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Israel Must Fight Hezbollah Like a State Army, Not Just a Terrorist Organization
Hezbollah members parade during a rally marking al-Quds Day, (Jerusalem Day) in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Lebanon, April 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
The daring operations carried out by Israel in the northern arena in recent weeks deserve to be praised for the exceptional feats they were.
According to The New York Times, the raid by the IDF’s Shaldag unit on the precision missile production site in Masyaf in Syria hit a vital site for Iran and Hezbollah in the field of precision missile production. The raid not only harmed the accelerated preparations of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) for the war in Lebanon, but also provided evidence of the IDF’s ability to raid and destroy similar sites in Lebanon.
The two waves of attack against Hezbollah via remote detonation of personal communication devices were also very important, as they introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The operation, attributed to Israel, caused significant horizontal damage to the organization both in terms of the dramatic scope of casualties and the disruption of the organization’s command and control. The surprise factor, as well as the sense of penetration inflicted on Hezbollah, are also very important. While it is better for such an operation to be carried out simultaneously with air and ground strikes as part of an all-out war, the decision to conduct it on its own was reasonable if the IDF was in a use-it-or-lose-it position.
It is possible that the elimination of Akil and his command group was related to the success of the previous operations. Some security managers may have been pushed aside in the emergency caused by Israel’s successes, creating another opportunity for Israeli intelligence.
The successes in Lebanon highlight the overall dragging on of the war in Gaza. The political reasons for this are clear and are being widely discussed in the Israeli media. The gap between the IDF’s tactical successes and the stubborn refusal to formulate a strategy for the war in the south — i.e., to come up with an alternative civilian control mechanism in Gaza — is visible to every Israeli citizen. What is less clear is the long and deep background at the level of Israeli military culture for this phenomenon.
In the decades since the 1990s, with the exception of Operation Defensive Shield, Israel has refrained from embarking on decisive military moves. Operational decisiveness, let’s remember, is an original Israeli-military concept.
Israel has never aimed for absolute victory and the evaporation of its enemies as political bodies — only for the removal of an immediate military threat. In the last decade, another military theory emerged — the “campaign short of war.” In the professional literature and in IDF strategy, this campaign is known as the “war between the wars” (WBW) or the “prevention” approach.
Formulated as Israel’s central strategy during the years of the Syrian civil war, this approach was based on delaying and preventing the enemy’s intensification through close intelligence surveillance and countermeasures (mostly airstrikes and occasionally special operations).
Some drafters of the approach stressed that it is not a substitute for the IDF’s ability to decisively defeat an enemy at war. “Whoever wants will prepare for war,” wrote Major General Nitzan Alon.
The logical connection between WBW and the idea of war itself was clarified in the same article. Disrupting the enemy’s plans to build up and prepare is part of the arms and war-readiness race. The balance of deterrence and freedom of strategic maneuver of the warring parties is closely related to the question of how each side perceives the degree of success it can expect.
But the culture and way of thinking of large organizations is shaped mainly through their actions. While to all intents and purposes Hezbollah became a military power many years ago and is now one of the largest and strongest armies in the region, decades of anti-terror operations have engrained strong habits into the IDF.
In the last decade, great attention was devoted to the WBW.
In a retirement interview Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot gave to The New York Times in January 2019, for example, extensive space was given to that campaign, which was presented with undisguised pride as a new strategy.
These efforts bore partial fruit. Iran does not maintain combat formations in Syria of the scope and quality it originally planned. Hezbollah would like to have much more significant capabilities in the field of precision missiles and in other fields.
But for all of that, here we are. The war has been going on for a year and seems to be escalating. Although many thought this was its role, the preventive approach did not prevent the war in the north.
The focus on WBW also came at a cost. WBW became a way of thinking and a pattern of behavior. Special operations are centrally managed at high levels. They exist within an almost perfect envelope of intelligence, air support and rescue capabilities. They always rely on the element of surprise, without which they are delayed or canceled. They give decision makers a sense of control and security.
Many commanders in the IDF testified that, in their opinion, these patterns affected the way the war in Gaza was conducted, at least in its first months. Too much centralized control, a slow pace of execution, and too limited freedom of action for the commanders on the ground.
The successes of the last few weeks point to another possible price.
The war in the north is, to a large extent, still managed under the same conceptual framework. Even after the assassination of Akil in the Dahaya district, Israel remains committed to the idea of the “threshold of escalation”.
