There were reasons for Israel to have accepted an American-authored “ceasefire” agreement with Hezbollah.

First, Iran is Israel’s chief security priority, not Hezbollah. In addition, Israel has been fighting the longest war of its modern existence, and its forces are being stretched. During that war, Hezbollah has been helping Hamas by diverting Israel’s military capability and attention; this ceasefire will allow Israel to put the focus of its deployment back on Gaza.

And not to be underestimated is the US “soft embargo” on weapons to Israel. There are rumors that the Biden administration has said that it will ensure deliveries on time if Israel agrees to the Lebanon plan. It would not be in Israel’s interest to further aggravate the outgoing administration.

There were also reasons for Israel to reject the current incarnation of a “ceasefire,” beginning with the way the signatories are positioned. Israel and the US have an agreement; the US and Lebanon have a separate one, although the language is the same; and there is an “authorized” non-Hezbollah representative as a third party.

The US tried the same fiction during the “Maritime Border Agreement” talks — separate US-Israel and US-Lebanon agreements, and a nod from Hezbollah. It failed when Hezbollah decided to break it.

Hezbollah had control not only of territory in the south, in which it had buried its arsenal, but also of the government in Beirut. Its control of territory is — happily — diminished, but it retains its place in Beirut. There is no assurance that Hezbollah will do other than what it chooses to do, and no assurance that the “Government of Lebanon” can operate independently.

According to the agreement, “both nations” — meaning Lebanon and Israel — retain their “inherent right of self-defense.” The kindest way to look at Lebanon is to say that it is occupied by Hezbollah, in which case, it has no ability to defend itself and requires rescue from its occupier. Neither the UN nor the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have that capability. Israel might, but only if the international community agrees that Hezbollah has to go. No such policy has been articulated.

Moving through the terms, they are precisely those of the failed UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006. Reports say that both Israel and Lebanon simply “reaffirmed” their commitment to the resolution. Hezbollah, it seems, simply reaffirmed its commitment to a “ceasefire.” Under the terms of 1701, the LAF was charged with enforcing conditions including, “Any other armed groups will be disarmed, and unauthorized military facilities or weapons caches will be dismantled.”

The LAF failed to do this in 2006, and there is no reason to believe it will succeed in 2024. Although it has received millions of US dollars, the US has had no influence on the political leaning of LAF commanders and troops.

Next, Israel has 60 days in which to operate in southern Lebanon and then gradually withdraw to the Blue Line (the UN-demarcated Lebanon-Israel border). Hezbollah has been tunneling and accumulating weapons inside civilian infrastructure — houses, mosques, schools — for 28 years. What if the job isn’t done in 60 days?

Hezbollah can wait 60 days, regroup its commanders and forces in Beirut, and then plan for its future. There is no international penalty on Hezbollah for its terrorist behavior or its violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for abusing the civilian population and infrastructure of Lebanon.

An “Oversight Committee” will “oversee” compliance. That was, in fact, the job of UNIFIL — which not only failed, but operated in conjunction with Hezbollah to protect it and enhance its capabilities. Now the Oversight Committee will report violations of the new agreement to — wait for it — UNIFIL.

And finally, the US will facilitate indirect talks between Israel and Lebanon to finalize a “mutually agreed-upon land border.”  This is obscurantism.

There is already a UN-demarcated land border between Israel and Lebanon, but there is also an unmentioned maritime border — encompassing vast natural gas reserves. This has been a separate but related bone of contention (see Maritime Border Agreement, above).

That covers the main points in the agreement, but what about the fundamental points that are NOT in the agreement?

There is no mention of eliminating, or even extracting a price from Hezbollah — an Iranian-funded proxy organization that has wrecked the once-prosperous nation of Lebanon, and threatens Israel as well as the broader region.

Speaking of the broader region, there is no mention of controlling the Iranian military supply lines that run through Syria and into Lebanon. Is that the responsibility of the LAF? UNIFIL?

The IDF, in conjunction with a deconfliction agreement with Russia, has worked to keep Iranian weapons out of Lebanon. Will that continue? Who says?

There is no mention of a peace agreement, or Lebanese recognition of the State of Israel, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 242 passed in 1967.

Without those, everything agreed to is temporary and lives at the convenience of organizations and countries uninterested in peace — but very much interested in the elimination of the State of Israel.

A ceasefire is not peace.
Survival is not victory.

Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of The Jewish Policy Center and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly magazine.

The post Israel-Hezbollah War: To Cease or Not to Cease first appeared on Algemeiner.com.