RSS
How Can Israel Complete Its Victory in the Swords of Iron War?
Israeli soldiers fire mortar shells, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, near Israel’s border with Gaza in southern Israel, Jan. 3, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Violeta Santos Moura
The security-military failure of October 7, 2023, revealed fundamental flaws in Israel’s national security doctrine. Those flaws led to the collapse of defense lines and the subsequent terrible outcome of a massacre and mass abduction of civilians. On October 7, Hamas succeeded and Israel failed.
October 7 also saw the expression of the Israeli spirit of audacity, resilience, and closeness, with remarkable acts of heroism that saved many lives on that day. However, it is regrettable that as a nation, Israel had to resort to them out of necessity.
From the deep abyss into which Israel was plunged, the IDF, security apparatus, and other critical systems — particularly healthcare — managed to lead Israel to a clear victory. That victory is not yet complete, but what has been achieved so far is significant in every respect.
First and foremost, Hamas has ceased to function wherever the IDF has engaged it in combat. The integrated warfare of the IDF undermines Hamas’ military and authoritative capabilities even beyond the areas where the IDF has physically reached. There are numerous indicators confirming this: a decrease in Hamas resistance to the IDF beyond mere survival or retreat, Gazan civilians’ attitudes toward Hamas, and the severe impact the war has had on the Hamas leadership’s military and civilian control capabilities.
So far, the ratio of casualties between the IDF and Hamas and other Palestinian factions is over 1:40. This is an extremely high ratio by any standard, one of the highest in history. It is based on the almost absolute operational efficiency and superiority of the IDF, stemming from the synergy between ground forces and effective close air support, the integration of precise intelligence with operational implementation on the ground, and the IDF’s proactive learning and knowledge dissemination processes, which exceed those of the enemy.
Another significant achievement is the notably low ratio between enemy combatants killed and civilian casualties. Even if, for example, all 24,000 reported Palestinian casualties (as of the time of writing) were civilians, the killing of around 9,000 militants, as reported by the IDF, represents a ratio of less than 1:3. Given some flexibility in casualty counting, it even approaches 1:2. This is an exceptional and highly unusual ratio. The IDF is eradicating the enemy while inflicting a very low proportional toll on civilians, making this one of the “cleanest” wars in history.
The combination of these two ratios — combatants affected on both sides and combatants relative to civilians on the enemy side — indicates the IDF’s highly effective operational capabilities, despite challenges like crossfire incidents and the population’s displacement efficiency. The strength and success of the Israeli military operation is also helping to contain potential terrorism in the region, at least for the time being.
The hostage exchange deal at the end of November was a significant achievement for the military operation. Israel did not succumb to an “all for all” deal, which was not only practically impossible but would also have posed a tangible threat to the security of Israeli citizens both domestically and abroad and would thus have constituted a strategic defeat. Instead, through military pressure, Israel succeeded in reaching an arrangement that released numerous captives in exchange for a limited and conditional release of Palestinian prisoners.
In the north, Hezbollah is being deterred from opening a comprehensive war, and based on the combination of temporary population displacement (the “security belt in our territory”) and precise strikes against Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon’s south, the IDF is successfully shifting the balance of power between the sides. The casualty ratio between the IDF and Hezbollah stands at 1:20. A clear indication of the positive trend was Hezbollah’s relative restraint in response to the strike against senior Hamas figure Saleh al-Arouri in his Beirut residence and the liquidation of the commander of the Redwan force, both attributed to Israel.
The issue of the violent disruptions by the Houthis in Yemen to maritime traffic in the Red Sea is being addressed as a global problem by a coalition led by the United States. The Houthis are paying a price for their disruptive behavior. China has indicated, through its foreign minister, a desire to remove the Houthi threat to freedom of navigation on a crucial trade route.
Iran is keeping its actions confined and is avoiding direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. The Iranian regime has refrained from conducting wide-ranging attacks on Israel, even when a senior official in the Quds Force was eliminated, relying on proxies in other areas (Syria, Iraq) to target the forces of the United States and Israel. Its success in this regard has been severely limited, partly due to the operational response by the United States and Israel’s advanced active defense measures.
