The Gaza Strip

The fighting in Gaza continues at the same reduced pace and with the same methods on both sides. The IDF is deliberately setting the pace, slowly combing through the Rafah area against small pinprick ambushes and raids by Hamas and other groups. IDF units operate both above and below ground.

Since my last report, the IDF also conducted a number of raids into northern Gaza in the Nusayrat and Burayj areas as well as the Khan Yunis area.

In the Rafah area, one hostage (an Israeli Bedouin) was rescued, but his rescue apparently prompted the guards imprisoning six other Israeli hostages at a different site to execute them. A Hamas spokesperson said that following the earlier rescue of four hostages in early June, “new instructions” had been given for “action” when Israeli troops approach a location containing hostages. This was essentially a threat that Hamas will kill hostages if IDF units are detected in their vicinity.

Hamas and other groups are still managing to fire a few rockets per week into Israel, though no Israeli casualties have been reported. One rocket landed in the sea just south of Tel Aviv, most were intercepted or landed on open ground in the areas around Gaza, and some failed to cross the border and landed inside Gaza.

To protect themselves, the terrorist launching teams operate from within the safe haven declared by Israel, near the road on which the humanitarian supply convoys travel, or inside schools, mosques, and UNRWA facilities.

A typical example of a rocket launch site adjacent to the Humanitarian Supply Convoy Route. This was the launch site of the rocket fired at Tel Aviv

In another case, a convoy of the humanitarian NGO ANERA was halted by Hamas personnel who commandeered one of the vehicles to travel to an undisclosed location “protected” by the convoy. This was observed by the IDF via a drone monitoring the convoy’s movement, and the specific vehicle was destroyed. No ANERA personnel were hurt.

To operate against the launch teams, the IDF periodically changes the instructions to the Gaza population about areas where they can be and areas to which they must evacuate. It also conducts precision strikes on specific targets. Hamas responds by invariably claiming large numbers of civilian casualties in these strikes.

In one example, on August 10, the IDF attacked a Hamas command post during a meeting there and killed 31 Hamas commanders and other personnel, all of whom were verified by name. Hamas claimed that none of its personnel were there and that the IDF had massacred about 100 civilians.

On local social media in Gaza, obituaries naming only 33 people were published, of which 31 corresponded to the IDF’s list. Furthermore, Hamas claimed that the IDF had used a one-ton bomb (the type President Biden refuses to provide Israel), but photographs of the damage published by Hamas and Gazan individuals do not show the level of damage such a large bomb would have caused. The IDF stated that three small precision munitions had been used, and a nearby school and mosque were not damaged.

As usual, a flood of condemnations of Israel in Western media and by Western politicians was quickly issued, all accepting Hamas’s version and dismissing Israel’s and without bothering to check the facts.

The IDF found several dozen smuggling tunnels between the Rafah area in Gaza and Egypt. These are the tunnels through which Hamas and the other groups imported their heavy weapons. These discoveries are increasing tensions between Egypt and Israel, as it is Egypt’s responsibility to prevent the existence of the tunnels. There have been reports that not only did it stop doing so, but high-ranking members of the Egyptian regime receive commissions on the operation of these tunnels.

Below is a smuggling tunnel crossing the border into Egypt. The vehicle parked inside it is Israeli to show its dimensions

This is not the original entrance to the tunnel. To bypass explosive booby-traps, the IDF digs into located tunnels through the roof.

Inside Gaza, in addition to fighting Israel, Hamas is busy asserting its threatened dominance over other Palestinian factions. There are reports by Gazans of executions, abductions, and beatings of critics or members of other factions that have taken too independent a stance. Hamas of course reports all these cases as dealing with “collaborators with the Zionists.”

For all the talk of “the day after,” there can be no day after so long as Hamas remains the most powerful force in Gaza.

