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Israel Must Fight Hezbollah Like a State Army, Not Just a Terrorist Organization
Hezbollah members parade during a rally marking al-Quds Day, (Jerusalem Day) in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Lebanon, April 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
The daring operations carried out by Israel in the northern arena in recent weeks deserve to be praised for the exceptional feats they were.
According to The New York Times, the raid by the IDF’s Shaldag unit on the precision missile production site in Masyaf in Syria hit a vital site for Iran and Hezbollah in the field of precision missile production. The raid not only harmed the accelerated preparations of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) for the war in Lebanon, but also provided evidence of the IDF’s ability to raid and destroy similar sites in Lebanon.
The two waves of attack against Hezbollah via remote detonation of personal communication devices were also very important, as they introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The operation, attributed to Israel, caused significant horizontal damage to the organization both in terms of the dramatic scope of casualties and the disruption of the organization’s command and control. The surprise factor, as well as the sense of penetration inflicted on Hezbollah, are also very important. While it is better for such an operation to be carried out simultaneously with air and ground strikes as part of an all-out war, the decision to conduct it on its own was reasonable if the IDF was in a use-it-or-lose-it position.
It is possible that the elimination of Akil and his command group was related to the success of the previous operations. Some security managers may have been pushed aside in the emergency caused by Israel’s successes, creating another opportunity for Israeli intelligence.
The successes in Lebanon highlight the overall dragging on of the war in Gaza. The political reasons for this are clear and are being widely discussed in the Israeli media. The gap between the IDF’s tactical successes and the stubborn refusal to formulate a strategy for the war in the south — i.e., to come up with an alternative civilian control mechanism in Gaza — is visible to every Israeli citizen. What is less clear is the long and deep background at the level of Israeli military culture for this phenomenon.
In the decades since the 1990s, with the exception of Operation Defensive Shield, Israel has refrained from embarking on decisive military moves. Operational decisiveness, let’s remember, is an original Israeli-military concept.
Israel has never aimed for absolute victory and the evaporation of its enemies as political bodies — only for the removal of an immediate military threat. In the last decade, another military theory emerged — the “campaign short of war.” In the professional literature and in IDF strategy, this campaign is known as the “war between the wars” (WBW) or the “prevention” approach.
Formulated as Israel’s central strategy during the years of the Syrian civil war, this approach was based on delaying and preventing the enemy’s intensification through close intelligence surveillance and countermeasures (mostly airstrikes and occasionally special operations).
Some drafters of the approach stressed that it is not a substitute for the IDF’s ability to decisively defeat an enemy at war. “Whoever wants will prepare for war,” wrote Major General Nitzan Alon.
The logical connection between WBW and the idea of war itself was clarified in the same article. Disrupting the enemy’s plans to build up and prepare is part of the arms and war-readiness race. The balance of deterrence and freedom of strategic maneuver of the warring parties is closely related to the question of how each side perceives the degree of success it can expect.
But the culture and way of thinking of large organizations is shaped mainly through their actions. While to all intents and purposes Hezbollah became a military power many years ago and is now one of the largest and strongest armies in the region, decades of anti-terror operations have engrained strong habits into the IDF.
In the last decade, great attention was devoted to the WBW.
In a retirement interview Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot gave to The New York Times in January 2019, for example, extensive space was given to that campaign, which was presented with undisguised pride as a new strategy.
These efforts bore partial fruit. Iran does not maintain combat formations in Syria of the scope and quality it originally planned. Hezbollah would like to have much more significant capabilities in the field of precision missiles and in other fields.
But for all of that, here we are. The war has been going on for a year and seems to be escalating. Although many thought this was its role, the preventive approach did not prevent the war in the north.
The focus on WBW also came at a cost. WBW became a way of thinking and a pattern of behavior. Special operations are centrally managed at high levels. They exist within an almost perfect envelope of intelligence, air support and rescue capabilities. They always rely on the element of surprise, without which they are delayed or canceled. They give decision makers a sense of control and security.
