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How Israeli Military Doctrine Must Evolve and Change After the October 7 Massacre

Armored vehicles of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are seen during their ground operations at a location given as Gaza in this handout image released on Nov. 1, 2023. Photo: Israel Defense Forces/Handout via REUTERS

There are experts and commentators examining the achievements of the current war with skepticism. They do not deny the IDF’s achievements in deep combat in Gaza, which is incorporating an unprecedented coordination of ground, air, and sea forces. However, they caution against excessive enthusiasm over tactical achievements, pointing out that the Hamas organization, its leaders, and its fighters have not yet been broken. They point out that at this stage, it is still unclear how to integrate all the IDF’s achievements into a tangible strategic success.

In the history of warfare, there are clear examples, such as the US Army in Vietnam, of armies winning the battles but losing the war. War is a complex and unmanageable phenomenon.

And yet, despite uncertainty regarding the continuation of the war, its outcomes, and the implications for the future security of the State of Israel, the moment the IDF launched a ground attack deep into the city of Gaza on Friday, October 27, it crossed a Rubicon of decades-old Israeli apprehension, thereby constituting a significant achievement in and of itself.

At times, our adversaries, understanding our situation, have pointed out our internal complexities. For example, in an interview 14 years ago, Bashar al-Assad described Israel’s situation this way:

Israel becomes stronger militarily as time passes … It has more destructive capability but less ability to achieve military objectives, and consequently, less ability to achieve political objectives. Therefore, it goes from failure to failure … Today, there is no Israeli system in the other side’s territories. It’s a strategic principle. Today, Israel’s system is “inside.” So the map has changed. Israel doesn’t know how to deal with this map. (Alaspir, March 25, 2009)

The anxiety of the Israeli leadership in recent decades regarding the deployment of ground forces into enemy territory represents a crisis in the Israeli security perception. It reflects a fear of the uncertainties associated with entering a war, which inherently involves a step into the unknown. At the crossroads where the decision to launch an offensive operation by ground forces is made, the political echelon has been hesitant about making such a potentially complicated move as it could mean a loss of control leading to a failure to achieve the desired end.

This problematic dynamic was evident in Operation Cast Lead at the end of 2008. A dispute arose between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was pushing for a decisive move against Hamas, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who sought to conclude the operation before matters escalated into the unknown. In this conflict, the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff prevailed.

The desire to avoid extensive and prolonged ground warfare is rooted deeply in Israeli culture. Despite the many technological innovations in ground warfare equipment, ground warfare continues to embody war’s fundamental nature as it was rooted in the industrial era. It is a mass activity involving physical friction with terrain and enemy forces, primarily in a mechanized form. It involves clashes in dust, mud, and trenches. A society immersed in the hi-tech and information age does not find it easy to invest in the physical friction of ground warfare.

This being the case, the audacity of the IDF leadership and the war cabinet to deploy the IDF for an attack deep into Gaza’s densely populated, confined, and fortified urban terrain, both above and below ground — with an intensity not seen before, not even in the warfare of the United States and its allies against ISIS in Mosul — must be recognized as an achievement of strategic significance. As in a pilgrimage, where the journey is as important as the destination, the bold and determined path taken by the IDF forces on their way to achieving this war’s objectives holds a significance of its own.

Above all, the choice to focus the attack on the core assets of Hamas rule in Gaza demonstrates the significance of the urban environment to Hamas. The dense, built-up environment plays a central role as a kind of cultural-religious womb for the organization. Professor Yuval Portugali, in his new book entitled The Second Urban Revolution, addresses the cultural aspect of war that focuses on the hearts of cities, calling it the “urbanization of warfare.”

It is true that in wars of the past century, especially World War II, cities became battlefields. However, urban warfare was just one part of the overall war effort. In the war waged by the IDF in the heart of Gaza, the city itself, with its rich cultural and religious institutions, serves as both the front and the focal point of the conflict. The ability of the IDF to operate successfully in the heart of the city should be regarded as a comprehensive achievement of the highest order.

Why is the war being prolonged, and what should this lengthening teach us about Israel’s perception of security?

The political and military leadership clearly understood that they were heading into a prolonged war, and they declared this to be the case from the outset. However, the public, including veterans of previous Israeli wars, is struggling to understand why this war needs to last longer than any other war the country has experienced since the War of Independence.