The IDF published numbers for the supplies being provided to the population of Gaza:

First, on the issue of preventing casualties by warning the population of impending operations: the IDF has dropped 9.3 million leaflets with instructions, conducted 100,000 telephone conversations with locals, and sent 15.5 million text messages and 17 million recorded messages.
As to supplies being sent into Gaza: up to the beginning of September 2024, more than 49,100 trucks carrying supplies and 9,930 air-dropped packages entered the Strip. These included food, medical supplies, some 25 million liters of gasoline, and 20,000 tons of cooking gas.
Electricity: Before the war, Israel provided electricity to Gaza on 10 lines. Hamas cut nine of them, and now complains that there is a drastic reduction in electric power available for civilian use.
Water: Before the war, Israel provided Gaza with drinking water through pipes. It has built another pipe and Egypt has built two more. Among the trucks sent into Gaza, almost 2,500 carried water.
Health: Gazan civilians in need of medical care have been evacuated through Israel. Also, in addition sending copious amounts of medical equipment and medicines into Gaza, Israel sent 1.26 million polio vaccines into Gaza via its own territory last week. Within three days of their arrival, already approximately 200,000 Gazans were vaccinated.

Judea and Samaria:

Throughout August, there has been an escalation in Palestinian attacks in Judea and Samaria or emanating from that area into Israel. The difference is not in the total number of attacks but in the methods.

There have been more attempts to conduct suicide bombings, with individuals carrying bombs on their bodies and cars loaded with explosives.

Below is the Israel Security Agency’s Monthly Summary for August, and the number of attacks on Israelis in or from Judea and Samaria:

In July, there were 500 attacks, but 343 were stone-throwing, whereas in August, there were more attacks involving firearms, explosives, and fire bombs. Also, there were three failed attempts to drive cars filled with explosives into Israeli villages. One was a failed attempt to explode a bomb next to a passing civilian bus. The bus was damaged but no one was hurt.

These attacks killed four Israeli civilians and wounded 12. Also killed were four Israeli soldiers and policemen. Seventeen more were wounded.

In response to this escalation, the IDF escalated its offensive counter-terrorist operations and on August 29 began its biggest offensive operation since 2002. While the operation was conducted in a number of Palestinian towns and villages, in other areas, Palestinian terrorists continued to attack passing cars or roadblocks and to infiltrate into Israeli villages.

Each IDF entry into Palestinian towns faces varying intensities of resistance, including bombs dug under roads (which are cleared by bulldozers that tear up the asphalt), rifles, machine guns, grenades, and improvised hand-thrown bombs as well as petrol bombs. During the operation a number of Israeli soldiers and policemen were wounded.

The Palestinian Authority stated that 39 Palestinians had been killed and 145 wounded all together. From the obituaries published, almost all were members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Fatah militia, and a few Palestinian Authority personnel who, contrary to orders, joined the fight against the IDF. Hundreds of members of the various groups were captured and a large quantity of weapons stores were taken and cleared or destroyed in situ.

Apart from the official response, there was also an escalation of violence by Israeli civilians who conducted revenge raids on Palestinian villages from which they were attacked. The IDF and Israeli police had to send troops to these villages to force these Israelis away, and they arrested a number of them.

Throughout the month, there have been gunfights between the official Palestinian Authority security forces, controlled by the Fatah, and the militias of other Palestinian factions. The Palestinian Authority security forces cleared bombs placed by Hamas, arguing that they threatened the lives of Palestinian civilians living near or driving on the roads beside which they had been placed.

The Palestinians claim that more than 10,200 people have been arrested since October 7, 2023, but the official Israeli number is approximately 4,950 (about 700 more since my last report), of whom approximately 2,000 belong to Hamas and the others to other groups.

The discrepancy is apparently because the Palestinians count anyone who was detained as “arrested” even if they were released after questioning. They also claim that more than 690 Palestinians have been killed since October 7, but do not provide a breakdown between armed personnel of the various factions and civilians. This figure is 170 more than in my previous report, but not that many Palestinians have been reported killed in this period. The reason for this discrepancy is not clear.

Dr. Eado Hecht, a senior research fellow at the BESA Center, is a military analyst focusing mainly on the relationship between military theory, military doctrine, and military practice. He teaches courses on military theory and military history at Bar-Ilan University, Haifa University, and Reichman University and in a variety of courses in the Israel Defense Forces. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Here’s What Happening in Gaza and the West Bank Right Now first appeared on Algemeiner.com.