believe it will succeed in 2024. Although it has received millions of US dollars, the US has had no influence on the political leaning of LAF commanders and troops.

Next, Israel has 60 days in which to operate in southern Lebanon and then gradually withdraw to the Blue Line (the UN-demarcated Lebanon-Israel border). Hezbollah has been tunneling and accumulating weapons inside civilian infrastructure — houses, mosques, schools — for 28 years. What if the job isn’t done in 60 days?

Hezbollah can wait 60 days, regroup its commanders and forces in Beirut, and then plan for its future. There is no international penalty on Hezbollah for its terrorist behavior or its violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for abusing the civilian population and infrastructure of Lebanon.

An “Oversight Committee” will “oversee” compliance. That was, in fact, the job of UNIFIL — which not only failed, but operated in conjunction with Hezbollah to protect it and enhance its capabilities. Now the Oversight Committee will report violations of the new agreement to — wait for it — UNIFIL.

And finally, the US will facilitate indirect talks between Israel and Lebanon to finalize a “mutually agreed-upon land border.”  This is obscurantism.

There is already a UN-demarcated land border between Israel and Lebanon, but there is also an unmentioned maritime border — encompassing vast natural gas reserves. This has been a separate but related bone of contention (see Maritime Border Agreement, above).

That covers the main points in the agreement, but what about the fundamental points that are NOT in the agreement?

There is no mention of eliminating, or even extracting a price from Hezbollah — an Iranian-funded proxy organization that has wrecked the once-prosperous nation of Lebanon, and threatens Israel as well as the broader region.

Speaking of the broader region, there is no mention of controlling the Iranian military supply lines that run through Syria and into Lebanon. Is that the responsibility of the LAF? UNIFIL?

The IDF, in conjunction with a deconfliction agreement with Russia, has worked to keep Iranian weapons out of Lebanon. Will that continue? Who says?

There is no mention of a peace agreement, or Lebanese recognition of the State of Israel, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 242 passed in 1967.

Without those, everything agreed to is temporary and lives at the convenience of organizations and countries uninterested in peace — but very much interested in the elimination of the State of Israel.

A ceasefire is not peace.
Survival is not victory.

Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of The Jewish Policy Center and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly magazine.

The post Israel-Hezbollah War: To Cease or Not to Cease first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

As a young girl growing up, my parents recognized the limited opportunities for women in a post-revolutionary Iran.

My father, a physician for the Shah, wanted my sister and I to get a good education — so we escaped the oppressive regime and came to America. My parents put me into the top schools, and I eventually landed at my dream school, Columbia University, where I graduated with a degree in economics with a pre-medical concentration.

I was always proud to be a Columbia grad — but not anymore. There were antisemitic incidents at the school over the years, but since October 7, 2023, when Hamas carried out the worst massacre of the Jewish people since the Holocaust, the school has seen an explosion of Jew-hatred.

And shockingly, Columbia has bowed to the antisemitic mob.

My disgraceful alma mater allowed students to set up pro-Palestinian encampments, and more than 100 Columbia professors signed a letter defending students who supported what they called “Hamas’ military action” on October 7. Senior Columbia administrators were caught sending hateful messages about Jews to one another, including tropes about the “Jews” having money. The antisemitism task force at Columbia found that the school failed to stop the hate perpetrated on campus; they said students were on the receiving end of “ethnic slurs, stereotypes about supposedly dangerous Israeli veterans, antisemitic tropes about Jewish wealth and hidden power, threats and physical assaults, [and] exclusion of Zionists from student groups.”

All of this is just the tip of the iceberg. It’s clear that Columbia is a lost cause. Now, will two other Ivy League universities, Princeton and Yale, also collapse under pressure from antisemites?

We will see, as Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) referenda are now on the table at both.

On November 10, Princeton’s Undergraduate Student Government (USG) approved a divestment referendum that’s “calling on the trustees and PRINCO to ‘uphold human rights’ by disclosing and divesting holds in weapon manufacturing companies connected to Gaza,” according to The Daily Princetonian. From November 25 through 27, students will be able to vote on whether they believe Princeton should divest from Israel.

And over at Yale, a new anti-Israel group called the Sumud Coalition is pushing for Yale to hold a student referendum to disclose and divest its holdings from military manufacturers, as well as invest in Palestinian students and scholars. At least 25 other student groups have already endorsed the Sumud Coalition’s “Books, Not Bombs” petition.

