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Current War Exposes a Shocking Reality: Israel Does Not Have True Air Superiority
Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system intercepts rockets launched from the Gaza Strip, as seen from Sderot, Israel May 13, 2023 Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad
Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, experienced the London Blitz in World War II. Though he was not a military man, he well understood the significance of air superiority — and, in its absence, the weight of an air threat to the Israeli home front. When, as Israel’s first prime minister, he was about to make his historic decision on the Sinai war (1956), he set a condition for the French allies: that they place two fighter squadrons to defend Israel’s skies during the war.
Since then, air superiority has been a fundamental pillar of the Israeli security concept. Absolute control of the skies was intended to prevent the Arab air forces from hitting the Israeli home front and to ensure that in an emergency, reserve forces could be mobilized and reach the front without interruption while the limited regular forces holding the lines were being supported. The regular forces would defend, air superiority would enable, and the reserves would regain the initiative.
Over the years, the Israeli Air Force has become one of the most advanced in the world. Israel’s confidence in its air power, an offensive force at its core, left limited room for a defensive approach. In the 1960s, advanced Hawk missile batteries were purchased from the United States, despite opposition from the Air Force. Considerations of air coordination and flight safety led to the transfer of the anti-aircraft units from the Artillery Corps to the Air Force under the central control method used in it.
In June 1982, the Air Force stunned the world with a brilliant strike operation on Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries (SAMs) in Lebanon. In addition to destroying the SAM formations, the strike shot down dozens of enemy planes. Since then, no Arab air force has challenged the skies of Israel. Absolute air supremacy was achieved.
Gradually, over the following decades, two processes took place. The first was the reduction of tactical anti-aircraft formations, the main purpose of which was to provide mobile protection at the front for ground forces against enemy aircraft. Mobile formations protected the ground maneuver and shot down enemy planes and helicopters in the Yom Kippur War, and also fought in the First Lebanon War. Despite its long-lasting deployment and use against some terrorist airborne attacks from the Lebanese border in the 1980s, the formation was a low priority for the Air Force. After the Second Lebanon War, the last of these units were shut down and the anti-aircraft formation moved in full force to its new mission, which had been evolving since the 1990s: defense of the home front against missiles and rockets.
The second significant process to occur over recent decades was the development and purchase of Arrow interceptors, Iron Dome, and David’s Sling, to protect the home front from the missiles and rockets that were accumulating on the other side. This threat intensified over the years, and the air defense corps, which, in 2011, officially changed its name from Anti-Aircraft to Air and Missile Defense, adapted itself, shifting its focus to the emerging threat that had replaced the anti-aircraft mission. The working assumption was, and remains to this day, that Israel’s Air Force rules the skies. The job of air defense, therefore, is to focus on missiles and rockets.
This assumption is no longer valid.
The “Low Sky” layer
The current war illustrates what military professionals and observers already knew. After all, this development has been observed in all recent wars in the world, particularly in Ukraine.
At the beginning of this decade, a new-old threat layer gradually developed: numerous cheap, small, unmanned aircraft with a low radar signature. The world of drones and unmanned aircraft completely changed the premise of absolute air superiority. The Israeli Air Force does continue to rule the skies — but “under the noses” of the advanced fighter jets, a new air layer has been created. This is the “low sky” layer.
The enemy has found a loophole here. The Air Force (and, within it, the air defense corps) is required to defend against the combined and coordinated threats of missiles, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and rockets (MUR).
The older precision missile threat was already a challenge. The risk of precision strikes applies not only to military and civilian infrastructure but also to the air defense system itself. This array was built over the years under the premise of Israeli air superiority. The air defense itself was not supposed to be hunted. Today, the enemy is able not only to accurately target our air defense elements but to maintain a real presence in our skies. Using UAVs, and even drones in shorter ranges, it can search for targets and strike them in real time. The enemy is able to penetrate deep into Israel and engage the air defense system in one lane while other aircraft take advantage of the diversion and penetrate in another, more covert lane. It can identify targets and strike immediately using armed or suicide UAS. Above all, it strives to locate, endanger, and destroy key elements of the air defense system itself. It is capable of all this and more. We have to defend our Air Defense.
