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Israel Must Fight Hezbollah Like a State Army, Not Just a Terrorist Organization
Hezbollah members parade during a rally marking al-Quds Day, (Jerusalem Day) in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Lebanon, April 5, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
The daring operations carried out by Israel in the northern arena in recent weeks deserve to be praised for the exceptional feats they were.
According to The New York Times, the raid by the IDF’s Shaldag unit on the precision missile production site in Masyaf in Syria hit a vital site for Iran and Hezbollah in the field of precision missile production. The raid not only harmed the accelerated preparations of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) for the war in Lebanon, but also provided evidence of the IDF’s ability to raid and destroy similar sites in Lebanon.
The two waves of attack against Hezbollah via remote detonation of personal communication devices were also very important, as they introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The operation, attributed to Israel, caused significant horizontal damage to the organization both in terms of the dramatic scope of casualties and the disruption of the organization’s command and control. The surprise factor, as well as the sense of penetration inflicted on Hezbollah, are also very important. While it is better for such an operation to be carried out simultaneously with air and ground strikes as part of an all-out war, the decision to conduct it on its own was reasonable if the IDF was in a use-it-or-lose-it position.
It is possible that the elimination of Akil and his command group was related to the success of the previous operations. Some security managers may have been pushed aside in the emergency caused by Israel’s successes, creating another opportunity for Israeli intelligence.
The successes in Lebanon highlight the overall dragging on of the war in Gaza. The political reasons for this are clear and are being widely discussed in the Israeli media. The gap between the IDF’s tactical successes and the stubborn refusal to formulate a strategy for the war in the south — i.e., to come up with an alternative civilian control mechanism in Gaza — is visible to every Israeli citizen. What is less clear is the long and deep background at the level of Israeli military culture for this phenomenon.
In the decades since the 1990s, with the exception of Operation Defensive Shield, Israel has refrained from embarking on decisive military moves. Operational decisiveness, let’s remember, is an original Israeli-military concept.
Israel has never aimed for absolute victory and the evaporation of its enemies as political bodies — only for the removal of an immediate military threat. In the last decade, another military theory emerged — the “campaign short of war.” In the professional literature and in IDF strategy, this campaign is known as the “war between the wars” (WBW) or the “prevention” approach.
Formulated as Israel’s central strategy during the years of the Syrian civil war, this approach was based on delaying and preventing the enemy’s intensification through close intelligence surveillance and countermeasures (mostly airstrikes and occasionally special operations).
Some drafters of the approach stressed that it is not a substitute for the IDF’s ability to decisively defeat an enemy at war. “Whoever wants will prepare for war,” wrote Major General Nitzan Alon.
The logical connection between WBW and the idea of war itself was clarified in the same article. Disrupting the enemy’s plans to build up and prepare is part of the arms and war-readiness race. The balance of deterrence and freedom of strategic maneuver of the warring parties is closely related to the question of how each side perceives the degree of success it can expect.
But the culture and way of thinking of large organizations is shaped mainly through their actions. While to all intents and purposes Hezbollah became a military power many years ago and is now one of the largest and strongest armies in the region, decades of anti-terror operations have engrained strong habits into the IDF.
In the last decade, great attention was devoted to the WBW.
In a retirement interview Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot gave to The New York Times in January 2019, for example, extensive space was given to that campaign, which was presented with undisguised pride as a new strategy.
These efforts bore partial fruit. Iran does not maintain combat formations in Syria of the scope and quality it originally planned. Hezbollah would like to have much more significant capabilities in the field of precision missiles and in other fields.
But for all of that, here we are. The war has been going on for a year and seems to be escalating. Although many thought this was its role, the preventive approach did not prevent the war in the north.
The focus on WBW also came at a cost. WBW became a way of thinking and a pattern of behavior. Special operations are centrally managed at high levels. They exist within an almost perfect envelope of intelligence, air support and rescue capabilities. They always rely on the element of surprise, without which they are delayed or canceled. They give decision makers a sense of control and security.
Many commanders in the IDF testified that, in their opinion, these patterns affected the way the war in Gaza was conducted, at least in its first months. Too much centralized control, a slow pace of execution, and too limited freedom of action for the commanders on the ground.
The successes of the last few weeks point to another possible price.