Given the horrendous track record that Ivy League schools have when it comes to antisemitism, I’m not very hopeful that these referendums will fail.

After all, Princeton hosted poet Mohammed El-Kurd, who expressed support for Hamas’ actions on Oct. 7 and previously said, “Zionism is apartheid, it’s genocide, it’s murder, it’s a racist ideology rooted in settler expansion and racial domination, and we must root it out of the world.” At the same time, a Zionist and Israeli professor, Ronen Shoval, had to shut his speech down early after anti-Israel protestors kept disrupting him. The police had to then escort him to his car out of concern for his safety. And this past April, the US Department of Education opened a Title VI investigation into antisemitism allegations against the school.

Yale is also under Federal investigation. In January, the United States Department of Education opened a Title VI Shared Ancestry investigation related to a November 6, 2023, panel called “Gaza under siege,” where several Jewish students claimed they were excluded from the event simply because they’re Jewish. Gabriel Diamond, a senior at Yale, wrote in The Hill that her school has let antisemitic and pro-Hamas propaganda proliferate on campus, citing a conference that peddled “Hamas propaganda to dozens of students for hours.”

Though Princeton and Yale have failed their Jewish students in the past, they can refrain from making another disastrous decision by rejecting divestment referenda. It’s clear that outright ignoring antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiments on campus is not a winning tactic for these schools — the Federal investigations prove that.

The Ivy League universities putting their stamp of approval on antisemitism claim that they’re all for free speech and student expression, but divestment is not a matter of free speech. It’s a targeted campaign against the only Jewish state in the world. Over this past year, anti-Zionists have proven that it’s not about freeing Palestinians, it’s also about wiping Israel off the map completely, which would include eliminating the Jewish population there.

It’s no surprise that BDS has ties to terrorist groups. Why any university would want to team up with a pro-terror group like this is mind-boggling, to say the least.

It’s time for Princeton and Yale to grow a backbone. I urge them to stand up to the antisemitic mob and shut down the divestment referendums before they come to a vote. They’ve made many mistakes over the past year, that’s for sure. But it’s not too late to rectify them.

Dr. Sheila Nazarian is a Los Angeles physician and star of the Emmy-nominated Netflix series “Skin Decision: Before and After.” Her family escaped to the United States from Iran.

The post Columbia, My Alma Mater, Fell to the Antisemitic Mob. Will Princeton and Yale Do the Same? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Soon, Israel will need to make critical decisions on launching preemptive strikes against Iran. Such non-nuclear defensive actions — expressions of anticipatory self-defense” under international law — would take calculated account of certain pro-Iran interventions. The point of such more-or-less plausible enemy state interventions would be to (1) deter Israel from making good on its residual preemption options; or (2) engage Israel in direct warfare if Jerusalem should choose to proceed with these options.

What would be the specific country sources of such pro-Iran interventions? Most reasonably, the states acting on behalf of Iran would be Russia and/or North Korea. If Russia were to act as Iran’s witting nuclear surrogate (because Iran would still be “pre-nuclear”), direct escalatory moves involving Moscow and Washington could ensue. There are no foreseeable circumstances under which direct Israeli moves against Russia would be rational or cost-effective.

Prima facie, all relevant analyses would be speculative. In strict scientific terms, nothing meaningful could be said concerning the authentic probabilities of unique events. This is because science-based estimations of probability must always depend on the determinable frequency of pertinent past events. Where there are no such events to draw upon, estimations must be less than scientific.

All potentially relevant scenarios involving Israel, Iran, Russia, and/or the United States would be unprecedented (sui generis). At the same time, both Israel and its American ally will need to fashion “best possible” estimations based on applicable elements of deductive reasoning. More particularly, useful Israeli assessments will need to focus on presumed escalation differences between Vladimir Putin’s “firebreak theory” and that of incoming US president Donald Trump.

Will Trump’s nuclear posture threshold remain unchanged from current doctrine; that is, will it continue to affirm the primacy of any escalation to nuclear engagement? Or will this escalation threshold more closely resemble the Russian theory that “small” nuclear weapons (i.e., tactical or theater ordnance) do not necessarily signal intent to initiate a full-blown nuclear war?

American and Russian nuclear escalation doctrines have always been asymmetrical; the implications of continuing such crucial difference could “spill-over” to Israel-Iran nuclear war calculations for the Middle East. Though counter-intuitive, a nuclear war could take place even while Iran remained pre-nuclear. And this risk has recently been heightened by Vladimir Putin’s nuclear policy “upgrades.”