The pager/walkie-talkie operations attributed to Israel stirred the world’s imagination and returned some of the luster that had been eroded from the IDF, and they no doubt hit the enemy hard. But as exciting as those successes were, the combination of covert capabilities in the Israeli concept of war must be seriously examined.
According to reports, the operation was launched at the moment it was due to fear of disclosure. It is likely that Israel was forced to escalate the war without gaining the operational benefits for which this capability was surely intended: throwing the enemy off balance as the IDF pushed into Lebanon.
However severe the damage to Hezbollah, it is likely to recover. Furthermore, Israel may have been forced into a strategic decision due to a tactical constraint: the fear of exposing the operation.
If this is the reality, then Hamas in Gaza — and Sinwar personally, who cut ties with the negotiation efforts for a hostage deal a few weeks ago — are the big beneficiaries.
For almost a year, Hamas has hoped for a strategic rescue through a flare-up of war in Lebanon. The IDF’s operational capability, a “red button” skillfully embedded in Hezbollah’s equipment, may have offered it new hope that this will come to pass.
This situation obliges us to think about the dependency of military capabilities on secret “red buttons.” That is not meant to diminish the vital role of secret intelligence in war. On the contrary: the closer integration of the Mossad in IDF operations, a trend to which the WBW contributed, is important and welcome. But a distinction must be made between the integration of the Mossad and its capabilities, if indeed that took place here, and the integration of covert operational capabilities in military moves.
Excellent intelligence obtained by the Mossad was also at the basis of Operation Moked at the start of the Six-Day War. But it was intelligence that enabled the air force’s preemptive attack on the Arab airbases.
The opening operation of the Six-Day War did not depend for its success on devices planted by the Mossad in the Egyptian planes or on pre-prepared sabotage of the Syrian airports.
Also, the one-time use of special capabilities deployed in enemy territory creates dramatic decision dilemmas. It was decision dilemmas combined with maintenance difficulties that caused “special measures” not to be activated on the eve of the Egyptian attack in 1973 and for the special systems of Unit 8200 to be unavailable on the eve of the attack on October 2023. In retrospect, a huge gap was discovered between the sense of security provided by these systems and their actual operational benefit.
The other series of questions concerns the way the IDF’s long focus on special operations has affected Israeli military thinking.
“We have a lot of capabilities. At every stage where we operate, we are already prepared two stages ahead,” the Chief of Staff was quoted as saying during his visit to the Northern Command after the pagers attack in Lebanon. This statement indicates that the IDF continues to think of the war as a chain of capability demonstrations and retaliation balances.
In the past, this was called “steps of escalation.”
A year into the war, the Chief of Staff is not quoted as briefing his subordinates in the Northern Command on the main goal of removing the Hezbollah threat in the North. Principles such as concentrating the effort and shortening the war are not mentioned.
Such ideas, called “theory of victory” in the professional literature, have a huge role to play not only as a war plan but also as a platform for a strategic coordination of expectations.
It is true that the Chief of Staff’s words were meant to be quoted in the open media. But precisely because of this, he could be expected to leverage the prospect of severe damage to Hezbollah or at least to convey the deterrent message that the IDF is facing a military decision.
Instead, the strategic message he sent is that the pager operation has not changed our strategic approach.
None of this is a coincidence.
The words of the Chief of Staff do not differ in essence from the famous “dynamic and evolving” approach that has characterized the contingency plans of the Southern Command in recent years.
Flexibility is an important tactical principle, and it can even be valuable in the management of a long-term strategy like the WBW. But flexibility is not a virtue for the conducting of war-fighting. At that level, clarity and concentration of effort are vital.
Clarity of purpose, not fuzziness, is what allows for tactical flexibility. The hidden assumption behind the “dynamic and evolving” approach is that operations are not conducted against the enemy as a military entity but as part of a strategic dialogue with its leadership. This is not a theory of victory.
The current Chief of Staff and his General Staff did not invent the WBW, the fight against terrorism, the deterrence operations or the steps of escalation. These appeared about 30 years ago and gradually became an almost intuitive way of thinking at our military and political level.
But the State of Israel has long faced terrorist armies, not terrorist organizations. A warlike way of thinking is required.
It is appropriate to congratulate and bless the IDF’s recent successes. It is also right to continue to support the IDF and its commanders in the conduct of the war.
But the war is also an opportunity for learning. The unfortunate reality is that even if we escalate to all-out war in Lebanon, chances are that it will end in some kind of agreement, not the complete removal of the military threat.
