RSS
If Israel Hesitates, It Could Lose Some Benefits of Working with a New, Post-Assad Syria on Energy

Top rebel commander Abu Mohammed al-Golani speaks to a crowd at Ummayad Mosque in Damascus, after Syrian rebels announced that they have ousted President Bashar al-Assad, Syria, Dec. 8, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano
The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 revived several Turkish-led energy infrastructure projects that had been abandoned due to the Syrian civil war. While some of these projects undermine Israel’s interest in becoming an “energy corridor” between Europe and the Arab Gulf States, others have the potential to open up new markets in the region for Israeli gas and electricity exports. This article will highlight three of these potential projects and examine their implications for Israeli regional interests: 1) a joint Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline through Syria; 2) an extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline to Turkey; and 3) new oil pipelines from the Arab Gulf States to Syria to replace Iranian oil supplies.
The Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project through Syria
Soon after the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish media outlets began reporting on their government’s desire to revive an old plan to construct a gas pipeline between Qatar and Turkey through Syria. The pipeline was first announced in 2009 and was primarily promoted by Turkey. Qatar ultimately abandoned it due to technical and political difficulties, including the eruption of the civil war in Syria, high-profile disputes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and between Turkey and Assad’s regime, and the crash in oil prices in 2014 that put many regional energy infrastructure plans on hold. Now that the Assad regime has fallen and relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have warmed, Turkey is again interested in advancing the Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project.
Proposed Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline
A joint gas pipeline with Qatar would serve several important Turkish interests. It would allow Turkey to strengthen its position as the main transit country for non-Russian gas to Europe; provide Turkey with an additional source of cheap gas to serve southeastern Turkey, which suffers from winter power outages due to unreliable supply from Iran and Iraq; and strengthen Turkish and Qatari ties with the new regime in Syria.
At this stage, there is no clear timeline for the pipeline’s construction and no estimate regarding the expected capacity or cost of such a project. Qatar likely wants to wait and see that the new regime in Syria is able to gain control over the center of the country before it makes any investment decisions. As a rule, energy companies do not invest in multibillion-dollar cross-border gas pipelines if they’re not certain that the transit country will remain stable and reliable for the next 10-15 years, which is the necessary period to recover a pipeline’s cost. This is especially important in areas of central Syria where the proposed pipeline will need to pass – areas that are still seeing activity by ISIS and similar groups and will therefore require strong security guarantees.
In the meantime, Qatar prefers to focus on securing its maritime transport routes to Europe, as it has become a major LNG supplier to Europe following the war in Ukraine. Qatar is also investing heavily in potential gas production projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, which will give it closer access to Europe and provide it with some leverage in the ongoing Turkey-Cyprus maritime dispute. These investments include the recent acquisition of a 23% stake in an Egyptian gas field and a partnership in two new drilling operations in Cypriot waters.
For Israel, the energy connection created between Turkey and Qatar through Syria could undermine some of its own ambitions to become part of an economic corridor between Europe and the Arab Gulf States, also known as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). If a new gas pipeline between Qatar and Turkey is successfully established, it will be much easier to supplement that route with additional infrastructure, such as roads, rails, and electricity cables. It would thus be easier for the UAE and other Arab Gulf States to connect to it and export dry gas and other products to Europe through Turkey than to construct a brand-new corridor through Jordan and Israel to reach the Eastern Mediterranean.
While it is clear that the UAE won’t want to depend on Qatar or Turkey as transit partners, their appeal as an alternative will grow for the UAE so long as the war in Gaza continues and Israel’s status as an island of regional stability continues to erode. Israel should be mindful that the continuation of the war and subsequent delays to Saudi-Israeli normalization could eventually lead to a point where a lucrative regional economic plan completely bypasses Israel on its way to Europe. Israel should continue to promote the idea of an East-Mediterranean corridor with Cyprus and Greece, especially to potential investors in Europe and the US, as an essential component of regional economic plans.
