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Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here?
One claim frequently heard from commentators and experts, both within and outside Israel, is that Jerusalem lacks a clear strategy and political plan for the day after the Iron Swords War.
According to this argument, while Israel may have achieved significant military gains in the north and in Gaza, Israel has no plan in place to translate those achievements into political arrangements that end the war and improve Israel’s security and international position. These commentators consistently repeat the phrase well-known to every first-year student of international relations: that the purpose of military action is to bring about an improved political situation, meaning there is no military solution without a concluding political leg (this has at least been true of most contemporary wars).
However, any implementation of a political arrangement that improves Israel’s security-political situation after October 7 will require military achievements and an end state that most of these commentators either refuse to accept or do not believe can be reached.
Until mid-September and the exploding pagers attack on Hezbollah — the first in a series of severe blows inflicted on Hezbollah by Israel, including the elimination of most of its leadership — many insisted that Israel must end the war as soon as possible. Their argument was based primarily on the need for an immediate hostage deal. This is a legitimate need that stands on its own. However, it would not be the precursor to a dramatic strategic-political change that brings with it peace on the borders, normalization with Saudi Arabia, improved relations with the US, and other desirable developments, as is erroneously claimed by many pundits and observers.
Those arguing against the expansion of the war into the north pointed out that in Gaza, Hamas has not been completely eliminated and is still tying up IDF forces. There was therefore no possibility of opening another front against Hezbollah, which is a much stronger opponent. However, contrary to these assessments, Israel reached a point in the Gaza campaign when it was able to shift its strategic attention and resources sufficiently to take aggressive action in Lebanon (indeed, it can be argued that it took Israel too long to reach this point in the campaign).
It appears that for the time being, Israel’s strategic patience has paid off, and most of its critics have been revealed as short-sighted. (It is worth noting that in most cases, these were the same people who warned against a ground operation in Gaza and insisted that Israel had no chance of operating in the Philadelphi Corridor and taking control of Rafah.)
Had Israel sought an arrangement in the days before it launched its campaign against Hezbollah, it would likely have received “shame and war together” in return, as Churchill famously put it.
Israel is now on the verge of a strategic turning point. It is in a position where it has restored its military superiority over Iran and its proxies. We should of course not rush to celebrate while the campaign is still ongoing, and the pendulum can still swing in any direction. At the time of writing, we do not yet know what Israel’s response will be to the recent direct Iranian missile attack, what Iran’s response will be to the Israeli response, and so on.
What, then, are Israel’s strategic goals in the war, and how can they be translated into political goals?
As in any war, Israel has both explicitly defined, declared goals and implied, undeclared goals that it would like to realize as a result of the war. It is essential to stress that in the Israeli view, this is an existential war.
Post-October 7, Israel now understands that it can no longer allow hostile terrorist armies to exist on its borders waiting for the order to invade Israeli territory. When a war is existential, the goal is first to remove the threat and only then to clarify arrangements for “the day after”. This is not, after all, the American invasion of Iraq, a war that took place thousands of kilometers from US borders.
Here are Israel’s declared strategic and political goals in Operation Iron Swords:
In Gaza: 1) To eliminate Hamas’ military power and force the collapse of its rule, with the object of bringing about a situation in which there is no longer any security threat from the Gaza Strip; and 2) to create conditions for the return of the hostages.
In Lebanon: To return the residents of the Israeli north to their homes by destroying and pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.
However, it appears there is also an undeclared goal for the overall campaign that takes a more comprehensive and long-term view: the creation of a new regional security reality.
Israel aims to dismantle the two Iranian proxies — Hamas and Hezbollah — that threatened it on its borders, creating a ring of fire that contained the threat of ground invasion. Without these two proxies, Iran will be much weaker, and decades of investment are now going down the drain. Considering Iran’s current economic state, it is doubtful that it will be able to reinvest in its proxies on the same scale.
In Gaza, the fight against remnants of Hamas, isolated terrorist cells that continue to operate, will go on for many months and perhaps even years. The realistic goal is to hit Hamas hard enough that Gaza does not pose a greater threat than that posed by Palestinian terrorists on the West Bank. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other organizational cells are present and active on the West Bank, but they do not pose a strategic threat. Israel will have to reach a hostage deal and thereafter to “mow the lawn” in Gaza as it is doing in the West Bank for the foreseeable future.