Many commanders in the IDF testified that, in their opinion, these patterns affected the way the war in Gaza was conducted, at least in its first months. Too much centralized control, a slow pace of execution, and too limited freedom of action for the commanders on the ground.
The successes of the last few weeks point to another possible price.
The war in the north is, to a large extent, still managed under the same conceptual framework. Even after the assassination of Akil in the Dahaya district, Israel remains committed to the idea of the “threshold of escalation”.
The pager/walkie-talkie operations attributed to Israel stirred the world’s imagination and returned some of the luster that had been eroded from the IDF, and they no doubt hit the enemy hard. But as exciting as those successes were, the combination of covert capabilities in the Israeli concept of war must be seriously examined.
According to reports, the operation was launched at the moment it was due to fear of disclosure. It is likely that Israel was forced to escalate the war without gaining the operational benefits for which this capability was surely intended: throwing the enemy off balance as the IDF pushed into Lebanon.
However severe the damage to Hezbollah, it is likely to recover. Furthermore, Israel may have been forced into a strategic decision due to a tactical constraint: the fear of exposing the operation.
If this is the reality, then Hamas in Gaza — and Sinwar personally, who cut ties with the negotiation efforts for a hostage deal a few weeks ago — are the big beneficiaries.
For almost a year, Hamas has hoped for a strategic rescue through a flare-up of war in Lebanon. The IDF’s operational capability, a “red button” skillfully embedded in Hezbollah’s equipment, may have offered it new hope that this will come to pass.
This situation obliges us to think about the dependency of military capabilities on secret “red buttons.” That is not meant to diminish the vital role of secret intelligence in war. On the contrary: the closer integration of the Mossad in IDF operations, a trend to which the WBW contributed, is important and welcome. But a distinction must be made between the integration of the Mossad and its capabilities, if indeed that took place here, and the integration of covert operational capabilities in military moves.
Excellent intelligence obtained by the Mossad was also at the basis of Operation Moked at the start of the Six-Day War. But it was intelligence that enabled the air force’s preemptive attack on the Arab airbases.
The opening operation of the Six-Day War did not depend for its success on devices planted by the Mossad in the Egyptian planes or on pre-prepared sabotage of the Syrian airports.
Also, the one-time use of special capabilities deployed in enemy territory creates dramatic decision dilemmas. It was decision dilemmas combined with maintenance difficulties that caused “special measures” not to be activated on the eve of the Egyptian attack in 1973 and for the special systems of Unit 8200 to be unavailable on the eve of the attack on October 2023. In retrospect, a huge gap was discovered between the sense of security provided by these systems and their actual operational benefit.
The other series of questions concerns the way the IDF’s long focus on special operations has affected Israeli military thinking.
“We have a lot of capabilities. At every stage where we operate, we are already prepared two stages ahead,” the Chief of Staff was quoted as saying during his visit to the Northern Command after the pagers attack in Lebanon. This statement indicates that the IDF continues to think of the war as a chain of capability demonstrations and retaliation balances.
In the past, this was called “steps of escalation.”
A year into the war, the Chief of Staff is not quoted as briefing his subordinates in the Northern Command on the main goal of removing the Hezbollah threat in the North. Principles such as concentrating the effort and shortening the war are not mentioned.
Such ideas, called “theory of victory” in the professional literature, have a huge role to play not only as a war plan but also as a platform for a strategic coordination of expectations.
It is true that the Chief of Staff’s words were meant to be quoted in the open media. But precisely because of this, he could be expected to leverage the prospect of severe damage to Hezbollah or at least to convey the deterrent message that the IDF is facing a military decision.
Instead, the strategic message he sent is that the pager operation has not changed our strategic approach.
None of this is a coincidence.
