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Israel Must Fight Hezbollah Like a State Army, Not Just a Terrorist Organization
Hezbollah members parade during a rally marking al-Quds Day, (Jerusalem Day) in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Lebanon, April 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
The daring operations carried out by Israel in the northern arena in recent weeks deserve to be praised for the exceptional feats they were.
According to The New York Times, the raid by the IDF’s Shaldag unit on the precision missile production site in Masyaf in Syria hit a vital site for Iran and Hezbollah in the field of precision missile production. The raid not only harmed the accelerated preparations of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) for the war in Lebanon, but also provided evidence of the IDF’s ability to raid and destroy similar sites in Lebanon.
The two waves of attack against Hezbollah via remote detonation of personal communication devices were also very important, as they introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The operation, attributed to Israel, caused significant horizontal damage to the organization both in terms of the dramatic scope of casualties and the disruption of the organization’s command and control. The surprise factor, as well as the sense of penetration inflicted on Hezbollah, are also very important. While it is better for such an operation to be carried out simultaneously with air and ground strikes as part of an all-out war, the decision to conduct it on its own was reasonable if the IDF was in a use-it-or-lose-it position.
It is possible that the elimination of Akil and his command group was related to the success of the previous operations. Some security managers may have been pushed aside in the emergency caused by Israel’s successes, creating another opportunity for Israeli intelligence.
The successes in Lebanon highlight the overall dragging on of the war in Gaza. The political reasons for this are clear and are being widely discussed in the Israeli media. The gap between the IDF’s tactical successes and the stubborn refusal to formulate a strategy for the war in the south — i.e., to come up with an alternative civilian control mechanism in Gaza — is visible to every Israeli citizen. What is less clear is the long and deep background at the level of Israeli military culture for this phenomenon.
In the decades since the 1990s, with the exception of Operation Defensive Shield, Israel has refrained from embarking on decisive military moves. Operational decisiveness, let’s remember, is an original Israeli-military concept.
Israel has never aimed for absolute victory and the evaporation of its enemies as political bodies — only for the removal of an immediate military threat. In the last decade, another military theory emerged — the “campaign short of war.” In the professional literature and in IDF strategy, this campaign is known as the “war between the wars” (WBW) or the “prevention” approach.
Formulated as Israel’s central strategy during the years of the Syrian civil war, this approach was based on delaying and preventing the enemy’s intensification through close intelligence surveillance and countermeasures (mostly airstrikes and occasionally special operations).
Some drafters of the approach stressed that it is not a substitute for the IDF’s ability to decisively defeat an enemy at war. “Whoever wants will prepare for war,” wrote Major General Nitzan Alon.
The logical connection between WBW and the idea of war itself was clarified in the same article. Disrupting the enemy’s plans to build up and prepare is part of the arms and war-readiness race. The balance of deterrence and freedom of strategic maneuver of the warring parties is closely related to the question of how each side perceives the degree of success it can expect.
But the culture and way of thinking of large organizations is shaped mainly through their actions. While to all intents and purposes Hezbollah became a military power many years ago and is now one of the largest and strongest armies in the region, decades of anti-terror operations have engrained strong habits into the IDF.
In the last decade, great attention was devoted to the WBW.
In a retirement interview Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot gave to The New York Times in January 2019, for example, extensive space was given to that campaign, which was presented with undisguised pride as a new strategy.
These efforts bore partial fruit. Iran does not maintain combat formations in Syria of the scope and quality it originally planned. Hezbollah would like to have much more significant capabilities in the field of precision missiles and in other fields.
But for all of that, here we are. The war has been going on for a year and seems to be escalating. Although many thought this was its role, the preventive approach did not prevent the war in the north.
The focus on WBW also came at a cost. WBW became a way of thinking and a pattern of behavior. Special operations are centrally managed at high levels. They exist within an almost perfect envelope of intelligence, air support and rescue capabilities. They always rely on the element of surprise, without which they are delayed or canceled. They give decision makers a sense of control and security.
Many commanders in the IDF testified that, in their opinion, these patterns affected the way the war in Gaza was conducted, at least in its first months. Too much centralized control, a slow pace of execution, and too limited freedom of action for the commanders on the ground.
