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Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here?
One claim frequently heard from commentators and experts, both within and outside Israel, is that Jerusalem lacks a clear strategy and political plan for the day after the Iron Swords War.
According to this argument, while Israel may have achieved significant military gains in the north and in Gaza, Israel has no plan in place to translate those achievements into political arrangements that end the war and improve Israel’s security and international position. These commentators consistently repeat the phrase well-known to every first-year student of international relations: that the purpose of military action is to bring about an improved political situation, meaning there is no military solution without a concluding political leg (this has at least been true of most contemporary wars).
However, any implementation of a political arrangement that improves Israel’s security-political situation after October 7 will require military achievements and an end state that most of these commentators either refuse to accept or do not believe can be reached.
Until mid-September and the exploding pagers attack on Hezbollah — the first in a series of severe blows inflicted on Hezbollah by Israel, including the elimination of most of its leadership — many insisted that Israel must end the war as soon as possible. Their argument was based primarily on the need for an immediate hostage deal. This is a legitimate need that stands on its own. However, it would not be the precursor to a dramatic strategic-political change that brings with it peace on the borders, normalization with Saudi Arabia, improved relations with the US, and other desirable developments, as is erroneously claimed by many pundits and observers.
Those arguing against the expansion of the war into the north pointed out that in Gaza, Hamas has not been completely eliminated and is still tying up IDF forces. There was therefore no possibility of opening another front against Hezbollah, which is a much stronger opponent. However, contrary to these assessments, Israel reached a point in the Gaza campaign when it was able to shift its strategic attention and resources sufficiently to take aggressive action in Lebanon (indeed, it can be argued that it took Israel too long to reach this point in the campaign).
It appears that for the time being, Israel’s strategic patience has paid off, and most of its critics have been revealed as short-sighted. (It is worth noting that in most cases, these were the same people who warned against a ground operation in Gaza and insisted that Israel had no chance of operating in the Philadelphi Corridor and taking control of Rafah.)
Had Israel sought an arrangement in the days before it launched its campaign against Hezbollah, it would likely have received “shame and war together” in return, as Churchill famously put it.
Israel is now on the verge of a strategic turning point. It is in a position where it has restored its military superiority over Iran and its proxies. We should of course not rush to celebrate while the campaign is still ongoing, and the pendulum can still swing in any direction. At the time of writing, we do not yet know what Israel’s response will be to the recent direct Iranian missile attack, what Iran’s response will be to the Israeli response, and so on.
What, then, are Israel’s strategic goals in the war, and how can they be translated into political goals?
As in any war, Israel has both explicitly defined, declared goals and implied, undeclared goals that it would like to realize as a result of the war. It is essential to stress that in the Israeli view, this is an existential war.
Post-October 7, Israel now understands that it can no longer allow hostile terrorist armies to exist on its borders waiting for the order to invade Israeli territory. When a war is existential, the goal is first to remove the threat and only then to clarify arrangements for “the day after”. This is not, after all, the American invasion of Iraq, a war that took place thousands of kilometers from US borders.
Here are Israel’s declared strategic and political goals in Operation Iron Swords:
In Gaza: 1) To eliminate Hamas’ military power and force the collapse of its rule, with the object of bringing about a situation in which there is no longer any security threat from the Gaza Strip; and 2) to create conditions for the return of the hostages.
In Lebanon: To return the residents of the Israeli north to their homes by destroying and pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.
However, it appears there is also an undeclared goal for the overall campaign that takes a more comprehensive and long-term view: the creation of a new regional security reality.
Israel aims to dismantle the two Iranian proxies — Hamas and Hezbollah — that threatened it on its borders, creating a ring of fire that contained the threat of ground invasion. Without these two proxies, Iran will be much weaker, and decades of investment are now going down the drain. Considering Iran’s current economic state, it is doubtful that it will be able to reinvest in its proxies on the same scale.
In Gaza, the fight against remnants of Hamas, isolated terrorist cells that continue to operate, will go on for many months and perhaps even years. The realistic goal is to hit Hamas hard enough that Gaza does not pose a greater threat than that posed by Palestinian terrorists on the West Bank. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other organizational cells are present and active on the West Bank, but they do not pose a strategic threat. Israel will have to reach a hostage deal and thereafter to “mow the lawn” in Gaza as it is doing in the West Bank for the foreseeable future.