The words of the Chief of Staff do not differ in essence from the famous “dynamic and evolving” approach that has characterized the contingency plans of the Southern Command in recent years.
Flexibility is an important tactical principle, and it can even be valuable in the management of a long-term strategy like the WBW. But flexibility is not a virtue for the conducting of war-fighting. At that level, clarity and concentration of effort are vital.
Clarity of purpose, not fuzziness, is what allows for tactical flexibility. The hidden assumption behind the “dynamic and evolving” approach is that operations are not conducted against the enemy as a military entity but as part of a strategic dialogue with its leadership. This is not a theory of victory.
The current Chief of Staff and his General Staff did not invent the WBW, the fight against terrorism, the deterrence operations or the steps of escalation. These appeared about 30 years ago and gradually became an almost intuitive way of thinking at our military and political level.
But the State of Israel has long faced terrorist armies, not terrorist organizations. A warlike way of thinking is required.
It is appropriate to congratulate and bless the IDF’s recent successes. It is also right to continue to support the IDF and its commanders in the conduct of the war.
But the war is also an opportunity for learning. The unfortunate reality is that even if we escalate to all-out war in Lebanon, chances are that it will end in some kind of agreement, not the complete removal of the military threat.
This means yet another war will break out in Lebanon within a few years. The current war is above all else a correction opportunity for Israeli strategy and the IDF’s theory of war.
A combatant force should strive to dismantle the enemy as a combatant system. It should be built for this end, while making strict assumptions regarding conditions of execution, the absence of the element of surprise, and non-optimal timing, because wars are not series of special operations. The forces should benefit from mutual support, such as air support for ground forces, but not be completely dependent on these envelopes.
The ground forces need to be prepared and built to conduct more independent ground operations in the near circle and be less dependent on a special operations envelope. The success of the operations in Gaza, for which tight and superior air-intelligence envelopes are a critical component, may obscure this need.
Israel must not allow itself to be fooled by success. The facts are that Israel chose not to destroy the enemy’s critical production infrastructure in Lebanon though it had done just that in Syria, even though the operational capability to do so was proven.
Like any serious military organization, the enemy will recover from the recent blows, simply because we are allowing him the time he needs to do so.
The IDF’s theory of war should be based on solid foundations that distinguish between the world of special operations and the world of war. Hezbollah is an army. Anti-terrorism methods will not do.
A year into the war, our learning of lessons and adaptation to the new strategic reality is still ahead of us.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version oft this article originally appeared at The BESA Center.
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US Agency Announces Sanctions Against Iran-Connected Company and Employees
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with a group of students in Tehran, Iran, Nov. 2, 2022. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
The United States’ Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced Friday sanctions on 7 individuals US officials say are tied to Iranian efforts to influence the American 2024 presidential election.
In a Friday statement, the Department of Treasury claims that Iranian “state actors” engaged in a number of activities, such as hack-and-leak operations and spear-phishing, to impact American elections. The agency says that these individuals have attempted to “undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institution .” Thus, the U.S. government will block “all property and interests” belonging to the implicated parties.
“The U.S. government continues to closely monitor efforts by malicious actors to influence or interfere in the integrity of our elections,” said Bradley T. Smith, the Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “Treasury, as part of a whole-of-government effort leveraging all available tools and authorities, remains strongly committed to holding accountable those who see to undermine our institutions.”
Government agencies first acknowledged Iranian attempts to create instability among the American public in the summer of 2024, amid a deluge of demonstrations condemning Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 Hamas slaughters of roughly 1200 people across the Jewish state. According to the Department of Treasury, Iranian state actors have attempted to “gain access to individuals with direct access to the presidential campaigns” to exercise “influence” over the American elections. The agency alleges that government actors for Iran, the chief global sponsor of terrorism, have utilized “hacking” attacks to impact the upcoming elections.