Turkish connection to the Arab Gas Pipeline in Syria
While Turkey’s pipeline plans with Qatar may undermine Israeli interests, another Turkish plan might help Israel open up new markets for its natural gas exports. Over the past month, Turkey has been reexamining the possibility of connecting to the Arab Gas Pipeline through its mostly neglected section in Syria. The Arab Gas Pipeline, inaugurated in 2003, was initially designed to allow Egypt to export natural gas northward to Jordan and Syria. Plans to extend the pipeline further to Turkey were signed in 2006 and 2008 but abandoned in 2009, primarily due to financial disputes and the fact that Egypt was running out of gas to export. Today, the pipeline mainly serves Israel, as it transits Israeli gas to Jordan and southward to Egypt while the Syrian section remains unused. The pipeline can transfer about 10 BCM of natural gas annually, but this amount can be increased to 15 BCM, given pipeline upgrades with additional compression stations.
The Arab Gas Pipeline
If Turkey does in fact connect to the Arab Gas Pipeline in its Syrian section, Israel could theoretically transit gas northward through Jordan to Turkey and from there to Europe (either directly or through swap deals). Such a plan is not likely to occur without a significant improvement in Israel-Turkey diplomatic relations, as well as normalization between Israel and the new regime in Syria. But even if none of those things occurs, Israeli gas can still reach Turkey if Jordan or Egypt serves as an “end user” for Israeli gas that they then sell onward to Turkey. A similar arrangement has existed over the past two years: Israeli gas is exported to Egypt, which then liquefies it and exports it to Turkey and other destinations.
There is a snag, however. Any arrangement Israel creates to sell dry gas by pipeline to Turkey, even indirectly, could be perceived by Cyprus and Greece as undermining their interests with Israel. Additionally, the new pipeline connection might undermine some of the goals of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The Turkish plan to connect to the Arab Gas Pipeline in Syria is only one of several plans for major infrastructure connections between the two countries. Turkish officials have already discussed projects that advance cross-border road, rail, and communication infrastructure with the new Syrian regime. Such projects would further cement Turkey’s influence in Syria and could provide Ankara with several benefits. One would be the drafting of a new maritime border agreement between Turkey and Syria that would challenge Cyprus’s maritime claims and undermine cooperation in the EMGF.
Israel should take steps to assuage such concerns from Cyprus and Greece. It should make clear that any opportunity Israel may have to export gas through Turkey would not contradict its plans to advance joint infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even if the pipeline plans in Syria materialize, Israeli gas companies won’t want to rely on Syria and Turkey as the main transit countries for their gas and would only use it cautiously and in limited amounts. Moreover, Israeli energy companies are not keen to rely on Egypt and Jordan as end users to sell Israeli gas to Turkey, partly over debt payment issues. They would still prefer a more direct route to new markets to diversify their portfolio, such as a joint LNG project with Cyprus.
Non-Iranian oil pipelines and electricity connections to Syria
The new regime in Syria has energy interests beyond using the country as a transit area for gas pipelines. Syria is in desperate need of a stable supply of oil now that it is without a regular supply of Iranian crude oil and fuels. During Assad’s regime, Syria received about 90% of its oil supply from Iran (60,000-70,000 barrels per day), with another 10% coming from local Syrian oil fields. In addition, Hezbollah smuggled fuel to Syria through Lebanon (despite Lebanon’s own problems with severe oil shortages). Syria’s new reality is very different. Immediately following the collapse of Assad’s regime, Iran cut off all oil shipments to Syria. At the same time, Israel bombed Hezbollah’s smuggling routes to Syria, thereby preventing fuel from being smuggled in from Lebanon.
Oil and Gas Pipelines in Syria
Under these new circumstances, Syria is now seeking cooperation agreements to receive regular oil supplies from one or more of its neighbors. The most immediate means would be cross-border truck shipments, which are expensive and infrequent. In the long term, Syria will seek new pipeline projects to ensure a consistent flow. The most obvious source would be the existing oil pipeline between Syria and Kirkuk in Iraq, which stopped operations in the 1980s and would require rehabilitation. However, those oil fields are now under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, which might provoke opposition from Turkey.
Additionally, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia are all examining the possibility of becoming Syria’s new oil supplier as part of the regional game to gain a political foothold with the new Syrian regime. In the coming months, we should expect to see many movements in this direction. Saudi Arabia is highly motivated to supply oil to Syria instead of Qatar and possibly thwart other Qatari plans to strengthen its presence in Syria together with Turkey.