The successes of the last few weeks point to another possible price.
The war in the north is, to a large extent, still managed under the same conceptual framework. Even after the assassination of Akil in the Dahaya district, Israel remains committed to the idea of the “threshold of escalation”.
The pager/walkie-talkie operations attributed to Israel stirred the world’s imagination and returned some of the luster that had been eroded from the IDF, and they no doubt hit the enemy hard. But as exciting as those successes were, the combination of covert capabilities in the Israeli concept of war must be seriously examined.
According to reports, the operation was launched at the moment it was due to fear of disclosure. It is likely that Israel was forced to escalate the war without gaining the operational benefits for which this capability was surely intended: throwing the enemy off balance as the IDF pushed into Lebanon.
However severe the damage to Hezbollah, it is likely to recover. Furthermore, Israel may have been forced into a strategic decision due to a tactical constraint: the fear of exposing the operation.
If this is the reality, then Hamas in Gaza — and Sinwar personally, who cut ties with the negotiation efforts for a hostage deal a few weeks ago — are the big beneficiaries.
For almost a year, Hamas has hoped for a strategic rescue through a flare-up of war in Lebanon. The IDF’s operational capability, a “red button” skillfully embedded in Hezbollah’s equipment, may have offered it new hope that this will come to pass.
This situation obliges us to think about the dependency of military capabilities on secret “red buttons.” That is not meant to diminish the vital role of secret intelligence in war. On the contrary: the closer integration of the Mossad in IDF operations, a trend to which the WBW contributed, is important and welcome. But a distinction must be made between the integration of the Mossad and its capabilities, if indeed that took place here, and the integration of covert operational capabilities in military moves.
Excellent intelligence obtained by the Mossad was also at the basis of Operation Moked at the start of the Six-Day War. But it was intelligence that enabled the air force’s preemptive attack on the Arab airbases.
The opening operation of the Six-Day War did not depend for its success on devices planted by the Mossad in the Egyptian planes or on pre-prepared sabotage of the Syrian airports.
Also, the one-time use of special capabilities deployed in enemy territory creates dramatic decision dilemmas. It was decision dilemmas combined with maintenance difficulties that caused “special measures” not to be activated on the eve of the Egyptian attack in 1973 and for the special systems of Unit 8200 to be unavailable on the eve of the attack on October 2023. In retrospect, a huge gap was discovered between the sense of security provided by these systems and their actual operational benefit.
The other series of questions concerns the way the IDF’s long focus on special operations has affected Israeli military thinking.
“We have a lot of capabilities. At every stage where we operate, we are already prepared two stages ahead,” the Chief of Staff was quoted as saying during his visit to the Northern Command after the pagers attack in Lebanon. This statement indicates that the IDF continues to think of the war as a chain of capability demonstrations and retaliation balances.
In the past, this was called “steps of escalation.”
A year into the war, the Chief of Staff is not quoted as briefing his subordinates in the Northern Command on the main goal of removing the Hezbollah threat in the North. Principles such as concentrating the effort and shortening the war are not mentioned.
Such ideas, called “theory of victory” in the professional literature, have a huge role to play not only as a war plan but also as a platform for a strategic coordination of expectations.
It is true that the Chief of Staff’s words were meant to be quoted in the open media. But precisely because of this, he could be expected to leverage the prospect of severe damage to Hezbollah or at least to convey the deterrent message that the IDF is facing a military decision.
Instead, the strategic message he sent is that the pager operation has not changed our strategic approach.
None of this is a coincidence.
The words of the Chief of Staff do not differ in essence from the famous “dynamic and evolving” approach that has characterized the contingency plans of the Southern Command in recent years.
Flexibility is an important tactical principle, and it can even be valuable in the management of a long-term strategy like the WBW. But flexibility is not a virtue for the conducting of war-fighting. At that level, clarity and concentration of effort are vital.
Clarity of purpose, not fuzziness, is what allows for tactical flexibility. The hidden assumption behind the “dynamic and evolving” approach is that operations are not conducted against the enemy as a military entity but as part of a strategic dialogue with its leadership. This is not a theory of victory.