Another achievement of Israel’s military victory is the change in Russia’s approach towards Israel, which was initially very negative. Russia, sensing Israeli weakness and seeing an opportunity to challenge the United States and divert attention from the war in Ukraine, showed support for Hamas at the beginning of the war. The Israeli military success led the Russians, operating from a cool and realistically grounded perspective based on strategic interests, to readjust their policy and realign with their previous stance towards Israel of recent years. This stance, while still negative in the public domain, is now much more balanced behind the scenes.
The crimes committed on October 7 and the understanding of governments and experts worldwide that they cannot be attributed to the Israeli military operation are influencing a change in public sentiment towards Israel. Setting aside the vocal minority of extreme progressives and the surge in antisemitic sentiments being expressed around the world, public opinion towards Israel is as balanced as one could expect. A clear expression of this is the struggle over the soul of universities in the United States, where the progressive response to October 7—effectively supporting the massacre of Jews that occurred on that day—has fueled a backlash against “woke” ideology and its incessant negative discourse on Israel.
Another significant achievement of the campaign is the strengthening of the alliance between Israel and its rising partners worldwide. The clear pro-Israel positions of Germany, India, Japan, to some extent South Korea, and Argentina with the ascent of its new president (compensating to some extent for the temporary distancing from Brazil) reflect a new international coalition of friends of Israel. At least with regard to India and Japan, it can be said that the security-political coalition built by the United States alongside Israeli military achievements constitutes a significant reinforcement of Israel’s security.
All this being the case, at the conclusion of the first hundred days of the war we can begin to discuss a clear Israeli military victory and its profound implications for Israel’s strategic position.
The greatest challenge will be to maintain and increase the positive momentum. Israel must not reach a point of strategic exhaustion, so it needs to push ongoing efforts to secure a clear strategic advantage with full force.
The main way to do this is to keep fighting. The difference — which will become clear to the leadership of Hamas in Gaza — is that this time, there will not be a complete ceasefire (allowing for possible temporary pauses) during which Yahya Sinwar can relax. The continuation of the campaign against Hamas infrastructure and the non-stop search for Hamas leadership both above and below ground will eventually bear fruit. As long as those leaders are in Gaza – and we must strive to ensure that that does not change – they are effectively neutralized and will pay with their lives for every small mistake they make, something that is increasingly likely as the days pass with them hiding underground. The IDF must continue to pursue and eliminate the military capabilities of Hamas and dismantle the organization (what is known in the US military as “degrade and destroy”) in order to return peace to the civilian home front and create a situation in which Hamas no longer has any substantial influence on the future of Gaza.
As part of its military operations, Israel needs to seize control of Rafah and the border area with Egypt. Israel must choke off the capabilities of terrorist entities, which include not only Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad but also global jihadist elements and al-Qaeda. The main way to achieve this is by blocking the escape route along the border with Egypt. As for any future local governance in Gaza, Israel must insist on controlling movement between the Strip and Egypt.
Taking control of Rafah requires dealing with the civilian component. There are currently hundreds of thousands of refugees in the Rafah area, and measures need to be taken to ensure their relocation to facilitate the takeover of the region. The relocation of civilians from the Rafah area is an excellent opportunity to return the population to northern Gaza and begin civilian reconstruction.
Part of Israel’s victory scenario is a situation in which Gaza residents rebuild infrastructure and damaged buildings in an organized manner, managed by a local civilian-government nucleus with the support of a limited external envelope composed of international and regional entities. Israel needs to ensure that Hamas cannot be the leading civilian force in the Gaza Strip, and this can only happen if a local force develops with sufficient capabilities and powers to address the population’s needs. A civilian reconstruction plan for Gaza operated by locals and guided and funded by external entities would constitute a clear Israeli victory.
Regarding the painful issue of the captives, the goal should be to rescue as many of them as possible through three avenues: military operations, negotiations, and deals (exchanges) with local entities that are holding them. One incentive could be the offer of a high monetary reward for anyone who delivers captives alive to the IDF. There is no reason to continue promoting a comprehensive deal with Hamas.