It seems that at this stage, Israel has not yet made a clear decision regarding the nature of its relationship with the new regime in Syria. This is understandable, considering the numerous political scenarios that could still occur in Syria that would completely change existing calculations. However, in terms of potential, a normalization agreement between Israel and Syria could open new energy routes and economic opportunities for Israel, including natural gas exports, assistance in oil supply, the establishment of joint wind turbines in the Golan Heights, and more. If Israel is slow to react to developments surrounding new energy infrastructure in Syria, especially those led by Turkey, it might lose a valuable economic and political opportunity to become an integral part of a new regional energy corridor.
Dr. Elai Rettig is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Studies and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in energy geopolitics and national security. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post If Israel Hesitates, It Could Lose Some Benefits of Working with a New, Post-Assad Syria on Energy first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Israel Declares Start of Gaza Ground Operations, No Progress Seen in Talks

Palestinians inspect the damage at the site of an Israeli strike on a tent camp sheltering displaced people, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, May 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Hatem Khaled
The Israeli military said on Sunday it had begun “extensive ground operations” in northern and southern Gaza, stepping up a new campaign in the enclave.
Israel made its announcement after sources on both sides said there had been no progress in a new round of indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas in Qatar.
The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the latest Doha talks included discussions on a truce and hostage deal as well as a proposal to end the war in return for the exile of Hamas militants and the demilitarization of the enclave – terms Hamas has previously rejected.
The substance of the statement was in line with previous declarations from Israel, but the timing, as negotiators meet, offered some prospect of flexibility in Israel’s position. A senior Israeli official said there had been no progress in the talks so far.
Israel’s military said it conducted a preliminary wave of strikes on more than 670 Hamas targets in Gaza over the past week to support its ground operation, dubbed “Gideon’s Chariots.”
It said it killed dozens of Hamas fighters. Palestinian health authorities say hundreds of people have been killed including many women and children.
Asked about the Doha talks, a Hamas official told Reuters: “Israel’s position remains unchanged, they want to release the prisoners (hostages) without a commitment to end the war.”
He reiterated that Hamas was proposing releasing all Israeli hostages in return for an end to the war, the pull-out of Israeli troops, an end to a blockade on aid for Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.
Israel’s declared goal in Gaza is the elimination of the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, which attacked Israeli communities on October 7, 2023, killing about 1,200 people and seizing about 250 hostages.
The Israeli military campaign has devastated the enclave, pushing nearly all residents from their homes and killing more than 53,000 people, according to Gaza health authorities.
The post Israel Declares Start of Gaza Ground Operations, No Progress Seen in Talks first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Pope Leo Urges Unity for Divided Church, Vows Not To Be ‘Autocrat’

Pope Leo XIV waves to the faithful from the popemobile ahead of his inaugural Mass in Saint Peter’s Square, at the Vatican, May 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Alessandro Garofalo
Pope Leo XIV formally began his reign on Sunday by reaching out to conservatives who felt orphaned under his predecessor, calling for unity, vowing to preserve the Catholic Church’s heritage and not rule like “an autocrat.”
After a first ride in the popemobile through an estimated crowd of up to 200,000 in St. Peter’s Square and surrounding streets, Leo was officially installed as the 267th pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church at an outdoor Mass.
Well-wishers waved US and Peruvian flags, with people from both countries claiming him as the first pope from their nations. Born in Chicago, the 69-year-old pontiff spent many years as a missionary in Peru and also has Peruvian citizenship.
Robert Prevost, a relative unknown on the world stage who only became a cardinal two years ago, was elected pope on May 8 after a short conclave of cardinals that lasted barely 24 hours.
He succeeded Francis, an Argentine, who died on April 21 after leading the Church for 12 often turbulent years during which he battled with traditionalists and championed the poor and marginalized.
In his sermon, read in fluent Italian, Leo said that as leader of the world’s 1.4 billion Roman Catholics, he would continue Francis’ legacy on social issues such as combating poverty and protecting the environment.
He vowed to face up to “the questions, concerns and challenges of today’s world” and, in a nod to conservatives, he promised to preserve “the rich heritage of the Christian faith,” repeatedly calling for unity.
Crowds chanted “Viva il Papa” (Long Live the Pope) and “Papa Leone,” his name in Italian, as he waved from the open-topped popemobile ahead of his inaugural Mass, which was attended by dozens of world leaders.