When David Ben-Gurion formulated the Israeli security perception, he acknowledged the fundamental weakness of the State of Israel in terms of its ability to withstand a prolonged war. Accordingly, he expected the IDF to decisively win wars fast, and developed an offensive striking force with the directive to transfer any conflict to the enemy’s territory as quickly as possible. This perspective was elaborated by General Israel Tal in his book National Security –The Few Against the Many.

The Israeli need to end wars quickly was clearly understood and effectively integrated into the perception of warfare developed by Hezbollah and Hamas, with the backing of Iran. They formulated a concept of warfare that is aimed at swiftly negating Israel’s decisive capabilities. Their concept relies on two systemic components. The first is a widespread rocket system covering the entire depth of the area, enabling continued effective firing into Israeli territory for an extended period, even after penetration by the IDF of extensive parts of the enemy’s territory. The second is based on dense defensive lines containing obstacles and explosives, both above and below ground, in the heart of built-up areas in cities and villages. Under these conditions, a rapid advance into enemy territory becomes a very complex task.

In conflicts like the Sinai and Six-Day Wars, after breaking through the first defensive line, the IDF’s armored forces entered enemy territory, utilizing maneuverability and speed, and achieved swift decisions. The current conflict reflects the ways Hamas and other terrorist organizations have learned from those wars and adjusted their defensive strategies. The defense system they have developed is different from that traditionally used in desert warfare.

The enemy made major changes to its command and control methods. The organization for warfare in Hezbollah and Hamas tends to be decentralized, which allows each local combat core to fight independently even without orders. In past wars, IDF targeting of command and control centers had a direct impact on weakening the enemy, but that is no longer the case.

For years, warfare has focused on urban areas — especially in the case of the organized local networks of Hamas. In Operation Sinai in 1956, a relatively small special forces unit (a reconnaissance battalion from the 37th Division) entered the Gaza Strip, followed by a reserve infantry brigade arriving on buses (Reserve Brigade 11) that conquered the entire Gaza Strip in one quick move. Upon the surrender of the Egyptian commander to IDF Brigadier General Asaf Simhoni, non-local Egyptian soldiers either left the area or surrendered. Similar events occurred in the Six-Day War, where Egyptian forces arrived from Egypt’s Delta and Nile regions as an expeditionary force.

In contrast, in the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, the enemy’s military force is organized into battalions and brigades made up of local residents. The Shejaiya Battalion, for instance, is made up of fighters and commanders from the Shejaiya region, while the Khan Yunis Brigade consists of residents of Khan Yunis. This pattern is repeated across the entire Gaza Strip. Even within the command hierarchy, local ties are significant. When IDF forces penetrate deep into the territory, Hamas fighters, who are locals, can relinquish their positions and easily blend into the population, ready to reemerge when opportunity strikes. This is why operations to clear the Gaza Strip or to combat Hezbollah in southern Lebanon require extensive force deployment and prolonged duration.

Another significant change is embedded in the jihadist religious consciousness that motivates the forces built up in the last decades to combat the State of Israel. Reflecting on the Arab armies’ defeat in June 1967, Khaled al-Qaradawi said: “Returning to faith and raising the banner of jihad is vital in every battle but particularly crucial against global Zionism because the Zionists fortify their soldiers with religious faith and religious dreams” (Uriya Shavit and Ofir Winter, Enemies of My Enemies, 2013, p. 88).

In this spirit, Abdullah Azzam, born in a village near Jenin, led the mujahideen struggle in Afghanistan. Inspired by this, the Hamas movement was established two days after the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987. When the IDF faces Hamas and Hezbollah, it encounters Islamic fighters who are believers, presenting a challenge not previously recognized.

In order to formulate a new Israeli strategic perception, it will be essential to examine the reasons to prolong the current war and the nature of the current threats to the State of Israel. In this effort, it will be necessary to separate from the concept of retreat. That concept is still maintained by former senior security officials who argue that the IDF, with its technological superiority, can always return to the victory patterns of the Six-Day War, as if the IDF’s technological superiority means it can dispense with the need for territorial depth and quickly win even beyond the 1967 borders. The IDF has not weakened since June 1967, but Israel’s enemies have changed. They have evolved creatively and are much stronger. This has vital implications for the future of the State of Israel.

Victory will depend on the post-war arrangements and an end to the concept of Israeli withdrawal from territory.