This means yet another war will break out in Lebanon within a few years. The current war is above all else a correction opportunity for Israeli strategy and the IDF’s theory of war.
A combatant force should strive to dismantle the enemy as a combatant system. It should be built for this end, while making strict assumptions regarding conditions of execution, the absence of the element of surprise, and non-optimal timing, because wars are not series of special operations. The forces should benefit from mutual support, such as air support for ground forces, but not be completely dependent on these envelopes.
The ground forces need to be prepared and built to conduct more independent ground operations in the near circle and be less dependent on a special operations envelope. The success of the operations in Gaza, for which tight and superior air-intelligence envelopes are a critical component, may obscure this need.
Israel must not allow itself to be fooled by success. The facts are that Israel chose not to destroy the enemy’s critical production infrastructure in Lebanon though it had done just that in Syria, even though the operational capability to do so was proven.
Like any serious military organization, the enemy will recover from the recent blows, simply because we are allowing him the time he needs to do so.
The IDF’s theory of war should be based on solid foundations that distinguish between the world of special operations and the world of war. Hezbollah is an army. Anti-terrorism methods will not do.
A year into the war, our learning of lessons and adaptation to the new strategic reality is still ahead of us.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version oft this article originally appeared at The BESA Center.
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Why Erdogan’s Turkish Empire Is an Emerging Threat
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks during a joint statement to the media in Baghdad, Iraq, April 22, 2024. Photo: AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/Pool via REUTERS
The world was once a series of empires. The British Empire, at its peak in 1922, covered about a quarter of the Earth’s land and ruled over 458 million people. The Russian Empire once covered about 8,800,000 sq/mi, roughly one-sixth of the world’s landmass, making it the third-largest empire in history, behind only the British and Mongols. An 1897 census recorded 125.6 million people under Russian control. Genghis Khan’s Mongol Empire, while short, was the largest contiguous empire in history.
The Ottoman Empire lasted from 1301 to 1922, and at one point, included parts of Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Hungary, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon. It was, in some ways and at some times, a relatively benign occupation of other people, though decidedly not for Greeks, Armenians, or Kurds.
Why does it matter? We don’t do empires anymore. Do we?
That depends. Turkey now, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is projecting its next empire — a scary combination of ISIS-related religious extremism, nationalist prejudice, and Western weaponry.
Erdogan gave a speech last week. The key paragraph is this:
Turkey is much bigger than Turkey as a nation. We cannot limit our horizon to 782,000 sq/km, Just as a person cannot escape from his destiny by fleeing it, Turkey as a nation cannot flee or hide from its destiny. We must see, accept and act according to the mission that history has given us as a nation. Those who ask, “What is Turkey doing in Libya, Syria, and Somalia?” may not be able to conceive the mission and the vision.
And, if you couldn’t “conceive the mission,” Bilal Erdogan, his son, clarified for you. At a massive rally, he exhorted the crowd: “Yesterday Hagia Sophia (once a Church in Istanbul), today the Umayyad Mosque (Damascus), tomorrow Al-Aqsa (the site of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem).”
Today, Turkey illegally occupies a large swath of northern Syria, claiming only to have in interest in defeating the PKK –– considered by Ankara to be a Kurdish terror organization. [For the US, the Kurds were an essential partner in defeating ISIS in Syria and northern Iraq, and remain an ally.]
Between October 2019 and January 2024, the Turkish military carried out more than 100 attacks on oil fields, gas facilities, and power stations in Kurdish-held areas. According to the BBC in October 2024, Ankara cut off access to electricity and water for more than a million people.
Turkey has operated in northern Syria in conjunction with HTS, the ISIS-adjacent group that has been on the US terror list, but now appears to be seeking legitimacy as the ruler of Syria. According to a Turkish news source, as a new Syrian military establishment begins to take shape, “Turkey will actively provide consultant-expert support to the restructuring process of Syria’s sea, air, and land forces. In addition … Turkish military presence will be included in five different points of Syria.”
The new force will number 300,000, according to the Turkish report, including 40,000 fighters from HTS, and 50,000 from the Syrian National Army (SNA). The latter is actually an auxiliary of the Turkish Armed Forces. SNA forces have been deployed by Turkey as a proxy in Libya and elsewhere.
Ankara also hosts leadership of Hamas, earning a rare rebuke from the US State Department in November 2024, and Hezbollah. It should be noted that the dismemberment of Hezbollah by Israel was understood as a defeat for Iran, Turkey’s regional rival.
