Recent events in the UAE and Central Asia show that Iran is again boosting recruitment of individuals from former Soviet republics for various purposes, including terrorist attacks and intelligence-gathering activities.

Tehran plans to use these individuals directly against Israeli “targets” this time. The abduction and murder of Rabbi Zvi Kogan by three Uzbek terrorists is the most recent case. Despite the lack of public disclosure of definitive evidence linking this attack to Iran, experts point to several factors that support this conclusion.

The Modus Operandi is consistent with Iranian tactics:

• The circumstances surrounding Rabbi Kogan’s murder align with methods previously attributed to Iranian operations, such as targeting individuals abroad through criminal proxies.
• The incident occurred amid heightened tensions between Israel and Iran, with Iran historically opposing normalization efforts between Israel and Arab states, with an emphasis on the Persian Gulf emirates.
• While direct ties of the apprehended perpetrators to Iran have not been confirmed, the use of foreign nationals in such operations is known to be a trademark tactic of the IRGC. One might think to first look into the Muslim denomination these terrorist operatives are a part of, however, no concrete evidence has surfaced to link them with Shia Islam – the primary religion in Iran.

ISIS might have carried out the attack, but it is well known that this organization consistently takes responsibility for the sake of clout, while Iran consistently refutes any involvement in such actions. Besides, the MO of the attack is different from those preferred by ISIS, which focus less on individual clandestine assassinations and more on mass casualty attacks.

Tajiks are known to be the IRGC’s primary recruiting pool; however, what about the Uzbeks?

Let’s examine previous cases in more detail. From December 2023 till January 2024, there were a series of failed attempts to attack Jewish Agency offices and the Ohr Avner Jewish Center in Almaty (Kazakhstan), an arson attempt on a farm belonging to the Israeli Saxovat Broyler Co. in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), and smaller events following the same pattern.

In August 2024, it became known that the organization behind these attempts was the IRGC-controlled Iraqi militia, Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades). The main coordinator, according to several sources, was Tajik operative Muhammad Ali Burhanov, also known as Sayed Hamid al-Tajiki.

According to the GFATF (Global Fight Against Terrorism Funding), Burhanov was recruited while studying at Al-Mustafa University in Iran — a known recruitment center for Tehran-backed militant groups, which is operating under the Islamic Propaganda Bureau of the Qom Seminary. The IRGC Qods Force’s Department 400 coordinates Burhanov’s activities. His handlers are Hossein Rahmani and Hossein Rahban, who are behind other attempts to murder Israelis abroad. For example, a November 2022 case in Georgia, where agents of the IRGC tried to kill a prominent Israeli businessman.

According to The Washington Institute, Quds Force’s Department 400 sometimes collaborates with ISIS and the Taliban despite deep-seated sectarian differences and opposing objectives.

It is crucial to remember that such sectarian differences as Sunni vs Shia Islam have not stopped the IRGC and Quds force from supporting Sunni terrorist groups before, as is the case with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

This brings us back to the recent murder of Rabbi Kogan in the UAE, where three Uzbek nationals were involved. Previously there were no cases of IRGC recruiting Uzbeks — Iranians prefer Tajik Shias. Tajikistan’s population shares linguistic and cultural ties with Iran, as both are Persian-speaking nations. Since 2013, the IRGC has enlisted Tajiks to fight in Syria alongside pro-Assad forces. They were instrumental in key battles, including the recapture of Aleppo, under the command of Iranian military advisors.

By recruiting Tajiks, Iran aims to extend its influence into Central Asia, countering the presence of other regional powers and promoting its ideological and political interests. Furthermore, the emergence of ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), also known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in Afghanistan and its recruitment of Central Asians, including Tajiks and Balochis, presents a significant threat to Iran. By recruiting Tajik Shia fighters, Iran seeks to counterbalance Sunni groups.

Interestingly enough, ISIS-Khorasan is actively recruiting Uzbeks to fight in Afghanistan. Reports indicate that ISKP has deliberately expanded its social media efforts in the Uzbek language.

As previously mentioned, the relationship between ISKP and Iran is hostile. In January 2024, ISKP claimed responsibility for twin bombings in the Iranian city of Kerman, Iran, during a ceremony commemorating Qassem Soleimani, resulting in nearly 100 fatalities. In August 2024, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry announced the detention of 14 ISKP members, alleging their involvement in planning attacks within the country.