The transition from dealing with piloted aircraft to aircraft with pre-programmed, changing routes that can perform a variety of tricks turns the aerial clash between defender and attacker into a complex professional battle. Such a battle requires additional measures. These consist mainly of finding means of detection, localization, tracking, accurate identification, and above all, faster decision-making that is based on more information in real time. As the challenge of managing the air battle increases, the air defense system, even one that is capable of successfully intercepting thousands of missiles and rockets, can engage fewer air targets at once. The array thus becomes more vulnerable and exposed.
The current war greatly accelerated the development of this threat. The enemy has spotted the breach and is daily improving the means and operational techniques at his disposal. The UAS threat can no longer be seen as separate from the ballistic, missile and rocket threats. The enemy is perfecting techniques by which to use these tools in a coordinated manner to overcome our air defense arrays, destroy them, and continue to hit targets on our front and home front.
This dangerous process, which is accelerating fast, requires quick learning, effective organization and practical preparation on Israel’s part. Here are three practical issues to be addressed, from light to heavy:
Central control
Central control is meant to enable effective, optimal and efficient decision-making. Processing information from all sensors makes it possible to launch the best interceptor from the best location at the best moment.
This approach is designed to deal mainly with quantity, on the assumption that it will be possible to see in real time where the enemy’s missiles are aimed. In a reality in which UAS appear and disappear from radar screens quickly, decentralized processes might also be required, under a central policy. This complexity will affect the scope of the threats the defense system can deal with simultaneously and also the extent of the possible savings in interceptors and management of interceptor stockpiles.
Absolute central control could also prove to be a single point of failure. The air defense control model must adapt and integrate decentralized decisions with a central policy and allow the integration of air assets like attack helicopters and fighter jets, as is the case these days.
The defense of air defense
Anyone who deals with air defense knows what “multi-layered” means. Multi-layered defense is the aerial version of the principle of operational depth in land defense. An attacking aircraft will relatively easily overcome a single SAM battery. But if, while attacking one battery, it is exposed to another one, or to a different type of radar or missile, or possibly even to a third battery, it will have much more difficulty. The principle of layered protection allows different batteries and types of detection and interception systems to back up and protect each other.
If some of the detection and interception means also change location from time to time, defend, and camouflage and scatter dummy targets, the challenge to the attacker is enhanced.
The Israeli air defense system is multi-layered, but the degree of mutual assistance and protection between the layers is relatively limited. The premise, as mentioned, was that of complete air superiority. The main challenge was to optimize the use of interceptors against a tremendous load of missiles and rockets. The result was that each tier was designed to deal with a specific type of missile or rocket. Iron Dome can’t really assist Arrow batteries or support their missions. This limitation is equally true among the other layers.
As noted, the degree of mobility, protection and hiding ability of the Israeli air defense system is inadequate. Unlike similar systems in the world, our air defense system was not built with synchronization as a critical goal. If we expect our air defense system to continue to provide the level of protection we have enjoyed so far or even close to it, it will have to go through a significant series of adjustments, and fast.
The first and most important will be the addition of another interception layer — point protection — which will enable a relatively high level of security for essential sites and assets. This layer would only be launched when it is clear that the other layers have failed and only to protect a critical asset for the country, such as an important power plant or vital component of the air defense system.
Another adjustment would be the shielding, camouflage and mobility of some of the elements of the array to make it difficult for the enemy to acquire these targets in real time. The hiding of air defense components and deception by dispersal of fake systems are common and essential methods of operation around the world.
Tactical air defense system
The air defense system must also adapt to the more demanding combat conditions at the front. This area, where ground troops from both sides are engaged in battle, will face thousands of missiles and rockets and hundreds of UAS and cruise missiles. The front is a smaller and denser area where civilian communities as well as concentrations of forces need to be defended from tens of thousands of short-range rockets, advanced anti-tank missiles, and aircraft and drones in abundance, and all in a very short time frame.
