The main lesson of the surprise attack on the Assad regime by the rebels in Syria begins with an overall view of the strategic logic that drives the Middle East region. The lesson that many in the West refuse to accept is that the region is a perpetually unstable ecosystem.

An ecosystem is sensitive to any small change. The conceptual opposite of an ecosystem is a sophisticated railway system. In the railways, operational stability is planned and managed according to a linear engineering design. In an ecosystem, conversely, stability is the result of systemic equilibrium and is always both temporary and sensitive to changes.

Western culture, which aspires to establish a reality of sustainable stability in the region, finds it difficult to accept that the Middle East — which contains clans, tribes, and radical terrorist organizations — is a system that operates according to the dynamics of an ecological system.

The achievements of the Israeli war against Hezbollah in Lebanon and against Hamas in the Gaza Strip created new conditions that marked an opportunity for the Sunni rebels in Syria. They took their chance and attacked the Assad army and the Iranian Shiite militias, toppling the Assad regime in less than two weeks.

The constant search by many Middle East actors for new fighting opportunities lies in their fundamental perception of all situations of calm, even prolonged periods of apparent peace, as temporary.

The Turks dream of returning to the expanses of the Ottoman Empire. Aleppo once played a central economic and symbolic role in connection with the cities of the Harran Valley in Turkey, including the city of Shelly-Orfa. After Napoleon’s retreat from Egypt and the Land of Israel, Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt, sought to extend his control from Israel to Aleppo. In the years 1839-1841, the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War took place in the region. With the help of a British expeditionary force, the Ottomans defeated the Egyptian army and pushed it from the Aleppo region to the outskirts of Sinai. Greater Syria, which extended to the Land of Israel, returned to Ottoman control. Turkey aspires to restore this regional order. From their perspective, the struggle began in Aleppo with the pursuit of Damascus, which contains important Sunni mosques.

There is much more involved here than a longing for the past. The past in this region drives religious and national struggles. I learned this during a visit to the Iranian pavilion at the Shanghai Expo. Opposite the visitors’ entrance, a map of the Persian Empire from the time of Darius was displayed across the entire wall. This was a kind of declaration that Iran aspires to return to that glorious past.

This kind of thinking is the driving force in the region — even for borders that have gained international validity, such as the Sykes-Picot borders. In the Middle East, nothing outweighs religious and national dreams. Those dreams never fade; they rather await the right opportunity.

For Americans who continue to seek a stable and sustainable regional order, it is worth suggesting that they treat the Middle East as if it were prone to hurricanes that erupt from the oceans and strike the region from a system of forces beyond human control.

This is not to say that no capabilities exist with which to restrain and delay conflicts in the regional chaos that characterizes the Middle East. But even arrangements that seem to promise a degree of stability and calm must be sensitive to the possibility of unexpected factors arising within the system.

Tactical note

The rebel offensive in Syria also teaches an important tactical lesson about the characteristics of the new war. As on October 7, we saw the outbreak of rapid battle movement involving civilian vehicles, including motorcycles, SUVs and vans, in mobile and agile groups.

No one who promises a demilitarized Palestinian state will be able to stop the Palestinians from purchasing motorcycles and SUVs. Israelis should give thought to the image of a raiding party on motorcycles and jeeps breaking into Israel by surprise from Tulkarem-Qalqilya to cut through the coastal strip. They must understand that the IDF, with all its strength, cannot guarantee overwhelming superiority in any possible context.

The IDF’s operations in Syria

Even the best intelligence experts had difficulty predicting the tsunami of the rebel assault that so swiftly toppled the Syrian government and its army.

There is a great lesson here in recognizing the limitations of human knowledge. We cannot pretend to know or be able to control events that occur suddenly and unpredictably. Precisely for this reason, the speedy organization by the Israeli leadership and the IDF of a proper response to the Syrian rebel surprise deserves special appreciation.