An unprecedented Israeli coalition has formed that insists on continuing the war until its goals are achieved. Leftists like the leaders of the Geneva Initiative for a two-state solution, such as Colonel Shaul Arieli, are voicing this demand. However, despite its urgency, the nationalist commitment to the war against Hamas is short-term. It emerged in response to a severe emergency and appears to be a temporary situation until Israel’s inevitable victory. It is doubtful whether it indicates a socio-political direction for the future. Only time will tell.

Those who come to the forefront during a crisis gather great support and unite the ranks of the fighters. But off the battlefield, this spirit does not seem to influence leaders in the socio-political discourse. The commitment to war, with all its urgency, relies on conflicting Israeli dreams that continue to resist settlement. Advocates for a two-state solution, including Yossi Beilin and others, see the war against Hamas as a historic opportunity to advance their vision. In their view, the disappearance of Hamas rule will mean the removal of an obstacle preventing the implementation of the two-state plan. Their renewed push for the plan, which involves extensive Israeli withdrawals in the West Bank and even the uprooting of settlements, aligns with the expectations of the American administration.

The support of former security establishment officials for the idea of two states has been and continues to be based on the assumption that even in a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, Israel will be able to defend its sovereignty and the security of its residents with its own forces. From a “professional” standpoint, they have argued for decades that the IDF will always be able to ensure Israel’s security even after withdrawals. For example, Major General (res.) Dan Halutz, in his article criticizing the Netanyahu government’s demand for “defensible borders,” said: “The IDF can defend any border defined by the political leadership. It is worth mentioning that the greatest military victory (after the War of Independence) was achieved in 1967, from the border line presented today by the government leadership as indefensible…” (Yedioth Ahronoth, January 16, 2015).

Leading up to the disengagement plan in the Gaza Strip in the early 200s, in a dialogue with Ari Shavit, Haim Ramon made a surprising statement: “I believe there will be calm (after the withdrawal), but let’s assume there will be war. What kind of war will it be? The IDF with all its capabilities against 3,000-4,000 Hamas members armed with nothing? If the Palestinians pose any threat, I’ll conquer the West Bank in 24 hours. And how do I know that? Because that’s what I did in the ‘Defensive Shield’ operation … I reconquered the territory and toppled the Palestinian Authority within a day.” (Haaretz, June 18, 2006)

The approach of the withdrawal supporters has a conceptual framework built on four principles:

Territorial separation and the evacuation of settlements, along with the definition of borders, will reduce friction points and generate a trend toward stability. Like Ambassador Martin Indyk, they quote the proverb: “Good fences make good neighbors.”
If stability is undermined to the point of intolerable security threats, the political leadership can make the necessary decision and deploy the IDF to counter the threat in the depth of the territory from which they withdrew.
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory, coupled with consent by the international community to recognize the end of the occupation, will provide Israel with international legitimacy for military action should it become necessary.
With its enduring superiority, the IDF can meet the challenge and achieve a decisive victory within a few days.

The war that broke out on October 7 proves these assumptions to be flawed to the core. The special security fence in the Gaza Strip did not prevent war and did not even delay Hamas’ rapid attack. The decision-making process of the Israeli government to launch an offensive was difficult and complex. The great confusion about the northern front also showed how challenging it is for the leadership to decide to go on the offensive. The promised international legitimacy is far from being realized — quite the opposite, in fact — and above all, the IDF has no way to achieve a quick victory.

Victory will require a long and protracted war that will be full of difficulties and complexities. Senior security officials who support the two-state solution argue that the Palestinian state that will emerge in the West Bank will be fragile. But in view of the changes that have unfolded in the phenomenon of warfare in war zones around the world and especially in the Gaza Strip, as demonstrated by Hamas’s resilience, this promise is hollow.

For over a decade, I have been grappling with supporters of disengagement, attempting to present their perspective as detached and dangerous. I based my arguments on comprehensive research published at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in January 2019 under the title: “Withdrawal from Area C in Judea and Samaria: An Existential Threat.”

That research outlined the foundations of a scenario like the sudden attack by Hamas on the morning of October 7. It referred to the doctrine of war intentionally developed by Hezbollah and Hamas under Iranian influence. My claims are based on an analysis of the characteristics of the new form of warfare that has emerged in the 21st century, emphasizing the critical need for territorial depth in defense. The changes in the phenomenon of warfare, particularly those adopted from the Russia-Ukraine war, present additional considerations indicating the need for Israeli control over vital territories in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley.

The evolving reality since the beginning of the war on October 7 in Gaza and on the northern border represents a practical demonstration of my claims in this research. Given the changes in modern warfare, proponents of disengagement appear to be suffering from a chronic overestimation of the IDF’s capabilities and a similarly dangerous underestimation of the enemies’ capabilities.

