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How Israeli Military Doctrine Must Evolve and Change After the October 7 Massacre

Armored vehicles of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are seen during their ground operations at a location given as Gaza in this handout image released on Nov. 1, 2023. Photo: Israel Defense Forces/Handout via REUTERS

There are experts and commentators examining the achievements of the current war with skepticism. They do not deny the IDF’s achievements in deep combat in Gaza, which is incorporating an unprecedented coordination of ground, air, and sea forces. However, they caution against excessive enthusiasm over tactical achievements, pointing out that the Hamas organization, its leaders, and its fighters have not yet been broken. They point out that at this stage, it is still unclear how to integrate all the IDF’s achievements into a tangible strategic success.

In the history of warfare, there are clear examples, such as the US Army in Vietnam, of armies winning the battles but losing the war. War is a complex and unmanageable phenomenon.

And yet, despite uncertainty regarding the continuation of the war, its outcomes, and the implications for the future security of the State of Israel, the moment the IDF launched a ground attack deep into the city of Gaza on Friday, October 27, it crossed a Rubicon of decades-old Israeli apprehension, thereby constituting a significant achievement in and of itself.

At times, our adversaries, understanding our situation, have pointed out our internal complexities. For example, in an interview 14 years ago, Bashar al-Assad described Israel’s situation this way:

Israel becomes stronger militarily as time passes … It has more destructive capability but less ability to achieve military objectives, and consequently, less ability to achieve political objectives. Therefore, it goes from failure to failure … Today, there is no Israeli system in the other side’s territories. It’s a strategic principle. Today, Israel’s system is “inside.” So the map has changed. Israel doesn’t know how to deal with this map. (Alaspir, March 25, 2009)

The anxiety of the Israeli leadership in recent decades regarding the deployment of ground forces into enemy territory represents a crisis in the Israeli security perception. It reflects a fear of the uncertainties associated with entering a war, which inherently involves a step into the unknown. At the crossroads where the decision to launch an offensive operation by ground forces is made, the political echelon has been hesitant about making such a potentially complicated move as it could mean a loss of control leading to a failure to achieve the desired end.

This problematic dynamic was evident in Operation Cast Lead at the end of 2008. A dispute arose between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was pushing for a decisive move against Hamas, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who sought to conclude the operation before matters escalated into the unknown. In this conflict, the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff prevailed.

The desire to avoid extensive and prolonged ground warfare is rooted deeply in Israeli culture. Despite the many technological innovations in ground warfare equipment, ground warfare continues to embody war’s fundamental nature as it was rooted in the industrial era. It is a mass activity involving physical friction with terrain and enemy forces, primarily in a mechanized form. It involves clashes in dust, mud, and trenches. A society immersed in the hi-tech and information age does not find it easy to invest in the physical friction of ground warfare.

This being the case, the audacity of the IDF leadership and the war cabinet to deploy the IDF for an attack deep into Gaza’s densely populated, confined, and fortified urban terrain, both above and below ground — with an intensity not seen before, not even in the warfare of the United States and its allies against ISIS in Mosul — must be recognized as an achievement of strategic significance. As in a pilgrimage, where the journey is as important as the destination, the bold and determined path taken by the IDF forces on their way to achieving this war’s objectives holds a significance of its own.

Above all, the choice to focus the attack on the core assets of Hamas rule in Gaza demonstrates the significance of the urban environment to Hamas. The dense, built-up environment plays a central role as a kind of cultural-religious womb for the organization. Professor Yuval Portugali, in his new book entitled The Second Urban Revolution, addresses the cultural aspect of war that focuses on the hearts of cities, calling it the “urbanization of warfare.”

It is true that in wars of the past century, especially World War II, cities became battlefields. However, urban warfare was just one part of the overall war effort. In the war waged by the IDF in the heart of Gaza, the city itself, with its rich cultural and religious institutions, serves as both the front and the focal point of the conflict. The ability of the IDF to operate successfully in the heart of the city should be regarded as a comprehensive achievement of the highest order.

Why is the war being prolonged, and what should this lengthening teach us about Israel’s perception of security?

The political and military leadership clearly understood that they were heading into a prolonged war, and they declared this to be the case from the outset. However, the public, including veterans of previous Israeli wars, is struggling to understand why this war needs to last longer than any other war the country has experienced since the War of Independence.