The current Chief of Staff and his General Staff did not invent the WBW, the fight against terrorism, the deterrence operations or the steps of escalation. These appeared about 30 years ago and gradually became an almost intuitive way of thinking at our military and political level.
But the State of Israel has long faced terrorist armies, not terrorist organizations. A warlike way of thinking is required.
It is appropriate to congratulate and bless the IDF’s recent successes. It is also right to continue to support the IDF and its commanders in the conduct of the war.
But the war is also an opportunity for learning. The unfortunate reality is that even if we escalate to all-out war in Lebanon, chances are that it will end in some kind of agreement, not the complete removal of the military threat.
This means yet another war will break out in Lebanon within a few years. The current war is above all else a correction opportunity for Israeli strategy and the IDF’s theory of war.
A combatant force should strive to dismantle the enemy as a combatant system. It should be built for this end, while making strict assumptions regarding conditions of execution, the absence of the element of surprise, and non-optimal timing, because wars are not series of special operations. The forces should benefit from mutual support, such as air support for ground forces, but not be completely dependent on these envelopes.
The ground forces need to be prepared and built to conduct more independent ground operations in the near circle and be less dependent on a special operations envelope. The success of the operations in Gaza, for which tight and superior air-intelligence envelopes are a critical component, may obscure this need.
Israel must not allow itself to be fooled by success. The facts are that Israel chose not to destroy the enemy’s critical production infrastructure in Lebanon though it had done just that in Syria, even though the operational capability to do so was proven.
Like any serious military organization, the enemy will recover from the recent blows, simply because we are allowing him the time he needs to do so.
The IDF’s theory of war should be based on solid foundations that distinguish between the world of special operations and the world of war. Hezbollah is an army. Anti-terrorism methods will not do.
A year into the war, our learning of lessons and adaptation to the new strategic reality is still ahead of us.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version oft this article originally appeared at The BESA Center.
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Colorado Attack Suspect Charged with Assault, Use of Explosives

FILE PHOTO: Boulder attack suspect Mohamed Sabry Soliman poses for a jail booking photograph after his arrest in Boulder, Colorado, U.S. June 2, 2025. Photo: Boulder Police Department/Handout via REUTERS
A suspect in an attack on a pro-Israeli rally in Colorado that injured eight people was being held on Monday on an array of charges, including assault and the use of explosives, in lieu of a $10-million bail, according to Boulder County records.
The posted list of felony charges against suspect Mohamed Sabry Soliman, 45, in the attack on Sunday also includes charges of murder in the first degree, although police in the city of Boulder have said on social media that no victims died in the attack. Authorities could not be reached immediately to clarify.
Witnesses reported the suspect used a makeshift flamethrower and threw an incendiary device into the crowd. He was heard to yell “Free Palestine” during the attack, according to the FBI, in what the agency called a “targeted terror attack.”
Four women and four men between 52 and 88 years of age were transported to hospitals after the attack, Boulder Police said.
The attack took place on the Pearl Street Mall, a popular pedestrian shopping district near the University of Colorado, during an event organized by Run for Their Lives, an organization devoted to drawing attention to the hostages seized in the aftermath of Hamas’ 2023 attack on Israel.
Rabbi Yisroel Wilhelm, the Chabad director at the University of Colorado, Boulder, told CBS Colorado that the 88-year-old victim was a Holocaust refugee who fled Europe.
A Department of Homeland Security spokesperson said Soliman had entered the country in August 2022 on a tourist visa that expired in February 2023. He filed for asylum in September 2022. “The suspect, Mohamed Soliman, is illegally in our country,” the spokesperson said.
The FBI raided and searched Soliman’s home in El Paso County, Colorado, the agency said on social media. “As this is an ongoing investigation, no additional information is available at this time.”
The attack in Boulder was the latest act of violence aimed at Jewish Americans linked to outrage over Israel’s escalating military offensive in Gaza. It followed the fatal shooting of two Israel Embassy aides that took place outside Washington’s Capital Jewish Museum last month.
