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Israel’s Understanding of Time

Israeli flag. Photo: Eduardo Castro / Pixabay.

JNS.org – For Israel, it’s all about chronology. Time represents both the most critical determinant of Israel’s survival and the context within which such survival must be ensured. As with an individual human being, time is also the reciprocal of death. This vital relationship is currently most conspicuous regarding Hamas and Hezbollah, but it is most urgently meaningful regarding war with Iran.

For Israel, successful geopolitics will necessarily center on this impending war. Whether the expected conflict will be sudden or incremental, its consequences could prove existential. Of greatest significance for Israel will be avoiding a nuclear war. Inter alia, this objective will be contingent on Jerusalem’s “use of time.”

What can these ambiguous observations mean for Israel in operational terms? What might be learned about the estimable probabilities of an unmanageable war with Iran? Hezbollah’s fighting capacities are greater than those of all other jihadist terror organizations, singularly and cumulatively. These belligerent capacities present a strategic threat to Israel even apart from their Iranian backing.

A key question now arises for Israel: To what extent could a greater conceptual awareness of time generate calculable security advantages for the beleaguered Jewish state?

Though generally unrecognized, Hezbollah and Israel’s other principal terrorist adversaries define authentic victory from the bewildering standpoint of “power over death.” For all these recalcitrant foes, becoming a “martyr” (shahid) represents “power over time.” Accordingly, Jerusalem will need to think about how best to undermine such intangible but determinative notions of power.

In Jerusalem, “real-time” ought never to be interpreted solely in terms of clock measurements. But what would constitute a suitably personalized and policy-centered theory of time?

Whether explicit or implicit, Israeli security analyses should contain theory-based elements of chronology. Israel’s many-sided struggle against war and terror will need to be conducted with more intellectually determined and nuanced concepts of time. Though seemingly “impractical,” such “felt time” or “inner time” conceptualizations could sometimes reveal more about Israel’s core survival problem than any easily decipherable measurements of clocks.

The pertinent notion of “felt time” or “time-as-lived” has its origins in ancient Israel. By rejecting time as a simple linear progression, the early Hebrews approached chronology as a qualitative experience. Once it had been dismissed as something that could submit only to quantitative measures, time began to be understood by seminal Jewish thinkers as a distinctly subjective quality. This view identified time as inseparable from its personally infused content.

In terms of current threats from Iran, Israeli planners should consider chronology not only at the most obvious operational levels (e.g., how much “time” before Iran becomes nuclear?), but also at the level of individual Iranian decision-makers (e.g., what do authoritative leaders in Tehran think about time in shaping their nuclear plans vis-à-vis Israel?).

From its beginnings, the Jewish prophetic vision was one of a community living “in time.” In this formative view, political space or geography was palpably important, but not because of territoriality. Instead, the relevance of particular geographic spaces stemmed from certain unique events that had presumably taken place within their boundaries.

It’s time to return to expressly tactical and strategic issues. For Israel, security policy enhancements should include support for “escalation dominance.” When Israel and Iran are engaged in continuous direct warfare, each adversary can be expected to seek primacy during unprecedented episodes of escalation but to accomplish this objective without heightening the risks of an existential conflict. Among other things, any such expectation would require mutual assumptions of enemy rationality.

There will be multiple particulars. If it could be determined that Iran and/or Hezbollah accept a short time horizon in their search for tangible “victory” over Israel, any Israeli response to enemy aggressions would have to be “swift” in the traditional sense. If it would seem that the presumed enemy time horizon was calculably longer, Jerusalem’s expected response could still be more or less incremental. For Israel, this would mean relying more on the relatively passive dynamics of military deterrence and military defense than on any active strategies of nuclear war fighting.

In the final analysis, the worst case for Israel would be to face an irrational Iran. Moreover, this could happen simultaneously with the appearance of the Hezbollah suicide bomber in microcosm: the flesh-and-blood individual terrorist. Of special interest to Israel’s prime minister and general staff, therefore, should be the hidden time horizons of this jihadist suicide bomber. In essence, this self-defiling terror-criminal is so afraid of “not being” that any plan for “suicide” will be intended as personal death avoidance. Prima facie, such a plan is not “only” literal nonsense; it is also patent cowardice.

An aspiring suicide bomber opposing Israel sees himself or herself as a religious sacrificer. This signals a jihadist adversary’s desperate hope to escape from time that lacks any “sacred” meaning. The relevant jihadist adversary could be an individual Hezbollah terrorist, the sovereign state of Iran or both acting in tandem.

What should Israel do with all such informed understandings of its Islamist adversaries’ concept of time? Jerusalem’s immediate policy response should be to convince both aspiring Hezbollah suicide bombers and Iranian national leaders that their intended “sacrifices” could never elevate them or their societies above the immutably mortal limits of time. This will be an intellectual problem, not a political problem.

Israeli policy-makers will need to recognize certain dense problems of chronology as policy-relevant quandaries. They will also need to acknowledge to themselves that any plausible hopes for national security and “escalation dominance” should be informed by reason. In Jerusalem, all ordinary considerations of domestic politics and global geopolitics will need to be understood as both reflective and transient.

“As earthlings,” comments Hoosier author Kurt Vonnegut, “all have had to believe whatever clocks said.” As necessary fonts of national security decision-making, Israeli strategic thinkers now have it in their power to look beyond the simplifying hands of clocks and investigate more policy-purposeful meanings of time. For Jerusalem, exercising such latent intellectual power could offer a survival posture of potentially unimaginable value. In the final analysis, Israel must survive in a subjective time that is “felt” by its enemies while it is being measured by clocks.

The post Israel’s Understanding of Time first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Reflections on the Jewish People Since Oct. 7: The Will to Never Give Up, and Protect Their Homeland

An Israeli soldier stands during a two-minute siren marking the annual Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Day, at an installation at the site of the Nova festival where party goers were killed and kidnapped during the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas terrorists from Gaza, in Reim, southern Israel, May 6, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad

This year, the one year anniversary of the October 7 Hamas massacre fell on the Jewish High Holidays, between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. What did this signify? Do we need to seek a meaning in this peculiar, sorrowful, tragic lunar coincidence? Ten days of awe, ten days of repentance.