According to the agency, Iranian agents have engaged in “cyber-enabled operations” during the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections in the U.S. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members have gained unauthorized access to multiple accounts belonging to high-ranking members of a 2024 presidential campaign. These agents subsequently leaked the information to the media in an effort to influence electoral outcomes. The agents reportedly used “technical infrastructure” tied to Masoud Jalili, an actor with reported IRGC ties.
OFAC also claims that six employees and executives of Emennet Pasargad, an Iran-based cybersecurity firm, implemented an “online operation to intimidate and influence American voters.” The individuals—Fatemeh Sadeghi, Elaheh Yazdi, Sayyed Mehdi Rahimi Hajjiabadi, Mohammad Hosein Abdolrahimi, and Rahmatollah Askarizadeh—accomplished this through sending “threatening emails to intimidate voters.”
In April, a confidential document leak indicated that the IRGC has helped plan a litany of anti-Israel protests in the United States. Iran’s support for anti-Israel demonstrations in the United States is well documented. The regime’s so-called “supreme leader,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly heaped praise on anti-Israel protesters, referring to the demonstrations as a “courageous, humane resistance movement.” He has also commended the protesters as a “branch of the Resistance Front” against Israel. Flags representing Hamas and Hezbollah, another Iranian-backed terrorist group — have regularly appeared at anti-Israel demonstrations across the United States.
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Nasrallah Dead? Senior Hezbollah Commanders Were Target of Israeli Strike in Beirut, Israeli Official Says
A series of powerful explosions shook Beirut on Friday (September 27) and thick clouds of smoke rose over the city, Reuters witnesses said, in what Lebanese media said were a series of Israeli airstrikes on the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of the city.
The Israeli military told residents in parts of Beirut’s southern suburbs to evacuate late on Friday, after strikes that it said had targeted Hezbollah‘s central headquarters and with no word hours later from the group on the fate of their head Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
The order to evacuate, made by Israeli army spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, told residents to get at least 500 meters (550 yards) away from three specific buildings in the area. It was the first announcement of its kind for the densely populated neighbourhoods south of Beirut.
A source close to Hezbollah told Reuters Nasrallah was alive. Iran’s Tasnim news agency also reported he was safe. A senior Iranian security official told Reuters Tehran was checking his status. Hezbollah‘s media office said that there was no truth to any statements surrounding the Israeli strikes, but did not say anything about the fate of the group’s leader.
In New York, a senior Israeli official told reporters that senior Hezbollah commanders were the target of Israel’s strike on the central headquarters on Friday but it was too early to say whether the attack took out Nasrallah.
Israel’s U.N. Ambassador Danny Danon told reporters at the United Nations that the attack targeted a “meeting of bad people” planning more attacks on Israel.
“When I said this was a meeting of bad actors, Nasrallah is a bad actor. He’s a terrorist. He has the blood on his hands for many Americans, thousands of Israelis, so I think he should be punished for that. I cannot confirm now whether he was at that meeting or not, but when I speak about bad actors, he’s one of them,” Danon said.
Lebanon’s health ministry said there were two dead and 76 wounded from the Israeli strikes, describing it as a preliminary toll.
Iran-backed Hezbollah‘s al-Manar television reported four buildings were destroyed and there were many casualties in the multiple strikes, which marked a major escalation of Israel’s conflict with the heavily armed Hezbollah.
Al-Manar’s live feed showed search and rescue teams scrambling over concrete and protruding metal, with a correspondent for the TV station saying the attack had left several large craters and damaged many surrounding buildings.
The Israeli military said it had carried out a “precise strike” on Hezbollah‘s headquarters, which it said were “embedded under residential buildings in the heart of the Dahiyeh in Beirut”.
Israel has struck the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut, known as Dahiyeh, four times over the last week, killing at least three senior Hezbollah military commanders.
Friday’s attack was far more powerful, with multiple blasts shaking windows across the city, recalling Israeli airstrikes during a war with Hezbollah in 2006.