The perceived strength of the IDF, according to their assessment, leads them to believe that the IDF will always be able to repeat its great achievements, such as that of June 1967. But in essence, the war of 1967 was the last military clash to unfold along the lines of World War II. Since then, the world of warfare has changed completely. To seek a victory along the lines of outdated patterns is like asking for the Red Sea to be split again.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post How Israeli Military Doctrine Must Evolve and Change After the October 7 Massacre first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Abraham Accords Tested on 5th Anniversary as Arab Leaders Gather to Condemn Israel’s Strike on Hamas in Qatar

Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, attends the preparatory ministerial meeting for emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha, Qatar, Sept. 14, 2025. Photo: Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Handout via REUTERS

The fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords was overshadowed on Monday as top Arab diplomats gathered in Doha for an emergency summit after Israel’s strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar last week.

Five years on, experts say that, despite war and political shocks, the US-brokered deals that normalized relations between Israel and several Araba countries have endured, though not without setbacks, and many argue that strengthening them is the most effective way to defeating the hatred and terrorism that led to Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel.

Trade between Abraham Accord countries in 2025 increased from the year before, though it remained well below the levels seen before the Hamas-led attack. The UAE, Israel’s most significant new trading partner, has dominated the commerce generated by the accords, signed on the lawn of the White House on Sept. 15, 2020.

Hundreds of Israeli companies now operate in the UAE, with Emirati investors channeling capital into Israeli tech startups and sovereign funds taking stakes in gas and technology ventures, though a planned $2 billion acquisition was shelved after the outbreak of the Gaza war. Recent figures show trade between Israel and the UAE reached $293 million in July 2025, a 4 percent rise from the year before, while trade with Morocco grew 32 percent in the same month to $8.7 million, according to data published by the Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation. Over the first seven months of 2025, Israel–Morocco trade totaled $71 million, a 7 percent increase from the same period in 2024, the report said.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, then-US President Donald Trump, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed display their copies of signed agreements as they participate in the signing ceremony of the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and some of its Middle East neighbors, in a strategic realignment of Middle Eastern countries against Iran, on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, Sept. 15, 2020. Photo: REUTERS/Tom Brenner

Asher Fredman, a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation who also served as Israel director of the Abraham Accords Peace Institute — a nonprofit founded by former White House adviser and US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner to promote and expand the accords — said the agreements had “proven their resilience.”

He noted that the war had exposed how Hamas, with its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, continues to threaten the region’s stability. 

“Many regional leaders appreciate Israel’s efforts to remove Hamas, a terrorist group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, from power, even if they are critical of Israel’s tactics,” he told The Algemeiner. 

But he went on to say that the war had resulted in diminishing many aspects of the “warm peace and people-to-people cooperation that made the accords so unique” and that restarting momentum will require “regional projects with tangible benefits,” with strong US backing, and ensuring Hamas can no longer undermine progress toward peace. 

“Lasting regional integration will depend on removing Hamas as the dominant military and governing power in Gaza,” he said.

Defense trade has also expanded, with Abraham Accords countries accounting for 12 percent of Israel’s $15 billion in arms exports last year, and major defense projects, including the UAE’s co-production of Israeli drones, continuing in 2025 – though many are now under wraps.

Middle East experts Elie Podeh and Yoel Guzansky, from the Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University, respectively, noted in The Jerusalem Post that Washington’s 2021 decision to place Israel within US Central Command signaled Arab states’ readiness to work with Israel openly, not just behind closed doors. Israel had already taken part in joint drills with regional neighbors, but its integration into CENTCOM created what they described as a qualitative shift in collaboration — a shift that was evident during Iranian attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 and again in June 2025.

But the UAE’s decision to bar Israeli defense firms from a major global defense and aerospace expo in Dubai later this year – reportedly in response to Israel’s strike in Doha – highlighted the political strains now testing the accords. 

Podeh and Guzansky agreed with Fredman that people-to-people ties have suffered during the war but emphasized the particular impact on younger Arabs. “The gap between elite positions and Arab public opinion – especially among younger generations – continues to widen across all countries, placing pressure on ruling elites to respond,” they said.