Israel is faced with an unresolved dilemma regarding Hamas’ control over humanitarian aid. If Israel distributes the aid, it will become the de facto force ruling Gaza, which it does not want. But if it does not act on the matter, it allows Hamas to control both the aid and the population. A solution needs to be found to this quandary.
However, Gaza is a relatively small area, and Israel currently controls the exits and entrances. It can gradually erode Hamas’ power, as the group is almost entirely unable to replenish its lost assets. Even the new fighters it is recruiting from among the local population lack the knowledge and equipment of the people Hamas has lost. Hamas has been stripped of most of its military assets and will not be able to restock them under the conditions of the Israeli closure and continuing military pressure.
One can hope that at some point, Hamas will be weak enough that an agreement can be reached with a body or agency (or a combination thereof) that will manage the Strip and maintain law and order. As of now, no body other than the IDF will agree to confront the remnants of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, no Palestinian element is currently capable of committing to such an arrangement, even if it were willing to do so. (The Americans, who have spoken about the need for reform in the Palestinian Authority, are aware of this.)
The IDF understands that in Lebanon, unlike in Gaza, it is not possible to destroy most of the enemy’s forces. It is, however, possible to hit Hezbollah extremely hard, as the IDF has already managed to do. The IDF is capable of pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River and destroying its infrastructure, as well as severely damaging its long-range missile and rocket array.
The undeclared goal in Lebanon is to bring Hezbollah to the point where it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel and is unable to carry out the horror scenarios that were outlined before the current operation, which included a massive invasion of the Galilee and severe damage to army bases, critical infrastructure, ports, airports, and so on. From this point on, Israel’s test will be whether or not it can prevent Iran from rehabilitating Hezbollah.
Israel’s strategic achievement here (beyond returning the residents of the north) is breaking free from the equation of mutual deterrence that has paralyzed it from acting against Hezbollah in Lebanon all these years. This means Israel will have to expand the campaign between the wars that it has been conducting in Syria for 10 years. It will now need to include Lebanon for the purpose of disrupting, delaying, and perhaps even preventing Hezbollah’s buildup. At some point, Israel may have to launch a broad preventive strike if Hezbollah manages to rebuild its power. Until then, Israel will gain a few years of quiet and rehabilitation of the north.
This scenario is based on Iran’s continuing as usual without any significant change. However, it is possible that Israel’s release from the grip of the Iranian proxies will allow to focus more strategic attention on Iran. This could lead to moves that weaken Iran and possibly even bring an end to the regime. If this occurs, Israel will be free to take some risks and break through to new arrangements in the Middle East. Its partners, primarily Saudi Arabia and other countries, would also be free to promote agreements with Israel. Other possibilities could open up for an accommodation with the Palestinians that both addresses the interests of both sides and has a chance of holding up.
Those familiar with the cabinet discussions that were conducted during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 know that after the lines on the fronts were stabilized on October 8, there was great fear of a continued war of attrition in which Israel would be at a disadvantage. The question facing the cabinet was how to bring Syria and Egypt to want a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Initially, there was an unsuccessful attempt that included shelling Damascus and a ground advance that was eventually halted. The Syrians were not impressed. Subsequently, the crossing of the Suez Canal plan matured, and the encirclement of and threat to destroy the Third Army led to an Egyptian request for a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Henry Kissinger, who thought Israel was seeking a ceasefire on October 11, was horrified by the thought that Israel would negotiate from a position of military weakness.
Israel is only one side in any set of political arrangements. It cannot dictate terms unilaterally. Nor can it determine who the leaders will be on the opposing side. At most, it can perhaps determine who will not be those leaders, as it has done to Hezbollah’s leadership and to a significant part of Hamas’ leadership. Israel can ensure an improved military-security situation and hope conditions mature on the other side, whether Lebanese or Palestinian, to the point that agreements can be reached that are worth the paper they’re written on. Israel does not control the internal political processes of the peoples surrounding it.
With that said, Israel is committed first and foremost to achieving a military achievement that significantly improves its security situation and places the other side in a position of clear military inferiority, which would improve the chance that that side is eventually interested in coming to an agreement.
