Agnes Keleti, former Olympic gold medal winning gymnast poses for a picture at her home in Budapest, Hungary, May 3, 2022. Photo: REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

Five-time Olympic champion Hungarian gymnast Agnes Keleti, the world’s oldest living Olympic gold medalist and a survivor of the persecution of Jews in World War Two, died at the age of 103 on Thursday, the Hungarian Olympic Committee said.

Born as Agnes Klein in Budapest on Jan. 9, 1921, Keleti joined the National Gymnastics Association in 1938 and won her first Hungarian championship in 1940, only to be banned from all sports activities that year because of her Jewish origin.

“Agnes Keleti is the greatest gymnast produced by Hungary, but one whose life and career were intertwined with the politics of her country and her religion,” the International Olympic Committee said in a profile on its website.

The HOC said Keleti escaped deportation to Nazi death camps, where hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were killed, by hiding in a village south of Budapest with false papers. Her father and several relatives died in the Auschwitz death camp.

She won her first gold at the Helsinki games in 1952 aged 31, when most gymnasts had long been retired, the HOC said.

Keleti reached the peak of her career in Melbourne in 1956, where she won four gold medals and became the oldest female gymnast to win gold, the HOC said. A year later Keleti settled in Israel, where she married and had two children.

Her 10 Olympic medals, including five golds, rank Keleti as the second most successful Hungarian athlete of all time, the HOC said. She has also received multiple Hungarian state awards.

The post Jewish Sports Legend, Holocaust Survivor Agnes Keleti Dies at 103 first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

The New York Times newspaper. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.

In an investigative piece, “Israel Loosened Its Rules to Bomb Hamas Fighters, Killing Many More Civilians,” The New York Times reports that it found that “Israel severely weakened its system of safeguards meant to protect civilians; adopted flawed methods to find targets and assess the risk of civilian casualties; routinely failed to conduct post-strike reviews of civilian harm or punish officers for wrongdoing; and ignored warnings from within its own ranks and from senior U.S. military officials about these failings.”

The New York Times summed up its findings in a separate article, “Eight Takeaways: How Israel Weakened Civilian Protections When Bombing Hamas Fighters.” While there was actual acknowledgment that Jerusalem has complied with international laws of armed conflict, the Times reverted to type, revealing that their recent investigation found that Israel had “…severely undermined its system of safeguards to make it easier to strike Gaza.”

Critically, paper fails to mention that following the October 7 massacre, the elevated threat level posed by Hamas provided a legally justifiable reason for Israel to change the way it interprets its rules of engagement. By not acknowledging this point, the December 26 piece displays a remarkable ignorance of the legal doctrine of proportionality regulating the conduct of hostilities.

“Eight Takeaways” claims that the IDF is using “…flawed methods to find targets and assess the risk to civilians.”

But according to the law of armed conflict, as long as an attack is proportionate to the concrete and direct anticipated military gains, any incidental wounding or killing of civilians may not automatically be deemed an unlawful act, subject to individual assessment. 

In other words, The New York Times is working off a false assumption, whereby the number of civilian casualties – potential and actual – between both sides of a conflict should be roughly even in order to not weaken one side’s ‘civilian protections.’

What Is Proportionality?

But, under the laws of armed conflict, an attack is only considered disproportionate, and therefore illegal, “if the anticipated collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the military advantage expected from the attack.”

Moreover, what is considered proportionate and legal can evolve based on changing circumstances.

Before October 7, Hamas was considered to be an ongoing security concern that Israel had managed to contain. But the post-October 7 reality is very different. Hamas now represents an existential threat to not only the citizens living in the region near Gaza, but the entire country. And let’s not forget Hamas’ Iranian connection.

Since the threat level is so much greater, Israel is legally justified to operate with more force.

The New York Times really needs better military reviewers. Their recent piece comparing targeting processes in counter-terror operations not in war against post-October 7th declared war military operations shows a major lack of understanding of the law of armed conflict,… pic.twitter.com/TaN6zGYntE

— John Spencer (@SpencerGuard) December 26, 2024

Who’s Really Driving Up the Civilian Casualty Numbers?

It is rich that a piece that includes “civil protections” and “Hamas” in the headline omits the very many ways that Gaza’s long-time rulers have for years embedded themselves and their terrorist command and control centers within the coastal enclave’s civilian population structures – including hospitals, schools, and houses of worship.

