The members of the progressive caucus in the US House of Representatives, known as “The Squad,” have recently coalesced around support for the “peaceful” antisemitic protests engulfing college campuses.

The Squad hears “ceasefire” when “Globalize the Intifada” and “From the River to the Sea” are chanted. They are pandering to the students who are currently calling for a Palestine “free” of Jews, and who believe their ideology that everything in the United States — and globally — is about race and an “oppressor vs. oppressed” ideology.

The litmus test for all progressive policies is that they must advance “racial justice and equity” (The House Progressive Promise). Members of the Squad justify their anti-Zionist position by falsely accusing Israel of being an “apartheid state.” This accusation is a lie, but it squares nicely with the objective of the progressive platform which is to advance their particular version of racial justice and equity — which means the demonization of whomever they deem to be “white” and “powerful.”

Members of the Squad believe that their commitment to “dismantle the systems of oppression and discrimination that allow racism to persist” obligates them to oppose Israel.

The following is a statement that Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) made on October 8, 2024, while Hamas sadists were still on a killing rampage in Israel and Hamas rockets were reigning down on Israeli towns:

The path to that future must include lifting the blockade, ending the occupation, and dismantling the apartheid system that creates the suffocating, dehumanizing conditions that can lead to resistance. The failure to recognize the violent reality of living under siege, occupation, and apartheid makes no one safer. No person, no child anywhere should have to suffer or live in fear of violence. We cannot ignore the humanity in each other. As long as our country provides billions in unconditional funding to support the apartheid government, this heartbreaking cycle of violence will continue.

I believe professor and diversity advocate Mona Khoury-Kassabri, the Vice President for “Strategy and Inclusion” at Hebrew Union College in Jerusalem, may have a different viewpoint concerning Congresswoman Tlaib’s libelous accusation that Israel is an apartheid state, as would the Arab-Israeli doctors who are studying and practicing medicine in Israel, all Arab citizens who have equal rights and serve in the Knesset and Supreme Court, and many others.

Israel is not an apartheid state. For just the beginnings of proof, you can look here.

New York Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC), probably the most well-known member of the Squad, hurried up to Columbia to give her support to the students of the Gaza Solidarity Encampment who demanded that Columbia University divest from all things Israel.

The following are the first two of five demands the Columbia University Apartheid Divest Organization made to the administration of Columbia (cuapartheiddivest):

Divest all of Columbia’s finances, including the endowment, from companies and institutions that profit from Israeli apartheid, genocide and occupation in Palestine. Ensure accountability by increasing transparency around financial investments.
Sever academic ties with Israeli universities, including the Global Center in Tel Aviv, the Dual Degree Program with Tel Aviv University, and all study-abroad programs.

The protestors refuse to let anyone speak who disagrees with these views. In effect, they are demanding that their free speech rights are respected while calling on the silencing of Jewish and pro-Israeli voices.

The intent of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement is to de-legitimize Israeli scientists, artists, politicians, entrepreneurs, athletes, farmers, industrialists, doctors, and professors — irrespective of their politics or views — and to de-legitimize the State of Israel itself.

The logic of the BDS movement is that isolating and suffocating Israeli society will create immense pressure that forces Israel to retreat to the geography of the 1967 borders — and eventually collapse upon itself. Of course, an isolated and weakened Israel will be far less likely to make any concessions because it will be unable to take the risks associated with ceding more autonomy over more land and resources to the Palestinian people. The anti-Zionist policies voiced by the student protestors, and supported by the Squad, will lead to more death and destruction in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank — not less.

The demands of the protestors also don’t include one word about the Israeli and American hostages that Hamas is currently torturing, or the 1,200 people massacred intentionally on October 7. They are ignoring Hamas and Palestinian terrorism — which are the primary cause of the ongoing catastrophe in Gaza. Protestors marching for the “global intifada” have decided that the actions of Hamas on October 7 were a legitimate act of resistance.

If they’re serious about what they believe, any non-Jewish progressive politician besides Ritchie Torres (D-NY) should step up to the bullhorn and address the students who are in a rage about the death and destruction in Gaza, and explain how and why the commitment of Hamas to slaughter Jews from “the river to the sea” is absolutely evil and not progressive.

Charles A. Stone is a Professor at Brooklyn College, CUNY.

The post Where Are the Progressive Politicians Standing Up to the Jew Hatred on Campus? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Israel’s nuclear posture remains “deliberately ambiguous.” In the past, this stance appears to have been sensible, even incontestable. Today, however, during a continuing Gaza War and following unprecedented missile aggressions from Iran, it requires fundamental reconsideration. In essence, there are compelling reasons to argue that Israel’s traditional “bomb in the basement” posture is no longer tenable.

There are clarifying particulars. A prudent nuclear posture for Israel should necessarily be based upon calculable assessments of all plausible options. At a minimum, any cost-effective changes of Israeli nuclear ambiguity would need to be readily identifiable but also not be gratuitously provocative. For a time, such changes might need to remain implicit in the small country’s codified military doctrine.