The cabinet discussion of November 19, 1973, almost a month after the end of the Yom Kippur War, was recently published. Then-Prime Minister Golda Meir said, “Many things will be forgiven us, but one thing will not: weakness. The moment we are registered as weak, it’s over.”
In the same discussion, then-defense minister Moshe Dayan said, “Once we relied on the fact that we have deterrence power regarding the Arabs. I am very much afraid of a conception [arising] among us that we will be the deterred [party] – that we will fear confrontation with the Arabs and enter a psychosis of reverse deterrence.”
These words resonate strongly, even today.
Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Under US Pressure, Syria and Israel Inch Toward Security Deal
Members of Israeli security forces stand at the ceasefire line between the Golan Heights and Syria, July 16, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad
Under US pressure, Syria is accelerating talks with Israel for a security pact that Damascus hopes will reverse Israel‘s recent seizures of its land but that would fall far short of a full peace treaty, sources briefed on the talks said.
Washington is pushing for enough progress to be made by the time world leaders gather in New York for the UN General Assembly at the end of this month to allow President Donald Trump to announce a breakthrough, four of the sources told Reuters.
Even a modest agreement would be a feat, the sources said, pointing to Israel‘s tough stance during months of talks and Syria‘s weakened position after sectarian bloodshed in its south inflamed calls for partition.
Reuters spoke to nine sources familiar with the discussions and with Israel‘s operations in southern Syria, including Syrian military and political officials, two intelligence sources, and an Israeli official.
They said Syria‘s proposal aims to secure the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territory seized in recent months, to reinstate a demilitarized buffer zone agreed in a 1974 truce, and to halt Israeli air strikes and ground incursions into Syria.
The sources said talks had not addressed the status of the Golan Heights, which Israel seized in a 1967 war. A Syrian source familiar with Damascus’s position said it would be left “for the future.”
The two countries have technically been at war since the creation of Israel in 1948, despite periodic armistices. Syria does not recognize the state of Israel.
After months of encroaching into the demilitarized zone, Israel abandoned the 1974 truce on Dec. 8, the day a rebel offensive ousted Syria‘s then-president Bashar al-Assad. It struck Syrian military assets and sent troops to within 20 kilometers (12 miles) of Damascus.
Israel has shown reluctance during the closed-door talks to relinquish those gains, the sources said.
“The US is pressuring Syria to accelerate a security deal – this is personal for Trump,” said an Israeli security source, who said the US leader wanted to present himself as the architect of a major success in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
But, the source said, “Israel is not offering much.”
The offices of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, who has been leading the negotiations, did not respond to Reuters questions.
A State Department official said Washington “continues to support any efforts that will bring lasting stability and peace between Israel, Syria, and its neighbors.” The official did not answer questions on whether the US wanted to announce a breakthrough during the General Assembly.
TRUST DEFICIT AT TALKS
Israel has voiced hostility to Syria‘s Islamist-led government, pointing to President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s former jihadist links, and has lobbied Washington to keep the country weak and decentralized.
But the US has encouraged talks – keen to expand the countries that signed peace deals with Israel under the Abraham Accords during Trump’s first administration.
Exploratory contacts began in Abu Dhabi following Sharaa’s April visit to the Emirates, which have ties with Israel. The two sides then met in the Azerbaijani capital Baku in July.
Days later, discussions were plunged into disarray when Syrian troops deployed to the southwestern Sweida region to quell sectarian violence between Bedouin and Druze militias. Israel said the deployment violated its enforcement of a “demilitarized zone” and bombed the defense ministry in Damascus. Sharaa accused it of seeking pretexts to interfere in Syria‘s south.
A US-brokered ceasefire ended the violence and, a month later, bilateral negotiations resumed in Paris – marking the first time Syria publicly acknowledged holding direct talks with its longtime foe.
However, the atmosphere in the room was tense, with a lack of trust between the two sides, according to two Syrian sources and a Western diplomat.
Negotiators are following a phased process modeled on deals Israel reached with Egypt that paved the way for a landmark normalization of relations in 1980. That involved the return to Egypt of the Sinai peninsula, seized by Israel in the 1967 war.
Six sources briefed on the talks said Israel would be unwilling even in the longterm to return the Golan, which Trump unilaterally recognized as Israeli in his first term.
Instead, Israel floated a proposal to the US special envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, that it could withdraw from southern Syria in return for Sharaa relinquishing the Golan, the Israeli official said.