Turkey’s relations with Hamas, Hezbollah and the emerging Syrian military all threaten Israel. Turkey’s direct attacks on Israel — both rhetorical and military, going back to Turkish sponsorship of the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2016 but increased after October 7 — also pose threats.
Turkey operates across Africa, as Erdogan noted in his speech. In January 2020, Turkey sent military forces to Libya in support of the Government of National Accord, the Tripoli government, followed by as many as 18,000 soldiers of the Syrian National Army (SNA — see above), which included child soldiers. Turkey has defense agreements with Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ghana. Turkish drones have been recently delivered to Chad, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
Like many empire-driven military adventures, this one appears to have two purposes: first, to secure access to natural resources, and then to serve as a launching point for Turkish social and religious interests. Turkey has built 140 schools for 17,000 students, while 60,000 Africans are studying in Turkey.
Turkey has made clear its intention to play as a world power. It is coming up against Russia and China in Africa, and Iran in the Middle East (Iran is injured, but not defeated). While there is no mechanism for the Western countries to remove Turkey from NATO (that requires a unanimous vote, and Turkey won’t vote itself out), the United States and its allies in Europe and the Middle East should be very skeptical of Turkey’s intentions and leery of its capabilities.
Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of The Jewish Policy Center and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly magazine.
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Joseph Massad, Columbia, and the War Against Israel in Academia
The “Gaza Solidarity Encampment” at Columbia University, located in the Manhattan borough of New York City, on April 25, 2024. Photo: Reuters Connect
When I was studying International Affairs and Middle East Studies at an American university, I took many courses on the conflict and the history of the Middle East. These courses inevitably involved extensive discussions of Israel, which often led to debates surrounding its right to exist.
I sat in classrooms and learned from scholars who, perhaps unknowingly, infused their teachings with fundamental biases against Israel — and, at times, against Jews and their right to a homeland.
While they may not have been as ruthlessly vocal as Joseph Massad, their anti-Israel agenda was present nonetheless, and they were educating a large, international group of students with it. Many of these students knew nothing about the conflict, and took what the teachers said (teachers the university told them to trust) at face value.
I sat alongside peers from around the world, and witnessed how this bias led them to learn fundamentally incorrect facts about the complex history, territory, and conflict in the Middle East. This further entrenched a bias that some had against Israel, and contributed to their outspoken hatred of the country.
When the October 7th attack occurred, and our peers and co-workers began to side with the terrorist group committing mass atrocities, I was not surprised. It was the result of these teachings, which gave them the belief that Israel is the oppressor (and always will be), and that anything it does to defend itself is wrong — a crime against humanity.
Joseph Massad called the October 7 attacks “awesome” and “astounding” — and now Columbia is letting him teach a course on Zionism. Joseph Stalin would be proud. It actively enables and supports the creation of more antisemitic and anti-Zionist attitudes and mindsets.
Massad is just another university professor using his position in a prestigious academic institution to instill this one-sided way of thinking in his students — a mentality that discourages discourse, critical examination, and promotes hatred.
The response we have seen in the West since the war began is the direct result of these teachings.
In the past, we often slept through this. We disagreed, but we did not challenge. We did not fight back. This cannot — and will not be the case — if Israel (and American Jewry) are going to survive.
Alma Bengio is a Northeastern University graduate with a Bachelor’s in International Relations, and a Master’s in Project Management from Harrisburg University. Follow @lets.talk.conflict on Instagram.
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How DEI Is Helping Fuel a Huge Rise of Antisemitism in Health Care and Hospitals
November 2023: An Israeli soldier helps to provide incubators to Al Shifa Hospital in Gaza. Photo: Screenshot
More than a year has passed since the hate-fueled encampments and rallies targeting Jews became fixtures on college campuses and in cities across America. Over time, the emerging narrative centered on the assumption that those participating in sowing the antisemitic chaos were confined to specific industries, such as Hollywood and academia, or were among an ignorant cast of undergrads steeped in an ecosystem of radical progressivism.
Unfortunately, in a disturbing phenomenon plucked directly from a Nazi-era playbook, a troubling rise of antisemitism in the medical community is now manifesting as an alternative and potentially deadly avenue through which Jew hatred is spreading across the US.
In its first published study of “Antisemitism in American Healthcare: A Survey Study of Reported Experiences,” the Data and Analytics Department of StandWithUS, a Jewish civil rights group, surveyed 645 self-identifying Jewish healthcare professionals, 74 percent of whom are physicians. The study found that nearly 40 percent of respondents recounted direct exposure to antisemitism within their professional or academic environments.
