The IDF is operating in the Gaza Strip to implement the directives of the political echelon. The objectives the cabinet defined for the army at a meeting on October 16, 2023, are: toppling the Hamas regime and destroying its military and governmental capabilities, removing the terrorist threat from the Gaza Strip, creating conditions for the return of the hostages, and defending the borders of the state and its citizens while removing the security threat from Gaza, and leaving the IDF full freedom of action without restrictions on the use of force. The IDF is succeeding in systematically dismantling Hamas, although the fighting in Gaza is fierce and exacting painful costs. After more than four months of war, the IDF has taken control of the northern Gaza Strip and has full operational freedom of action in the area. The forces operate in a variety of ways to continue cleansing Hamas infrastructure — above and below ground. Progress has also been made in Khan Yunis, where the IDF is eliminating terrorists and destroying their infrastructure.

Hamas is deeply embedded in the population of the Gaza Strip. Not only do Hamas terrorists receive support and assistance from the population, some of the “civilian” population has intensified resistance and taken up arms against IDF forces. The event of Simchat Torah when a barbaric mob joined the Nukhba terrorists in carrying out the massacre in Gaza border communities, was not exceptional. In fact, this is a “popular” war with the participation of civilians. The Gaza Strip has seen the emergence of a generation whose sole goal is to kill and exterminate Jews. In the face of this resistance, the IDF is succeeding in advancing methodically and systematically.

Recently, questions have been raised as to whether Israel needs to extend operations to Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor. The prime minister has already said on several occasions that this war will not end until the IDF operates in Rafah and takes over the Philadelphi Corridor. An operation in this arena is of great importance for several reasons. First, it is Hamas’ last organized stronghold in the Gaza Strip, and the elimination of Hamas’ military capabilities will not be achieved without the destruction of the battalions stationed there. Second, Israel must remove Hamas’ governmental capabilities in this area. Third, in order to free hostages, it is essential to reach the areas where they are held.

As we saw in the operation to rescue Fernando Simon Merman and Luis Hare, some of the hostages are being held in the Rafah area. Moreover, we need to realize that Israeli communities in areas opposite Rafah will not return to their homes if operational Hamas battalions are on the other side of the border. Finally, the border between Gaza and Egypt — the Philadelphi Corridor — still operates as a conduit for the entry of weapons into the Strip through a network of tunnels. The IDF will have to eliminate this smuggling route.

With the IDF’s advance in Khan Yunis, a chorus of countries began to announce their opposition to an IDF operation in Rafah, in most cases due to their concern for the large population of displaced persons in the Rafah area. White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said on Feb. 12, 2024, that, “the Israelis have a commitment, an obligation to make sure that they can provide for the safety of innocent Palestinian people that are there [in Rafah].” He added that the US doesn’t “want to see any forced relocation of people out of Gaza … we support and continue to support an extended humanitarian pause.”

It should be remembered that as far as the United States is concerned, the operation in Rafah could interfere with the process it is trying to advance, the essence of which is the cessation of hostilities and agreement (or coercion on Israel) to bring the Palestinian Authority into the Gaza Strip, and thus enable the advancement of normalization with Saudi Arabia. It wants to do all this in a timetable that could give President Biden an achievement to present to the American electorate ahead of the presidential elections in November. Needless to say, this American desire does not correspond at all with the reality in the region and with the Israeli public’s position on the Palestinian Authority.

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron said (Feb. 10, 2024) that the UK was “deeply concerned” about the possibility of military action in Rafah. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak also said he was “deeply concerned about the loss of civilian life in Gaza and the potentially devastating humanitarian impact of a military incursion into Rafah.” French President Emmanuel Macron went further when he told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about France’s “firm opposition to an Israeli offensive in Rafah, which could only lead to a humanitarian disaster of a new magnitude, as to any forced displacement of populations.” According to reports, Macron added that Israeli military action “would constitute violations of the international humanitarian law and would pose an additional risk of regional escalation.”

It should be noted that the number of non-combatant casualties in the Gaza Strip is among the lowest in the world when compared to all the wars in urban areas in the past hundred years. Even if we believe the reports of the Hamas-run Palestinian Health Ministry in Gaza, the ratio of civilian casualties is 1.3 non-combatants for each Hamas terrorist killed. This contrasts with a ratio of 5-7 non-combatants for every dead combatant in other urban battles where a large civilian population was present. The non-combatant casualty ratio in Gaza is particularly low because the IDF developed combat methods that have enabled it to dismantle Hamas while preserving the lives of civilians in the Gaza Strip in a way that no country has succeeded in doing (or did not even try or never wanted to succeed in doing so in the first place) in urban warfare in recent decades.

Egypt, for its part on the other hand, opposes the operation because it fears that the border will be breached and many Palestinians will flock into the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian media even went so far as to claim that relations with Israel could be damaged if this happened. Egypt should be reminded of its laxity in preventing the strengthening of Hamas in the Gaza Strip due to the passage of weapons into Gaza through the Rafah crossing or through the tunnel network under the Philadelphi Corridor.

There has also been criticism of the IDF for not operating simultaneously in both the southern and northern Gaza Strip — but it is indeed easy to criticize those who actually do the work. The IDF, which has been severely curtailed in recent decades, found itself going to war with a very small order of battle given the challenges faced in Gaza. It was also necessary to direct some of the forces to Judea and Samaria and to defend the northern front. The IDF has thus been forced to manage the army’s resources, including reserves, in a way that will enable it to conduct a prolonged campaign. As a result, it also had to prioritize operations within the Gaza campaign itself.

The operation in Rafah is necessary and inevitable. So too is cutting off Hamas’ smuggling route along the Philadelphi Corridor. The IDF will have to create for itself complete operational freedom of action for decades to come in Gaza in order to eliminate any possibility of a rebuilding of terrorist capabilities there. There will also have to be a long process of de-Hamasification. Operating in Rafah and other terrorist centers in Gaza is an essential component in achieving the goals of the war, and as we have learned from the long months of fighting, the IDF will be able to carry out this operation successfully while maintaining the norms of international humanitarian law.

Gabi Siboni was director of the military and strategic affairs program, and the cyber research program, of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) from 2006-2020, where he founded academic journals on these matters. He serves as a senior consultant to the IDF and other Israeli security organizations and the security industry. He holds a B.Sc. and M.Sc. in engineering from Tel Aviv University and a Ph.D. in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) from Ben-Gurion University. A version of this article was originally published by The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. 

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