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Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here?

Terrorists in Gaza using humanitarian aid bags to prop up rockets. Photo: Screenshot

One claim frequently heard from commentators and experts, both within and outside Israel, is that Jerusalem lacks a clear strategy and political plan for the day after the Iron Swords War.

According to this argument, while Israel may have achieved significant military gains in the north and in Gaza, Israel has no plan in place to translate those achievements into political arrangements that end the war and improve Israel’s security and international position. These commentators consistently repeat the phrase well-known to every first-year student of international relations: that the purpose of military action is to bring about an improved political situation, meaning there is no military solution without a concluding political leg (this has at least been true of most contemporary wars).

However, any implementation of a political arrangement that improves Israel’s security-political situation after October 7 will require military achievements and an end state that most of these commentators either refuse to accept or do not believe can be reached.

Until mid-September and the exploding pagers attack on Hezbollah — the first in a series of severe blows inflicted on Hezbollah by Israel, including the elimination of most of its leadership — many insisted that Israel must end the war as soon as possible. Their argument was based primarily on the need for an immediate hostage deal. This is a legitimate need that stands on its own. However, it would not be the precursor to a dramatic strategic-political change that brings with it peace on the borders, normalization with Saudi Arabia, improved relations with the US, and other desirable developments, as is erroneously claimed by many pundits and observers.

Those arguing against the expansion of the war into the north pointed out that in Gaza, Hamas has not been completely eliminated and is still tying up IDF forces. There was therefore no possibility of opening another front against Hezbollah, which is a much stronger opponent. However, contrary to these assessments, Israel reached a point in the Gaza campaign when it was able to shift its strategic attention and resources sufficiently to take aggressive action in Lebanon (indeed, it can be argued that it took Israel too long to reach this point in the campaign).

It appears that for the time being, Israel’s strategic patience has paid off, and most of its critics have been revealed as short-sighted. (It is worth noting that in most cases, these were the same people who warned against a ground operation in Gaza and insisted that Israel had no chance of operating in the Philadelphi Corridor and taking control of Rafah.)

Had Israel sought an arrangement in the days before it launched its campaign against Hezbollah, it would likely have received “shame and war together” in return, as Churchill famously put it.

Israel is now on the verge of a strategic turning point. It is in a position where it has restored its military superiority over Iran and its proxies. We should of course not rush to celebrate while the campaign is still ongoing, and the pendulum can still swing in any direction. At the time of writing, we do not yet know what Israel’s response will be to the recent direct Iranian missile attack, what Iran’s response will be to the Israeli response, and so on.

What, then, are Israel’s strategic goals in the war, and how can they be translated into political goals?

As in any war, Israel has both explicitly defined, declared goals and implied, undeclared goals that it would like to realize as a result of the war. It is essential to stress that in the Israeli view, this is an existential war.

Post-October 7, Israel now understands that it can no longer allow hostile terrorist armies to exist on its borders waiting for the order to invade Israeli territory. When a war is existential, the goal is first to remove the threat and only then to clarify arrangements for “the day after”. This is not, after all, the American invasion of Iraq, a war that took place thousands of kilometers from US borders.

Here are Israel’s declared strategic and political goals in Operation Iron Swords:

In Gaza: 1) To eliminate Hamas’ military power and force the collapse of its rule, with the object of bringing about a situation in which there is no longer any security threat from the Gaza Strip; and 2) to create conditions for the return of the hostages.
In Lebanon: To return the residents of the Israeli north to their homes by destroying and pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.

However, it appears there is also an undeclared goal for the overall campaign that takes a more comprehensive and long-term view: the creation of a new regional security reality.

Israel aims to dismantle the two Iranian proxies — Hamas and Hezbollah — that threatened it on its borders, creating a ring of fire that contained the threat of ground invasion. Without these two proxies, Iran will be much weaker, and decades of investment are now going down the drain. Considering Iran’s current economic state, it is doubtful that it will be able to reinvest in its proxies on the same scale.

In Gaza, the fight against remnants of Hamas, isolated terrorist cells that continue to operate, will go on for many months and perhaps even years. The realistic goal is to hit Hamas hard enough that Gaza does not pose a greater threat than that posed by Palestinian terrorists on the West Bank. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other organizational cells are present and active on the West Bank, but they do not pose a strategic threat. Israel will have to reach a hostage deal and thereafter to “mow the lawn” in Gaza as it is doing in the West Bank for the foreseeable future.

Israel is faced with an unresolved dilemma regarding Hamas’ control over humanitarian aid. If Israel distributes the aid, it will become the de facto force ruling Gaza, which it does not want. But if it does not act on the matter, it allows Hamas to control both the aid and the population. A solution needs to be found to this quandary.