The war in the north is, to a large extent, still managed under the same conceptual framework. Even after the assassination of Akil in the Dahaya district, Israel remains committed to the idea of the “threshold of escalation”.
The pager/walkie-talkie operations attributed to Israel stirred the world’s imagination and returned some of the luster that had been eroded from the IDF, and they no doubt hit the enemy hard. But as exciting as those successes were, the combination of covert capabilities in the Israeli concept of war must be seriously examined.
According to reports, the operation was launched at the moment it was due to fear of disclosure. It is likely that Israel was forced to escalate the war without gaining the operational benefits for which this capability was surely intended: throwing the enemy off balance as the IDF pushed into Lebanon.
However severe the damage to Hezbollah, it is likely to recover. Furthermore, Israel may have been forced into a strategic decision due to a tactical constraint: the fear of exposing the operation.
If this is the reality, then Hamas in Gaza — and Sinwar personally, who cut ties with the negotiation efforts for a hostage deal a few weeks ago — are the big beneficiaries.
For almost a year, Hamas has hoped for a strategic rescue through a flare-up of war in Lebanon. The IDF’s operational capability, a “red button” skillfully embedded in Hezbollah’s equipment, may have offered it new hope that this will come to pass.
This situation obliges us to think about the dependency of military capabilities on secret “red buttons.” That is not meant to diminish the vital role of secret intelligence in war. On the contrary: the closer integration of the Mossad in IDF operations, a trend to which the WBW contributed, is important and welcome. But a distinction must be made between the integration of the Mossad and its capabilities, if indeed that took place here, and the integration of covert operational capabilities in military moves.
Excellent intelligence obtained by the Mossad was also at the basis of Operation Moked at the start of the Six-Day War. But it was intelligence that enabled the air force’s preemptive attack on the Arab airbases.
The opening operation of the Six-Day War did not depend for its success on devices planted by the Mossad in the Egyptian planes or on pre-prepared sabotage of the Syrian airports.
Also, the one-time use of special capabilities deployed in enemy territory creates dramatic decision dilemmas. It was decision dilemmas combined with maintenance difficulties that caused “special measures” not to be activated on the eve of the Egyptian attack in 1973 and for the special systems of Unit 8200 to be unavailable on the eve of the attack on October 2023. In retrospect, a huge gap was discovered between the sense of security provided by these systems and their actual operational benefit.
The other series of questions concerns the way the IDF’s long focus on special operations has affected Israeli military thinking.
“We have a lot of capabilities. At every stage where we operate, we are already prepared two stages ahead,” the Chief of Staff was quoted as saying during his visit to the Northern Command after the pagers attack in Lebanon. This statement indicates that the IDF continues to think of the war as a chain of capability demonstrations and retaliation balances.
In the past, this was called “steps of escalation.”
A year into the war, the Chief of Staff is not quoted as briefing his subordinates in the Northern Command on the main goal of removing the Hezbollah threat in the North. Principles such as concentrating the effort and shortening the war are not mentioned.
Such ideas, called “theory of victory” in the professional literature, have a huge role to play not only as a war plan but also as a platform for a strategic coordination of expectations.
It is true that the Chief of Staff’s words were meant to be quoted in the open media. But precisely because of this, he could be expected to leverage the prospect of severe damage to Hezbollah or at least to convey the deterrent message that the IDF is facing a military decision.
Instead, the strategic message he sent is that the pager operation has not changed our strategic approach.
None of this is a coincidence.
The words of the Chief of Staff do not differ in essence from the famous “dynamic and evolving” approach that has characterized the contingency plans of the Southern Command in recent years.
Flexibility is an important tactical principle, and it can even be valuable in the management of a long-term strategy like the WBW. But flexibility is not a virtue for the conducting of war-fighting. At that level, clarity and concentration of effort are vital.
Clarity of purpose, not fuzziness, is what allows for tactical flexibility. The hidden assumption behind the “dynamic and evolving” approach is that operations are not conducted against the enemy as a military entity but as part of a strategic dialogue with its leadership. This is not a theory of victory.
The current Chief of Staff and his General Staff did not invent the WBW, the fight against terrorism, the deterrence operations or the steps of escalation. These appeared about 30 years ago and gradually became an almost intuitive way of thinking at our military and political level.