Israel is faced with an unresolved dilemma regarding Hamas’ control over humanitarian aid. If Israel distributes the aid, it will become the de facto force ruling Gaza, which it does not want. But if it does not act on the matter, it allows Hamas to control both the aid and the population. A solution needs to be found to this quandary.
However, Gaza is a relatively small area, and Israel currently controls the exits and entrances. It can gradually erode Hamas’ power, as the group is almost entirely unable to replenish its lost assets. Even the new fighters it is recruiting from among the local population lack the knowledge and equipment of the people Hamas has lost. Hamas has been stripped of most of its military assets and will not be able to restock them under the conditions of the Israeli closure and continuing military pressure.
One can hope that at some point, Hamas will be weak enough that an agreement can be reached with a body or agency (or a combination thereof) that will manage the Strip and maintain law and order. As of now, no body other than the IDF will agree to confront the remnants of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, no Palestinian element is currently capable of committing to such an arrangement, even if it were willing to do so. (The Americans, who have spoken about the need for reform in the Palestinian Authority, are aware of this.)
The IDF understands that in Lebanon, unlike in Gaza, it is not possible to destroy most of the enemy’s forces. It is, however, possible to hit Hezbollah extremely hard, as the IDF has already managed to do. The IDF is capable of pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River and destroying its infrastructure, as well as severely damaging its long-range missile and rocket array.
The undeclared goal in Lebanon is to bring Hezbollah to the point where it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel and is unable to carry out the horror scenarios that were outlined before the current operation, which included a massive invasion of the Galilee and severe damage to army bases, critical infrastructure, ports, airports, and so on. From this point on, Israel’s test will be whether or not it can prevent Iran from rehabilitating Hezbollah.
Israel’s strategic achievement here (beyond returning the residents of the north) is breaking free from the equation of mutual deterrence that has paralyzed it from acting against Hezbollah in Lebanon all these years. This means Israel will have to expand the campaign between the wars that it has been conducting in Syria for 10 years. It will now need to include Lebanon for the purpose of disrupting, delaying, and perhaps even preventing Hezbollah’s buildup. At some point, Israel may have to launch a broad preventive strike if Hezbollah manages to rebuild its power. Until then, Israel will gain a few years of quiet and rehabilitation of the north.
This scenario is based on Iran’s continuing as usual without any significant change. However, it is possible that Israel’s release from the grip of the Iranian proxies will allow to focus more strategic attention on Iran. This could lead to moves that weaken Iran and possibly even bring an end to the regime. If this occurs, Israel will be free to take some risks and break through to new arrangements in the Middle East. Its partners, primarily Saudi Arabia and other countries, would also be free to promote agreements with Israel. Other possibilities could open up for an accommodation with the Palestinians that both addresses the interests of both sides and has a chance of holding up.
Those familiar with the cabinet discussions that were conducted during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 know that after the lines on the fronts were stabilized on October 8, there was great fear of a continued war of attrition in which Israel would be at a disadvantage. The question facing the cabinet was how to bring Syria and Egypt to want a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Initially, there was an unsuccessful attempt that included shelling Damascus and a ground advance that was eventually halted. The Syrians were not impressed. Subsequently, the crossing of the Suez Canal plan matured, and the encirclement of and threat to destroy the Third Army led to an Egyptian request for a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Henry Kissinger, who thought Israel was seeking a ceasefire on October 11, was horrified by the thought that Israel would negotiate from a position of military weakness.
Israel is only one side in any set of political arrangements. It cannot dictate terms unilaterally. Nor can it determine who the leaders will be on the opposing side. At most, it can perhaps determine who will not be those leaders, as it has done to Hezbollah’s leadership and to a significant part of Hamas’ leadership. Israel can ensure an improved military-security situation and hope conditions mature on the other side, whether Lebanese or Palestinian, to the point that agreements can be reached that are worth the paper they’re written on. Israel does not control the internal political processes of the peoples surrounding it.
With that said, Israel is committed first and foremost to achieving a military achievement that significantly improves its security situation and places the other side in a position of clear military inferiority, which would improve the chance that that side is eventually interested in coming to an agreement.
The cabinet discussion of November 19, 1973, almost a month after the end of the Yom Kippur War, was recently published. Then-Prime Minister Golda Meir said, “Many things will be forgiven us, but one thing will not: weakness. The moment we are registered as weak, it’s over.”