Earlier this month, the UAE also issued a rare public rebuke to Israel over reports of renewed annexation ambitions in the West Bank. A senior Emirati official, Lana Nusseibeh, warned that any Israeli move to apply sovereignty would constitute a “red line” for Abu Dhabi that “would severely undermine the vision and spirit of the Abraham Accords” – marking the Gulf country’s toughest criticism of Israel since the war began.

On Friday, the UAE said it had summoned Israel’s deputy ambassador over the strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s subsequent “hostile and unacceptable” remarks, in another sign of strain between the two countries with close economic and defense ties. The Emirati foreign ministry said it told David Ohad Horsandi that “the continuation of such hostile and provocative rhetoric … solidifies a situation that is unacceptable and cannot be overlooked.”

Speaking from the emergency summit three days later, Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi addressed Israel, saying that its decision to strike in Doha harms “the future of peace, threatens your security and the security of the peoples in the region, and adds obstacles to chances for any new peace agreements and even aborts existing ones.”

A draft resolution from the Arab-Islamic summit in Doha, a day before Monday’s emergency summit, warned that Israel’s “brutal” strike in Qatar and other actions “threaten prospects of peace and coexistence in the region, and threaten everything that has been achieved on the path of normalizing ties with Israel, including current agreements and future ones.”

The text accused Israel of “genocide, ethnic cleansing, starvation, siege, and colonizing activities and expansion policies,” and said such conduct jeopardized efforts to expand normalization with Arab nations.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with Emir Of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and GCC representatives pose for a group photo ahead of an emergency Arab-Islamic leaders’ summit convened to discuss the Sept. 9 Israeli attack on Hamas on Qatari territory, in Doha, Qatar, Sept. 15, 2025. Photo: Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS

Podeh and Guzansky noted that Saudi Arabia, once seen as the most likely next signatory to the Abraham Accords, is “treading very carefully” since the outbreak of the Gaza war. As the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and a leading voice in the Sunni world, Riyadh is reluctant to proceed without “significant progress on the Palestinian issue” or firm American commitments on security and civilian nuclear cooperation. 

Fleur Hassan-Nahoum, Israel’s special envoy for trade and innovation and co-founder of the UAE-Israel Business Council, struck a more positive note, saying that the Abraham Accords have been “game changing for Israel and the Middle East,” and stressing that even after an extensive regional war they have “stood strong.” She noted that the signatory states have consistently condemned Hamas, blocked boycott efforts against Israel at the Arab League, and made no overtures toward unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state, unlike Canada, the UK, France and Australia. 

“Even with the current tensions, it is the Abraham Accords countries who are clearly calling for the end of Hamas, as European countries remain silent,” Hassan-Nahoum told The Algemeiner.

“I am extremely optimistic about the long-term viability and even expansion of the Abraham Accords in the next ten years,” she concluded.

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Anti-Israel Protests Force Early End to Vuelta a Espana Cycle Race

Cycling – Vuelta a Espana – Stage 21 – Alalpardo to Madrid – Madrid, Spain – Sept. 14, 2025: Barriers are smashed by anti-Israel protesters during Stage 21. Photo: REUTERS/Ana Beltran

Anti-Israel protests forced the Vuelta a Espana cycle race to be abandoned at its finale on Sunday, with Danish cyclist Jonas Vingegaard declared winner as police sought to quell demonstrations against an Israeli team’s participation.

Protesters chanting “they will not pass” overturned metal barriers and occupied the Vuelta (Tour of Spain) route at several points in Madrid as police attempted to push them back.

Two people were arrested and 22 police officers injured, the Spanish government said.

“The race is over,” said a spokesperson for the organizers, who also canceled the podium ceremony, leaving Vingegaard celebrating in the back of his team car.

Earlier, Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez expressed “admiration for the Spanish people mobilizing for just causes like Palestine” by protesting during the race.

Israel‘s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar posted on X that Sanchez and his government were “a disgrace to Spain.”

“Today he encouraged demonstrators to take to the streets. The pro-Palestinian mob heard the incitement messages – and wrecked the La Vuelta cycling race.”

The demonstrations have targeted the Israel-Premier Tech team over Israel‘s actions in Gaza. Some riders had threatened to quit last week as routes were blocked, causing some falls.

Israel‘s war against Palestinian terrorist group Hamas has sparked protests globally and affected several sporting events.

Seven Israeli chess players withdrew from a Spanish tournament starting on Friday after organizers told them they would not be competing under their flag, citing the Gaza conflict and expressing solidarity with the Palestinians.