One of the ongoing themes of the Days of Awe is the concept that God inscribes our names into the Book of Life, writing down who will live and who will die, who will have a good life and who will have a bad one, for the next year. These books are written on Rosh Hashanah, and sealed on Yom Kippur. But during these days of awe, we can alter G-d’s decree.

If we look back at the year Israel experienced between October 7, 2023, and October 7, 2024, we see a small, ultra-modern, democratic nation surrounded by hostile states that openly threaten Israel and America.

On October 7, 2023, the Jewish nation endured one of its darkest hours since the Holocaust. Despite the world’s tepid sympathy, including what I regard as inadequate support from the United States, and widespread condemnation of Israel’s response to the attack, Israel has remained defiant in the face of relentless pressure from anti-Zionist and hypocritical forces. These forces include the farcical United Nations, with its cowardly, blatantly antisemitic chief; the International Court of injustice; and prominent figures from around the world, including many American politicians of Jewish descent, all of whom have sought to undermine Israel’s right to exist.

Still, against all odds, Israel has dismantled Hamas and severely weakened Hezbollah, and although it has not finished Hamas off in its entirety, it has nevertheless greatly diminished its militaristic might. Israel has also taken the fight to Iran, and the collapse of the Assad government in Syria shows much Israel has accomplished, and Iran and its proxies have lost, since the Hamas pogrom in October 2023.

Now, like at no other time in its history, Israel needs true, strong, and honest allies who trust Israel and don’t try to restrain it out of calculating and cynical self-interest. Had America or the United Kingdom ever found themselves in a situation of a true existential threat, no other country or political body on earth would have been able to push them toward the self-restraint they continue to demand of Israel.

Israel again and again tells the world that we Jews matter — despite our small numbers and despite what has happened to us, and despite what has been happening to us for the past two millennia.

We are a sovereign nation, and we, and only we, shall determine our fate. Never again shall we be enslaved; our fate will never be in the hands of other people and other nations. Our nation shall never depend on the mercy of other people. As Jews, we will not allow ourselves to be taken away, humiliated, or abused — because now we have a country of our own that will protect us from our enemies.

The fate of the Jewish people has always been the extreme balancing act between survival and extermination, and in between those two extremes, we Jews have managed to make lives for ourselves. Our identity is rooted in life, in how we value it, how we fight for it, and whom we trust with it. Unlike so many of those who seek to destroy us, we are not a cult of death, but a nation of life.  We search and find meaning in everything life throws at us, even suffering and tragedy.

Our eyes are still filled with tears, our hearts are heavy with unbearable pain, and our minds are clouded with sadness over the loss of the lives so brutally taken from us since October 7, 2023, and the hostages and their bodies that are still captive in Gaza. And, despite all this, we — the Jewish nation, headed by the state of Israel — have demonstrated to the world that we will not give up and that we have not forgotten how to fight back. Our unwavering goal remains to protect our Jewish homeland, our Jewish freedom, and the voice of Jewish communities in the Diaspora.

We Jews stand here today to announce to the world that we are here to stay, whether in Israel or here in this messy antisemitic world, called the Diaspora.

I think this notion for us Jews today transcends religion. There are those among us who are religious, and those who are not. There are those who believe in G-d, and there are those who don’t. Some people are angry with him and argue with him about the injustice and cruelty that has befallen the Jewish nation and enveloped this world with unbearable sadness. But maybe by coming together,  and showing up for Israel, maybe G-d has looked down upon us and and inscribed us in the “good” book, because we are saying “yes” to a nation that chooses life over death — not only for its own people, but for everyone who chooses the glorious lightness of freedom over the despairing abyss of tyranny.

Anya Gillinson is an immigration lawyer and author of the new memoir Dreaming in Russian. She lives in New York City. More at www.anyagillinson.com

The post Reflections on the Jewish People Since Oct. 7: The Will to Never Give Up, and Protect Their Homeland first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Why Is the NYPD Refusing to Protect Jews, But Enabling Genocidal Hamas Supporters?

Pro-Hamas students staging an anti-Hillel protest as New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers look on. Photo: Columbia Jewish & Israeli Students/Screenshot

It’s good to know that a New Yorker from a well-known Jewish family — and a dedicated public servant — has recently been named Commissioner of the New York Police Department (NYPD). With violence against Jews soaring, Jessica Tisch has a unique chance to lead the nation’s largest police force — and lead the way for law enforcement agencies nationwide to push back against antisemites — and pro-Hamas violent mobs — everywhere. We demand that Zionists and all Jews be protected in New York.

Just a few months ago, terrorist supporters menacingly chanted “We’re gonna get you” outside of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hotel, the Loews Hotel, which the Tisch family owns. and no one was arrested. But even worse than threatening one Israeli leader, is that pro-Hamas supporters have been marching with impunity since October 2023, demanding and supporting the murder of Jews in Israel, New York, and all across the world.

In response, the NYPD has insisted many of these marches are protected by freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. In reality, these marches are incitement to murder — and often descend into violence — and letting them happen with no consequence only  encourages more violence.

I am writing to Commissioner Tisch with deep concern about the future of the Jewish community in New York City. Antisemitism has permeated all areas of daily life in New York, and Jew-haters operate with impunity in this city, which is no longer safe for Jews. We have had enough political speeches and empty promises. We don’t care what Mayor Eric Adams says about the hostages, we care that he does not keep the Jews of New York safe.

As the head of the NYPD, Commissioner Tisch must be aware that last Saturday evening, on 59th Street and 5th Avenue, a large disruptive pro-Hamas rally was held in front of the Park Lane Hotel, where Israel’s former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was staying. As masked terrorist supporters waved Hamas and Hezbollah flags and screamed “We don’t want no Zionists here” — amidst violent calls for “intifada” — Tisch’s NYPD removed American Jewish Zionists who were present from the scene, as the police said they could not protect Jews from violence.