The results of the survey confirm an underacknowledged reality — that the healthcare arena is emerging as a new and dangerous stronghold for antisemites to exert their influence. If left unchecked, this movement will rupture the integrity of America’s medical professionals.
The rise of anti-Jewish attitudes in healthcare stems from several factors, including the decision made by some medical schools to supplant critical instructional time with toxic Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs that supposedly focus on cultural inclusion and social inequities.
Unsurprisingly, when combined with a deterioration of academic standards, medical students educated in this pedagogy prove prone to gravitating towards a framework that designates Israel, and by extension, all Jews, as privileged colonialists.
It is a paradigm that advances Nazi-like boycotts of Jewish medical professionals, which is precisely what happened this year when “anti-racist” therapists in Chicago attempted to organize against Jews working in the mental health field.
It bears mentioning that tactics deployed by antisemites in medical circles to intimidate and ostracize Jews echo strategies planted by the Nazis in the 1930s. One of the first industries the Nazi party took over was medicine.
Research published in The Israel Journal of Health Policy Research details how Jewish healthcare professionals were often the first to lose their jobs, with “forty-five percent of German physicians” choosing to join the Nazi party compared to “seven percent of teachers in Germany.”
The American Jewish Medical Association (AJMA), a non-profit organization of “Jewish physicians, fellows, residents, medical students, public health, and healthcare professionals,” was formed in the wake of the October 7 massacre in Israel to address the issue of the growing systemic bias against Jews in healthcare.
Dr. Steven Roth, who practices anesthesiology at the University of Illinois Chicago and co-authored a study on antisemitism in the medical community, revealed that “it has been suggested that DEI, and ‘anti-racist’ curricula in particular, present in some medical schools, is related to the antisemitism that flared after October 7.”
Roth maintains that “nearly all universities today have DEI frameworks, and all medical schools do as well.”
Efforts by the AJMA to lobby members of Congress and urge them to insist that medical schools and journals adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working definition of antisemitism remains crucial to the institution’s platform of encouraging lawmakers and colleagues to confront antisemitism in the healthcare space with the level of urgency that the current moment demands.
Apart from pushing for medical institutions to abide by the IHRA definition of antisemitism, AJMA’s Founder and President, NYC-based plastic surgeon Dr. Yael Halaas, also notes that the meetings they are doing with lawmakers include discussing AJMA’s project to create a “new antisemitism curriculum,” which the organization is developing and plans to pilot at certain medical schools.
Unsurprisingly, medical workers launching a campaign of intimidation against Jews masquerade as opponents of Israel.
According to Congressman Ritchie Torres (D-NY), former University of California San Francisco (UCSF) professor of internal medicine Dr. Rupa Marya suggested earlier this year that students in her class had the right to be concerned about sitting in the same classroom with Israeli classmates. Marya’s growing list of outlandish assertions concerning Jews ultimately led to her suspension, and she is one of several seasoned antisemitic medical workers curating a path forward for younger cohorts that polling shows is drifting against Israel.
Once counted as responsible stewards of America’s healthcare system, a youthful cadre of aspiring healers are revealing themselves as unprofessional disruptors who don keffiyehs and promote antisemitic screeds at medical school commencement ceremonies. Just this week, the group StopAntisemitism said it had identified a nursing graduate, who was exposed for tearing down hostage posters in New York City.
A few hours south in Washington D.C., The Times of Israel unveiled several physicians in training at Georgetown University Medical School and the George Washington University School of Medicine who were posting vile antisemitic content on social media in the aftermath of the October 7 massacre.
Today’s unserious era is enveloped with students marinating in a political and educational climate under which false claims made by progressives and leftist radicals accusing Israel of practicing medical apartheid are legitimized by a host of medical journals publishing distorted accounts of Israeli actions in Gaza.
It’s not unreasonable to assume that episodes such as the one that occurred in London, where a student nurse allegedly refused care to a Jewish patient, could one day soon appear in America. Healthcare professionals who find it acceptable to unleash their antisemitism with a stroke of the keyboard may one day justify withholding critical medical information or tampering with a treatment plan for a Jewish patient.
Sadly, recent developments involving the growth of antisemitic incidents in medicine reinforce the fact that no industry is safe from the scourge of antisemitism and that perhaps, for the time being, Jewish Americans should navigate their healthcare needs with an extra dose of caution.
Irit Tratt is an American and pro-Israel advocate residing in New York.
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