In the same discussion, then-defense minister Moshe Dayan said, “Once we relied on the fact that we have deterrence power regarding the Arabs. I am very much afraid of a conception [arising] among us that we will be the deterred [party] – that we will fear confrontation with the Arabs and enter a psychosis of reverse deterrence.”
These words resonate strongly, even today.
Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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A Purim Guide for the Perplexed, 2025
A Hamentashen pastry commonly served during the Jewish holiday of Purim. Photo: Rebecca Siegel via Flickr.
Ahead of this year’s Purim celebrations on Thursday night, here are seven facts you should know about the holiday:
1. Purim is a Jewish national liberation holiday — just like Passover and Hanukkah — which highlights the transition of the Jewish people from subjugation to liberty. It is celebrated seven days following the birth and death date of Moses — a role model of liberty, leadership, and humility.
2. Here is some information on Purim’s historical background:
A Jewish exile to Babylon and Persia was triggered by the 586 BCE destruction of the First Jewish Temple and the expulsion of Jews from Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria by the Babylonian Emperor, Nebuchadnezzar. Persia then replaced Babylon as the leading regional power.
In 538 BCE, Xerxes the Great, proclaimed his support for the reconstruction of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, the resurrection of national Jewish life in the Land of Israel, and the recognition of Jerusalem as the exclusive capital of the Jewish people. In 499-449 BCE, King Ahasuerus established a coalition of countries — from India to Ethiopia — which launched the Greco-Persian Wars, aiming to expand the Persian Empire westward. Persia was resoundingly defeated (e.g., the 490 BCE and 480 BCE battles of Marathon and Salamis), and Ahasuerus’ authority in Persia was gravely eroded.
3. “Purimfest 1946” yelled Julius Streicher, the Nazi propaganda chief, as he approached the hanging gallows in Nuremberg. On October 16, 1946, ten convicted Nazi war criminals were hanged, similar to Haman’s ten sons, who were hanged in ancient Persia. An 11th Nazi criminal, Hermann Goering, committed suicide in his cell, similar to Haman’s 11th child, who committed suicide following her father’s demise (according to the Talmud’s Megillah tractate 16a).
Julius Streicher’s ranch served as a camp for young Jewish Holocaust survivors on their way to Israel following World War II.
4. Remembrance is at the core of the Purim holiday. The Scroll of Esther — which narrates the Purim saga — is also named The Book of Remembrance. The pre-Purim Sabbath is called The Sabbath of Remembrance (Zachor in Hebrew), commemorating the deadly threat of the Amalekites (the ancestors of Haman), who aimed to annihilate the Jewish people following their deliverance from Egyptian bondage.
Deuteronomy 25:17-19 commands the remembrance of the Amalekite’s attempt to annihilate the Jewish people following the Exodus from Egypt, on the way to the Land of Israel. These verses are read in synagogues/temples on the Sabbath preceding Purim.
5. Queen Esther is Purim’s heroine. The Scroll of Esther is one of the five Biblical scrolls, which are highlighted on Jewish holidays: Song of Songs (Passover), Scroll of Ruth (Pentecost), Lamentations (the 9th day of Av – destruction of the Jewish Temple), Ecclesiastes (Feast of Tabernacles), and The Scroll of Esther (Purim).
Esther symbolized the centrality of women in Judaism, as did Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah (the Matriarchs), Miriam (Moses’ older sister), Batyah (who saved Moses’ life), Deborah (the Prophetess, Judge and military leader), Hannah (Samuel’s mother) and Yael (who killed Sisera, the Canaanite General).
Esther was one of the seven Biblical Jewish Prophetesses: Sarah, Miriam, Deborah, Hannah, Abigail, Huldah, and Esther. Sarah lived 127 years and Esther was the Queen of 127 countries. The Hebrew name of Esther was Hadassah, whose root is Hadass, which is the Hebrew word for the myrtle tree. The myrtle tree features prominently during the Feast of Tabernacles. It is known for its pleasant scent and humble features, including leaves in the shape of the human eye. Greek mythology identifies the myrtle tree with Aphrodite, the Greek goddess of love.
6. Mordechai, the hero of Purim and one of the deputies of Ezra the Scribe, was a role model of principle-driven optimism in defiance of colossal odds.
The first three Hebrew letters of Mordechai (מרדכי) spell the Hebrew word “rebellion” (מרד). Mordechai did not bow to Haman, when the latter was the second most powerful person in the Persian Empire. Mordechai was a member of the tribe of Benjamin, the only son of Jacob who did not bow to Esau.