On both the home front and the battle front, our defense will depend on a prior decision on the identification of essential assets and a prioritizing of defense. The complexity will be twofold: the battle picture will be intricate and dynamic, and it will demand real-time prioritizing. Because of this, the air defense batteries will have to change position frequently for protection. The shorter ranges of the threat and defense elements will require closer coordination between the movement of air defense batteries that protect each other. Each location will have to be chosen in view of the risk from enemy ground forces and the need to protect our forces.
At the front, it will be necessary to (re)establish an organization that uses short-term, more mobile tactical measures. This flexible organization will have to be much more coordinated with the picture seen by the ground combat commanders. A tactical air defense system will be required – one not much different from the northern anti-aircraft units that were closed down almost 15 years ago.
The tactical air defense array that operates at the front will have to wear two hats. In one hat, it will protect the forces fighting on land and the vital assets in the sector. It is possible that, thanks to its radars, the array will also be an important partner in locating sources of enemy fire, producing targets for ground forces fire support. In the other hat, the array will serve as the “front layer” of the home-front air defense array. The aerial battle picture – the coordination of air operations for safety and the identification of friends and foes – will have to be managed by the centralized control of the air force.
More importantly, the relative density of the tactical air defense system at the front will make it possible to detect and stop some threats designed to penetrate deep into our territory while they are still in their early stages of flight, above the front. The array will serve as a kind of “front wall” for the defense of the home front. It will reduce the number of missiles and aircraft the home front defense will have to deal with and channel some of them to flight paths that are easier to detect and defend against within the Israeli topography.
Arrange the sky
On the eve of the Battle of France in May 1940, the Anglo-French alliance possessed more tanks and aircraft than were available to the invading force of the German Wehrmacht, and their models were superior and more modern. They were nevertheless defeated. Their defeat was not due to lack of means but to an inferior understanding of mechanized warfare. The Wehrmacht was better organized for the battle and made better use of the tanks and planes it had at its disposal.
The rapid procurement of means is not a sufficient answer to the challenge we now face. If we do not reorganize the battle for the sky, especially at the front, we can’t hope for a real improvement in the results. If we just add more measures without managing the layered defense with the required dynamism, we will experience not only waste but failure. A multi-layered and advanced air defense would not be complete without tactical capabilities for the defense of the front. Such air defense requires significant conceptual, operational and organizational adjustments to the existing structure.
Defending the country’s air space is the first mission of the Israeli Air Force. The recognition that our air superiority is not absolute is dramatic, but it must be acknowledged. Despite our control of fighter jets and traditional air superiority, our forces at the front suffer from a dangerous level of inferiority and lack of protection. The “low sky” has become a real threat.
It is vital for Israel to reestablish a tactical air defense system at the front. Israeli air superiority is incomplete without it. The sky needs to be rearranged.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book, The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew), dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate, and renew a decisive war approach.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Ran Kochav (RanKo) recently retired from the IDF. Among his duties he served as commander of the Air and Missile Defense Corps and IDF Spokesperson, and was a member of the General Staff forum. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Current War Exposes a Shocking Reality: Israel Does Not Have True Air Superiority first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Turkey Has Become ‘the Central Nerve Center for Hamas Abroad’

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks during a joint statement to the media in Baghdad, Iraq, April 22, 2024. Photo: AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/Pool via REUTERS
JNS.org – A Hamas terror cell in Nablus that received instructions and funding from the organization’s overseas headquarters in Turkey was dismantled by Israeli security forces in recent weeks in what observers say is part of a broader pattern of Turkey serving as a permissive hub for Hamas’s terror operations.
According to a joint statement by the Israel Police and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) issued on March 25, “a terror cell from Nablus was thwarted, which acted under the guidance and funding of Hamas headquarters in Turkey to carry out shooting and explosive device attacks.” The statement added that “an M-16 rifle and tens of thousands of dollars in cash were handed over during the investigation.”