But the State of Israel has long faced terrorist armies, not terrorist organizations. A warlike way of thinking is required.
It is appropriate to congratulate and bless the IDF’s recent successes. It is also right to continue to support the IDF and its commanders in the conduct of the war.
But the war is also an opportunity for learning. The unfortunate reality is that even if we escalate to all-out war in Lebanon, chances are that it will end in some kind of agreement, not the complete removal of the military threat.
This means yet another war will break out in Lebanon within a few years. The current war is above all else a correction opportunity for Israeli strategy and the IDF’s theory of war.
A combatant force should strive to dismantle the enemy as a combatant system. It should be built for this end, while making strict assumptions regarding conditions of execution, the absence of the element of surprise, and non-optimal timing, because wars are not series of special operations. The forces should benefit from mutual support, such as air support for ground forces, but not be completely dependent on these envelopes.
The ground forces need to be prepared and built to conduct more independent ground operations in the near circle and be less dependent on a special operations envelope. The success of the operations in Gaza, for which tight and superior air-intelligence envelopes are a critical component, may obscure this need.
Israel must not allow itself to be fooled by success. The facts are that Israel chose not to destroy the enemy’s critical production infrastructure in Lebanon though it had done just that in Syria, even though the operational capability to do so was proven.
Like any serious military organization, the enemy will recover from the recent blows, simply because we are allowing him the time he needs to do so.
The IDF’s theory of war should be based on solid foundations that distinguish between the world of special operations and the world of war. Hezbollah is an army. Anti-terrorism methods will not do.
A year into the war, our learning of lessons and adaptation to the new strategic reality is still ahead of us.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications. A version oft this article originally appeared at The BESA Center.
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ADL Research: 24% of Americans Believe Recent Violence Against Jews Is ‘Understandable’

Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Lynn Milgrim who were shot and killed as they left an event at the Capital Jewish Museum, pose for a picture at an unknown location, in this handout image released by Embassy of Israel to the US on May 22, 2025. Photo: Embassy of Israel to the USA via X/Handout via REUTERS
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) released a report on Friday revealing American attitudes about antisemitic violence following the targeted attacks earlier this year against Jews in Boulder, Colo., Harrisburg, Pa., and Washington, D.C. The watchdog group found a sizable minority (24 percent) found the attacks “understandable” while 13 percent regarded them as “justified.”
The ADL surveyed a representative sample of 1000 Americans on Thursday, ensuring the group matched accurate proportions of the country’s demography. The findings showed disparate views across age groups and partisan affiliations while also a clear, majority consensus on many questions.
The survey showed that 87 percent of respondents believed the three recent antisemitic attacks to be unjustifiable while 85 percent called them morally wrong and 77 percent assessed them as antisemitic. Eighty-six percent regarded the violence against Jews as hate crimes. However, nearly a quarter of respondents said the attacks were “understandable.”
More Republicans (15 percent) than Democrats (11 percent) regarded the attacks as justified, while more Republicans (79 percent) than Democrats (77 percent) saw the attacks as antisemitic. Partisan differences also manifested in support for increased government action against antisemitism with 74 percent of Republicans in favor compared to 81 percent of Democrats.
In presenting their research findings, the ADL emphasized the broad agreement in American opposition to antisemitic violence and conspiracist tropes before noting the presence of a distinct minority of “millions of people who excuse or endorse violence against Jews—an alarming sign of how anti-Jewish narratives are spreading.” For example, 67 percent of Democrats and 58 percent of Republicans agree that antisemitism is a serious problem.
Smaller numbers among the Democrats (25 percent) and Republicans (23 percent) will acknowledge antisemitism as a concern in their own party. The ADL poll suggests the legitimacy of such suspicions, finding that “28 percent of Republicans and 30 percent of Democrats agreed with tropes such as Jews have too much influence in politics and media.”
Partisan affiliations correlated with where respondents saw the most significant antisemitic threats. Republicans expressed a 3.6 times greater likelihood of worries about left-wing antisemitism compared to Democrats who were 4.4 times as likely to focus on right-wing antisemitism.
The pollsters found that attitudes toward the severity of the antisemitic threat differed according to age.