When David Ben-Gurion formulated the Israeli security perception, he acknowledged the fundamental weakness of the State of Israel in terms of its ability to withstand a prolonged war. Accordingly, he expected the IDF to decisively win wars fast, and developed an offensive striking force with the directive to transfer any conflict to the enemy’s territory as quickly as possible. This perspective was elaborated by General Israel Tal in his book National Security –The Few Against the Many.

The Israeli need to end wars quickly was clearly understood and effectively integrated into the perception of warfare developed by Hezbollah and Hamas, with the backing of Iran. They formulated a concept of warfare that is aimed at swiftly negating Israel’s decisive capabilities. Their concept relies on two systemic components. The first is a widespread rocket system covering the entire depth of the area, enabling continued effective firing into Israeli territory for an extended period, even after penetration by the IDF of extensive parts of the enemy’s territory. The second is based on dense defensive lines containing obstacles and explosives, both above and below ground, in the heart of built-up areas in cities and villages. Under these conditions, a rapid advance into enemy territory becomes a very complex task.

In conflicts like the Sinai and Six-Day Wars, after breaking through the first defensive line, the IDF’s armored forces entered enemy territory, utilizing maneuverability and speed, and achieved swift decisions. The current conflict reflects the ways Hamas and other terrorist organizations have learned from those wars and adjusted their defensive strategies. The defense system they have developed is different from that traditionally used in desert warfare.

The enemy made major changes to its command and control methods. The organization for warfare in Hezbollah and Hamas tends to be decentralized, which allows each local combat core to fight independently even without orders. In past wars, IDF targeting of command and control centers had a direct impact on weakening the enemy, but that is no longer the case.

For years, warfare has focused on urban areas — especially in the case of the organized local networks of Hamas. In Operation Sinai in 1956, a relatively small special forces unit (a reconnaissance battalion from the 37th Division) entered the Gaza Strip, followed by a reserve infantry brigade arriving on buses (Reserve Brigade 11) that conquered the entire Gaza Strip in one quick move. Upon the surrender of the Egyptian commander to IDF Brigadier General Asaf Simhoni, non-local Egyptian soldiers either left the area or surrendered. Similar events occurred in the Six-Day War, where Egyptian forces arrived from Egypt’s Delta and Nile regions as an expeditionary force.

In contrast, in the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, the enemy’s military force is organized into battalions and brigades made up of local residents. The Shejaiya Battalion, for instance, is made up of fighters and commanders from the Shejaiya region, while the Khan Yunis Brigade consists of residents of Khan Yunis. This pattern is repeated across the entire Gaza Strip. Even within the command hierarchy, local ties are significant. When IDF forces penetrate deep into the territory, Hamas fighters, who are locals, can relinquish their positions and easily blend into the population, ready to reemerge when opportunity strikes. This is why operations to clear the Gaza Strip or to combat Hezbollah in southern Lebanon require extensive force deployment and prolonged duration.

Another significant change is embedded in the jihadist religious consciousness that motivates the forces built up in the last decades to combat the State of Israel. Reflecting on the Arab armies’ defeat in June 1967, Khaled al-Qaradawi said: “Returning to faith and raising the banner of jihad is vital in every battle but particularly crucial against global Zionism because the Zionists fortify their soldiers with religious faith and religious dreams” (Uriya Shavit and Ofir Winter, Enemies of My Enemies, 2013, p. 88).

In this spirit, Abdullah Azzam, born in a village near Jenin, led the mujahideen struggle in Afghanistan. Inspired by this, the Hamas movement was established two days after the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987. When the IDF faces Hamas and Hezbollah, it encounters Islamic fighters who are believers, presenting a challenge not previously recognized.

In order to formulate a new Israeli strategic perception, it will be essential to examine the reasons to prolong the current war and the nature of the current threats to the State of Israel. In this effort, it will be necessary to separate from the concept of retreat. That concept is still maintained by former senior security officials who argue that the IDF, with its technological superiority, can always return to the victory patterns of the Six-Day War, as if the IDF’s technological superiority means it can dispense with the need for territorial depth and quickly win even beyond the 1967 borders. The IDF has not weakened since June 1967, but Israel’s enemies have changed. They have evolved creatively and are much stronger. This has vital implications for the future of the State of Israel.

Victory will depend on the post-war arrangements and an end to the concept of Israeli withdrawal from territory.