Six suspects from Nablus were arrested between January and February in a joint operation by the Shin Bet, the Israel Police Central Unit of the Judea and Samaria District and the Israel Defense Forces.
The investigation revealed that the suspects had received approximately $40,000 from Hamas in Turkey to carry out shooting and bombing attacks against Israeli security forces and other targets in Judea and Samaria.
The Shin Bet stated that “the investigation revealed that the cell operated under direct guidance from the Hamas terror organization in Turkey,” and that “significant evidence was gathered which not only thwarted the planned attacks but also enabled the indictment of all involved.”
One of the suspects led security forces to a hidden roadside bomb buried near a key junction in Samaria. The large metal container filled with explosives was destroyed in a controlled demolition by police sappers.
Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and former head of IDF Military Intelligence’s Department for Palestinian Affairs, told JNS on Wednesday, “Turkey at this stage constitutes one of Hamas’s most important operational hubs abroad.”
Milshtein noted that “in Lebanon, there’s been a decline [of Hamas activities] since the war—and Hezbollah is angry at Hamas for trying to heat up the border with rocket fire. In Syria, there is still rebuilding [of Hamas] after Assad’s fall, but it remains limited. As a result, Turkey has become a central nerve center.”
Milshtein added that Istanbul is home to Zaher Jabarin, the successor of Saleh al-Arouri, the late Hamas deputy political bureau chief [eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on Jan. 2, 2024] who was responsible for Hamas’s Judea and Samaria operations across a variety of fields. “Most operations in Judea and Samaria—especially military ones—are promoted from there,” said Milshtein.
He added, “I assess carefully that Hamas finds it very convenient to operate in Turkey. There’s freedom of action, though not the same intense support as from Iran or Hezbollah. As long as they don’t establish military bases like in Syria, they are allowed to work freely, and of course, it is known that their focus is on promoting terrorism.”
Milshtein said there had been several reports indicating that “it’s not just a free hand, but also training, mainly in intelligence and commando fields, by Turkish security elements.” And, he stressed, “Turkey is a central NATO member.”
Under Jabarin, the core of Hamas’s Judea and Samaria command is run by operatives deported as part of the 2011 Shalit prisoner exchange.
“A minority are in Qatar and Gaza—where a number of senior headquarters operatives were eliminated during the war—but the core is in Turkey, led by Mousa Dudin,” said Milshtein.
A number of these terrorists were involved in attacks such as orchestrating the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in 2014. Milshtein said that this network also continues to explore “breakthrough moves like undermining the Palestinian Authority’s hold on the West Bank,” a strategic vision led by Arouri until his elimination.
Regarding potential counteraction, Milshtein said, “The question of operating against the headquarters in Turkey is very complex, similar to operating against Hamas figures in Qatar. Against those in Lebanon or Syria, there has been no problem, but any assassinations, even quiet ones, in an arena like Turkey would mean friction with Erdoğan, especially now that Ankara is more deeply involved in Syria.”
He concluded, “I assume that as with Arouri and Haniyeh, there would be a theoretical possibility to act against Hamas operatives from Turkey if and when they leave the country for a more convenient arena, such as Iran or Lebanon.”
Michael Barak, senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and a specialist on radical Islamist and jihadist movements, told JNS on Tuesday, “Turkey is a base for the Muslim Brotherhood. There are networks there that help Hamas with funding, support, religious rulings, and logistics. Turkey has become a reception point for Brotherhood members.”
Barak confirmed that “a Hamas headquarters still exists there—in Istanbul and Ankara—and it is integrated into educational institutions, including universities.”
He cited the example of Professor Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad financier in the 1990s who was deported from the United States and now operates from a university-affiliated think tank in Ankara. “There he hosts Hamas figures,” Barak said. “Al-Arian maintains ties with Hamas, runs webinars with them on Zoom, and manages Brotherhood-Hamas links, including in India.”