While 80 percent of silent generation respondents saw antisemitism as a serious problem, that number fell to 65 percent for baby boomers and members of Generation X. The rates dropped again for millennials (52 percent) and Gen-Zers (55 percent).
Perceptions of antisemitism in local communities also differed by generation. While 19 percent of Americans overall report having witnessed antisemitism in their communities, that figure jumps to 33 percent for Gen-Zers and 20 percent for millennials. Among the boomers it drops to 10 percent and for Silent Generation respondents it reaches 17 percent.
Large numbers saw the threat of popular protest slogans “globalize the intifada” and “from the river to the sea” with 68 percent seeing the phrases as potentially fueling violence, a view held even among 54 percent of those who favor protests against Israel.
Researchers also observed a correlation between Israel support and perceiving the seriousness of antisemitism in America. While 74 percent of those favorable to Israel saw domestic antisemitism as significant, only 57 percent of those with negative views of the Jewish state agreed.
Nearly a quarter of those polled—24 percent—expressed the conspiratorial view that some group had staged the attacks to provoke sympathy for Israel. A second report also released by the ADL on Friday showed the rise in discussions of “false flag” attacks on the Reddit website in response to the antisemitic violence.
The ADL warned that “these beliefs are especially dangerous because they justify holding Jewish Americans responsible for the actions of the State of Israel, effectively viewing them as collectively responsible for international politics—making them greater targets.”
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Sen. Bernie Sanders Calls on Democrats to Stop Accepting Money From AIPAC

US Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) speaks to the media following a meeting with US President Joe Biden at the White House in Washington, US, July 17, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein
Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT), took to X/Twitter on Monday to call on all Democrats to stop accepting political donations from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the influential pro‑Israel lobbying entity.
In his tweet, Sanders wrote that AIPAC has aided Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in waging an “illegal and immoral war being waged against the Palestinian people.” Sanders continued, claiming that “NO Democrat should accept money from AIPAC” while asserting that the organization helped “deliver the presidency to Donald Trump.”
Sanders’s post came in response to comments by former Obama administration foreign policy advisor Ben Rhodes, in which Rhodes urged Democrats to reject all future donations from AIPAC. Rhodes argued that AIPAC has influenced Democrats to take immoral stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict.
“AIPAC is part of the constellation of forces that has delivered this country into the hands of Donald Trump and Stephen Miller, and you cannot give them a carve out,” Rhodes said on an episode of the podcast Pod Save the World. “We need to have this fight as a party, because these are the wrong people to have under your tent.”
Tommy Vietor, another former Obama administration official and podcast co-host, agreed, accusing AIPAC of “funneling money to front organizations that primary progressive Democrats.”
AIPAC, the foremost pro-Israel lobbying firm in the US, has historically backed pro-Israel candidates from both parties. The organization does not specifically lobby against progressive candidates. AIPAC has aided the campaigns of pro-Israel progressives such as Ritchie Torres.
Sanders has long held an acrimonious relationship with AIPAC. In November 2023, he repudiated the group for supposedly having”supported dozens of GOP extremists who are undermining our democracy,” and urged his fellow Democrats to stand together in the fight for a world of peace, economic and social justice and climate sanity.”
Rhodes, a former deputy national security adviser under President Obama, has emerged as a vocal critic of Israeli policy, particularly under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. His skepticism is rooted in years of diplomatic frustration during the Obama administration, especially surrounding failed peace negotiations and Israel’s settlement expansions in the West Bank. Rhodes has often framed Israel’s hardline stance as a major obstacle to a two-state solution, and he has been critical of what he sees as unconditional U.S. support that enables right-wing Israeli policies. His stance reflects a broader shift among some American progressives who advocate for a more balanced U.S. approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Sanders has long been a staunch critic of the Jewish state. Sanders has repeatedly accused Israel of committing “collective punishment” and “apartheid” against the Palestinian people. Although the senator initially condemned the Oct. 7 slaughters of roughly 1200 people throughout southern Israel by Hamas, he subsequently pushed for a “ceasefire” between the Jewish state and the terrorist group. Sanders also spearheaded an unsuccessful campaign to implement a partial arms embargo on Israel in 2024.