Indeed, the weakening of civil protections in Gaza is in no small part the result of the terrorist group’s human shield strategy, which its leaders acknowledge is deliberately intended to lead to elevated civilian deaths, thereby ratcheting international pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire that would leave Hamas intact.

Moreover, there is ample evidence that Hamas fighters have posed as medical staff, and journalists, and fought in civilian clothes so as to inflate the civilian death count.

From a legal standpoint as it pertains to armed conflict, Hamas is in violation of the Rule of Distinction, which demands that belligerents and fighters at all times distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on one hand, and combatants and military objectives on the other hand, so as to protect persons not taking part in the conflict.

Evidently, The New York Times was too preoccupied with depicting Israel as seemingly going out of its way to endanger Gaza civilians to note that it is, in fact, Hamas that is in violation of international law.

“Eight Takeaways” implies – by showing how Israel has expanded its list of targets, removed limits on how many civilians can be put at risk each day, used a simplistic risk assessment model, and dropped large, less accurate bombs – that the IDF’s approach to urban warfare is somehow unique.

The New York Times, inadvertently, is absolutely correct. Israel is creating a new standard for urban warfare. And there is a growing body of data to support the claim that the country has developed a way to reduce civilian casualties to historically low levels.

The UN, EU, and other sources estimate that civilians usually account for 80 percent to 90 percent of casualties, or a 1:9 ratio, in modern war. In the 2016-2017 Battle of Mosul, a battle supervised by the U.S. that used the world’s most powerful airpower resources, some 10,000 civilians were killed compared to roughly 4,000 ISIS terrorists.

But with regards to Israel, and given Hamas’ likely inflation of the death count, the figure could be closer to 1 to 1.

The New York Times’ rather sophomoric attempt at legal analysis here is not the result of sloppy journalism. Rather, it is part of a pattern, whereby “findings,” such as those revealed in “Eight Takeaways: How Israel Weakened Civilian Protections When Bombing Hamas Fighters,” somehow dovetail with the talking points of Israel’s most vociferous detractors.

The post Legally Blind: The New York Times’ Muddled View of Law of Armed Conflict first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. Photo: Kremlin.ru

Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term (2004–2008) was marked by Moscow’s obvious desire to regain its status as a global superpower, which had been lost by the Soviet Union as a result of its defeat in the Cold War. The point of official departure from the former policy of open partnership with Western countries and close cooperation with NATO was the so-called 2007 Munich Speech of the Russian President and the invasion of Georgia that followed in August 2008. Moscow’s global claims gained momentum sharply after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and received an even more refined doctrinal formulation after February 24, 2022.

A critical element of the Kremlin’s new doctrine, which represented a peculiar synthesis of neoconservatism and formally leftist Soviet ideology, was its anti-colonial aspect: the movement of the unprivileged countries of the Global South against the world economic and political dominance of the Global North, usually identified with the US-led bloc of “old” and “old-new” Western democracies.

From the point of view of the Russian leadership, such ideological constructs were to become the common denominator of the geopolitical, diplomatic and economic strategy of the international organizations that Moscow is building as a tool to confront the “collective West.” Notable among them is BRICS — an informal association of initially four non-Western states with rapidly growing economies, established in 2006 at the initiative of the Russian Federation, which has gradually expanded to nine member states, together accounting for 46% of the world’s population and 37% of global GDP.

Moscow’s bid for leadership in the global South also had an obvious Middle East dimension. Already at the beginning of the shift in Russia’s foreign policy, it was made clear there that Moscow was no longer willing to settle for the rather formal status of “co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process,” but intended to set the tone in the region. It is clear that with such an “anti-imperialist” vision, which, incidentally, is shared by ultra-leftist and radical-progressive circles in Western countries, the emergence of the subject of “Israeli colonialism” allegedly oppressing the “freedom-loving people of Palestine” in the official rhetoric of the Kremlin was a matter of time.

As a result, in late 2010s Russia’s initial practice of balancing and mediating between almost all actors involved in the Middle East conflict began to gradually change, and its final reformatting took place after October 7, 2023.  This time Moscow almost openly supported Hamas as a satellite of Iran, Russia’s current closest partner in the Middle East.

Russia’s support for the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank, whose leaders from the very beginning of the Russian military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have taken the side of Moscow, where they continue to repeat the long-exhausted formula about the creation of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital as the only way to resolve the conflict in the Middle East. (In this context, the results of voting by PA residents with Russian citizenship in the March 2024 Russian presidential election are quite revealing. More than 90% of those who took part in the elections in the PA voted for Vladimir Putin, while Vladislav Davankov was the leading candidate among the Russian citizens who voted in Israel).