An unprecedented Israeli coalition has formed that insists on continuing the war until its goals are achieved. Leftists like the leaders of the Geneva Initiative for a two-state solution, such as Colonel Shaul Arieli, are voicing this demand. However, despite its urgency, the nationalist commitment to the war against Hamas is short-term. It emerged in response to a severe emergency and appears to be a temporary situation until Israel’s inevitable victory. It is doubtful whether it indicates a socio-political direction for the future. Only time will tell.

Those who come to the forefront during a crisis gather great support and unite the ranks of the fighters. But off the battlefield, this spirit does not seem to influence leaders in the socio-political discourse. The commitment to war, with all its urgency, relies on conflicting Israeli dreams that continue to resist settlement. Advocates for a two-state solution, including Yossi Beilin and others, see the war against Hamas as a historic opportunity to advance their vision. In their view, the disappearance of Hamas rule will mean the removal of an obstacle preventing the implementation of the two-state plan. Their renewed push for the plan, which involves extensive Israeli withdrawals in the West Bank and even the uprooting of settlements, aligns with the expectations of the American administration.

The support of former security establishment officials for the idea of two states has been and continues to be based on the assumption that even in a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, Israel will be able to defend its sovereignty and the security of its residents with its own forces. From a “professional” standpoint, they have argued for decades that the IDF will always be able to ensure Israel’s security even after withdrawals. For example, Major General (res.) Dan Halutz, in his article criticizing the Netanyahu government’s demand for “defensible borders,” said: “The IDF can defend any border defined by the political leadership. It is worth mentioning that the greatest military victory (after the War of Independence) was achieved in 1967, from the border line presented today by the government leadership as indefensible…” (Yedioth Ahronoth, January 16, 2015).

Leading up to the disengagement plan in the Gaza Strip in the early 200s, in a dialogue with Ari Shavit, Haim Ramon made a surprising statement: “I believe there will be calm (after the withdrawal), but let’s assume there will be war. What kind of war will it be? The IDF with all its capabilities against 3,000-4,000 Hamas members armed with nothing? If the Palestinians pose any threat, I’ll conquer the West Bank in 24 hours. And how do I know that? Because that’s what I did in the ‘Defensive Shield’ operation … I reconquered the territory and toppled the Palestinian Authority within a day.” (Haaretz, June 18, 2006)

The approach of the withdrawal supporters has a conceptual framework built on four principles:

Territorial separation and the evacuation of settlements, along with the definition of borders, will reduce friction points and generate a trend toward stability. Like Ambassador Martin Indyk, they quote the proverb: “Good fences make good neighbors.”
If stability is undermined to the point of intolerable security threats, the political leadership can make the necessary decision and deploy the IDF to counter the threat in the depth of the territory from which they withdrew.
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory, coupled with consent by the international community to recognize the end of the occupation, will provide Israel with international legitimacy for military action should it become necessary.
With its enduring superiority, the IDF can meet the challenge and achieve a decisive victory within a few days.

The war that broke out on October 7 proves these assumptions to be flawed to the core. The special security fence in the Gaza Strip did not prevent war and did not even delay Hamas’ rapid attack. The decision-making process of the Israeli government to launch an offensive was difficult and complex. The great confusion about the northern front also showed how challenging it is for the leadership to decide to go on the offensive. The promised international legitimacy is far from being realized — quite the opposite, in fact — and above all, the IDF has no way to achieve a quick victory.

Victory will require a long and protracted war that will be full of difficulties and complexities. Senior security officials who support the two-state solution argue that the Palestinian state that will emerge in the West Bank will be fragile. But in view of the changes that have unfolded in the phenomenon of warfare in war zones around the world and especially in the Gaza Strip, as demonstrated by Hamas’s resilience, this promise is hollow.

For over a decade, I have been grappling with supporters of disengagement, attempting to present their perspective as detached and dangerous. I based my arguments on comprehensive research published at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in January 2019 under the title: “Withdrawal from Area C in Judea and Samaria: An Existential Threat.”

That research outlined the foundations of a scenario like the sudden attack by Hamas on the morning of October 7. It referred to the doctrine of war intentionally developed by Hezbollah and Hamas under Iranian influence. My claims are based on an analysis of the characteristics of the new form of warfare that has emerged in the 21st century, emphasizing the critical need for territorial depth in defense. The changes in the phenomenon of warfare, particularly those adopted from the Russia-Ukraine war, present additional considerations indicating the need for Israeli control over vital territories in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley.

The evolving reality since the beginning of the war on October 7 in Gaza and on the northern border represents a practical demonstration of my claims in this research. Given the changes in modern warfare, proponents of disengagement appear to be suffering from a chronic overestimation of the IDF’s capabilities and a similarly dangerous underestimation of the enemies’ capabilities.