US Vice President JD Vance, a Catholic convert who clashed with Francis over the White House’s hardline immigration policies, led a US delegation alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also Catholic.
Vance briefly shook hands with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the start of the ceremony. The two men last met in February in the White House, when they clashed fiercely in front of the world’s media.
Zelensky and Leo were to have a private meeting later on Sunday, while Vance was expected to see the pope on Monday.
In a brief appeal at the end of the Mass, Leo addressed several global conflicts. He said Ukraine was being “martyred,” a phrase often used by Francis, and called for a “just and lasting peace” there.
He also mentioned the humanitarian situation in Gaza, saying people in the Palestinian enclave were being “reduced to starvation.”
Among those in the crowds on Sunday were many pilgrims from the US and Peru.
Dominic Venditti, from Seattle, said he was “extremely excited” by the new pope. “I like how emotional and kind he is,” he said. “I love his background.”
APPEAL FOR UNITY
Since becoming pope, Leo has already signaled some key priorities for his papacy, including a warning about the dangers posed by artificial intelligence and the importance of bringing peace to the world and to the Church itself.
Francis’ papacy left a divided Church, with conservatives accusing him of sowing confusion, particularly with his extemporaneous remarks on issues of sexual morality such as same-sex unions.
Saying he was taking up his mission “with fear and trembling,” Leo used the words “unity” or “united” seven times on Sunday and the word “harmony” four times.
“It is never a question of capturing others by force, by religious propaganda or by means of power. Instead, it is always and only a question of loving, as Jesus did,” he said, in apparent reference to a war of words between Catholics who define themselves as conservative or progressive.
Conservatives also accused Francis of ruling in a heavy-handed way and lamented that he belittled their concerns and did not consult widely before making decisions.
Referring to St. Peter, the 1st century Christian apostle from whom popes derive their authority, Leo said: “Peter must shepherd the flock without ever yielding to the temptation to be an autocrat, lording it over those entrusted to him. On the contrary, he is called to serve the faith of his brothers and sisters, and to walk alongside them.”
Many world leaders attended the ceremony, including the presidents of Israel, Peru and Nigeria, the prime ministers of Italy, Canada and Australia, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
European royals also took their place in the VIP seats near the main altar, including Spanish King Felipe and Queen Letizia.
Leo shook many of their hands at the end of the ceremony, and hugged his brother Louis, who had traveled from Florida.
As part of the ceremony, Leo received two symbolic items: a liturgical vestment known as a pallium, a sash of lambswool representing his role as a shepherd, and the “fisherman’s ring,” recalling St. Peter, who was a fisherman.
The ceremonial gold signet ring is specially cast for each new pope and can be used by Leo to seal documents, although this purpose has fallen out of use in modern times.
It shows St. Peter holding the keys to Heaven and will be broken after his death or resignation.
The post Pope Leo Urges Unity for Divided Church, Vows Not To Be ‘Autocrat’ first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
The ‘Nakba’ Is Not Our Problem

Pro-Palestinian demonstrators during a protest against Israel to mark the 77th anniversary of the “Nakba” or catastrophe, in Berlin, Germany, May 15, 2025. REUTERS/Axel Schmidt
JNS.org – A smattering of Arabic words has entered the English language in recent years, the direct result of more than a century of conflict between the Zionist movement and Arab regimes determined to prevent the Jews from exercising self-determination in their historic homeland.
These words include fedayeen, which refers to the armed Palestinian factions; intifada, which denotes successive violent Palestinian uprisings against Israel; and naksa, which pertains to the defeat sustained by the Arab armies in their failed bid to destroy Israel during the June 1967 war.
At the top of this list, however, is nakba, the word in Arabic for “disaster” or “catastrophe.” The emergence of the Palestinian refugee question following Israel’s 1948-49 War of Independence is now widely described as “The Nakba,” and the term has become a stick wielded by anti-Zionists to beat Israel and, increasingly, Jews outside.
Last Thursday, a date which the U.N. General Assembly has named for an annual “Nakba Day,” workers at a cluster of Jewish-owned businesses in the English city of Manchester arrived at the building housing their offices to find that it had been badly vandalized overnight. The front of the building, located in a neighborhood with a significant Jewish community, was splattered with red paint. An external wall displayed the crudely painted words “Happy Nakba Day.”