On the northern front, it is advisable to seek international agreements based on an international monitoring mechanism to ensure that Hezbollah forces stay away from the border. Such arrangements could hold for an extended period if the IDF’s strikes on Hezbollah continue until an agreement is reached and compliance is achieved, minimizing casualties on our side. After securing such agreements, the IDF should stand strong in defending the border and respond forcefully to any provocations by Hezbollah. However, it is clear that a much broader approach will be required (as was the case in Gaza with Hamas) to comprehensively address the Hezbollah challenge.
Increasing Israel’s strategic advantage also requires the exploitation of political opportunities. The most important is capitalizing on the decrease in the visibility of the conflict to broaden the Abraham Accords through an agreement with Saudi Arabia and the renewed promotion of relations with the UAE and other countries. A clear military victory and the advancement of the reconstruction process with the assistance of a regional coalition will facilitate this progress.
As for the United States, the upcoming presidential election represents a fundamental challenge to Israel. Israel must navigate between maintaining a close relationship with the American administration, currently led by President Joe Biden, which is taking significant — in some cases unprecedented – steps in support of Israel during wartime, and the fact that each of the Republican candidates is a clear supporter of Israel. Israel will need to handle political matters with extreme caution, but there is a major opportunity to harness the mechanisms and processes successfully executed during the war — with an emphasis on building the international coalition and convincing the Americans to deter Iran — to advance the discussion on long-term confrontation with Iran and its proxies. This should include a return to a joint discussion on the nuclear issue, which has been pushed aside due to the war.
The final effort to highlight the military victory involves deepening the discourse with international actors. It is crucial to solidify the support and partnerships that have been established with Germany, India, Japan, and other countries to accelerate diplomatic and military cooperation. There should also be an aspiration to restore positive dialogue with Russia, which has been strained since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s growing need for an Iranian foothold in the Middle East. Israel’s demonstrated strength in Gaza and the northern front allows a return to an open and critical dialogue with Moscow, which previously led to meaningful understandings on Syrian and Iranian issues.
Perhaps most importantly, the victory should be exploited to effect a change in the Israeli domestic discourse. The current generation of Israeli leadership on both sides of the political spectrum failed on October 7, in terms of the unnecessary and extreme polarization around the judiciary issue, management of the internal crisis in the years that led up to the massacre, and the formulation of policy towards Gaza over the years. It is likely that, as happened after the Yom Kippur War, the current leadership will make way for a younger generation.
Alongside the political-military issue, the biggest challenge will be to leverage the expected recovery of Israel, which tends to be rapid after a crisis or war, to accelerate the Israeli economy while creating new balances. For example, in the hi-tech sector and other industries, a balance will need to be achieved between growth and self-production and imports that ensure, among other things, food security in times of crisis. Similarly, there will need to be a balance between traditional and renewable energy to diversify risk.
Israel is a country of many narratives and not one of extremes. This stems from the history of the Jewish people but is reinforced by the political discourse, characteristics of Israeli media coverage, and the dynamics of open studios in which excess opinions, arrogance, and criticism are expressed. A significant gain from the ordeal of October 7 will be a process of correction in all these aspects.
Lt. Col. (Res.) Shai Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a strategist in the field of cyber defense and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. He is about to complete his doctorate at Bar-Ilan University. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post How Can Israel Complete Its Victory in the Swords of Iron War? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Why Does the Media Not Tell the Truth About Hezbollah’s Attacks on Israel?
Firefighters respond to a fire near a rocket attack from Lebanon, amid ongoing cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, near Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel, June 14, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad
Last month, the BBC News website published a report by the BBC Jerusalem bureau’s Lucy Williamson under the headline “Fires in northern Israel fuel demands to tackle escalation with Hezbollah.”
The following day, the BBC News website published another report by the same journalist on the same topic titled “Israelis using gardening tools to fight wildfires sparked by Hezbollah rockets.”
A couple of weeks later, that pattern was repeated. On June 19, the BBC News website published a report by Williamson headlined “Israel and Hezbollah play with fire as fears grow of another war,” which was previously discussed here.
Late on June 22, the BBC News website published another report titled “Unable to back down, Israel and Hezbollah move closer to all-out war,” which is credited to “Lucy Williamson, Reporting from the Israel-Lebanon border.”
If one assumed that the reason for the appearance within days of a second report on the same topic by the same journalist was the emergence of new information concerning the situation on Israel’s northern border, one would be wrong.