The perceived strength of the IDF, according to their assessment, leads them to believe that the IDF will always be able to repeat its great achievements, such as that of June 1967. But in essence, the war of 1967 was the last military clash to unfold along the lines of World War II. Since then, the world of warfare has changed completely. To seek a victory along the lines of outdated patterns is like asking for the Red Sea to be split again.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post How Israeli Military Doctrine Must Evolve and Change After the October 7 Massacre first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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International Muaythai Federation Bans Israeli Representation at All Competitions

People stand next to flags on the day the bodies of deceased Israeli hostages, Oded Lifschitz, Shiri Bibas, and her two children Kfir and Ariel Bibas, who were kidnapped during the deadly Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, are handed over under the terms of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, in Tel Aviv, Israel, Feb. 20, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad

The International Federation of Muaythai Associations (IFMA) has banned all representation of Israel at its events and said Israeli athletes must compete under neutral status, following the alleged death of a Palestinian boy who was a member of the Palestinian national Muaythai team.

Ammar Mutaz Hamayel, 13, was allegedly shot in the back by an Israeli soldier near Ramallah in the West Bank, Palestinian media claimed. Soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were also accused of detaining Hamayel for two hours before handing him over to a Palestinian ambulance that took him to the hospital, where he was allegedly pronounced dead. Israel has not verified or commented on Hamayel’s death.

The IFMA published a tribute to Hamayel after his alleged death, saluting him as a “young warrior” and saying that “his passion for Muaythai was matched only by the warmth and kindness he shared with all who knew him.” In honor of Hamayel, the IFMA flew its flags at half-mast, its social media profiles went dark, and a moment of silence was held for him at the final of the Asian Championships on June 25. Stephan Fox, the general secretary of IFMA, posted his own tribute to Hameyel on social media.

“When a child, a youth peace ambassador, is killed, silence is no longer an option,” said IFMA President Dr. Sakchye Tapsuwan. “This is not just a tragedy – it is a call to action. We cannot stand by when the innocent pay the price of conflict,” he added. “Sport is meant to protect, empower, and unite – especially for the young. Ammar believed in that. We honor his memory not with silence, but with a stand for justice.”

The IFMA, which is the world governing body for the Thai martial arts and combat sport, published a policy report on July 18 announcing that effective immediately, Israeli national symbols – including the flag, anthem, and emblems – will be “strictly prohibited” at all IFMA-organized and IFMA-sanctioned events. Israeli athletes, team officials, coaches, and delegation members must participate under the status of Authorized Individual Neutrals (AIN), a designation also applied to individuals from Russia and Belarus. “They must not represent their country in any capacity,” according to the new policy. Also, no IFMA or IFMA-affiliated events will be hosted in or supported within Israel until further notice.

The new policy will remain in place until repealed or amended by the IFMA Executive Committee. “The policy reflects IFMA’s commitment to fair play, neutrality, and the protection of the values and integrity of sport in the current complex geopolitical landscape and recent developments,” the organization stated.

The IFMA added that the new policy will not impact the 2025 Youth World Championships in Abu Dhabi set for September. Israeli delegations may compete in the championships with Israeli representation but “all subsequent events will enforce the full neutrality conditions set forth in this policy.”

Muaythai originated hundreds of years ago in Thailand, a Southeast Asian country whose citizens have been constantly impacted by the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. During the Hamas-led deadly massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, terrorists killed more than 40 Thais and kidnapped 31 Thai laborers, some of whom died in captivity, according to the Thai government. Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists abducted more than 250 people in total, including Israelis and foreign nationals.

In June, Israeli military forces retrieved the body of a Thai hostage, Nattapong Pinta, who had been held in Gaza since the attack on Oct. 7, 2023. Pinta was abducted alive from Kibbutz Nir Oz, and was killed during captivity. Last year, four Thai nationals were killed and one was injured in northern Israel by rockets fired from the Lebanon-based terrorist group Hezbollah.

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Most New York City Jewish Voters Oppose Mamdani but Are Divided Among Other Candidates, Poll Finds

Candidate Zohran Mamdani speaks during a Democratic New York City mayoral primary debate, June 4, 2025, in New York, US. Photo: Yuki Iwamura/Pool via REUTERS

Most Jewish voters in New York City oppose Democratic mayoral nominee Zohran Mamdani, but he still enjoys a plurality of their support as their collective vote is too divided among other the other candidates in the race, according to new polling released by the New York Solidarity Network.