The IDF’s rapid operational response to developments in Syria was guided by three objectives:

• To strengthen the defense effort on the Golan Heights. It is worth noting that preparations for strengthening and expanding Israel’s defense systems in the Golan — through proactive operations east of the border fence — began in the Golan Division, with the support of the Northern Command, several months ago. These preparations enabled a rapid response to expand Israel’s defensive hold on vital areas in the buffer zone defined in the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria. The IDF also took control of the peaks of the Hermon Range in a location that allows for influence deep inside Syria and southern Lebanon.
• To destroy the numerous weapons left behind by the Syrian army in Syria. In an unprecedented attack by the Israeli Air Force and Navy, weapons systems were destroyed that, had they remained operational, could have been used against the State of Israel. This effort was carried out with rapid momentum and precise management.
• To project power in the face of the chaos and make clear that the State of Israel has a security-strategic interest in the developing trends in Syria and will not be content to passively look on. Prime Minister Netanyahu wisely emphasized that Israel will try not to interfere in the institutionalization of the new order being organized in Syria. However, Israel has an interest in influencing developments in southern Syria in the Yarmouk Basin, where, until recently, Shiite militias took part in efforts to smuggle weapons to the Palestinian Authority and towards the Kingdom of Jordan. Looking north from the Hermon area, Israel has a primary interest in preserving Hezbollah’s isolation in Lebanon and preventing any possibility of reinforcements or new weapons arriving via Syria.

The first two objectives have been achieved in an astonishing manner. The third is complex and will require dynamic monitoring combined with an international effort emphasizing Israeli interests.

The situation in Syria continues to be unprecedented in its uncertainty.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post The Future of Syria Is Uncertain; Here’s What Israel Should Be Doing (PART ONE) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Forty-six years after the death of Ali Hassan Salameh, who planned the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to tout Salameh as a hero.

The official PA news agency, WAFA, praised Salameh, who was the commander of operations of the Black September terror organization, saying his “name was associated with many quality operations” — a reference to the Olympics Massacre:

Headline: “46 years since the death as a Martyr of leader Ali Hassan Salameh”

“On Jan. 22, 1979, the Israeli Mossad (Israeli Secret Intelligence Service) assassinated leader Ali Hassan Salameh ‘The Red Prince’, who was the founder of the PLO leadership security force (later Force 17) [parentheses in source]

… As soon as he moved to Beirut, he was assigned to oversee the special operations against the Israeli occupation worldwide. His name was associated with many quality operations.” [emphasis added]

[WAFA, official PA news agency, Jan. 22, 2025]

A week earlier, the PA and Fatah marked the 34th anniversary of the assassination of two other terror leaders: Salah Khalaf “Abu Iyad,” who was the head of Black September, and “fighter Fakhri Al-Omari ‘Abu Muhammad,’” a co-founder of Black September and “one of the close associates of Abu Iyad in the united [PA] Security Forces.”

The official PA daily praised the terrorists as follows:

With their deaths as Martyrs, the PLO, the Palestinian revolution, and Fatah lost [two] of their most committed and skilled leaders, whose record is filled with sacrifice and struggle against the Israeli occupation…”

[Official PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Jan. 15, 2025]

Fatah vowed … to continue the struggle and the resistance to the occupation [i.e., Israel] and its aggressive machinery, and to protect our people’s achievements that were painted with the blood of the Martyrs until defeating the occupation and achieving our people’s freedom and independence.” [emphasis added]

[Official PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Jan. 15, 2025]

Black September was a secret branch of Fatah, and today’s Fatah didn’t miss the opportunity to join in glorifying terrorist mastermind Salameh.

Fatah marked Salameh’s “death as a Martyr” by posting the image above with the following text:

Text: “46 years since the death as a Martyr of commander Ali Hassan Salameh”

[Fatah Commission of Information and Culture, Facebook page, Jan. 22, 2025]

The PA and Fatah’s infatuation with Salameh and fellow terrorist murderers from Black September is not new. For decades, Palestinian Media Watch has exposed the glorification of the Munich Olympics attack and its perpetrators and planners.