“Our feelers via the Americans suggest this is a non-starter,” the official said. Netanyahu’s office, Dermer’s office, and the US State Department did not respond to questions on the swap proposal.
A Syrian official told Reuters that Sharaa understood that “any compromise on the Golan would mean the end of his rule” and had told Barrack the security pact must be anchored in the 1974 lines.
While Sharaa is willing to accelerate talks with Israel to please Washington, he remains wary, according to a Western intelligence officer, the Israeli official, and Syrian source.
He has told Barrack that conditions are not yet ripe for a broad peace agreement. “The basic elements of trust are simply not there,” said the Syrian official.
A senior US administration official told Reuters that Trump was clear when he met Sharaa in May in Riyadh that “he expected Syria to work towards peace and normalization with Israel and its neighbors.”
“The administration has actively supported this position since then,” the official said. “The president wants peace throughout the Middle East.”
NARROW PATH FOR SHARAA
Realities on the ground have limited the Syrian leader’s options.
On the one hand, Israel‘s incursions and support for the Druze have hardened Syrian public opinion against any deal, a factor weighing on Sharaa, officials say.
On the other, Israel‘s land grabs in Syria pose a threat to Damascus, making a de-escalatory pact all the more important for Sharaa.
A Syrian military officer based near the border with Israel, who asked not to be identified, said Syrian army patrols in the south avoid confronting Israeli troops, who regularly raid villages and go door-to-door collecting household data and searching for arms.
In response to Reuters questions, the Israeli military said its operations had discovered “numerous weapons,” thwarted smuggling attempts, and apprehended “dozens of suspects involved in advancing terrorist activity.”
The Israeli military was operating in southern Syria to protect Israel and its citizens, the statement said. Israel has threatened air strikes on any significant Syrian military or intelligence presence near the border without its consent.
Israel uses its new post at Mount Hermon, which it seized after Assad’s fall, to surveil the region. Defense Minister Israel Katz said last month Israel would not cede the location.
Israel‘s military has imposed buffer zones in some neighboring countries following the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas, in which some 1,200 people were killed.
“As in northern Gaza and southern Lebanon, Israel is now enforcing a wider demilitarized zone in southern Syria,” Syrian security analyst Wael Alwan said.
DRUZE DEVELOPMENTS BOLSTERED ISRAEL
Israel‘s position has been strengthened by developments in Sweida, where Syrian forces stand accused of execution-style killings of Druze civilians. Druze leaders are calling for independence and a humanitarian corridor from Golan to Sweida – a challenge to Sharaa’s vow to centralize control of Syrian territory.
Two senior Druze figures, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, said that since the Sweida fighting, Israel was helping unify splintered Druze factions and had delivered military supplies including guns and ammunition to them.
The two Druze commanders and a Western intelligence source said that Israel was also paying salaries for many of the roughly 3,000 Druze militia fighters.
Reuters was not able to independently confirm the munitions supplies nor the payments. The offices of Netanyahu and Dermer did not respond to Reuters questions on support for the Druze militia.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani dismissed the possibility of a humanitarian corridor at the Paris talks, saying it would infringe on Syria‘s sovereignty, according to a Syrian official familiar with the discussions.
Both sides agreed that stability in Syria‘s south was key to preventing a resurgence of covert agents linked to Iran, Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, or Palestinian terrorist groups – common enemies of Israel and Syria‘s new leaders. Israel agreed to allow interior ministry forces to deploy checkpoints in Sweida.
“Both parties are probing areas of common ground,” said the Syrian official.
Sharaa is keen not to provoke his southern neighbor, aware of how much damage its military can inflict, one close aide said on condition of anonymity: “Avoiding confrontation is central to his plan to rebuild and govern.”
Erdem Ozan, a former Turkish diplomat and expert on Syria, said Sharaa could accelerate talks to secure economic aid and reconstruction support from investors, Gulf benefactors, and Washington.
“Sharaa’s focus on economic delivery could push him toward pragmatic concessions, but he’ll need to balance this with maintaining legitimacy among his supporters,” Ozan said.
Concessions could include handing greater autonomy to regional groups, including the Kurds and Druze, Ozan said, as well as demilitarization near Syria‘s borders with Israel and Jordan.