With the United States in mind, the Russian president declared significant “enhancements” to his country’s nuclear doctrine. There are now additional reasons to worry about nuclear war stemming from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Most worrisome is that (1) Moscow would react more forcefully against the United States and/or Ukraine because of President Joe Biden’s widened gamut of missile-firing authority to Volodymyr Zelensky; (2) Vladimir Putin’s reaction would include prompt Russian enlargements of theater nuclear forces; and (3) these Russian enlargements would lower Russia’s tangible threshold of nuclear weapons use.

Such lowering would apply at both doctrinal and operational levels. Although nothing theoretic could be determined about competitive risk-taking in extremis, probabilities concerning Moscow and Washington would still need to be estimated. This includes examining derivative warfare scenarios between Israel and Iran, deductive narratives in which Jerusalem would rely on US nuclear deterrence to protect against Russian-backed North Korean forces. In the parlance of traditional nuclear strategy, this would signify Israeli reliance on “extended nuclear deterrence.” North Korea is a nuclear Iranian ally with a documented history of actual warfighting against Israel. 

Facing an intellectual problem

Nuclear war avoidance should always be approached by pertinent national leaders as a preeminently intellectual problem.

What happens next? How might these developments impact Israel? What should be expected from “Trump II?” Most specifically, how would the answers impact Israel’s precarious war with Iran?

During “Trump I,” major US national security problems were framed by an unprepared American president in needlessly rancorous terms. Today, armed with greater regard for applicable intellectual factors, American planners and policy-makers should look more systematically at what might lie ahead. What will happen next in Vladimir Putin’s determinedly cruel war against Ukraine? How can the United States best prepare for nuclear war avoidance? Playing Putin’s “nuclear firebreak” game, should Washington seek to persuade Moscow of America’s willingness to “go nuclear” according to Russian-defined policy thresholds, or should the United States proceed “asymmetrically” with its own preferred firebreak? How would Washington’s decision affect Israel’s national security?

In facing off against each other, even under optimal assumptions of mutual rationality, American and Russian presidents would have to concern themselves with all possible miscalculations, errors in information, unauthorized uses of strategic weapons, mechanical or computer malfunctions and assorted nuances of cyber-defense/cyber-war.

A still pre-nuclear Iran would still have access to radiation dispersal weapons and to conventional rockets for use against Israel’s nuclear reactor at Dimona. An Israeli nuclear war with a not-yet-nuclear Iran could arise if already- nuclear North Korea, a close ally of Iran, were willing to act as Tehran’s military surrogate against Israel. Such willingness, in turn, would be impacted by the presumed expectations of Russia and/or China.

Figuring all this out represents a survival-determining challenge for Jerusalem.

Pretended irrationality as nuclear strategy

Going forward, a joint US-Israel obligation will be to assess whether a nuanced posture of “pretended irrationality” could enhance nuclear deterrence posture. On several earlier occasions, it should be recalled, then US President Donald Trump openly praised the untested premises of such a posture. But was such presidential praise warranted on intellectual grounds?

In reply, US and Israeli enemies continue to include both state and sub-state foes, whether considered singly or in multiple forms of possible collaboration. Such forms could be “hybridized” in different ways between state and sub-state adversaries.

In principle, this could represent a potentially clever strategy to “get a jump” on the United States or Israel in any still-expected or already-ongoing competition for “escalation dominance.”

Nuclear weapons as instruments of war prevention, not punishment

A US president or Israeli prime minister should always bear in mind that any national nuclear posture ought to remain focused on war prevention rather than punishment. In all identifiable circumstances, using a portion of its available nuclear forces for vengeance rather than deterrence would miss the most essential point: that is, to fully optimize national security obligations.

Any American or Israeli nuclear weapons use based on narrowly corrosive notions of revenge, even if only as a residual or default option, would be glaringly irrational. Among other things, this would be a good time for both US and Israeli nuclear crisis planners to re-read Clausewitz regarding primacy of the “political object.” Absent such an object, there could be no meaningful standard of escalation rationality.

There remains one penultimate but critical observation.  It is improbable, but not inconceivable, that certain of America’s and Israel’s principal enemies would sometime be neither rational nor irrational, but mad. While irrational decision-makers could already pose special problems for nuclear deterrence — by definition, because these decision-makers would not value collective survival more highly than any other preference or combination of preferences — they might still be rendered susceptible to alternate forms of dissuasion.