Jewish support in the upcoming New York City mayoral race is fractured among other candidates, with former New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo (21 percent), incumbent Mayor Eric Adams (25 percent), and Republican challenger Curtis Sliwa (14 percent) all drawing significant backing.

The July survey of 800 registered Jewish voters found that just 37 percent said they would back Mamdani in a general election matchup. The fragmented opposition for the rest of the Jewish electorate underscores the challenge Mamdani’s critics face in consolidating around an alternative.

However, Jewish voters, who overwhelmingly identify as Democrats, are still breaking with the party’s nominee. Even among Democratic-leaning and progressive Jewish communities, many are turning away from Mamdani due to his record on Israel and antisemitism.

The sharpest divides emerge along religious lines, according to the poll. Orthodox Jews, both Hasidic and Modern, overwhelmingly reject Mamdani, with just 3 percent supporting him. They instead lean heavily toward Adams (61 percent) and to a lesser extent Cuomo (14 percent) and Sliwa (18 percent). Conservative Jews also favor Cuomo (35 percent) over Mamdani (31 percent). In contrast, Reform Jews and those without a denominational affiliation are more likely to support Mamdani, 54 percent and 48 percent, respectively.

At the core of the opposition is Mamdani’s stance on Israel. Two-thirds of respondents identified as “pro-Israel,” and over 70 percent described antisemitism in New York as a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem. Mamdani’s refusal to condemn the slogan “globalize the intifada,” which 62 percent of surveyed voters described as antisemitic, has been particularly controversial.

The survey presented voters with a statement detailing Mamdani’s support for the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement, his reluctance to affirm Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, and his past efforts in the State Assembly to limit cooperation between Jewish-American and Israeli charities. After hearing this description, 66 percent of Jewish voters said it raised either “very serious” or “somewhat serious” concerns about his candidacy.

In fact, about half of all respondents (51 percent) said they believe Mamdani is antisemitic. Among his supporters, however, that number dropped sharply to just 3 percent, revealing a stark divide in perception.

While Mamdani does find support among younger, less observant Jews, the polling shows that Jewish concerns over safety and antisemitism remain potent political issues. Among voters aged 50 and older, more than 60 percent said they are concerned that Mamdani’s election would make the city less safe for Jews.

Mamdani, the 33‑year‑old state assemblymember and proud democratic socialist, defeated Cuomo and other candidates in a lopsided first‑round win in the city’s Democratic primary for mayor, notching approximately 43.5 percent of first‑choice votes compared to Cuomo’s 36.4 percent.

A little-known politician before this year’s primary campaign, Mamdani is an outspoken supporter of the BDS movement, which seeks to isolate Israel from the international community as a step toward its eventual elimination.

Mamdani has also repeatedly refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, falsely suggesting the country does not offer “equal rights” for all its citizens, and promised to arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he visits New York.

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Lithuanian Government Blasted for Plans to Convert Historic Jewish Cemetery Into Conference Center

Jevgenius Kevicius prays in front of the chapel of Vilna Gaon in a Jewish cemetery in Vilnius, Aug. 7, 2007. Photo: Reuters

The Lithuanian government has come under fire for its decision to move forward with construction on the historic Snipiskes (Piramónt) Jewish Cemetery in the country’s capital of Vilnius and to convert it into a conference center.

In 1971, when Lithuania was still part of the Soviet Union, the Soviets built the Vilnius Concert and Sports Palace on top of the Jewish cemetery after destroying the historic graveyard located in the neighborhood of Piromont, now known as Šnipiškės. The burial site dates back to the 15th century and was once the burial place for thousands of Lithuanian Jews, including revered rabbis, scholars, and community leaders, according to the Auschwitz Jewish Center Fourndation (AJCF). It is the oldest Jewish cemetery in Vilnius.

In 2004, the Sports Palace was closed and began to fall into disrepair. It has been vacant ever since and is often vandalized.

The Lithuanian government announced on July 28 that it will revive former plans, proposed more than a decade ago, to turn the now “unused and abandoned” concert and sports center into the Vilnius Congress Centre. “The territory of the former Vilnius Jewish Šnipiškės old cemetery located around the building will also be cleaned up and commemorated,” according to the announcement. The building also hosted the founding congress of the Lithuanian Reform Movement in October 1988 and a farewell ceremony for victims of Soviet violence in January 1991.

