Last weekend was a very tragic one for Israelis and Jews, as the IDF discovered the bodies of six hostages executed by Hamas in order to prevent them from being rescued and returned home.

The murder of the hostages triggered demonstrations against the Israeli government, which were further aggravated by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech delivered a day after the murders where he reaffirmed the need to control the Philadelphi Corridor. The Corridor is a strip of land approximately 8.5 miles long between Gaza and Egypt, which has been used to smuggle weapons, personnel, and equipment to Hamas for years.

Protestors argue that the cabinet’s decision and Netanyahu’s speech undermined the chances of reaching a deal to bring the hostages home.

The protests, President Joe Biden’s comments questioning Netanyahu’s intentions, and the arms embargo imposed by the UK on Israel, have all contributed to strengthening Hamas’ position in the negotiations.

A recent Hamas document quoted by the German newspaper Bild reveals Hamas’ negotiating strategy. The terror group seeks to exert psychological pressure on the families of the prisoners to build public pressure on the Israeli government. The Hamas document does not mention the Philadelphi Corridor or the humanitarian needs of Gazans.

It appears, unsurprisingly, that Hamas is less concerned about ending the war and more interested in creating chaos in Israel and isolating the Jewish State in the international arena. Likewise, it seeks to survive as the ruling party in Gaza and continue to threaten the security of Israelis.

Hamas seeks to make the Israeli public agree to any terms in exchange for the hostages — and cast Israel as the villain for blocking a “ceasefire.”

And Hamas’ strategy is working.

Across the free world, Hamas’ role in the war is barely acknowledged — in fact, it is non-existent. Hamas is demanding a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and seeks to return to the situation prior to October 7.

No wonder US National Security communications aide John Kirby recently held the terror group responsible for the stagnation in the negotiation.

Yet, despite Netanyahu’s controversial speech, Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer said in an interview to Bloomberg that Israel may agree to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor in the second phase of a deal, meaning after partial Israeli withdrawal from certain areas in Gaza. 

But that’s not a possibility without looking at Egypt’s role. Egypt has enabled Hamas to smuggle weapons to Gaza either by looking the other way, or because of their own internal corruption. Egyptians have refused to provide Israel any assurances that they will not allow such border trafficking of people or weapons (including the hostages).

It is not clear how much pressure the United States has applied on Egypt to fully secure the border, and if the Egyptian government has given any credible assurances.

Most recently, the Egyptian Armed Forces chief of staff visited the Egyptian-Gaza border in an attempt to send the message that Egypt is indeed in control of the border.  

However, to trust Egypt after all these years of border chaos and anarchy will be hard.

Some voices in the Israeli security establishment even argue that Israel needs to focus on a hostage deal and then come back to the Philadelphi Corridor or resume the war if necessary. Netanyahu seems to think that if an agreement is signed, it will be impossible to return to Gaza to complete the mission of destroying Hamas — both logistically and because of international pressure.

But even if Hamas’ firepower is destroyed, there is one piece that is conspicuously missing: who will rule Gaza after Hamas?

Answering this question is the key to securing a more promising future for Israelis and Palestinians. But the current reality offers no clear path.

The massive flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza has strengthened Hamas. Hamas seizes the humanitarian aid and uses it as leverage to recruit fighters. 

That’s why former Israeli National Security advisor Giora Eiland, along with other generals, published the so-called “Generals Plan.”

The plan proposes to cut humanitarian aid and move the 300,000 Gazans currently residing in Northern Gaza to the Strip’s south. The IDF will then impose a siege on northern Gaza. The terrorists who refuse to evacuate will remain in this territory without humanitarian aid thus leaving them with the choice to  surrender or die of hunger. Humanitarian aid will continue in the rest of the Gaza Strip. 

If necessary, General Eiland pointed out, “we can replicate the siege of Northern Gaza to other areas in the Gaza Strip.”  

The plan sounds creative and, in the best-case scenario, Hamas may release some hostages, but as Eiland himself pointed out, nothing would threaten Hamas more than an alternative Palestinian government in Gaza.

But even this path looks difficult. According to Israeli analyst Ehud Yaari, Hamas would agree to form a technocratic government with other Palestinian partners. That government would attend civil matters while Hamas would remain in charge of security (meaning it would rebuild their terrorist infrastructure).

Hamas has also demanded the removal of Fatah’s control over the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Some key current and former Fatah leaders such as Mohammed Dahlan, a former Security Chief in Gaza who is critical of Hamas, believe that the post Gaza government must include Hamas. Hamas seems to have lobbied Palestinians from all persuasions to include them in a future Gazan government.

Yet, former Palestinian foreign minister Nasser Al Qudwa was not intimidated by such Hamas’ power. He, along with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, drew a up a proposal for a permanent peace. The plan, presented in late August, attempts to revive an old Olmert idea of creating a demilitarized Palestinian state with a policing system, a multi nation trusteeship of Old Jerusalem, plus an Arab peacekeeping force in Gaza after the war ends. 

The two former leaders suggest creating a Palestinian technocratic governing council in Gaza linked to the Palestinian Authority, stating that after two years, the West Bank and Gaza should conduct elections. But it’s not clear whether this proposal rules out allowing Hamas to run in the elections.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has rejected the possibility of returning Abbas and the PA to Gaza, arguing they indoctrinate their children to hate and kill Jews, and pay the families of terrorists.

The PA is indeed weak, and has difficulties exerting control over the West Bank, let alone Gaza. However, it is precisely Mahmoud Abbas, the head of Fath and the Palestinian Authority, who has conditioned Hamas’ participation to its acceptance of the Oslo Accords.  

So, it appears there is no other option but to strengthen Fatah, which is the most moderate faction. On the other hand, the Biden administration’s insistence on quickly moving towards a two-state solution will not work.

The Palestinian leadership rejected the two-state solution at Camp David (2000), at Taba (2001), and later in 2008 precisely because Fatah was under the threat of the dissident groups. There is no reason why it will succeed now, except if Hamas is removed.

Therefore, the Israeli government and its American allies must continue to do everything possible to eradicate Hamas. It’s the only way peace can come to the region.

Luis Fleischman, Ph.D is a professor of Sociology at Palm Beach State College, the author of The Middle East Riddle: A Study of the Middle East Peace Process and Israeli-Arab Relations in Changing Times, and a member of the Academic Engagement Network. 

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