On Sunday in Madrid, more than 1,000 police officers were on duty as cyclists reached the final stage of the 21-day race – the biggest deployment since the Spanish capital hosted the NATO summit three years ago.

PROTESTERS CLASH WITH RIOT POLICE

Police held back a crowd of hundreds bearing placards and waving Palestinian flags for several hours as the cyclists snaked their way through towns and villages towards Madrid.

As the riders drew closer to the capital, the demonstrators hurled plastic bottles and traffic cones, upended blue barriers and surged onto the road. Baton-wielding riot police fired smoke bombs to try to disperse them.

Sanchez has repeatedly clashed with Israel over its war in Gaza, describing it as genocide. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has accused his Spanish counterpart of antisemitism and making genocidal threats.

Madrid’s Mayor Jose Luis Martinez-Almeida blamed Sanchez.

“[It’s] violence that the prime minister is directly responsible for due to his statements today in the morning instigating the protests,” Martinez-Almeida said.

“Today is the saddest day since I became mayor of this great city.”

Santiago Abascal, leader of the far-right Vox party, posted: “The psychopath has taken his militias to the streets.”

“He doesn’t care about Gaza. He doesn’t care about Spain. He doesn’t care about anything. But he wants violence in the streets to maintain power.”

It is the first time one of cycling’s Grand Tours has been prevented from completing its final stage by political demonstrators since the Vuelta in 1978 was halted by Basque separatists in San Sebastian.

Health Minister Monica Garcia said the latest protests showed Spain was a “global beacon in the defense of human rights.”

“The people of Madrid join dozens of demonstrations across the country and peacefully bring to a halt the end of a cycling race that should never have been used to whitewash genocide,” Garcia said in a post on Bluesky.

Israel‘s nearly two-year-long campaign against Hamas in Gaza was prompted by the Palestinian terrorist group’s Oct. 7, 2023, invasion of and massacre across southern Israel. The onslaught, in which Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists murdered 1,200 people and kidnapped 251 hostages, was the deadliest single day for Jews since the Holocaust.

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Iran’s Uranium-Enrichment Program Must Be Dismantled, US Energy Secretary Says

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright speaks on the opening day of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference at the agency’s headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Sept. 15, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Lisa Leutner

Iran’s uraniumenrichment program must be “completely dismantled,” US Energy Secretary Chris Wright told the UN nuclear watchdog’s annual General Conference on Monday.

The US and Israel bombed Iran’s uraniumenrichment plants in June, arguing Iran was getting too close to being able to produce a nuclear weapon, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency that inspects Iran’s nuclear facilities said it had no credible indication of a coordinated weapons program.

The IAEA has, however, said it is concerning that Iran amassed an estimated 440.9 kg (972 lbs) of uranium enriched to up to 60 percent purity, close to the roughly 90 percent of weapons-grade. That is enough, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear bombs, according to an IAEA yardstick.

Iran’s enrichment plants were seriously damaged or destroyed in the attacks. It is less clear what happened to its stock of enriched uranium. The IAEA has not been able to carry out verification inspections since the attacks.

“If it wasn’t already clear enough, I will restate the United States’ position on Iran,” Wright said in a speech to the meeting of all IAEA member states.

Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway, including all [uranium] enrichment and [plutonium] reprocessing capabilities, must be completely dismantled.”

E3 IN PROCESS OF REIMPOSING SANCTIONS

Britain, France, and Germany, known as the E3, have initiated a one-month process to re-impose sanctions on Iran lifted under a 2015 nuclear deal that unraveled after President Donald Trump pulled the United States out in 2018.

The E3 have said they might hold off on completing that process if Iran lets IAEA inspections fully resume, accounts for its enriched uranium, and holds direct nuclear talks with the United States.

Iran reached an agreement with the IAEA last week to pave the way towards resuming inspections. It is unclear whether enough progress will be made to satisfy the Europeans.

Tehran insists, however, that it has the right to enrich uranium, as all parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) do, provided they use nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. It denies seeking nuclear weapons.

Israel, by contrast, is not a party to the NPT and is widely believed to be the only country in the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons. Israel has a policy of not commenting on that subject.

“We hope dialogues restart, and we hope they’re successful. I think there’s a reasonable chance they will be,” Wright later told a press conference.

Asked what the United States was offering Iran, he said: “Rejoining the community of trading nations, removal of sanctions. It would be a home run for the Iranian people, and we’ve talked about other things as well, so there’s plenty of carrots for Iran to abandon their nuclear weapons program.”

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