The appearance of the PNA/PLO and Hamas delegations at the next BRICS summit in Kazan in late October 2024 as honorary observer guests in the “BRICS plus/outreach” format was in line with this policy. The head of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) made the most of the arena graciously provided by the organizers and the sympathetic attention of the federal and local Russian press to accuse Israel of “genocide” of Palestinian Arabs, “ethnic cleansing in the Gaza Strip,” and other alleged “violations of international law.” He concluded by demanding that BRICS member states impose sanctions against Israel and expressed hope that “Palestine will be accepted as a member of BRICS” in the near future.

In fact, it is not so much the bilateral relations with the virtual “Palestinian state” that are important for Russia itself, but rather more significant things for Moscow – its attempts to intercept the status of the main sponsor of the “Palestinian cause” from the West in order to gain geopolitical regional and global advocacy perspectives. Apparently, it is within the framework of such a strategy that the Soviet rhetoric about the alleged “pivotal nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for the entire situation in the Middle East” and its “key role in the major regional crises threatening the security and stability of the region” is being revitalized.

Russian society, which until recently was generally favorably disposed toward Israel, has embraced the revival of propaganda clichés that seemed to have been long gone: according to polls, the percentage of Russians sympathizing with the Palestinian Arabs today is many times higher than the percentage of those sympathizing with the Jewish state.

In fact, this was not a big surprise. Data collected over 26 years of sociological observations by the authoritative Moscow-based Levada Center showed that although the majority of Russians do not support either side in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, since 2011 there has been a gradual increase in the share of respondents whose sympathies are on the side of the Palestinian Arabs, while at the same time the number of respondents who support the Israelis has been decreasing. By October 2024, the level of support for Palestinian Arabs exceeded the level of support for Israelis by 4.5 times (28% and 6%, respectively), while 13 years ago the ratio was inverse.

However, also in 2011 there was an absolute maximum — more than 70% — of respondents who did not express sympathy for either side in the conflict. In October 2024, the share of such respondents in Russia amounted to 57% — almost identical (56%) to the share of Americans who chose the same answer option in a parallel survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. At the same time, while the share of those who found it difficult to answer was four times lower than among respondents in Russia, the share of Americans who supported Israel (31%) was five times higher than the share of Russians (6%), among whom the number of those who sympathized with the Palestinians was, on the contrary, 2.5 times higher than among those who sympathized with the Israelis (28% and 11%, respectively).

In light of these data, it is not surprising that the share of American respondents who believe that Israel is protecting its interests in the current conflict and its actions are justified is more than twice as high (32% and 14%) as the share of Russians who share this opinion. But among those who chose the statement “Israel has gone too far and its actions are not justified,” the split was the opposite: 59% of the Russians surveyed and 34% of the Americans thought so.

The fundamental question — What is going to be “the day after”? — eventually leads the debate to the problem of establishing a Palestinian state, which in the romantic period of the Norwegian Accords of 1993–1997 was considered by many to be the optimal solution to the Palestinian Arab problem and the trigger for ending the almost century-long Arab-Israeli confrontation and the Middle East conflict as a whole. While the idea of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict according to the Oslo model (“two states for two peoples”) has clearly exhausted itself long ago, this formula is still too entrenched in international political and diplomatic discourse to be abandoned without severe consequences for the strategies based on it, the careers built on it, and the diplomatic, political and economic resources invested in it. And it is in this capacity that it remains a notable geopolitical and geostrategic factor.

It seems that public sentiments in the two countries quite accurately reflect the local media agenda: rather diversified in the United States, and relatively homogeneous, with the dominance of pro-government media, in Russia. At first glance, the opinions of Americans and Russians are completely identical on this point: 49% of respondents in both the American and Russian samples were in favor of the creation of an independent Palestinian state. At the same time, the number of those who were against the creation of such a state in the United States (41%) was slightly less than those who were in favor, while in Russia this number was three times less (14%).

However, if for the United States and its allies this subject, in one way or another, mistakenly or not, is still seen as one of the ways to solve the problem, for Russia and its allies it is hardly more than an active propaganda resource and a tool of geopolitical confrontation with the “global West” and competition with China, Turkey and the Saudi bloc for influence in the Middle East.

Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin lectures in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and is Academic Chairman of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies in Herzliya, Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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