In fact, this past summer, the PA chose to name its largest summer camp, which hosted 150 children aged 7-13, after terrorist Salah Khalaf, “Abu Iyad.”

On the 50th anniversary of the massacre, Palestinian Media Watch exposed that what has become a dark stain on the Olympics and has settled in the collective global memory as an illustration of the horrors of terrorism, is actually a symbol of glory and honor for the PA.

The author is a senior analyst at Palestinian Media Watch, where a version of this article was originally published.

The post Palestinian Authority: Munich Massacre of Israeli Athletes was a ‘Quality Operation’ first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Over the weekend, as Israeli hostages held by Hamas were again released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, it became clear that media outlets are unable to stop the use of misleading terminology that creates a moral inversion between victims and perpetrators.

The misleading terms were sloppy, at best, or biased, at worst, mixing “hostages” with “prisoners” and “soldiers” with civilians.

NBC News, for example, led with a headline calling Palestinian prisoners “hostages.” After being alerted by HonestReporting, they swiftly corrected it to “prisoners,” but the fact remains that an editor there was either confused or agenda-driven:

“Palestinian hostages.”

Seriously, @NBCNews?!

They were imprisoned by Israel for terrorism. The only hostages are the Israelis and others kidnapped and held captive in Gaza by Palestinian terrorist orgs. pic.twitter.com/561mfmOIxs

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) February 1, 2025

And the word “soldier” messed up the coverage of The New York Times and Sky News, which couldn’t get their facts straight.

The New York Times called Israeli civilian Arbel Yehoud, who was released on Thursday by Islamic Jihad, an “Israeli soldier.”

She was not; she was a civilian kidnapped from her home.

And Sky News, while mentioning the first round of the deal, called Israeli civilians Emily Damari, Romi Gonen, and Doron Steinbrecher “soldiers.”

No, @nytimes, Arbel Yehoud is not an Israeli soldier, she is a civilian and was kidnapped from her home in Nir Oz.

Please correct the error and stop portraying Israelis as legitimate military targets for terrorists. pic.twitter.com/o754wAEu4M

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) January 30, 2025

 

No, @SkyNews, Emily Damari and the two other Israelis released with her were civilians, not soldiers. Get your facts straight. Do better. pic.twitter.com/bbOtWG9K9v

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) February 2, 2025

Meanwhile, the BBC had to apologize for calling three Israeli hostages Yarden Bibas, Keith Seigel, and Ofer Calderon “prisoners.”

But the UK network had no qualms about using footage of terrified Arbel Yehoud by none other than Hassan Eslaiah —  a Gaza photojournalist who was fired from CNN and AP after HonestReporting exposed his ties to Hamas.

(Not only was Eslaiah spotted using his access to get closeups of the hostages but he was also later photographed with UN staff.)

Whose footage did @BBCNews & others use from the heart of the appalling crowd scenes when Hamas released Israeli hostage Arbel Yehoud?

Which Gazan photojournalist has that sort of access?

Hint: It’s not the first time he’s cozied up to terrorists to get the shots.

Find out pic.twitter.com/yYBQ6XPeSn

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) January 30, 2025

To be clear, misleading terminology has an apologetic effect — captive soldiers or prisoners are not the same as hostage civilians, and the same goes for misleading terminology on the Palestinian side.

For example, Sky News described Palestinian mass murderer Zakaria Zubeidi as a “freed Palestinian prisoner”:

Zakaria Zubeidi led the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, orchestrated deadly attacks, and escaped prison in 2021—yet @SkyNews calls him a “freed prisoner.” Whitewashing terror isn’t journalism. pic.twitter.com/YE262CLVqQ

— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) February 1, 2025

The aim of this misleading terminology, conscious or not, is a moral inversion — because if the hostages are prisoners or soldiers and the perpetrators are family guys celebrating their freedom, it’s clear who’s right and who’s wrong.

Media outlets should be more careful with their choice of words because it creates the very reality they report on.

The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.

The post There Is a Huge Difference Between Israeli Hostages and Freed Palestinian Murderers first appeared on Algemeiner.com.