Barak emphasized: “All of these Muslim Brotherhood assets in Turkey assist Hamas—whether through dawa [Islamic outreach], financing, or religious rulings.”
He added that Turkey has become “a reception point for Muslim Brotherhood figures from Libya, Iraq, and Yemen.”
On March 30, during a Ramadan prayer service, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared, “May Allah, for the sake of his name … destroy and devastate Zionist Israel.”
He also prayed for “mercy upon the martyrs” of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and wished a “speedy recovery” to their wounded terrorists.
Erdoğan has intensified his anti-Israel rhetoric since the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre in southern Israel, comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler and asserting that “Turkey is a country that speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them.” Throughout the conflict, Erdoğan has met openly with Hamas officials and even threatened military action against Israel, according to the Washington D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Tyler Stapleton, director of congressional relations at FDD, warned, “Erdoğan’s call for the destruction of Israel should force the United States to begin an escalatory ladder of responses to hold Turkey’s leadership accountable.” He said the US should reassess arms sales to Turkey, warning that “Turkey’s ability to purchase advanced fighter aircraft like the F-35 should trigger congressional review.” He added that Washington “should continue to outline restrictions on foreign military financing and the exclusion of Turkey from NATO exercises” as initial steps to address Erdoğan’s hostility against Israel.
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Half a Matzah

Rabbi Yosef Rice packs handmade matzah into 425 Passover packages at the Palm Beach Synagogue Tuesday March 23, 2021 in Palm Beach. MEGHAN McCARTHY/Palm Beach Daily NewsPbn 032321 Passover 07
JNS.org – Passover is around the corner, and I will be so presumptuous as to suggest that you may have opened your favorite Haggadah to have a look and start preparing for the big seder night.
Seder means “order.” And one of the items in the order of the seder agenda is yachatz. Well, what is yachatz?
It’s one of the first things we do on seder night, even before anyone says the “Ma Nishtanah.” We break the middle matzah of the three matzahs on our seder plates. The larger part is put away for the afikomen and the smaller part remains inside the seder plate throughout the recital of the Haggadah, until we say the blessing of “Hamotzi.”
This is true lechem oni, the bread of poverty. Not only is it matzah; it is plain flour and water with no flavoring whatsoever—just a flat, tasteless wafer but broken as well. Back in Egypt, the slaves were fed the simplest, cheapest food. Bread of affliction, prisoners’ bread, what the most miserable pauper might be able to afford, a mere morsel rather than a proper meal. And now that it’s been broken, it is a morsel of a morsel.
It’s bad enough that the Jews were forced to eat a matzah, but now they are eating a broken matzah.
Rabbi Shlomo Riskin has pointed out that, seeing as the custom is to show the broken matzah during the recital of the Haggadah, and therefore, we say all of maggid, virtually the entire Haggadah, over half a matzah. And he makes a very powerful conclusion.
The whole Haggadah over half a matzah. And isn’t life just like that?
There is always something eluding us. For some, it may be health, for others wealth or success, nachas or happiness in general. Somehow, as much as we achieve in life, there is always something more that we want that keeps slipping out of our grasp.
Isn’t it so true … our whole life is but half a matzah.
Our Sages taught, “No person dies having achieved even half of his ambitions and desires.”
“Really?” you may say. Aren’t there many individuals who have achieved everything they set out to achieve? I know a couple of guys who seem to fit the description of “the man who has everything.” Just have a look at the Forbes list of billionaires.
The answer is yes, there are such people. The problem is that as soon as they achieve one ambition, they have broader horizons, and new and bigger ambitions. With each success, our ambitions develop further.
Elon Musk is currently the world’s richest man. He’s made enough money to look after his great-, great-, great-grandchildren and their great-grandchildren, too! So, he needed a new challenge. Now his challenge is to balance the United States’ budget. (That may be harder than becoming the world’s richest man!)
The rabbis put it simply.“If a man has $100, he wants $200. And if he gets $200, he then wants $400.” And so it goes on and on.