“When implementing the project, attention will be maintained both to the significance of this place for the history of Lithuania and to the memory of the events that marked it,” said since-resigned Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas. He announced his decision to step down as prime minister on Friday.

The goal of the new construction is to promote business and conference tourism to Lithuania, while also addressing the fact that country still does not have an A-class conference center, according to the government. It added that according to preliminary estimates from the Ministry of Economy and Innovation, the proposed Vilnius Congress Centre could generate up to €133 million annually and create up to 1,200 jobs in sectors ranging from tourism, logistics, and event organizing.

Proposals to convert the site into a convention venue started in 2015, but they have always been met with backlash from Jewish groups because of the historic Jewish cemetery located on the land.

The decision to convert the site into a convention center is a “painful betrayal of Lithuania’s own past commitments and a desecration to the interned deceased,” said Pinchas Goldschmidt, the former chief rabbi of Moscow and the current President of the Conference of European Rabbis (CER). The rabbinical alliance represents more than 700 religious leaders across Europe.

Goldschmidt noted in a statement that a special committee, established by the previous Lithuanian government in 2023, concluded that the site of the historic Jewish cemetery should not be developed further, and drafted proposals on how it should be commemorated with a memorial site within the Vilnius Concert and Sports Palace. “We now urge the current government to honor those conclusions, which were reached through serious consultation and international engagement,” he said.

“This is not a matter of politics, but of moral and historical responsibility. Thousands of Jewish graves lie beneath that site,” Goldschmidt added. “Turning it into a venue for entertainment and gatherings is a profound desecration to their dignity. We call on the Lithuanian authorities, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to reverse this decision and recommit to protecting Jewish heritage and faith, as they have previously pledged.”

Faina Kukliansky, chairwoman of the Lithuanian Jewish Community, said the local Jewish community was not consulted regarding the construction and that it could cause disrespect to those buried at the site. “I fear this project will attract Jews from around the world – not for conferences, but to witness how a civilized democratic country desecrates Jewish graves,” Kukliansky told Lithuania’s LRT RADIO.

The American Jewish Committee expressed “shock at the Lithuanian government’s surprise announcement.”

“We urge the Lithuanian government to immediately reverse course,” the AJC said in a statement. The move “reverses an internationally endorsed decision of the previous government, which rightly committed to transforming the site into a place of Jewish remembrance and education. The Jewish group added that the “abrupt nature of this decision raises serious questions and casts a shadow over Lithuania’s stated commitment to Holocaust memory and Jewish heritage.”

“The decision by Lithuania to desecrate what is among the oldest Jewish cemeteries in Europe is a grave insult to the memory of the dead and to the conscience of the living,” said AJCF Chairman Simon Bergson. “Cemeteries are eternal places of rest, and this betrayal reverberates far beyond Lithuania. It undermines the universal promise to preserve Jewish memory and respect for the sanctity of the dead.”

“Lithuania once vowed to protect the Vilnius cemetery and honor it as a place of remembrance,” added AJCF Director General Jack Simony. “To renege on that promise now is a profound breach of trust — not only with the Jewish community but with all who believe in the integrity of Holocaust memory. This is not about stones and soil; it is about the eternal dignity of human beings whose remains lie there.”

“Vilnius must decide whether it will be remembered as a guardian of memory or as a force of its destruction,” added Simony. “We cannot allow silence to pave over sacred ground. This is not only a Jewish issue. It is a human issue. History is watching.”

The AJCF has urged the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to designate the Jewish cemetery as a protected heritage site under international law, and called on the European Union “to hold Lithuania accountable to its previous pledges and its responsibility to preserve cultural and historical memory.” The AJCF also called on the United States government, which has a statutory obligation to safeguard Jewish cemeteries abroad, to get involved and ensure the preservation of the Jewish site.

Vilnius Mayor Valdas Benkunskas criticized the government for not consulting with city officials before making the decision. He told LRT RADIO that the city was already making progress on developing an alternative site for a A-class conference center, near the parliament building.

“The government announced – without any discussion – that the space would become a conference center. We weren’t sitting idly by; we were moving ahead with our own plans. Learning about this from a press release was unexpected,” Benkunskas said. The mayor noted that Paluckas reassured him, early in his term as prime minister, that there would be no changes regarding the Vilnius Concert and Sports Palace on top of the old Jewish cemetery, and any moves regarding the building would include conversations with city officials.

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