In the 20 months following the Hamas-led attacks on Israel, relations between the Democratic party and the Jewish state have deteriorated. Democratic lawmakers have grown more vocally critical of Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, sometimes arguing that the Jewish state has recklessly endangered lives of Palestinian civilians. Moreover, polls indicate that Democratic voters have largely turned against Israel, intensifying pressure on liberal lawmakers to shift their tone regarding the war in Gaza.
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Iranian National Charged in Plot to Subvert US Sanctions Against Islamic Republic

Iranians participating in a memorial ceremony for IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists in downtown Tehran, Iran, on July 2, 2025. Photo: Morteza Nikoubazl via Reuters Connect.
Federal law enforcement officials have arrested an Iranian national after uncovering his alleged conspiracy to export US technology to Tehran in violation of a slew of economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic, the US Department of Justice announced on Friday.
For May 2018 to July 2025, Bahram Mohammad Ostovari, 66, allegedly amassed “railway signaling and telecommunications systems” for transport to the Iranian government by using “two front companies” located in the United Arab Emirates. After filing fake orders for them with US vendors at Ostovari’s direction, the companies shipped the materials — which included “sophisticated computer processors” — to Tehran, having duped the US businesses into believing that they “were the end users.”
The Justice Department continued, “After he became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in May 2020, Ostovari continued to export, sell, and supply electronics and electrical components to [his company] in Iran,” noting that the technology became components of infrastructure projects commissioned by the Islamic Republic.
Ostovari has been charged with four criminal counts for allegedly violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), under which conducting business with Iran is proscribed due to the country’s human rights abuses, material support for terrorism, and efforts to build a larger-scale nuclear program in violation of international non-proliferation obligations. Each count carries a 20-year maximum sentence in federal prison.
Ostovari is one of several Iranian nationals to become the subject of criminal proceedings involving crimes against the US this year.
In April, a resident of Great Falls, Virginia — Abouzar Rahmati, 42 — pleaded guilty to collecting intelligence on US infrastructure and providing it to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“From at least December 2017 through June 2024, Rahmati worked with Iranian government officials and intelligence operatives to act on their behalf in the United States, including by meeting with Iranian intelligence officers and government officials using a cover story to hide his conduct,” the Justice Department said at the time, noting that Rahmati even infiltrated a contractor for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that possesses “sensitive non-public information about the US aviation sector.”
Throughout the duration of his cover, Rahmati amassed “open-source and non-public materials about the US solar energy industry,” which he delivered to “Iranian intelligence officers.”
The government found that the operation began in August 2017, after Rahmati “offered his services” to a high-ranking Iranian government official who had once been employed by the country’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, according to the Justice Department. Months later, he traveled to Iran, where Iranian agents assigned to him the espionage activity to which he pleaded guilty to perpetrating.
“Rahmati sent additional material relating to solar energy, solar panels, the FAA, US airports, and US air traffic control towers to his brother, who lived in Iran, so that he would provide those files to Iranian intelligence on Rahmati’s behalf,” the Justice Department continued. Rahmati also, it said, delivered 172 gigabytes worth of information related to the National Aerospace System (NAS) — which monitors US airspace, ensuring its safety for aircraft — and NAS Airport Surveillance to Iran during a trip he took there.
Rahmati faces up to 10 years in prison. He will be sentenced in August.
In November, three Iranian intelligence assets were charged with contriving a conspiracy to assassinate critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as then US President-elect Donald Trump.
According to the Justice Department, Farhad Shakeri, 51; Carlisle Rivera, 49; and Jonathan Loadholt, 36, acted at the direction of and with help from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an internationally designated terrorist organization, to plot to murder a US citizen of Iranian origin in New York. Shakeri, who remains at large and is believed to reside in Iran, was allegedly the principal agent who managed the two other men, both residents of New York City who appeared in court.
Their broader purpose, prosecutors said, was to target nationals of the United States and its allies for attacks, including “assaults, kidnapping, and murder, both to repress and silence critical dissidents” and to exact revenge for the 2020 killing of then-IRGC Quds Force chief Qasem Soleimani in a US drone strike in Iraq. Trump was president of the US at the time of the operation.
All three men are now charged with murder-for-hire, conspiracy, and money laundering. Shakeri faces additional charges, including violating sanctions against Iran, providing support to a terrorist organization, and conspiring to violate the International Emergency Powers Act, offenses for which he could serve up to six decades in federal prison.
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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