Take the lottery. When we are in the fantasy stage of winning, we are prepared to give a big percentage of our winnings away to charity, and family and friends. “Master of the Universe, if you help me buy the winning ticket, I promise to give 20% to tzedakah. I will renovate the synagogue, refurbish the seats—just tell me and I’ll get it done. But once you do win (you should be so lucky!), and it is no longer make-believe Monopoly money but cash in your pocket. And suddenly, it’s not that easy to give away.
Take the story of Harry, the guy who won $50 million. His family heard about the win before he did, and they were worried he might have a heart attack when he heard the news. So, they called his doctor to come and give him the good news. This way, if Harry went into shock or had a coronary, the doctor would be there with a remedy on the spot to administer an antidote.
In comes the doctor and says, “Harry, my friend, what would you say if I told you that you just won the state lottery? 50 million smackers?” And Harry replies, “Doc, you’ve been so good to me all these years. If I won the lottery, I would give you half!”
And the doctor dropped dead of a heart attack!
It’s easy to give it away when you don’t have it. But when you do have it, it’s not so easy. When it’s yours, you don’t give half away so quickly.
The truth is that we do go through life with only half a matzah; we never seem to get to the full one. While many of our dreams and aspirations do materialize to one extent or another, there is always something that remains frustratingly, mysteriously, almost hauntingly elusive.
But let me ask you. Just because we can’t have it all, do we desist from acquiring as much as we can? Do we say it’s either all or nothing? Or do we settle for as much as we can acquire? Do we turn down a deal that will make us a profit, even if it doesn’t make us instant millionaires?
The Kotzker Rebbe was renowned for his sharp wit and wisdom. He once asked his disciples, “What is the enemy of good?” One said that the enemy of good is bad. Another suggested that it must be evil. But the Rebbe said “wrong” to all their answers.
“Do you really want to know what the enemy of good is? I will tell you,” he said. “The enemy of good is excellence.” The Kotzker Rebbe explained that many people strive for excellence, but because they cannot achieve excellence, they stop trying altogether.
How many of us never achieved success in any given field of endeavor because it just wasn’t right, the conditions were not suitable or because “if I can’t do it right, I’d rather not do it at all.” So, what happened? Nothing. While we were waiting for the perfect opportunity, every other opportunity passed us by, and we were left with nothing.
“All or nothing” sounds very idealistic and principled. But it is not practical. When we say “All or nothing,” we usually wind up with nothing.
The seder reminds us that if the whole Haggadah can be recited over a broken matzah, then there is nothing wrong with half a matzah. If “half a loaf is better than no loaf,” then half a matzah is better than no matzah.
Yes, says the Kotzker, the greatest enemy of good is not evil, but excellence. And the unrealistic demand for perfection … or nothing.
So, take half a matzah. Take the broken morsel. It doesn’t have to be the end, the ultimate. But it can be a beginning and a good beginning.
Say kiddush. Put on tefillin. Light the Shabbat candles. Come to the shiur (a class on Jewish learning), even if you won’t become a rabbi. Do the deal, even if it isn’t the mother of all deals. And get married, even if he or she isn’t the fulfillment of every single fantasy. Don’t make the mistake of saying “All or nothing.” You don’t have to settle for second best; just start somewhere, even if it is only a morsel of a morsel.
Yes, we recite the whole Haggadah on half a matzah. And we can live our whole life on half a matzah. And it can still be very satisfying indeed.
I wish you Passover seders that satisfy, physically and spiritually. Chag Kasher v’Sameach!
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J Street’s Dishonest, Anti-Israel, Anti-Peace, Anti-Democracy Manifesto

J Street president Jeremy Ben-Ami addressing the 2019 J Street National Conference. Photo: J Street via Flickr.
JNS.org – Since its founding, J Street has established itself as a far-left extremist organization that represents only a sliver of American Jewry. However, it attracts disproportionate media attention because it serves as a “man bites dog” story—Jews who oppose Israel. J Street published a 10-point manifesto to rationalize its positions, but its raison d’être can be summarized in a single sentence: To lobby the US government to impose the views of a small group residing far from Israel, who neither participate in its elections nor contribute their children to its military, upon the people of Israel, who alone bear the consequences of these misguided policies.