In a televised statement, Israeli military spokesperson Daniel Hagari said the central command centre was embedded deep within civilian areas.
The strikes hit Beirut shortly after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to continue Israel’s attacks on Iranian-backed fighters in Lebanon in a U.N. speech, as hopes faded for a ceasefire to head off all-out regional war.
Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati said the attack showed Israel did not care about global calls for a Lebanon ceasefire.
Iran’s embassy in Lebanon said on X that the strike represented a dangerous game-changing escalation that would “bring its perpetrator an appropriate punishment.”
SHARP ESCALATION IN CONFLICT RAISES CONCERN AT UN
The escalation raised concern at the United Nations, where the annual General Assembly has been meeting this week. Among those voicing concern was France, which earlier in the week proposed a 21-day ceasefire to reduce tensions.
“The large-scale strikes which took place today in the south suburb of Beirut, brought devastation and claimed many casualties. This must be brought to an end immediately,” French Ambassador Nicolas de Riviere told a Security Council meeting.
At a New York press conference, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “We believe the way forward is through diplomacy, not conflict. The path to diplomacy may seem difficult to see at this moment, but it is there, and in our judgment, it is necessary, and we will continue to work intentionally with all parties to urge them to choose that course.”
It was by far the most powerful Israeli attack on Beirut during nearly a year of conflict with Hezbollah. Security sources in Lebanon said the attack targeted an area where top Hezbollah officials are usually based.
This week, Israeli airstrikes have killed more than 700 people in Lebanon, an escalation that has raised fears of an even more destructive conflict.
In its first statement since the Israeli strike, Hezbollah said it had fired rockets at the city of Safed in Israel.
Israeli emergency services said they were treating a woman with minor injuries from the rocket in Safed.
Speaking at the U.N. General Assembly, Netanyahu said: “As long as Hezbollah chooses the path of war, Israel has no choice, and Israel has every right to remove this threat and return our citizens to their homes safely.”
Several delegations walked out as Netanyahu approached the lectern while supporters in the gallery cheered.
Netanyahu’s office said he would cut short his trip to New York and return to Israel on Friday.
The United States did not have advance warning of the Beirut strike and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with his Israeli counterpart as the operation was ongoing, a Pentagon spokesperson said.
Israel says its campaign aims to secure the safe return of thousands of people forced to evacuate in northern Israel because of Hezbollah rocket attacks in solidarity with its Palestinian ally Hamas, which is fighting Israel in Gaza.
This week’s escalation has displaced around 100,000 people in Lebanon, increasing the total number of people uprooted in the country by the conflict to well over 200,000. Israel says Hezbollah rocket attacks during the past year have forced the evacuation of 70,000 Israelis from northern Israel.
UNCONFIRMED REPORTS
Senior Hezbollah commanders were the target of Israel’s strike on the group’s central headquarters in Beirut’s suburbs on Friday but it was too early to say whether the attack took out its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, a senior Israeli official said on Friday.
“I think it’s too early to say, but, you know, it’s a question of time. Sometimes they hide the fact when we succeed,” the official told reporters when asked if the Israeli strike on Friday had killed Nasrallah.
The Israeli military said it had targeted Iran-backed Hezbollah‘s central headquarters in Beirut in an attack that shook the Lebanese capital.
Asked how long it might take to determine the fate of Nasrallah, the senior Israeli official said: “Certainly if he’s alive, you’ll know it very immediately. If he’s dead, it may take some time.”
The official, who was briefing reporters in New York on condition of anonymity, said: “We cannot survive if we don’t stop this and reverse it,” he said, referring to the threat to Israel from Iran-backed militia in the region.
“It’s impossible to reverse it without a general war. That was the assumption, a general war with Hezbollah, which, of course, entails the possibility of a broader war with Iran.”
“The other way to do it was to take him out. That’s the only thing. If you take him out, you not only neutralize, possibly neutralize that front, because nothing else will, but you also break a lynchpin. You break a central axis of the axis.”