Ron Halber, CEO of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Washington, said after the shooting there was a question of how far security perimeters outside Jewish institutions should extend.
Boulder Police said they would hold a press conference later on Monday to discuss details of the Colorado attack.
The Denver office of the FBI, which is handling the case, did not immediately respond to emails or phone calls seeking clarification on the homicide charges or other details in the case.
Officials from the Boulder County Jail, Boulder Police and Boulder County Sheriff’s Office did not immediately respond to inquiries.
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Iran Poised to Dismiss US Nuclear Proposal, Iranian Diplomat Says

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi attends a press conference following a meeting with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Russia, April 18, 2025. Photo: Tatyana Makeyeva/Pool via REUTERS
Iran is poised to reject a US proposal to end a decades-old nuclear dispute, an Iranian diplomat said on Monday, dismissing it as a “non-starter” that fails to address Tehran’s interests or soften Washington’s stance on uranium enrichment.
“Iran is drafting a negative response to the US proposal, which could be interpreted as a rejection of the US offer,” the senior diplomat, who is close to Iran’s negotiating team, told Reuters.
The US proposal for a new nuclear deal was presented to Iran on Saturday by Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, who was on a short visit to Tehran and has been mediating talks between Tehran and Washington.
After five rounds of discussions between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, several obstacles remain.
Among them are Iran’s rejection of a US demand that it commit to scrapping uranium enrichment and its refusal to ship abroad its entire existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium – possible raw material for nuclear bombs.
Tehran says it wants to master nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and has long denied accusations by Western powers that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
“In this proposal, the US stance on enrichment on Iranian soil remains unchanged, and there is no clear explanation regarding the lifting of sanctions,” said the diplomat, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.
Araqchi said Tehran would formally respond to the proposal soon.
Tehran demands the immediate removal of all US-imposed curbs that impair its oil-based economy. But the US says nuclear-related sanctions should be removed in phases.
Dozens of institutions vital to Iran’s economy, including its central bank and national oil company, have been blacklisted since 2018 for, according to Washington, “supporting terrorism or weapons proliferation.”
Trump’s revival of “maximum pressure” against Tehran since his return to the White House in January has included tightening sanctions and threatening to bomb Iran if the negotiations yield no deal.
During his first term in 2018, Trump ditched Tehran’s 2015 nuclear pact with six powers and reimposed sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy. Iran responded by escalating enrichment far beyond the pact’s limits.
Under the deal, Iran had until 2018 curbed its sensitive nuclear work in return for relief from US, EU and U.N. economic sanctions.
The diplomat said the assessment of “Iran’s nuclear negotiations committee,” under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was that the US proposal was “completely one-sided” and could not serve Tehran’s interests.
Therefore, the diplomat said, Tehran considers this proposal a “non-starter” and believes it unilaterally attempts to impose a “bad deal” on Iran through excessive demands.
NUCLEAR STANDOFF RAISES MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS
The stakes are high for both sides. Trump wants to curtail Tehran’s potential to produce a nuclear weapon that could trigger a regional nuclear arms race and perhaps threaten Israel. Iran’s clerical establishment, for its part, wants to be rid of the devastating sanctions.
Iran says it is ready to accept some limits on enrichment, but needs watertight guarantees that Washington would not renege on a future nuclear accord.
Two Iranian officials told Reuters last week that Iran could pause uranium enrichment if the US released frozen Iranian funds and recognized Tehran’s right to refine uranium for civilian use under a “political deal” that could lead to a broader nuclear accord.
Iran’s arch-foe Israel sees Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat and says it would never allow Tehran to obtain nuclear weapons.
Araqchi, in a joint news conference with his Egyptian counterpart in Cairo, said: “I do not think Israel will commit such a mistake as to attack Iran.”
Tehran’s regional influence has meanwhile been diminished by military setbacks suffered by its forces and those of its allies in the Shi’ite-dominated “Axis of Resistance,” which include Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi militias.
In April, Saudi Arabia’s defence minister delivered a blunt message to Iranian officials to take Trump’s offer of a new deal seriously as a way to avoid the risk of war with Israel.