J Street’s manifesto opens by graciously acknowledging that “Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people,” but it quickly distorts history. It fails to mention that, beginning with the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the international community recognized the Jewish people’s right to a national home in Palestine. Nor does it acknowledge that two-thirds of the land originally designated for the Jewish homeland was unilaterally excised to create Jordan.
The root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023, stems from the Islamist desire to eradicate the Jewish people—a goal first championed in the 1920s by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Hitler-collaborating Mufti of Jerusalem. By 1947, Palestinians had already rejected multiple statehood offers, including the 1937 Peel Plan, the 1939 British White Paper and the 1947 U.N. partition plan. Instead of negotiating, Arab nations launched a war intended to annihilate Israel, not create a Palestinian state. The outcome of the war was the 19-year occupation of the West Bank by Jordan and of Gaza by Egypt. During that period, there were no demands by the Palestinians, the United Nations, human-rights organizations, campus activists or anyone else to end the occupation and create a Palestinian state. J Street conveniently ignores the repeated Palestinian refusals of autonomy in 1979 and statehood offers in 2000 and 2008.
Contrary to its assertion, Palestine was never the national home of the Palestinian people. The Jewish people trace their indigeneity to the Land of Israel to their exile from Egypt. If it had not been for foreign conquerors, Israel would be more than 3,000 years old. Still, Jews have been sovereign in their homeland altogether for more than 500 years. Arabs did not arrive in what the Romans first called Palaestina until the seventh-century Muslim conquest, and “Palestine” was never an independent state. In the early 20th century, Palestinian nationalism was not driven by a desire for independence but by the aspiration to become part of Greater Syria.
J Street claims that most American Jews support a Palestinian state. However, a May 2024 poll found that only 12% supported a state with no conditions, while just 25% would accept one that is demilitarized and accepts Israel as a Jewish state. What Americans think is irrelevant anyway. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians want a Palestinian state.
- A February 2025 survey by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs found that 75% of Israeli Jews opposed a Palestinian state.
- A 2024 PSR survey reported that 57% of Palestinians opposed a two-state solution, while 48% supported violent “armed struggle.”
Despite these facts, J Street insists that the two-state solution is the only way forward and that granting Palestinians independence is essential to guarantee Israelis’ safety. However, history has disproven this notion. Israel gave up land in the Oslo Accords and got suicide bombings; it withdrew from Gaza and got missile attacks culminating in the horrors of Oct. 7. Palestinian Islamists reject any Jewish presence, and the “secular” Palestinian Authority is committed to the destruction of Israel in stages.
J Street insists peace requires “statesmanship, diplomacy and compromise,” three characteristics totally absent from Palestinian society. It also overlooks that their vision would require the politically unacceptable evacuation of 100,000 or more Israelis from their homes.
J Street speciously claims that the “occupation” prevents its “acceptance.” This is demonstrably false. Israel has relations with 159 out of the 193 U.N. member states. Regionally, the Arab-Israeli conflict is over. Israel has formal relations with Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates.
J Street claims Israel’s policies threaten bipartisan support in the United States, yet Congress overwhelmingly backs Israel. Efforts to condition foreign aid, supported by J Street, were rejected.
J Street insists that American Jews can be “pro-Israel” while criticizing the Israeli government. However, Israelis have no obligation to listen to those who don’t live with the consequences. J Street lobbies the US government to coerce Israel’s democratically elected leaders, which is neither democratic nor pro-Israel.
J Street ignores that Israel was ready to withdraw from captured territories in exchange for peace after 1967, only to be met with the Arab League’s “Three No’s”: no peace, no recognition and no negotiations. The 2009 Fatah conference reiterated this stance: no recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and no end to armed struggle.