A considerable proportion of Williamson’s second report (which was also translated into Swahili) consists of interviews with people on both sides of the border: Israelis from Kiryat Shmona and Malkiya, and two residents of southern Lebanese villages.
Failing to clarify that her interviewee lives in a town described as one of the “bastions of strong Hezbollah support” where a strike against a Hezbollah command center took place in March, Williamson tells her readers that:
Fatima Belhas lives a few miles (7km) from the Israeli border, near Jbal el Botm.
In the early days, she would shake with fear when Israel bombed the area, she says, but has since come to terms with the bombardments and no longer thinks of leaving.
“Where would I go?” she asked. “[Others] have relatives elsewhere. But how can I impose on someone like that? We have no money.”
“Maybe it is better to die at home with dignity,” she said. “We have grown up resisting. We won’t be driven out of our land like the Palestinians.”
Readers may recall that just days earlier, another BBC report from southern Lebanon promoted that same “Nakba” comparison.
Similarly failing to note Hezbollah’s presence and infrastructure in Mays al Jbal (also Meiss al Jabal), Williamson continues:
Hussein Aballan recently left his village of Mays al Jbal, around 6 miles (10km) from Kiryat Shmona, on the Lebanese side of the border.
Life there had become impossible, he said, with erratic communications and electricity, and almost no functioning shops.
The few dozen families left there are mainly older people who refuse to leave their homes and farms, he told the BBC.
But he backed the Hezbollah assault on Israel.
“Everyone in the south [of Lebanon] has lived through years of aggression, but has come out stronger,” he said. “Only through resistance are we strong.”
Williamson fails to remind her readers that Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon 24 years ago, and that the only “aggression” has been in response to attacks by Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, such as the cross-border attack that sparked the war in 2006.
As in her previous report, Williamson portrays the events resulting from the Lebanese terror group’s decision to attack Israel on October 8 as “tit-for-tat”:
But as the tit-for-tat conflict grinds on, and more than 60,000 Israelis remain evacuated from their homes in the north, there are signs that both Israel’s leaders and its citizens are prepared to support military options to push Hezbollah back from the border by force.
Also, as in her own previous reports and in most other BBC content, Williamson fails to explain to her readers that according to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, Hezbollah should be nowhere near the border with Israel ,and that the UN’s “peacekeeping force” in Lebanon has failed to enforce that resolution since it was passed in 2006.
Williamson’s framing of the situation in the north of Israel includes the following:
The dangerous stalemate here hinges largely on the war Israel is fighting more than 100 miles (160km) to the south in Gaza.
A ceasefire there would help calm tensions in the north too, but Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is keeping both conflicts going, mortgaged by his promise to far-right government allies to destroy Hamas before ending the Gaza War. [emphasis added]
And:
Demands for political change are likely to increase when Israel’s conflicts end.
Many believe Israel’s prime minister is playing for time: caught between growing demands for a ceasefire in Gaza, and growing support for a war in the north.
In other words, Williamson’s framing ignores the fact that Hamas chose to attack Israel on October 7, and that Hezbolah chose to attack Israel on October 8, and almost every day since then. She erases the fact that Hamas has rejected multiple ceasefire offers in order to promote a narrative whereby it is Israel’s prime minister alone who is “keeping both conflicts going”.
Moreover, she tells BBC audiences that:
The problem for Israel is how to stop the rockets and get its people back to the abandoned northern areas of the country.
The problem for Hezbollah is how to stop the rockets when its ally, Hamas, is being pounded by Israeli forces in Gaza.
Williamson cites a statement made by the UN Secretary General on June 21:
Hezbollah is a well-armed, well-trained army, backed by Iran; Israel, a sophisticated military power with the US as an ally.
Full-scale war is likely to be devastating for both sides.
The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, said it would be a “catastrophe that goes […] beyond imagination”.
Like the UN Secretary General, Williamson has nothing to tell her audiences about the Lebanese state’s decades-long failure to tackle the Islamist terrorist organization that has repeatedly dragged that country into conflict, and has nothing to say about the failure of the United Nations to enforce its own resolutions designed to prevent further conflict.