It is difficult to imagine that the IRGC and ISKP have found common ground. However, taking into account the above-mentioned Qods Force’s Department 400 ties to ISIS and desperate need for any retaliatory action against Israel (considering the failed attacks in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), there is the probability of a joint operation aimed to murder a prominent Israeli citizen. ISIS may have “loaned” its operatives or provided a “blessing” for the use of Uzbeks.

Another possibility exists, one that carries even greater risk. There is a chance that IRGC emissaries have found a way to recruit representatives of a tiny (between 200,000 and 300,000) Uzbek Shia minority living in Bukhara and Samarkand. Their existence is hardly common knowledge in the Arab world and in the West, as they are primarily comprised of descendants of ethnic Iranians, who live there for 2-3 hundred years. Uzbek extremists, being associated with Sunni groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, are much less visible and identifiable as IRGC agents and thus constitute a larger threat.

The history of the IRGC’s recruiting of the citizens of the FSU countries

The IRGC has reportedly engaged criminal gangs from former Soviet regions for operations abroad, including espionage and violent acts. This strategy leverages existing criminal networks to conduct activities that further Iran’s strategic interests while maintaining plausible deniability. As was mentioned above, Tajikistan and ethnic Tajiks are the major recruiting pools for Iranian proxy militias. Yet they are not the only source of operatives that share cultural and ideological affinity with Iranians.

Conversely, Azerbaijan is one of the most frequent locations where the IRGC attempts to carry out terrorist attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets. The highly-experienced local national security service DTX foils the vast majority of such plots.

In 2004, 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022, DTX neutralized and apprehended several mixed groups of terrorists, comprising both local and foreign citizens (Lebanese and Afghans, for example). Iran trained most of them to gather intelligence and carry out attacks on Israeli and, occasionally, other Western embassies.

It should be mentioned that the IRGC has its own proxy organization for spreading Khomeinist ideology inside Azerbaijan, Hussainiyoun. This organization aims to destabilize the government of Azerbaijan per the mission given to it by Tehran. If and when the opportunity presents itself, Husayniyun operatives emphasize their opposition to Azerbaijani ties with Israel through incitement of local unrest. It is no mere coincidence that the leader of Husayniyun, Tawhid Ibrahim Begli, started his organization in Qom, a known recruitment center for these types of groups, as previously presented. The organization was even named by Qassem Soleimani himself.

In March 2023, an Iranian agent tried to murder Azerbaijani MP Fazil Mustafa, known for his staunch support for strengthening relations with Israel.

An Afghan citizen received a 10-year sentence in October 2024 for his attempt to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku in July 2023. He had several local accomplices, recruited by the IRGC, who were also apprehended.

In October 2021, Cypriot authorities arrested a dual Russian-Azerbaijani national suspected of planning attacks on Israeli businessmen in Cyprus. He was using a Russian passport to operate from Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus as an operational and transit area.

In November 2022, Georgian security services thwarted an IRGC plot to assassinate an Israeli businessman in Tbilisi. A hitman of Pakistani origin had a support team of several persons with dual Iranian-Georgian citizenship, who provided him with weapons and transportation.

The IRGC primarily seeks to enlist kindred Shia Muslims to act out its bidding across the globe, yet occasionally even cooperates with Sunni groups, as long as their geopolitical goals surpass the cultural and religious differences. However, there have been cases where non-Muslims and non-Islamic entities have served other purposes. For instance, money laundering, sanction evasion, and the supply of dual-use materials have involved several Armenian businessmen and companies, including banks.

All this demonstrates how much influence and free reign the tentacles of Tehran have throughout the southern hemisphere of the post-Soviet world, especially now, when there is no longer the same level of Russian influence to stave off the propagation of extremist, fundamentalist, and Islamic ideas.

Ariel Kogan is an Israeli member of international fora of independent researchers on contemporary post-Soviet politics and society. He is affiliated with the Institute of Applied Ethnopolitical Research (Kazakhstan) and MPIC Center (Georgia). He is also a columnist for I24news and Ynet in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Iran Is Recruiting Operatives From the Former Soviet Union to Target Israelis first appeared on Algemeiner.com.