Israel, after all, is less than half the size of America’s Lake Michigan.

A comprehensive Israeli strategic doctrine represents the general framework from which any specific posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity or selective nuclear disclosure would be extracted. More precisely, the principal importance of Israeli nuclear doctrine lies not only in the several ways that it can animate, unify, and optimize the state’s armed forces, but also in the more-or-less efficient manner in which it could transmit cautionary messages to enemy state Iran and sub-state surrogate Hamas.

Understood in terms of Israel’s many-sided strategic policy, any continuous across-the-board nuclear ambiguity could have existential consequences. This is because effective deterrence and defense policies call for a military doctrine that is at least partially recognizable by adversary states and terrorist proxies. Today, as Israel decides on whether to re-ignite a multi-front war with Iran — a war that could prove indispensable to preventing Iranian nuclear weapons — such “wise counsel” is conspicuously urgent.

For Israel, any ultimate and durable military success against Iran must lie in credibly-layered nuclear deterrence options, never in nuclear war-fighting. Recalling ancient Chinese military thought offered by Sun-Tzu in The Art of War, “Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” Soon, in the overriding matter of nuclear deterrence, Israeli decision-makers will need to acknowledge that there are occasions when too much further secrecy would degrade the country’s national security.

Israel’s nuclear weapons should always be oriented to deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. Nuclear weapons can succeed only in their calculated non-use. By definition, once they have been used for actual battle, nuclear deterrence will have failed, perhaps irremediably. Once they were used in any possible form, tactical or strategic, all traditional meanings of “victory” would immediately become moot.

Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture could have certain counter-terrorism benefits, but only with direct regard to Iran. Reciprocally, allowing itself to be weakened by Iran-backed terrorists (Sunni or Shia) could enlarge Israel’s existential vulnerabilities to the Islamic Republic. In evaluating such perplexing interconnections, Israeli planners will have to devote continuous attention to all possible synergies and “force multipliers.”

The original Cold War is over; still, “Cold War II” is underway between the United States, Russia, and (this time) China. If Iran is allowed to become nuclear, Israel’s deterrence relationship with Iran would never be comparable to what earlier was obtained between the US and the USSR. In such unique or sui generis circumstances, any unmodified continuance of total nuclear ambiguity could cause an already-nuclear Iran to underestimate or overestimate Israel’s nuclear retaliatory capacity. Either kind of misestimating could lead to catastrophic war.

The world is a system. Accordingly, various uncertainties surrounding Israel’s nuclear posture could lead other enemy states to reach similar kinds of misunderstanding. For example, Israel’s willingness to make good on any threatened nuclear retaliation could sometime be taken as inversely related to weapon system destructiveness. Ironically, therefore, if Israel’s nuclear weapons were thought “too destructive,” they might not deter.

Any continuing Israeli posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity could cause terrorist-mentoring Iran to overestimate the first-strike vulnerabilities of Israel’s nuclear forces. This could be the result of a too-rigorous silence concerning measures of protection deployed to safeguard Israel’s nuclear weapons and infrastructures. Alternatively, such an over-estimation could represent the product of Israeli doctrinal opacity regarding the country’s potential for defense, an absence of transparency that would be wrongly interpreted as fragile or “porous” ballistic missile defense.

Though any such Iranian conclusion would seem preposterous after Israel’s extraordinary recent success at active defense, anything less than a 100% probability of interception would be inadequate vis-a-vis Iranian nuclear attacks.

To deter an enemy state attack or post-preemption retaliation against Israel, Jerusalem must always prevent a rational aggressor, via threats of unacceptably damaging retaliation or counter-retaliation, from deciding to strike first. Understood in such a “classic” context, Israel’s national security should now be sought by convincing a presumptively rational Iranian attacker that the costs of any considered attack on Israel would exceed the expected benefits.

Assuming that Iran values its national self-preservation more highly than any other preference or combination of preferences, and that it would always choose rationally among all alternative options, that enemy state will refrain from launching any attack on an Israel that is believed willing and able to deliver unacceptably damaging reprisals.

The “bottom line” should be clear in Jerusalem. Israel’s security posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity is outdated and dangerous. With Israel’s operational nuclear forces and doctrine kept locked away in its metaphoric “basement,” Iran could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-preemption reprisal against Israel would be rational and cost-effective. But if relevant Israeli doctrine were made more obvious to Tehran, Israel’s nuclear forces could more reliably serve their existential security functions.

Another critical success factor of Israeli nuclear doctrine is “presumed willingness.” How can Israel convince Iranian decision-makers that it possesses the resolve to deliver an appropriately destructive retaliation or counter retaliation? The answer to this core question lies in antecedent strategic doctrine, in Israel’s estimated strength of commitment to carry out such an attack and in the tangible nuclear ordnance that would likely be available.