The BBC’s sidelining of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and its whitewashing of the failures of the UN forces that are supposed to enforce it, did not begin in October 2023: that editorial policy has been evident for many years.
Now, however, that policy is being used to advance framing of a potential escalation after over eight months of continuous attacks on Israeli communities by Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations, as something that is the responsibility of Israel alone.
Hadar Sela is the co-editor of CAMERA UK – an affiliate of the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA), where a version of this article first appeared.
The post Why Does the Media Not Tell the Truth About Hezbollah’s Attacks on Israel? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
University of Toronto is granted an injunction to dismantle a pro-Palestinian encampment that has been on campus for two months
The University of Toronto has received an injunction to dismantle the pro-Palestinian encampment on its property. The 98-page decision from Justice Markus Koehnen of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice said that members of the encampment must take down the tents within 24 hours, by 6 p.m. on Wednesday, July 3. Toronto Police will have […]
The post University of Toronto is granted an injunction to dismantle a pro-Palestinian encampment that has been on campus for two months appeared first on The Canadian Jewish News.
RSS
Jewish Cemeteries Vandalized in Cincinnati, Montreal
Vandals in Canada targeted a Jewish cemetery. Photo: Screenshot
Vandals have targeted notable Jewish cemeteries in Cincinnati, Ohio and Montreal, Canada, sparking outcry and concern over mounting threats of antisemitism.
Vandals at Montreal’s Kehal Yisrael Cemetery placed memorial stones in the shape of a Nazi swastika on top of tombstones. Ones with the last names Eichler and Herman were targeted in the antisemitic attack.
Placing memorial stones on graves is an ancient Jewish custom to memorialize the dead. Jewish cemeteries oftentimes have stones nearby tombstones for mourners.
Canadian leaders decried the vandalism.
“It is absolutely abhorrent and revolting to defile the dead with swastikas,” Jeremy Levi, the Jewish mayor of a Jewish-majority suburb of Montreal, commented on X/Twitter. “This desecration at the Kehal Israel cemetery in Montreal is beyond contempt. [Canadian Prime Minister] Justin Trudeau, step aside and get out of the way so we can reclaim our country. May this Kohen’s neshama have an Aliyah on high.” One of the tombstones vandalized belonged to a Kohen.
The leader of the Conservative Party in Canada’s parliament and candidate for prime minister, Pierre Poilievre, lambasted Trudeau and denounced antisemitism. “We cannot close our eyes to the disgusting acts of antisemitism that are happening in our country everyday,” he posted on X/Twitter. “The prime minister must finally act to stop these displays of antisemitism. If he won’t, a common sense Conservative government will.”
Canada, like many countries around the world, has experienced a surge in antisemitic incidents since the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas’ massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7.
Meanwhile in Cincinnati, vandals targeted two historic Jewish cemeteries this past week, toppling and shattering ancient tombstones — some dating back to the 1800s.
According to a statement from the Jewish Federation of Cincinnati, 176 gravesites in Cincinnati’s West Side were ruined “in an act of antisemitic vandalism.”
“Due to the extensive damage and the historical nature of many of the gravestones, we have not yet been able to identify all the families affected by this act,” the statement continued. “Our community [is] heartbroken.”
The Cincinnati Police Department and the FBI are investigating the incidents.
The destruction of monuments is the latest in a greater trend of antisemitic vandalism. In an incident over the weekend, vandals in Australia targeted war memorials dedicated to Australian veterans who sacrificed their lives in Korea and Vietnam with pro-Hamas graffiti.
A couple weeks earlier, vandals in Belgium defaced two memorials for Holocaust victims with swastikas and a phrase calling for violence against Israel. In Germany, meanwhile, at least seven stolpersteine, or stumbling blocks in the sidewalk meant to mark Jewish homes seized by the Nazis, were defaced with the message “Jews are perpetrators.”
The US, Canada, Europe, and Australia have all experienced an explosion of antisemitic incidents in the wake of the Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7, and amid the ensuing war in Gaza. In many countries, anti-Jewish hate crimes have spiked to record levels.
According to the B’nai Brith, antisemitic incidents in Canada more than doubled in 2023 compared to the prior year.
The post Jewish Cemeteries Vandalized in Cincinnati, Montreal first appeared on Algemeiner.com.