However, Gaza is a relatively small area, and Israel currently controls the exits and entrances. It can gradually erode Hamas’ power, as the group is almost entirely unable to replenish its lost assets. Even the new fighters it is recruiting from among the local population lack the knowledge and equipment of the people Hamas has lost. Hamas has been stripped of most of its military assets and will not be able to restock them under the conditions of the Israeli closure and continuing military pressure.

One can hope that at some point, Hamas will be weak enough that an agreement can be reached with a body or agency (or a combination thereof) that will manage the Strip and maintain law and order. As of now, no body other than the IDF will agree to confront the remnants of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, no Palestinian element is currently capable of committing to such an arrangement, even if it were willing to do so. (The Americans, who have spoken about the need for reform in the Palestinian Authority, are aware of this.)

The IDF understands that in Lebanon, unlike in Gaza, it is not possible to destroy most of the enemy’s forces. It is, however, possible to hit Hezbollah extremely hard, as the IDF has already managed to do. The IDF is capable of pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River and destroying its infrastructure, as well as severely damaging its long-range missile and rocket array.

The undeclared goal in Lebanon is to bring Hezbollah to the point where it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel and is unable to carry out the horror scenarios that were outlined before the current operation, which included a massive invasion of the Galilee and severe damage to army bases, critical infrastructure, ports, airports, and so on. From this point on, Israel’s test will be whether or not it can prevent Iran from rehabilitating Hezbollah.

Israel’s strategic achievement here (beyond returning the residents of the north) is breaking free from the equation of mutual deterrence that has paralyzed it from acting against Hezbollah in Lebanon all these years. This means Israel will have to expand the campaign between the wars that it has been conducting in Syria for 10 years. It will now need to include Lebanon for the purpose of disrupting, delaying, and perhaps even preventing Hezbollah’s buildup. At some point, Israel may have to launch a broad preventive strike if Hezbollah manages to rebuild its power. Until then, Israel will gain a few years of quiet and rehabilitation of the north.

This scenario is based on Iran’s continuing as usual without any significant change. However, it is possible that Israel’s release from the grip of the Iranian proxies will allow to focus more strategic attention on Iran. This could lead to moves that weaken Iran and possibly even bring an end to the regime. If this occurs, Israel will be free to take some risks and break through to new arrangements in the Middle East. Its partners, primarily Saudi Arabia and other countries, would also be free to promote agreements with Israel. Other possibilities could open up for an accommodation with the Palestinians that both addresses the interests of both sides and has a chance of holding up.

Those familiar with the cabinet discussions that were conducted during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 know that after the lines on the fronts were stabilized on October 8, there was great fear of a continued war of attrition in which Israel would be at a disadvantage. The question facing the cabinet was how to bring Syria and Egypt to want a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Initially, there was an unsuccessful attempt that included shelling Damascus and a ground advance that was eventually halted. The Syrians were not impressed. Subsequently, the crossing of the Suez Canal plan matured, and the encirclement of and threat to destroy the Third Army led to an Egyptian request for a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Henry Kissinger, who thought Israel was seeking a ceasefire on October 11, was horrified by the thought that Israel would negotiate from a position of military weakness.

Israel is only one side in any set of political arrangements. It cannot dictate terms unilaterally. Nor can it determine who the leaders will be on the opposing side. At most, it can perhaps determine who will not be those leaders, as it has done to Hezbollah’s leadership and to a significant part of Hamas’ leadership. Israel can ensure an improved military-security situation and hope conditions mature on the other side, whether Lebanese or Palestinian, to the point that agreements can be reached that are worth the paper they’re written on. Israel does not control the internal political processes of the peoples surrounding it.

With that said, Israel is committed first and foremost to achieving a military achievement that significantly improves its security situation and places the other side in a position of clear military inferiority, which would improve the chance that that side is eventually interested in coming to an agreement.

The cabinet discussion of November 19, 1973, almost a month after the end of the Yom Kippur War, was recently published. Then-Prime Minister Golda Meir said, “Many things will be forgiven us, but one thing will not: weakness. The moment we are registered as weak, it’s over.”

In the same discussion, then-defense minister Moshe Dayan said, “Once we relied on the fact that we have deterrence power regarding the Arabs. I am very much afraid of a conception [arising] among us that we will be the deterred [party] – that we will fear confrontation with the Arabs and enter a psychosis of reverse deterrence.”

These words resonate strongly, even today. 

Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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After False Dawns, Gazans Hope Trump Will Force End to Two-Year-Old War

Palestinians walk past a residential building destroyed in previous Israeli strikes, after Hamas agreed to release hostages and accept some other terms in a US plan to end the war, in Nuseirat, central Gaza Strip October 4, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa

Exhausted Palestinians in Gaza clung to hopes on Saturday that US President Donald Trump would keep up pressure on Israel to end a two-year-old war that has killed tens of thousands and displaced the entire population of more than two million.

Hamas’ declaration that it was ready to hand over hostages and accept some terms of Trump’s plan to end the conflict while calling for more talks on several key issues was greeted with relief in the enclave, where most homes are now in ruins.

“It’s happy news, it saves those who are still alive,” said 32-year-old Saoud Qarneyta, reacting to Hamas’ response and Trump’s intervention. “This is enough. Houses have been damaged, everything has been damaged, what is left? Nothing.”

GAZAN RESIDENT HOPES ‘WE WILL BE DONE WITH WARS’

Ismail Zayda, 40, a father of three, displaced from a suburb in northern Gaza City where Israel launched a full-scale ground operation last month, said: “We want President Trump to keep pushing for an end to the war, if this chance is lost, it means that Gaza City will be destroyed by Israel and we might not survive.

“Enough, two years of bombardment, death and starvation. Enough,” he told Reuters on a social media chat.

“God willing this will be the last war. We will hopefully be done with the wars,” said 59-year-old Ali Ahmad, speaking in one of the tented camps where most Palestinians now live.

“We urge all sides not to backtrack. Every day of delay costs lives in Gaza, it is not just time wasted, lives get wasted too,” said Tamer Al-Burai, a Gaza City businessman displaced with members of his family in central Gaza Strip.

After two previous ceasefires — one near the start of the war and another earlier this year — lasted only a few weeks, he said; “I am very optimistic this time, maybe Trump’s seeking to be remembered as a man of peace, will bring us real peace this time.”

RESIDENT WORRIES THAT NETANYAHU WILL ‘SABOTAGE’ DEAL

Some voiced hopes of returning to their homes, but the Israeli military issued a fresh warning to Gazans on Saturday to stay out of Gaza City, describing it as a “dangerous combat zone.”

Gazans have faced previous false dawns during the past two years, when Trump and others declared at several points during on-off negotiations between Hamas, Israel and Arab and US mediators that a deal was close, only for war to rage on.

“Will it happen? Can we trust Trump? Maybe we trust Trump, but will Netanyahu abide this time? He has always sabotaged everything and continued the war. I hope he ends it now,” said Aya, 31, who was displaced with her family to Deir Al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip.

She added: “Maybe there is a chance the war ends at October 7, two years after it began.”

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Mass Rally in Rome on Fourth Day of Italy’s Pro-Palestinian Protests

A Pro-Palestinian demonstrator waves a Palestinian flag during a national protest for Gaza in Rome, Italy, October 4, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Claudia Greco

Large crowds assembled in central Rome on Saturday for the fourth straight day of protests in Italy since Israel intercepted an international flotilla trying to deliver aid to Gaza, and detained its activists.

People holding banners and Palestinian flags, chanting “Free Palestine” and other slogans, filed past the Colosseum, taking part in a march that organizers hoped would attract at least 1 million people.

“I’m here with a lot of other friends because I think it is important for us all to mobilize individually,” Francesco Galtieri, a 65-year-old musician from Rome, said. “If we don’t all mobilize, then nothing will change.”

Since Israel started blocking the flotilla late on Wednesday, protests have sprung up across Europe and in other parts of the world, but in Italy they have been a daily occurrence, in multiple cities.

On Friday, unions called a general strike in support of the flotilla, with demonstrations across the country that attracted more than 2 million, according to organizers. The interior ministry estimated attendance at around 400,000.

Italy’s right-wing government has been critical of the protests, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni suggesting that people would skip work for Gaza just as an excuse for a longer weekend break.

On Saturday, Meloni blamed protesters for insulting graffiti that appeared on a statue of the late Pope John Paul II outside Rome’s main train station, where Pro-Palestinian groups have been holding a protest picket.

“They say they are taking to the streets for peace, but then they insult the memory of a man who was a true defender and builder of peace. A shameful act committed by people blinded by ideology,” she said in a statement.

Israel launched its Gaza offensive after Hamas terrorists staged a cross border attack on October 7, 2023, killing some 1,200 people and taking 251 people hostage.

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Hamas Says It Agrees to Release All Israeli Hostages Under Trump Gaza Plan

Smoke rises during an Israeli military operation in Gaza City, as seen from the central Gaza Strip, October 2, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Dawoud Abu Alkas

Hamas said on Friday it had agreed to release all Israeli hostages, alive or dead, under the terms of US President Donald Trump’s Gaza proposal, and signaled readiness to immediately enter mediated negotiations to discuss the details.

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