If Jews (codeword Zionists) aren’t safe on a Saturday evening on 59th street — but Hamas supporters are — then the NYPD is not doing its job. There should be enough cops to protect everyone.

As a New Yorker, I see Jews beaten with shocking frequency, and threatened with impunity by jihadis with face coverings who intimidate, terrorize, and disrupt life daily. The NYPD’s job is to protect people everywhere, not allow jihadi supporters to run rampant.

Here were some of the chants heard on Saturday night: “Hitler should have finished you off” and we will “give you the United Health treatment.”

How is this allowed to happen? These are threats of murder — plain and simple. And as we Jews no, threats rarely often end there.

We demand that Commissioner Tisch immediately remove the handcuffs from the NYPD and arrest criminals. We demand the police enforce the law, and not pro-terrorist rallies block streets and roads. We demand she urge the FBI and Homeland Security to investigate people who openly support illegal terror organizations and work with the new presidential administration to get them deported if they aren’t citizens if they are breaking US law and threatening people with murder and violence.

We are past the crisis point for Jews in New York City. We want action to protect Jews, of which we have seen none. After heinous protests celebrating murder and rape took place at an exhibit on the Nova Festival massacre, Mayor Adams said, “We have the largest Jewish population outside of Israel right here in New York. This is not going to be a city where you’ll have to take off your yarmulke, be afraid to walk inside a synagogue.”

The reality is that many Jews have taken off their yarmulkes, as the streets have been surrendered to terrorists. Antisemitism is flourishing in New York City, and Jews have never been so unsafe as they are today in Gotham. Jews who haven’t yet escaped to Florida or elsewhere are wondering if there is a future for Jews in New York City. It certainly doesn’t feel like it.

The job you signed up for is to keep this city safe, Ms. Tisch. We demand you do your job, as you remind New York and America that not only are Zionists welcome here, but they are welcome everywhere.

Ronn Torossian is an American-Israeli entrepreneur, author and philanthropist.

The post Why Is the NYPD Refusing to Protect Jews, But Enabling Genocidal Hamas Supporters? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israel Must Make Its Nuclear Intentions Clear in Order to Stay Safe in an Escalating Middle East

Israel’s nuclear reactor near Dimona. Photo: Wikicommons

Recent events  in Syria underscore the changing geo-strategic landscape in the Middle East. For Israel, although the fall of Assad will likely weaken Iran, it won’t necessarily reduce the risk of a nuclear war in the region. In fact, there is apt to take place a strengthening of certain Sunni sub-state jihadist elements, a development that could prove “force-multiplying” with a non-nuclear Turkey and/or an already-nuclear non-Arab Pakistan. Plausible “wild cards” in this opaque mix would be an increasingly desperate pre-nuclear Iran and an expectedly perplexed non-nuclear Saudi Arabia. Also to be factored in should be the unpredictable element of already-nuclear Iranian ally North Korea and its potentially critical connections to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In essence, even a newly-weakened and still pre-nuclear Iran could pose existential hazards to Israel by means of North Korean military surrogates.

Israel’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear doctrine should ensure national survival. In the early 1950s, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, already understood the need for a conspicuous “equalizer” to secure an otherwise too-vulnerable Jewish State.

Early on, the “old man” had recognized that in the absence of task-appropriate nuclear assets, Israel could sometime lose every tangible chance to simply endure.

Still, no category of weapons, even nuclear ordnance, is meaningful on its own All weapon systems need to be informed by suitable strategy and tactics. How should these special Israeli assets be “used?”

Back in the early days, when Americans and the Soviets were first defining a bipolar Cold War nuclear strategy ex nihilo, Israel had nowhere to turn for a template of useful nuclear guidance. What Jerusalem did understand, from the start, is that nuclear ordnance can succeed only through non-use.

This seeming paradox has prominent conceptual origins in Sun Tzu’s ancient dictum from The Art of War: “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” In brief, deterrence, whether ancient or contemporary, “works” to the extent that prospective aggressors could calculate that the expected costs of striking first would exceed expected gains.

To work, designated adversaries must be considered rational nation-states. Sometimes, these states could operate in tandem with other states (an alliance) or with assorted terror groups (hybrid). In the future, Israel’s enemies could include sub-state nuclear foes acting by themselves, such as Hezbollah, after it had become the recipient of reassuring nuclear largesse from Iran or even North Korea.

For now, at least, Israel has no current nuclear enemies, unless one were to consider Pakistan.

Despite a common enemy in Israel, the conflict between radical Shiite and Sunni forces continues across the region. For all sides, the aim of this conflict is “escalation dominance” during episodes of competitive risk-taking. Over time, such escalations by Iran could include nuclear warheads, not against insurgent targets, but against a formidable Arab state such as Saudi Arabia.

As a literal matter of survival, Israel should be intellectually creative and conceptually well-prepared. For deterrence to work long-term, Iran and its proxies would need to be told more rather than less about (1) Israel’s nuclear targeting doctrine; and (2) the expected invulnerability and penetration-capability of Israel’s nuclear forces.

However counter-intuitive, this means that to best prepare for all plausible attack scenarios, Israel should plan conscientiously for the incremental replacement of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” with apt levels of “selective nuclear disclosure.” In common parlance, it will soon be time for Jerusalem to remove Israel’s bomb from the “basement.”

For Israel, the only continuously true purpose of nuclear weapons should be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. Nonetheless, there would inevitably remain diverse circumstances under which Israeli nuclear deterrence could fail.

How might such fearful circumstances arise? Four principal though not mutually exclusive scenarios now warrant both mention and examination. Israel’s strategic planners should study these paradigmatic narratives closely, and prepare to deal effectively with any and all of them, singly and in potentially synergistic interactions.

Taken together with the four basic scenarios outlined below, these “parallel” narratives could help provide Israel with needed intellectual armaments to prevent “the worst.” Presently, though Israel need not worry about any existing regional nuclear adversary, state or sub-state, it’s nuclear weapons and doctrine could still represent an indispensable “ultimate” deterrent against forms of massive conventional/biological/chemical attack.