The culprits were a group called Palestine Action, a pro-Hamas collective of activists whose sole mission is to intimidate the Jewish community in the United Kingdom in much the same way as Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists did back in the 1930s. Its equivalents in the United States are groups like Within Our Lifetime and Students for Justice in Palestine, who have shown themselves equally enthused when it comes to intimidating Jewish communities by conducting loud, sometimes violent, demonstrations outside synagogues and other communal facilities, all too frequently showering Jews with the kind of abuse that was once the preserve of neo-Nazis. These thugs, cosplaying with keffiyehs instead of swastika armbands, can reasonably be described as the neo-neo-Nazis.
The overarching point here is that ideological constructs like nakba play a key role in enabling the intimidation they practice. It allows them to diminish the historic victimhood of the Jews, born of centuries of stateless disempowerment, with dimwitted formulas equating the nakba with the Nazi Holocaust. It also enables them to camouflage hate speech and hate crimes as human-rights advocacy—a key reason why law enforcement, in the United States as well as in Canada, Australia and most of Europe, has been found sorely wanting when it comes to dealing with the surge of antisemitism globally.
Part of the response needs to be legislative. That means clamping down on both sides of the Atlantic on groups that glorify designated terrorist organizations by preventing them from fundraising; policing their access to social media; and restricting their demonstrations to static events in a specific location with a predetermined limit on attendees, rather than a march that anyone can join, along with an outright ban on any such events in the environs of Jewish community buildings.
These are not independent civil society organizations, as they pretend to be, but rather extensions of terrorist organizations like Hamas and—in the case of Samidoun, another group describing itself as a “solidarity” organization—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If we cannot ban them outright, we need to contain them much more effectively. We can start by framing the issue as a national security challenge and worry less about their “freedom of speech.”
But this is also a fight that takes us into the realm of ideas and arguments. We need to stop thinking about the nakba as a Palestinian narrative of pain deserving of empathy by exposing it for what it is—another tool in the arsenal of groups whose goal is to bring about the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state.
When it was originally introduced in the late 1940s, the word nakba had nothing to do with the plight of the Palestinian refugees or their dubious claim to be the uninterrupted, indigenous inhabitants of a land seized by dispossessing foreign colonists. Popularized by the late Syrian writer Constantine Zureik in a 1948 book titled The Meaning of Disaster, the nakba described therein was, as the Israeli scholar Shany Mor has crisply pointed out, simply “the failure of the Arabs to defeat the Jews.”
Zureik was agonized by this defeat, calling it “one of the harshest of the trials and tribulations with which the Arabs have been inflicted throughout their long history.” His story is fundamentally a story of national humiliation and wounded pride. Yet there is absolutely no reason why Jews should be remotely troubled by the neurosis it projects. Their defeat was our victory and our liberation, and we should unreservedly rejoice in that fact.
The only aspect of the nakba that we should worry about is the impact it has on us as a community, as well as on the status of Israel as a sovereign member of the international society of states. As Mizrahi Jews know well (my own family among them), the nakba assembled in Zureik’s imagination really was a “catastrophe”— for us. Resoundingly defeated on the battlefield by the superior courage and tactical nous of the nascent Israeli Defense Forces, the Arabs compensated by turning on the defenseless Jews in their midst. From Libya to Iraq, ancient and established Jewish communities were the victims of a cowardly, spiteful policy of expropriation, mob violence and expulsion.
The inheritors of that policy are the various groups that compose the Palestinian solidarity movement today. Apoplectic at the realization that they have been unable to dislodge the “Zionists”—and knowing now that the main consequence of the Oct. 7, 2023 pogrom in Israel has been the destruction of Gaza—they, too, have turned on the Jews in their midst.
They have done so with one major advantage that the original neo-Nazis never had: sympathy and endorsement from academics, celebrities, politicians and even the United Nations. Indeed, the world body hosted a two-day seminar on “Ending the Nakba” at its New York headquarters at the same time that pro-Hamas fanatics were causing havoc just a few blocks downtown. Even so, we should take heart at the knowledge that nakba is not so much a symbol of resistance as it is defeat. Just as the rejectionists and eliminationists have lost previous wars through a combination of political stupidity, diplomatic ineptitude and military flimsiness, so, too, can they lose this one.
The post The ‘Nakba’ Is Not Our Problem first appeared on Algemeiner.com.