Mordechai was a descendant of King Saul, who defied a clear commandment to eradicate the Amalekites, sparing the life of Agag, the Amalekite king, thus precipitating further calamities upon the Jewish People. Mordechai learned from Saul’s crucial error and eliminated Haman, a descendant of Agag the Amalekite, thus sparing the Jewish people from a major disaster.
7. Purim’s (פורים) Hebrew root is “fate” as well as “casting lots” (פור), commemorating Haman’s lottery, which determined a designated day for the annihilation of the Jewish People. It also means “to frustrate,” “to annul” (הפר), “to crumble,” and “to shutter” (פורר), reflecting the demise of Haman.
The author is a commentator and former Israeli ambassador.
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Palestinian Authority Used International Women’s Day to Celebrate Terrorists and Their Mothers
Students at the Dalal Mughrabi Elementary Mixed School, which was built with funds from the Belgian government. (Photo: Facebook)
As in previous years, the Palestinian Authority (PA) used International Women’s Day to glorify the memory of female terrorists and the value of mothers who knowingly send their sons to die as “Martyrs.”
Senior Fatah leader Abbas Zaki sang the praises of the mothers who publicly celebrate their sons’ deaths. He also lauded the mothers who give their sons the stones to throw at Israelis with the full knowledge that their children will die.
However, sending their sons to their death is not in vain, according to Zaki: “She [the mother] begins to feel that she has gained respect and high status in society when her son dies as a Martyr.”
Fatah Central Committee member Abbas Zaki: “Allah is witness to the fact that there is no woman in the world like the Palestinian woman. The woman who makes sounds of joy for the Martyr and sings songs of the revolution for the groom [i.e., a Martyr’s funeral is considered his wedding to the 72 Virgins in Paradise in Islam].
This woman is the one who gives up her son as he goes to fight with a rock, and she gives him the rock while knowing what her son’s fate will be. However, this woman is placed on a pedestal because she gave oxygen to this homeland, and she begins to feel that she has gained respect and high status in society when her son dies as a Martyr.”
[Fatah Central Committee member Abbas Zaki, Facebook page, March 10, 2025]
The PA also chose International Women’s Day to specifically glorify mass murderer Dalal Mughrabi, who led the Coastal Road Massacre, which was the most lethal attack in Israel’s history prior to October 7, 2023. Mughrabi, along with other Fatah terrorists, hijacked a bus, murdered 37 people, of which 12 were children, and wounded 70.
PA Ramallah Governor Laila Ghannam wrote on Facebook that “on this day … we pray for our female Martyrs and leaders whose blood paved the path of freedom, from Dalal Mughrabi to … the rest of the icons of the struggle.”
In the PA’s official daily, the Ramallah governor continued to extol the role of all Palestinian women as terrorists — the “Martyr, prisoner, and wounded” — and terrorist supporters — “the Martyr’s mother, the prisoner’s mother, his wife, his sister, and his daughter” [Official PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, March 9, 2025].
When someone is referred to as a “Martyr,” or Shahid in Arabic, it means that the person died while carrying out an idyllic act for Allah, such as the way Dalal Mughrabi murdered children in cold blood.
In yet another article, the official PA daily honored other female terrorists as “icons”: Zakiya Shammout — who planted a bomb in the Afula market in 1969, murdering one and injuring dozens; Shadia Abu Ghazaleh — who prepared bombs for many attacks as a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); and Intisar Al-Wazir — the wife of Abu Jihad. Abu Jihad planned numerous lethal terror attacks from the 1960s to the 1980s, in which a total of 125 Israelis were murdered:
In addition to regularly broadcasting that dying for the sake of Allah is the greatest of acts, the PA exploits International Women’s Day year in and year out to focus on women linked to terror. It does this in order to reiterate that the highest form of feminine hero is the terrorist Martyr, or the mother of the terrorist Martyr.
Ephraim D. Tepler is a contributor to Palestinian Media Watch (PMW). Itamar Marcus is PMW’s Founder and Director. A version of this article originally appeared at PMW.
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A Fascinating Look Into the Rise of Campus Hatred and Antisemitism
Pro-Hamas protesters at Columbia University on April 19, 2024. Photo: Melissa Bender via Reuters Connect
The latest offering from Jewish Quarterly provides a timely and thorough exploration of the state of antisemitism in contemporary universities. It particularly focuses on the rise of campus activism and its implications for academic freedom.