(1)     Nuclear Retaliation

Should Iran or an alliance of enemy states ever launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel (in principle, this could include North Korea), Jerusalem would respond to the extent possible with a nuclear retaliatory strike. If enemy first-strikes were to involve other available forms of unconventional weapons, such as chemical, biological or EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons, Israel might still launch a “limited” nuclear reprisal. This decision would depend, in large measure, on Jerusalem’s informed expectations of follow-on enemy aggression and its comparative calculations of damage-limitation.

If Israel were to absorb a massively disruptive non-nuclear attack, a nuclear retaliation could not automatically be ruled out, especially if: (a) the state aggressors were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel’s leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent annihilation of the Jewish State. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out only in those rapidly discernible circumstances where enemy state aggressions were clearly conventional, “typical” (that is, consistent with all previous instances of attack, in degree and intent), and hard-target oriented (that is, directed towards Israeli weapons and related military infrastructures, rather than civilian populations).

(2)     Nuclear Counter retaliation

Should Israel ever feel compelled to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons, the target state(s)’ response would largely determine Jerusalem’s next moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would doubtlessly turn to some available form of nuclear counter retaliation.

If this retaliation were to involve other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, Israel could also feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative. Again, this decision would depend upon Jerusalem’s judgments of enemy intent and on its corollary calculations of damage-limitation.

Should the enemy state response to Israel’s preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is unlikely that the Jewish State would then move to any nuclear counter retaliations. If, however, the enemy conventional retaliation was “all-out” and directed toward Israeli civilian populations as well as Israeli military targets, an Israeli nuclear counter retaliation could not be excluded. Such a counter retaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy state’s conventional retaliation were identifiably proportionate to Israel’s preemption; confined to Israeli military targets; circumscribed by the legal limits of “military necessity”; and accompanied by certain explicit and verifiable assurances of non-escalatory intent.

(3)     Nuclear Preemption

It is highly implausible that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would be rational and permissible under authoritative international law, it is unlikely that Israel would allow itself to reach such irremediably dire circumstances. Unless the nuclear weapons involved were usable in a fashion still consistent with the longstanding laws of war, this most extreme form of preemption could represent an expressly egregious violation of humanitarian international law.

Even if such consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the entire world community would be strongly negative and significantly far-reaching. This means that an Israeli nuclear preemption could conceivably be expected only: (a) where Israel’s pertinent state enemies had acquired nuclear and/or other weapons of mass destruction judged capable of annihilating the Jewish State; (b) where these enemies had made it clear that their intentions paralleled their genocidal capabilities; (c) where these enemies were believed ready to begin an operational “countdown to launch;” and (d) where Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could not achieve the needed minimum levels of damage-limitation — that is, levels consistent with physical preservation of the Jewish State.

(4)     Nuclear War fighting

Should nuclear weapons ever be introduced into any actual conflict between Israel and its enemies, either by Israel or a regional foe, nuclear war fighting, at one level or another, could ensue. This would hold true so long as: (a) enemy first-strikes would not destroy Israel’s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy the Jewish State’s nuclear counter retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for conventional first-strikes would not destroy the enemy’s nuclear counter retaliatory capability.

In order to satisfy its most indispensable survival imperatives, Israel must take appropriate steps to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the simultaneous unlikelihood of (c) and (d).

Even in the midst of “only” a conventional war with Iran, Israel could sometime decide that the expectations of “escalation dominance” had become overwhelming and that escalation to nuclear combat would be the sole rational option.

A compelling example could involve an Iranian non-nuclear missile attack upon Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor, Iranian resort to radiation-dispersal weapons (dirty bombs), and/or Pyongyang’s combat involvement on behalf of Iran.

All these scenarios pose more-or-less indecipherable hazards for Jerusalem, including manifestly unknown prospects of enemy irrationality. Writing in broadly philosophical terms, philosopher Karl Jaspers observed: “The rational is not thinkable without its other, the non-rational, and it never appears in reality without it.”

Understood in more narrowly military or strategic terms, Jaspers wisdom suggests that appearances may deceive and an apparently rational foe in Tehran could turn in extremis to non-rational decision-making.

The opposite is also worrisome. Accordingly, for Israel, a presumptively irrational adversary in Iran could unexpectedly turn to rational decision-making, a policy tilt that would at first seem welcome but quickly become dissembling. In tangible essence, this tilt could create unmanageable levels of “cognitive dissonance” for strategic planners in Jerusalem.

For Jerusalem, in daring to face prospects of a nuclear war, candor matters. In all matters of national security strategy, just as in all matters of law and jurisprudence, truth will be exculpatory. Going forward in an unprecedented strategic universe, Israel will need to combine deeply theoretical examinations with tangibly pragmatic policies. Ironically, even its most plainly threatening nuclear weapons could prove useless or self-defeating unless there had first been suitable advance planning for virtually every imaginable WMD war scenario.

For Israel, national survival must always be about what ancient Greeks and Macedonians defined as a struggle of “mind over mind.” Even in a steadily nuclearizing world, the true contest is never just about “mind over matter.” In the end, if all goes well for Israel, there will have been meticulous considerations of enemy rationality and correspondingly calibrated shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Without such multi-layered antecedents, a catastrophic conflict, whether operationally nuclear or “merely” conventional, could become unavoidable.

For the Jewish State, mentored by history, Swiss playwright Friedrich Durrenmatt’s warning should be unchallengeable: “The worst does sometimes happen.” It should be taken most seriously by Jerusalem with reference to nuclear war avoidance. No strategic imperative could be more obvious.

Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books, monographs, and scholarly articles dealing with military nuclear strategy. In Israel, he was Chair of Project Daniel. Over recent years, he has published on nuclear warfare issues in Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; The Atlantic; Israel Defense; Jewish Website; The New York Times; Israel National News; The Jerusalem Post; The Hill; and other sites.

The post Israel Must Make Its Nuclear Intentions Clear in Order to Stay Safe in an Escalating Middle East first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israel’s Understanding of Time

Israeli flag. Photo: Eduardo Castro / Pixabay.