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Qatar, US Near Defense Deal After Israeli Strike in Doha
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio listens as he speaks to media at Ben Gurion International Airport, as he departs Tel Aviv for Qatar following an official visit, near Lod, Israel, Sept. 16, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Nathan Howard/Pool
Qatar and the United States are on the verge of finalizing an enhanced defense cooperation agreement, top US diplomat Marco Rubio said on Tuesday, after Israel’s attack on Hamas political leaders in Doha last week drew widespread condemnation.
“We have a close partnership with the Qataris. In fact, we have an enhanced defense cooperation agreement, which we’ve been working on, we’re on the verge of finalizing,” Rubio said while departing Tel Aviv for Doha.
Rubio met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and discussed defense cooperation, Qatari foreign ministry spokesperson Majed Al Ansari said.
“This [Israeli] attack, of course, expedites the need for a renewed strategic defence agreement between us and the United States. It’s not something new per se, but certainly expedited,” Al Ansari said in a briefing after Rubio’s visit.
QATAR HOSTS BIGGEST US BASE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The attack in Doha was especially sensitive as Qatar is a close US ally and home to the biggest US military base in the Middle East. Qatar has been hosting and mediating ceasefire talks – alongside Egypt – since the Gaza war started nearly two years ago.
When asked about the mediation efforts in light of the Doha attack, Al Ansari said: “Our focus right now is protecting our sovereignty and we will not look into other issues until this one is resolved.”
The Amiri Diwan, or Emir’s Office, said in a later statement that the emir discussed with Rubio the future of joint diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire in Gaza and release Israeli hostages held in the enclave, as well as Palestinian prisoners.
The two also discussed the repercussions of the Israeli attack in Doha, the Emir’s Office added.
TRUMP ‘UNHAPPY’ WITH ISRAELI STRIKE
US President Donald Trump said during a visit to Doha in May that Washington would protect Qatar if it ever came under attack. He said he was not informed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in advance about Israel’s attack.
Trump said he was unhappy with Israel’s strike, which he described as a unilateral action that did not advance US or Israeli interests.
He sought to assure the Qataris that such attacks would not happen again during a meeting with the Qatari prime minister in New York on Friday.
Rubio called for Qatar to continue its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza war, saying there was “a very short window of time in which a deal could happen.”
“If any country in the world can help mediate it, Qatar is the one. They’re the ones that can do it,” Rubio said while departing Tel Aviv for Doha.
Qatar called the Israeli attack “cowardly and treacherous,” but said it wouldn’t deter it from its role as a mediator, alongside Egypt and the United States.
Netanyahu threatened to attack Hamas leaders “wherever they are” during a press conference with Rubio on Monday, as the heads of Arab and Islamic states held a summit to back Qatar after Israel’s attack last week in the Gulf state.
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Israeli Military Targets Iran-Backed Houthis, Striking Yemen’s Red Sea Port of Hodeidah
Illustrative: Smoke billows following an Israeli air strike in Sanaa, Yemen, Sept. 10, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
Israel said it struck a military infrastructure site in its latest attack on Yemen’s Houthi terrorists at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah on Tuesday.
The Houthis, Islamist rebels backed by Iran who control the most populous parts of Yemen, have attacked vessels in the Red Sea in what they describe as solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.
Tuesday’s attack came hours after the Israeli military issued an evacuation order for the port and a few weeks after a major Israeli attack that killed Houthi officials in August.
Al Masirah TV, a station affiliated with the Houthis, said that 12 Israeli strikes targeted the port‘s docks.
Two sources at the port told Reuters the strikes targeted three docks restored after previous Israeli hits. Residents in the area told Reuters the attack lasted about 10 minutes.
“The Houthi terrorist organization will continue to suffer blows and will pay painful prices for any attempt to attack the State of Israel,” Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said in a post on X following the attack.
The Houthis have also in the past fired missiles towards Israel, most of which have been intercepted.
Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said on Telegram that the group’s air defenses had been able to force Israeli warplanes away but provided no proof.
The Israeli military‘s statement gave no details of the strike beyond saying they hit infrastructure.
“The Hodeidah Port is used by the Houthi terrorist regime for the transfer of weapons supplied by the Iranian regime, in order to execute attacks against the State of Israel and its allies,” it said.