Mindless: What Happened to Universities? features an in-depth essay by Professor Cary Nelson, a respected scholar and former president of the American Association of University Professors. Nelson’s analysis is well-researched and candid, illuminating the ideological shifts within higher education and their consequences for open discourse.
Nelson’s essay is a critical reflection on how academic institutions have evolved in recent years, particularly in response to anti-Zionist activism, antisemitism, and the broader politicization of campus spaces. He examines how university environments, which should be spaces for debate and critical thinking, have increasingly become arenas for dogmatic activism, often at the expense of intellectual diversity. He argues that the Gaza Solidarity encampments that spread across Western campuses in 2024 were symptomatic of deeper issues in academia — specifically, the growing resistance to debate and the framing of complex geopolitical conflicts in binary terms.
Nelson does not claim that student activism itself is problematic. Rather, he critiques the extent to which some protests have crossed the line into intimidation and exclusion for Jewish students. The essay provides extensive and unsettling evidence of antisemitic rhetoric emerging in protests, alongside surveys indicating that over half of Jewish students in the US felt unsafe on campus in 2024. His argument is not that all activism is inherently harmful, but that in many cases, the principle of free inquiry has been overshadowed by ideological conformity and naked political activism in place of scholarship.
One of the strengths of Nelson’s essay is that it does not rely on alarmism; rather, he builds the case methodically. He traces the historical trajectory of academic institutions, illustrating how certain disciplines have gradually shifted toward ideological uniformity, especially in their framing of Israel and Zionism. He also emphasizes how some faculty members have actively promoted activism that extends beyond protest to include calls for exclusion and censorship.
Nelson’s essay is an important contribution for readers looking for a balanced critique. While he clearly finds much of the current campus climate troubling, he avoids sweeping generalizations. Instead, he focuses on specific examples of how anti-Zionist activism has, in some cases, led to exclusionary practices and threats to the psychological safety essential for learning. The result is an essay that invites reflection rather than simply reinforcing entrenched positions.
A particularly valuable aspect of this work is its examination of the role that faculty and administrators play in shaping campus climates. Nelson provides examples of professors who have actively celebrated extremist rhetoric, as well as administrators who have been hesitant to confront antisemitism under the guise of protecting free speech. He contrasts this with past university responses to other forms of discrimination, questioning why antisemitism is often treated differently, especially within the context of a polarizing broader debate over DEI and identity politics.
At the same time, the issue does not present a one-sided view of faculty involvement. There is an acknowledgment that many academics oppose the radicalization of campus discourse but feel unable to speak out due to professional risks. Whilst highlighting increasingly politicized humanities and social sciences departments, his nuanced approach strengthens the essay’s credibility, as it avoids portraying all faculty as complicit or all students as antagonistic.
The past year has witnessed intense debates over free speech, antisemitism, and academic freedom. Nelson’s essay provides an important perspective on how these discussions are unfolding in higher education. Although it does not purport to offer all the answers to antisemitism, it presents a well-argued assessment of the challenges facing universities and offers possible solutions.
Furthermore, the issue underscores how the internationalization of campus activism has influenced these trends. With protests erupting across North America, Europe, and Australia, Nelson places these developments within a global framework, showing that these issues are not limited to any one country or institution. Nelson’s writing is clear and persuasive, and helps frame the discussion within a broader historical and intellectual tradition.
Mindless is an important read for anyone concerned about the future of academic institutions and the principles of free inquiry. While some readers may disagree with Nelson’s conclusions, his work’s strength lies in its commitment to reasoned debate. It does not demand agreement but encourages deeper reflection, which is increasingly rare in today’s polarized discourse.
This issue is well worth reading for those who follow developments in higher education or are concerned about the growing tensions around academic freedom and antisemitism. Jewish Quarterly continues to demonstrate why it is a respected voice in Jewish intellectual and cultural discussions, and Mindless is a testament to its enduring relevance.
Andrew Fox served for 16 years in the British Army (2005-21). He was a senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and is currently a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. Andrew provides regular commentary on defense and foreign policy across the media including articles in the New York Post, The Telegraph, The Spectator, and Spiked. He has amassed a large following across his digital platforms, including X (formerly Twitter) and Substack, where he writes on disinformation, defense and security.
Mindless is available at www.jewishquarterly.com
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