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The Islamist Crescent: A New Syrian Danger

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa speaks during a joint press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron after a meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, May 7, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Stephanie Lecocq/Pool
The dramatic fall of the Assad regime in Syria has undeniably reshaped the Middle East, yet the emerging power dynamics, particularly the alignment between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, warrant profound scrutiny from those committed to American and Israeli security. While superficially presented as a united front against Iranian influence, this new Sunni axis carries a dangerous undercurrent of Islamism and regional ambition that could ultimately undermine, rather than serve, the long-term interests of Washington and Jerusalem.
For too long, Syria under Bashar al-Assad served as a critical conduit for Iran’s destabilizing agenda, facilitating arms transfers to Hezbollah and projecting Tehran’s power across the Levant. The removal of this linchpin is, on the surface, a strategic victory. However, the nature of the new Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa — a figure Israeli officials continue to view with deep suspicion due to his past as a former Al-Qaeda-linked commander — raises immediate red flags. This is not merely a change of guard; it is a shift that introduces a new set of complex challenges, particularly given Turkey’s historical support for the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization deemed a terror group by Saudi Arabia and many other regional states.
Israel’s strategic calculus in Syria has always been clear: to degrade Iran’s military presence, prevent Hezbollah from acquiring advanced weaponry, and maintain operational freedom in Syrian airspace. Crucially, Israel has historically thought it best to have a decentralized, weak, and fragmented Syria, with reports that it has actively worked against the resurgence of a robust central authority. This preference stems from a pragmatic understanding that a strong, unified Syria, especially one under the tutelage of an ambitious regional power like Turkey, could pose much more of a threat than the Assad regime ever did. Indeed, Israeli defense officials privately express concern at Turkey’s assertive moves, accusing Ankara of attempting to transform post-war Syria into a Turkish protectorate under Islamist tutelage. This concern is not unfounded; Turkey’s ambitious, arguably expansionist, objectives — and its perceived undue dominance in Arab lands — are viewed by Israel as warily as Iran’s previous influence.
The notion that an “Ottoman Crescent” is now replacing the “Shiite Crescent” should not be celebrated as a net positive. While it may diminish Iranian power, it introduces a new form of regional hegemony, one driven by an ideology that has historically been antithetical to Western values and stability. The European Union’s recent imposition of sanctions on Turkish-backed Syrian army commanders for human rights abuses, including arbitrary killings and torture, further underscores the problematic nature of some elements within this new Syrian landscape. The fact that al-Sharaa has allowed such individuals to operate with impunity and even promoted them to high-ranking positions should give Washington pause.
From an American perspective, while the Trump administration has pragmatically engaged with the new Syrian government, lifting sanctions and urging normalization with Israel, this engagement must be tempered with extreme caution. The core American interests in the Middle East — counterterrorism, containment of Iran, and regional stability — are not served by empowering Islamist-leaning factions or by enabling a regional power, like Turkey, whose actions have sometimes undermined the broader fight against ISIS. Washington must demand that Damascus demonstrate a genuine commitment to taking over the counter-ISIS mission and managing detention facilities, and unequivocally insist that Turkey cease actions that risk an ISIS resurgence.
The argument that Saudi Arabia and Turkey, despite their own complex internal dynamics, are simply pragmatic actors countering Iran overlooks the ideological underpinnings that concern many conservatives. Turkey’s ruling party, rooted in political Islam, and its historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, present a fundamental challenge to the vision of a stable, secular, and pro-Western Middle East. While Saudi Arabia has designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, its alignment with Turkey in Syria, and its own internal human rights record, means that this “new front” is far from a clean solution.
The Saudi-Turkey alignment in Syria is a double-edged sword. While it may indeed serve to counter Iran’s immediate regional ambitions, it simultaneously risks empowering actors whose long-term objectives and ideological leanings are deeply problematic for American, Israeli, and Western interests. Washington and Jerusalem must approach this new dynamic with extreme vigilance, prioritizing the containment of all forms of radicalism — whether Shiite or Sunni — and ensuring that any strategic gains against Iran do not inadvertently pave the way for a new, equally dangerous, Islamist crescent to rise in the heart of the Levant.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx
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