Nasrallah became secretary general of Hezbollah in 1992 at just 35, the public face of a once shadowy group founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in 1982 to fight Israeli occupation forces.
Israel killed his predecessor, Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi, in a helicopter attack.
The official defended Israel’s action when asked why killing Nasrallah would change the threat from Hezbollah when earlier assassinations of militant leaders had not hobbled their organizations.
“I think it’s different,” the official said. “In many ways he keeps this thing focused, alive and kicking.”
“Some people are irreplaceable. It happens, some people do not have a substitute. That’s one of the cases, there’s no question,” the official said.
“About 10 days ago or two weeks ago, the cabinet made a decision that we cannot have – after a year – Israelis who are basically refugees in their own land,” the official said.
“So we added a formal war aim to bring our people back, to degrade Hezbollah‘s power, to be able to push them back from the border, to destroy the infrastructure along the border, to change the balance of forces.”
“The most important thing that we did was to try to take out about half of the missile and rocket capabilities that he built up over the last 30 years with Iran, and to take it out in a few hours. And we did,” the official said.
“I can’t tell you what will evolve, but I can tell you that this could be a pivot. We don’t seek a broader war. In fact, we seek not to have a broader war and Iran has to consider what it does now,” the official said.
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Jewish Icon Barbra Streisand Announces Production Has Begun on Her Multi-Part Documentary
Barbra Streisand. Photo: Vince Flores/startraksphoto.com via Reuters
Production has commenced on a documentary about legendary Jewish singer, actress, producer and director Barbra Streisand, she announced on Thursday.
“For years I’ve been thinking about the best way to share the vast amount of content I’ve been safely storing in my vault, much never seen or heard by the public. And today I’m delighted to finally share that we’re starting production on my official documentary,” Streisand wrote in an Instagram post.
The SAG Lifetime Achievement Award winner added that she is collaborating on the Sony Music project with director and fellow Oscar winner Frank Marshall and Oscar-winning producer Alex Gibney. Streisand is excited “to bring this very personal project to screens around the world,” she said.
“People have been talking about the need for the definitive documentary on Barbra Streisand for years. After a series of wonderful conversations and rigorous research, we are moving forward with Frank Marshall at the helm,” said Gibney. “I am delighted to produce this film on Barbra, a legendary singer, extraordinary actor, director, and political activist who inspires us all. Did I forget to mention that she’s a great storyteller who is funny as hell?”
Sony Music Vision announced that it is developing the “definitive multi-part documentary” in partnership with Columbia Records, Jigsaw Productions and the Kennedy/Marshall Company. The documentary will follow Streisand’s life starting from her upbringing in Brooklyn to her many career accomplishments, like her acclaimed breakout performance in “Funny Girl” on stage and then her Oscar win for that performance on film, but will also document her current life.
“The project will offer an intimate and comprehensive exploration of every facet of the iconic multi-hyphenate, who, in a career spanning six decades, has excelled in every area of entertainment,” according to Sony Music Vision.
The production team has also been granted one-of-a-kind access to Streisand’s ” treasure trove” of personal archival materials, including never-before-seen video, photographs, audio recordings and more. “We have been given unprecedented access to archival footage from decades of her groundbreaking career and intimate visibility to the trailblazing she continues to do in life today,” Marshall said. “Uncovering these remarkable moments illustrate why she has become an enduring icon to a global audience of all generations.”
Streisand became the first woman to write, produce, direct, and star in a major motion picture with the 1983 film “Yentl.” A EGOT winner, she won her first Oscar at the age of 27 and has been nominated for a Grammy 46 times. In 2023 she was awarded the annual Genesis Prize, nicknamed the “Jewish Nobel” by TIME magazine, which recognizes individuals for their achievements and commitment to Jewish values. She was also awarded last year the Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Woman of Leadership Award, named after the late Jewish Supreme Court justice.
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