JNS.org – For Israel, it’s all about chronology. Time represents both the most critical determinant of Israel’s survival and the context within which such survival must be ensured. As with an individual human being, time is also the reciprocal of death. This vital relationship is currently most conspicuous regarding Hamas and Hezbollah, but it is most urgently meaningful regarding war with Iran.

For Israel, successful geopolitics will necessarily center on this impending war. Whether the expected conflict will be sudden or incremental, its consequences could prove existential. Of greatest significance for Israel will be avoiding a nuclear war. Inter alia, this objective will be contingent on Jerusalem’s “use of time.”

What can these ambiguous observations mean for Israel in operational terms? What might be learned about the estimable probabilities of an unmanageable war with Iran? Hezbollah’s fighting capacities are greater than those of all other jihadist terror organizations, singularly and cumulatively. These belligerent capacities present a strategic threat to Israel even apart from their Iranian backing.

A key question now arises for Israel: To what extent could a greater conceptual awareness of time generate calculable security advantages for the beleaguered Jewish state?

Though generally unrecognized, Hezbollah and Israel’s other principal terrorist adversaries define authentic victory from the bewildering standpoint of “power over death.” For all these recalcitrant foes, becoming a “martyr” (shahid) represents “power over time.” Accordingly, Jerusalem will need to think about how best to undermine such intangible but determinative notions of power.

In Jerusalem, “real-time” ought never to be interpreted solely in terms of clock measurements. But what would constitute a suitably personalized and policy-centered theory of time?

Whether explicit or implicit, Israeli security analyses should contain theory-based elements of chronology. Israel’s many-sided struggle against war and terror will need to be conducted with more intellectually determined and nuanced concepts of time. Though seemingly “impractical,” such “felt time” or “inner time” conceptualizations could sometimes reveal more about Israel’s core survival problem than any easily decipherable measurements of clocks.

The pertinent notion of “felt time” or “time-as-lived” has its origins in ancient Israel. By rejecting time as a simple linear progression, the early Hebrews approached chronology as a qualitative experience. Once it had been dismissed as something that could submit only to quantitative measures, time began to be understood by seminal Jewish thinkers as a distinctly subjective quality. This view identified time as inseparable from its personally infused content.

In terms of current threats from Iran, Israeli planners should consider chronology not only at the most obvious operational levels (e.g., how much “time” before Iran becomes nuclear?), but also at the level of individual Iranian decision-makers (e.g., what do authoritative leaders in Tehran think about time in shaping their nuclear plans vis-à-vis Israel?).

From its beginnings, the Jewish prophetic vision was one of a community living “in time.” In this formative view, political space or geography was palpably important, but not because of territoriality. Instead, the relevance of particular geographic spaces stemmed from certain unique events that had presumably taken place within their boundaries.

It’s time to return to expressly tactical and strategic issues. For Israel, security policy enhancements should include support for “escalation dominance.” When Israel and Iran are engaged in continuous direct warfare, each adversary can be expected to seek primacy during unprecedented episodes of escalation but to accomplish this objective without heightening the risks of an existential conflict. Among other things, any such expectation would require mutual assumptions of enemy rationality.

There will be multiple particulars. If it could be determined that Iran and/or Hezbollah accept a short time horizon in their search for tangible “victory” over Israel, any Israeli response to enemy aggressions would have to be “swift” in the traditional sense. If it would seem that the presumed enemy time horizon was calculably longer, Jerusalem’s expected response could still be more or less incremental. For Israel, this would mean relying more on the relatively passive dynamics of military deterrence and military defense than on any active strategies of nuclear war fighting.

In the final analysis, the worst case for Israel would be to face an irrational Iran. Moreover, this could happen simultaneously with the appearance of the Hezbollah suicide bomber in microcosm: the flesh-and-blood individual terrorist. Of special interest to Israel’s prime minister and general staff, therefore, should be the hidden time horizons of this jihadist suicide bomber. In essence, this self-defiling terror-criminal is so afraid of “not being” that any plan for “suicide” will be intended as personal death avoidance. Prima facie, such a plan is not “only” literal nonsense; it is also patent cowardice.

An aspiring suicide bomber opposing Israel sees himself or herself as a religious sacrificer. This signals a jihadist adversary’s desperate hope to escape from time that lacks any “sacred” meaning. The relevant jihadist adversary could be an individual Hezbollah terrorist, the sovereign state of Iran or both acting in tandem.

What should Israel do with all such informed understandings of its Islamist adversaries’ concept of time? Jerusalem’s immediate policy response should be to convince both aspiring Hezbollah suicide bombers and Iranian national leaders that their intended “sacrifices” could never elevate them or their societies above the immutably mortal limits of time. This will be an intellectual problem, not a political problem.

Israeli policy-makers will need to recognize certain dense problems of chronology as policy-relevant quandaries. They will also need to acknowledge to themselves that any plausible hopes for national security and “escalation dominance” should be informed by reason. In Jerusalem, all ordinary considerations of domestic politics and global geopolitics will need to be understood as both reflective and transient.

“As earthlings,” comments Hoosier author Kurt Vonnegut, “all have had to believe whatever clocks said.” As necessary fonts of national security decision-making, Israeli strategic thinkers now have it in their power to look beyond the simplifying hands of clocks and investigate more policy-purposeful meanings of time. For Jerusalem, exercising such latent intellectual power could offer a survival posture of potentially unimaginable value. In the final analysis, Israel must survive in a subjective time that is “felt” by its enemies while it is being measured by clocks.

The post Israel’s Understanding of Time first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Reflections on the Jewish People Since Oct. 7: The Will to Never Give Up, and Protect Their Homeland

An Israeli soldier stands during a two-minute siren marking the annual Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Day, at an installation at the site of the Nova festival where party goers were killed and kidnapped during the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas terrorists from Gaza, in Reim, southern Israel, May 6, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad

This year, the one year anniversary of the October 7 Hamas massacre fell on the Jewish High Holidays, between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. What did this signify? Do we need to seek a meaning in this peculiar, sorrowful, tragic lunar coincidence? Ten days of awe, ten days of repentance.