In yet another omission, J Street says that Israel’s “occupation” was supposed to be temporary, forgetting that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the basis for all peace talks, tied Israeli withdrawal to the Arab states ending their belligerency. Israel was not obligated to give up all the territory it captured but still withdrew from roughly 94%. The Palestinians were not mentioned and given no political rights.
J Street criticizes Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, but says nothing about the repression of Palestinian rights by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
During the Obama administration, most Jews disagreed with his call to halt settlement construction. In 2019, only 25% supported dismantling all settlements; 41% supported dismantling some, while 28% opposed dismantling any. Meanwhile, a December 2024 poll found that only 29% of Israeli Jews opposed annexation, while 40% supported it.
The manifesto calls for “The 23-State Solution.” This is interesting because opponents of Palestinian statehood have long pointed out that since there are already 22 Arab states, there is no reason for a 23rd. Many people also note that Jordan is both geographically and demographically a Palestinian state. Yet another fact is that most Palestinians live in what was historically Palestine.
J Street falsely equates the “historical and emotional ties” to the land of Palestinians and Jews. They argue that adding another Arab state will lead to Israel’s acceptance by its adversaries and global recognition. The former, however, cannot be placated, and the latter has already been achieved.
The fact that all the peace agreements with Israel were made without concessions to the Palestinians proves that they are unnecessary. The Abraham Accords succeeded because the UAE and Bahrain were fed up with Palestinian intransigence and decided to put their interests first. J Street argues that Saudi Arabia will be different; however, the Saudis will likely follow the example of the others who normalized ties with Israel and bypassed the Palestinians—provided they get what they want from the United States.
J Street backs a return to the disastrous Iran nuclear deal and advocates a “diplomacy-first approach,” oblivious to the fruitless negotiations pursued by the Biden administration that allowed Iran to advance to the point it has the uranium to build multiple weapons.
Point eight reminds us that J Street added pro-democracy to its tagline. The problem is that it doesn’t support democracy unless the outcome suits its needs. The group rejects the democratic process in Israel because it disagrees with the representatives chosen by the people. The group also claims to support bipartisanship, yet it exclusively funds Democrats, including those who are openly hostile to Israel.
Regarding combating antisemitism, J Street defends antisemitic rhetoric under the guise of “criticism of Israel.” It falsely claims that right-wing groups exaggerate campus antisemitism while Jewish students face unprecedented harassment almost exclusively from the left. They mention “longstanding allies,” but not the fact that many turned on and often expelled Jewish students while endorsing Hamas. J Street defends radical groups that glorify terrorism, opposes anti-boycott legislation and objects to effective methods for motivating administrators to protect Jewish students.
Like other demonizers of Israel, J Street speciously attacks the internationally recognized (including the United States) definition of antisemitism proffered by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance for conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism by ignoring its explicit declaration: “Criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”
In its final catchall point that “everything else also matters,” J Street argues Jewish voters are not hawkish single-issue Israel voters. True, Jews don’t rank Israel high among the issues that determine their vote, and yet they consistently vote for pro-Israel candidates and oppose those who are anti-Israel.
The manifesto complains about “powerful and well-funded” lobbies, meaning AIPAC, which have those traits because they represent the bulk of the pro-Israel community. After years of being the largest “pro-Israel” PAC and filling Democratic candidates’ coffers, their funding is now dwarfed by AIPAC’s bipartisan support.
Reflecting its anti-democratic agenda, J Street denigrates “hawkish” voters, meaning conservative and Orthodox Jews who, in the last election, overwhelmingly favored Donald Trump in part or whole because of his positions on Israel. Kamala Harris, meanwhile, received the lowest percentage of the Jewish vote of any Democrat since Michael Dukakis, partly due to President Joe Biden’s policy toward Israel.
J Street pretends to represent Jewish interests, but its actions tell a different story. It supports policies that endanger Israel, disregards the will of Israelis and Arabs, and undermines Israel’s democracy.
The post J Street’s Dishonest, Anti-Israel, Anti-Peace, Anti-Democracy Manifesto first appeared on Algemeiner.com.