Resembling rational leaderships, these decision-makers could still maintain a fixed, determinable, and “transitive” hierarchy of preferences. This means, at least in principle, that “merely” irrational enemies could sometimes be successfully deterred.

International law

From the standpoint of international law, it is always necessary to distinguish preemptive attacks from “preventive ones.” Preemption is a military strategy of striking first in the expectation that the only foreseeable alternative is to be struck first oneself.  A preemptive attack is launched by a state that believes enemy forces are about to attack.  A preventive attack, on the other hand, is not launched out of any concern about “imminent” hostilities, but rather for fear of some longer-term deterioration in prevailing military balance.

In a preemptive attack, the length of time by which the enemy’s action is anticipated is presumptively very short; in a preventive strike, the anticipated interval is considerably longer. A related problem here for the United States and Israel is not only the practical difficulty of accurately determining “imminence,” but also that delaying a defensive strike until imminence was more precisely ascertainable could prove existential. A resort to “anticipatory self-defense” could be nuclear or non-nuclear and could be directed at either a nuclear or non-nuclear adversary. Plainly, any such resort involving nuclear weapons on one or several sides would prove catastrophic.

America and Israel are not automatically made safer by having only rational adversaries. Even fully rational enemy leaderships could commit serious errors in calculation that would lead them toward nuclear confrontation and/or a nuclear/biological war. There are also certain related command and control issues that could impel a perfectly rational adversary or combination of rational adversaries (both state and sub-state) to embark upon variously risky nuclear behaviors. It follows that even the most pleasingly “optimistic” assessments of enemy leadership decision-making could not reliably preclude catastrophic outcomes.

For the United States and Israel, issues of calibrated nuclear deterrence remain fundamentally intellectual challenges, issues requiring meticulous analytic preparation rather than any particular leadership “attitude.” Such planning ought never become just another contest of “mind over matter” — that is, just a vainly overvalued inventory of comparative weaponry or identifiable “order of battle.”  war.

In both Ukraine and portions of the Middle East, the historical conditions of nature bequeathed at the Peace of Westphalia (1648) could soon come to resemble the primordial barbarism of William Golding’s Lord of the Flies. Long before Golding, Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century English philosopher, warned insightfully in Leviathan (Chapter XIII) that in any such circumstances of human disorder there must exist “continual fear, and danger of violent death….”

Perceptions of credibility

If Putin should sometime prove willing to cross the conventional-tactical nuclear firebreak on the assumption that such a move would not invite any reciprocal cycle of nuclear escalation with the United States, the American president could face an overwhelmingly tragic choice: total capitulation or nuclear war. Though it would be best for the United States to avoid ever having to reach such a fateful decisional moment, there could still be no guarantees of “mutual assured prudence” between Washington and Moscow. It follows that growing perils of asymmetrical nuclear doctrine should be countered incrementally and intellectually.

Looking ahead at “Cold War II,” American and Israeli security will hinge on fostering vital “perceptions of credibility,” Regarding Russia’s changing nuclear doctrine, only dedicated analytic minds could ever distance Planet Earth from World War III. Taken together with Russia’s war against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s strategic doctrine blurs essential conceptual lines between conventional and nuclear conflict and creates existential hazards for both the United States and Israel. The solely rational response from Washington and Jerusalem should be to understand these unsustainable hazards and to plan appropriately for their most efficient minimization or removal.

For the United States and Israel, the threat posed by asymmetrical nuclear firebreaks could impact the likelihood of both deliberate and inadvertent nuclear war.

These are daunting intellectual issues. Sorting out the most urgent ones, Israel could soon find itself confronting North Korean military assets that threaten on behalf of a pre-nuclear Iran. Whether or not these proxy weapons and forces were under the overall direction of Moscow, asymmetries in nuclear escalation doctrine between Russia and the United States would be material to pertinent event outcomes. Left unanticipated or unmodified, they could sometime prove determinative.

Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books, monographs, and scholarly articles dealing with military nuclear strategy. In Israel, he was Chair of Project Daniel. Over recent years, he has published on nuclear warfare issues in Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; The Atlantic; Israel Defense; Jewish Website; The New York Times; Israel National News; The Jerusalem Post; The Hill and other sites. A different version of this article appeared in JewishWebsight.

The post Vladimir Putin Has Threatened to Use Nuclear Weapons; What Would This Mean for Israel? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.