One of the ongoing themes of the Days of Awe is the concept that God inscribes our names into the Book of Life, writing down who will live and who will die, who will have a good life and who will have a bad one, for the next year. These books are written on Rosh Hashanah, and sealed on Yom Kippur. But during these days of awe, we can alter G-d’s decree.

If we look back at the year Israel experienced between October 7, 2023, and October 7, 2024, we see a small, ultra-modern, democratic nation surrounded by hostile states that openly threaten Israel and America.

On October 7, 2023, the Jewish nation endured one of its darkest hours since the Holocaust. Despite the world’s tepid sympathy, including what I regard as inadequate support from the United States, and widespread condemnation of Israel’s response to the attack, Israel has remained defiant in the face of relentless pressure from anti-Zionist and hypocritical forces. These forces include the farcical United Nations, with its cowardly, blatantly antisemitic chief; the International Court of injustice; and prominent figures from around the world, including many American politicians of Jewish descent, all of whom have sought to undermine Israel’s right to exist.

Still, against all odds, Israel has dismantled Hamas and severely weakened Hezbollah, and although it has not finished Hamas off in its entirety, it has nevertheless greatly diminished its militaristic might. Israel has also taken the fight to Iran, and the collapse of the Assad government in Syria shows much Israel has accomplished, and Iran and its proxies have lost, since the Hamas pogrom in October 2023.

Now, like at no other time in its history, Israel needs true, strong, and honest allies who trust Israel and don’t try to restrain it out of calculating and cynical self-interest. Had America or the United Kingdom ever found themselves in a situation of a true existential threat, no other country or political body on earth would have been able to push them toward the self-restraint they continue to demand of Israel.

Israel again and again tells the world that we Jews matter — despite our small numbers and despite what has happened to us, and despite what has been happening to us for the past two millennia.

We are a sovereign nation, and we, and only we, shall determine our fate. Never again shall we be enslaved; our fate will never be in the hands of other people and other nations. Our nation shall never depend on the mercy of other people. As Jews, we will not allow ourselves to be taken away, humiliated, or abused — because now we have a country of our own that will protect us from our enemies.

The fate of the Jewish people has always been the extreme balancing act between survival and extermination, and in between those two extremes, we Jews have managed to make lives for ourselves. Our identity is rooted in life, in how we value it, how we fight for it, and whom we trust with it. Unlike so many of those who seek to destroy us, we are not a cult of death, but a nation of life.  We search and find meaning in everything life throws at us, even suffering and tragedy.

Our eyes are still filled with tears, our hearts are heavy with unbearable pain, and our minds are clouded with sadness over the loss of the lives so brutally taken from us since October 7, 2023, and the hostages and their bodies that are still captive in Gaza. And, despite all this, we — the Jewish nation, headed by the state of Israel — have demonstrated to the world that we will not give up and that we have not forgotten how to fight back. Our unwavering goal remains to protect our Jewish homeland, our Jewish freedom, and the voice of Jewish communities in the Diaspora.

We Jews stand here today to announce to the world that we are here to stay, whether in Israel or here in this messy antisemitic world, called the Diaspora.

I think this notion for us Jews today transcends religion. There are those among us who are religious, and those who are not. There are those who believe in G-d, and there are those who don’t. Some people are angry with him and argue with him about the injustice and cruelty that has befallen the Jewish nation and enveloped this world with unbearable sadness. But maybe by coming together,  and showing up for Israel, maybe G-d has looked down upon us and and inscribed us in the “good” book, because we are saying “yes” to a nation that chooses life over death — not only for its own people, but for everyone who chooses the glorious lightness of freedom over the despairing abyss of tyranny.

Anya Gillinson is an immigration lawyer and author of the new memoir Dreaming in Russian. She lives in New York City. More at www.anyagillinson.com

The post Reflections on the Jewish People Since Oct. 7: The Will to Never Give Up, and Protect Their Homeland first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Why Is the NYPD Refusing to Protect Jews, But Enabling Genocidal Hamas Supporters?

Pro-Hamas students staging an anti-Hillel protest as New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers look on. Photo: Columbia Jewish & Israeli Students/Screenshot

It’s good to know that a New Yorker from a well-known Jewish family — and a dedicated public servant — has recently been named Commissioner of the New York Police Department (NYPD). With violence against Jews soaring, Jessica Tisch has a unique chance to lead the nation’s largest police force — and lead the way for law enforcement agencies nationwide to push back against antisemites — and pro-Hamas violent mobs — everywhere. We demand that Zionists and all Jews be protected in New York.

Just a few months ago, terrorist supporters menacingly chanted “We’re gonna get you” outside of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hotel, the Loews Hotel, which the Tisch family owns. and no one was arrested. But even worse than threatening one Israeli leader, is that pro-Hamas supporters have been marching with impunity since October 2023, demanding and supporting the murder of Jews in Israel, New York, and all across the world.

In response, the NYPD has insisted many of these marches are protected by freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. In reality, these marches are incitement to murder — and often descend into violence — and letting them happen with no consequence only  encourages more violence.

I am writing to Commissioner Tisch with deep concern about the future of the Jewish community in New York City. Antisemitism has permeated all areas of daily life in New York, and Jew-haters operate with impunity in this city, which is no longer safe for Jews. We have had enough political speeches and empty promises. We don’t care what Mayor Eric Adams says about the hostages, we care that he does not keep the Jews of New York safe.

As the head of the NYPD, Commissioner Tisch must be aware that last Saturday evening, on 59th Street and 5th Avenue, a large disruptive pro-Hamas rally was held in front of the Park Lane Hotel, where Israel’s former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was staying. As masked terrorist supporters waved Hamas and Hezbollah flags and screamed “We don’t want no Zionists here” — amidst violent calls for “intifada” — Tisch’s NYPD removed American Jewish Zionists who were present from the scene, as the police said they could not protect Jews from violence.

If Jews (codeword Zionists) aren’t safe on a Saturday evening on 59th street — but Hamas supporters are — then the NYPD is not doing its job. There should be enough cops to protect everyone.

As a New Yorker, I see Jews beaten with shocking frequency, and threatened with impunity by jihadis with face coverings who intimidate, terrorize, and disrupt life daily. The NYPD’s job is to protect people everywhere, not allow jihadi supporters to run rampant.

Here were some of the chants heard on Saturday night: “Hitler should have finished you off” and we will “give you the United Health treatment.”

How is this allowed to happen? These are threats of murder — plain and simple. And as we Jews no, threats rarely often end there.

We demand that Commissioner Tisch immediately remove the handcuffs from the NYPD and arrest criminals. We demand the police enforce the law, and not pro-terrorist rallies block streets and roads. We demand she urge the FBI and Homeland Security to investigate people who openly support illegal terror organizations and work with the new presidential administration to get them deported if they aren’t citizens if they are breaking US law and threatening people with murder and violence.

We are past the crisis point for Jews in New York City. We want action to protect Jews, of which we have seen none. After heinous protests celebrating murder and rape took place at an exhibit on the Nova Festival massacre, Mayor Adams said, “We have the largest Jewish population outside of Israel right here in New York. This is not going to be a city where you’ll have to take off your yarmulke, be afraid to walk inside a synagogue.”

The reality is that many Jews have taken off their yarmulkes, as the streets have been surrendered to terrorists. Antisemitism is flourishing in New York City, and Jews have never been so unsafe as they are today in Gotham. Jews who haven’t yet escaped to Florida or elsewhere are wondering if there is a future for Jews in New York City. It certainly doesn’t feel like it.

The job you signed up for is to keep this city safe, Ms. Tisch. We demand you do your job, as you remind New York and America that not only are Zionists welcome here, but they are welcome everywhere.

Ronn Torossian is an American-Israeli entrepreneur, author and philanthropist.

The post Why Is the NYPD Refusing to Protect Jews, But Enabling Genocidal Hamas Supporters? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israel Must Make Its Nuclear Intentions Clear in Order to Stay Safe in an Escalating Middle East

Israel’s nuclear reactor near Dimona. Photo: Wikicommons

Recent events  in Syria underscore the changing geo-strategic landscape in the Middle East. For Israel, although the fall of Assad will likely weaken Iran, it won’t necessarily reduce the risk of a nuclear war in the region. In fact, there is apt to take place a strengthening of certain Sunni sub-state jihadist elements, a development that could prove “force-multiplying” with a non-nuclear Turkey and/or an already-nuclear non-Arab Pakistan. Plausible “wild cards” in this opaque mix would be an increasingly desperate pre-nuclear Iran and an expectedly perplexed non-nuclear Saudi Arabia. Also to be factored in should be the unpredictable element of already-nuclear Iranian ally North Korea and its potentially critical connections to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In essence, even a newly-weakened and still pre-nuclear Iran could pose existential hazards to Israel by means of North Korean military surrogates.

Israel’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear doctrine should ensure national survival. In the early 1950s, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, already understood the need for a conspicuous “equalizer” to secure an otherwise too-vulnerable Jewish State.

Early on, the “old man” had recognized that in the absence of task-appropriate nuclear assets, Israel could sometime lose every tangible chance to simply endure.

Still, no category of weapons, even nuclear ordnance, is meaningful on its own All weapon systems need to be informed by suitable strategy and tactics. How should these special Israeli assets be “used?”

Back in the early days, when Americans and the Soviets were first defining a bipolar Cold War nuclear strategy ex nihilo, Israel had nowhere to turn for a template of useful nuclear guidance. What Jerusalem did understand, from the start, is that nuclear ordnance can succeed only through non-use.

This seeming paradox has prominent conceptual origins in Sun Tzu’s ancient dictum from The Art of War: “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” In brief, deterrence, whether ancient or contemporary, “works” to the extent that prospective aggressors could calculate that the expected costs of striking first would exceed expected gains.

To work, designated adversaries must be considered rational nation-states. Sometimes, these states could operate in tandem with other states (an alliance) or with assorted terror groups (hybrid). In the future, Israel’s enemies could include sub-state nuclear foes acting by themselves, such as Hezbollah, after it had become the recipient of reassuring nuclear largesse from Iran or even North Korea.

For now, at least, Israel has no current nuclear enemies, unless one were to consider Pakistan.

Despite a common enemy in Israel, the conflict between radical Shiite and Sunni forces continues across the region. For all sides, the aim of this conflict is “escalation dominance” during episodes of competitive risk-taking. Over time, such escalations by Iran could include nuclear warheads, not against insurgent targets, but against a formidable Arab state such as Saudi Arabia.

As a literal matter of survival, Israel should be intellectually creative and conceptually well-prepared. For deterrence to work long-term, Iran and its proxies would need to be told more rather than less about (1) Israel’s nuclear targeting doctrine; and (2) the expected invulnerability and penetration-capability of Israel’s nuclear forces.

However counter-intuitive, this means that to best prepare for all plausible attack scenarios, Israel should plan conscientiously for the incremental replacement of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” with apt levels of “selective nuclear disclosure.” In common parlance, it will soon be time for Jerusalem to remove Israel’s bomb from the “basement.”

For Israel, the only continuously true purpose of nuclear weapons should be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. Nonetheless, there would inevitably remain diverse circumstances under which Israeli nuclear deterrence could fail.

How might such fearful circumstances arise? Four principal though not mutually exclusive scenarios now warrant both mention and examination. Israel’s strategic planners should study these paradigmatic narratives closely, and prepare to deal effectively with any and all of them, singly and in potentially synergistic interactions.

Taken together with the four basic scenarios outlined below, these “parallel” narratives could help provide Israel with needed intellectual armaments to prevent “the worst.” Presently, though Israel need not worry about any existing regional nuclear adversary, state or sub-state, it’s nuclear weapons and doctrine could still represent an indispensable “ultimate” deterrent against forms of massive conventional/biological/chemical attack.

(1)     Nuclear Retaliation

Should Iran or an alliance of enemy states ever launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel (in principle, this could include North Korea), Jerusalem would respond to the extent possible with a nuclear retaliatory strike. If enemy first-strikes were to involve other available forms of unconventional weapons, such as chemical, biological or EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons, Israel might still launch a “limited” nuclear reprisal. This decision would depend, in large measure, on Jerusalem’s informed expectations of follow-on enemy aggression and its comparative calculations of damage-limitation.

If Israel were to absorb a massively disruptive non-nuclear attack, a nuclear retaliation could not automatically be ruled out, especially if: (a) the state aggressors were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel’s leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent annihilation of the Jewish State. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out only in those rapidly discernible circumstances where enemy state aggressions were clearly conventional, “typical” (that is, consistent with all previous instances of attack, in degree and intent), and hard-target oriented (that is, directed towards Israeli weapons and related military infrastructures, rather than civilian populations).

(2)     Nuclear Counter retaliation

Should Israel ever feel compelled to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons, the target state(s)’ response would largely determine Jerusalem’s next moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would doubtlessly turn to some available form of nuclear counter retaliation.

If this retaliation were to involve other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, Israel could also feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative. Again, this decision would depend upon Jerusalem’s judgments of enemy intent and on its corollary calculations of damage-limitation.

Should the enemy state response to Israel’s preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is unlikely that the Jewish State would then move to any nuclear counter retaliations. If, however, the enemy conventional retaliation was “all-out” and directed toward Israeli civilian populations as well as Israeli military targets, an Israeli nuclear counter retaliation could not be excluded. Such a counter retaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy state’s conventional retaliation were identifiably proportionate to Israel’s preemption; confined to Israeli military targets; circumscribed by the legal limits of “military necessity”; and accompanied by certain explicit and verifiable assurances of non-escalatory intent.

(3)     Nuclear Preemption

It is highly implausible that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would be rational and permissible under authoritative international law, it is unlikely that Israel would allow itself to reach such irremediably dire circumstances. Unless the nuclear weapons involved were usable in a fashion still consistent with the longstanding laws of war, this most extreme form of preemption could represent an expressly egregious violation of humanitarian international law.

Even if such consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the entire world community would be strongly negative and significantly far-reaching. This means that an Israeli nuclear preemption could conceivably be expected only: (a) where Israel’s pertinent state enemies had acquired nuclear and/or other weapons of mass destruction judged capable of annihilating the Jewish State; (b) where these enemies had made it clear that their intentions paralleled their genocidal capabilities; (c) where these enemies were believed ready to begin an operational “countdown to launch;” and (d) where Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could not achieve the needed minimum levels of damage-limitation — that is, levels consistent with physical preservation of the Jewish State.

(4)     Nuclear War fighting

Should nuclear weapons ever be introduced into any actual conflict between Israel and its enemies, either by Israel or a regional foe, nuclear war fighting, at one level or another, could ensue. This would hold true so long as: (a) enemy first-strikes would not destroy Israel’s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy the Jewish State’s nuclear counter retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for conventional first-strikes would not destroy the enemy’s nuclear counter retaliatory capability.

In order to satisfy its most indispensable survival imperatives, Israel must take appropriate steps to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the simultaneous unlikelihood of (c) and (d).

Even in the midst of “only” a conventional war with Iran, Israel could sometime decide that the expectations of “escalation dominance” had become overwhelming and that escalation to nuclear combat would be the sole rational option.

A compelling example could involve an Iranian non-nuclear missile attack upon Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor, Iranian resort to radiation-dispersal weapons (dirty bombs), and/or Pyongyang’s combat involvement on behalf of Iran.

All these scenarios pose more-or-less indecipherable hazards for Jerusalem, including manifestly unknown prospects of enemy irrationality. Writing in broadly philosophical terms, philosopher Karl Jaspers observed: “The rational is not thinkable without its other, the non-rational, and it never appears in reality without it.”

Understood in more narrowly military or strategic terms, Jaspers wisdom suggests that appearances may deceive and an apparently rational foe in Tehran could turn in extremis to non-rational decision-making.

The opposite is also worrisome. Accordingly, for Israel, a presumptively irrational adversary in Iran could unexpectedly turn to rational decision-making, a policy tilt that would at first seem welcome but quickly become dissembling. In tangible essence, this tilt could create unmanageable levels of “cognitive dissonance” for strategic planners in Jerusalem.

For Jerusalem, in daring to face prospects of a nuclear war, candor matters. In all matters of national security strategy, just as in all matters of law and jurisprudence, truth will be exculpatory. Going forward in an unprecedented strategic universe, Israel will need to combine deeply theoretical examinations with tangibly pragmatic policies. Ironically, even its most plainly threatening nuclear weapons could prove useless or self-defeating unless there had first been suitable advance planning for virtually every imaginable WMD war scenario.

For Israel, national survival must always be about what ancient Greeks and Macedonians defined as a struggle of “mind over mind.” Even in a steadily nuclearizing world, the true contest is never just about “mind over matter.” In the end, if all goes well for Israel, there will have been meticulous considerations of enemy rationality and correspondingly calibrated shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Without such multi-layered antecedents, a catastrophic conflict, whether operationally nuclear or “merely” conventional, could become unavoidable.

For the Jewish State, mentored by history, Swiss playwright Friedrich Durrenmatt’s warning should be unchallengeable: “The worst does sometimes happen.” It should be taken most seriously by Jerusalem with reference to nuclear war avoidance. No strategic imperative could be more obvious.

Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books, monographs, and scholarly articles dealing with military nuclear strategy. In Israel, he was Chair of Project Daniel. Over recent years, he has published on nuclear warfare issues in Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; The Atlantic; Israel Defense; Jewish Website; The New York Times; Israel National News; The Jerusalem Post; The Hill; and other sites.

The post Israel Must Make Its Nuclear Intentions Clear in Order to Stay Safe in an Escalating Middle East first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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