Any continued ambiguity over Israel’s nuclear posture could create the erroneous impression of a state that is unwilling to retaliate. Conversely, any doctrinal movement toward some as-yet-undetermined level of nuclear disclosure could heighten the impression that Israel is actually willing to follow-through on its pertinent nuclear threats.

What if Iran were ultimately allowed to become nuclear? To be deterred by Israel, a newly-nuclear Iran would need to believe that a critical number of Israel’s retaliatory forces could survive an Iranian first-strike and that these forces could not subsequently be prevented from hitting pre-designated targets in Iran. Concerning the “presumed survivability” of Israeli nuclear forces, continued sea-basing (submarines) by Israel would be self-evidently gainful.

If carefully articulated, expanding doctrinal openness or selective nuclear disclosure would represent a rational and plausibly imperative option for Israel. The operational benefits of such an expanding doctrinal openness would accrue from certain deliberate flows of information concerning Israeli weapons dispersion, multiplication or hardening of nuclear weapon systems and other technical weapon features. Most importantly, doctrinally controlled and orderly flows of information could serve to remove any intermittent or lingering Iranian doubts about Israel’s nuclear force capabilities and intentions. At some point, if left unchallenged, such doubts could undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence with unprecedented suddenness and lethality. This is the case, moreover, whether Iran were pre-nuclear or already-nuclear.

A summarizing thought dawns. As Israel confronts a state enemy that would best be countered while still in its pre-nuclear form, Jerusalem should understand that avoiding active warfare with Iran need not be in Israel’s best security interests. Ipso facto, if Israel could fight a law-based and comprehensive war against a still pre-nuclear Iran, it could plausibly avoid a nuclear war in the future. Under authoritative international law, such a defensive war could represent a fully permissible expression of “anticipatory self-defense.”

Looking ahead, Israel must do whatever possible and lawful to prevent a nuclear Iran. In this genuinely existential obligation, a pronounced shift in strategic posture from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would represent Israel’s most expressly rational decision. By drawing upon such “wise counsel,” Israel could prudently plan for a no-choice war against a still non-nuclear Iranian foe.

The author is Emeritus Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University. Educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), he is the author of twelve major books dealing with international relations, military strategy and world affairs. Dr. Beres was born in Zürich, Switzerland on August 31, 1945, and lectures and publishes widely on issues of terrorism, counter-terrorism, nuclear strategy and nuclear war. Professor Beres’ latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (2016; 2nd ed. 2018).  A version of this article was originally published by Israel National News.

The post On Iran, Israel’s Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity Is Outdated and Dangerous first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Several days after the beginning of anti-Israel student sit-ins on US campuses, those protests began to garner expressions of support from perpetrators and patrons of terrorism.

On April 23, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) issued a statement condemning “the repressive practices of the administrations of universities in the United States” against “our [sic] students in American universities.”

“We in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, along with all our people, the honorable of our nation and the world, confirm our steadfast support for the struggle of the student and youth movements, Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM) at universities such as Columbia, Rutgers, Yale, and Stanford, among others. We call for enhancing the unity of students and their struggle to divest American universities from the zionist entity and cut all forms of relations with it.”

On April 24, the protests got the endorsement of Iran’s Supreme Leader:

On April 25, Hamas released a statement:

On April 26, it was the turn of the Houthis:

More insight into Iranian views of the topic was provided on the same day in a TV interview with an Iranian professor:

Tehran University professor Foad Izadi, one of the leading mouthpieces of the Iranian regime, discussed encampments in American college campuses on an April 26, 2024 show on Ofogh TV (Iran). He said that Iranians like what they see on the college campuses, but “it should not end with this.” Izadi continued to say that these students are “our people.” He added that if tensions between America an Iran rise, “these are the people who will have to take to the streets to support of Iran.” Izadi said that Iran could potentially repeat what it did in Lebanon in greater measure, because its “Hizbullah-style” groups in America are “much larger” than in Lebanon.

So how did media organizations, specifically the BBC’s numerous reports on the topic of the sit-ins, cover those endorsements from terrorist organizations and the terror-facilitating Iranian regime?

The answer to that question is that they didn’t. As can be seen below, BBC reports published on the relevant and following days avoided any mention of those expressions of support for the protests that were their subject matter.

Mass arrests made as US campus protests over Gaza spread by James FitzGerald and Bernd Debusmann Jr

Columbia University: Pro-Palestinian protesters refuse to disband by Brandon Drenon

House speaker Mike Johnson heckled by protesters in tense Columbia campus visit by Bernd Debusmann Jr and Mike Wendling

Pelosi urges Gaza campus protesters to target Hamas as well as Israel by Laura Kuenssberg

Major Gaza protests at US universities by Max Matza

What do pro-Palestinian student protesters at US universities want? by Sam Cabral and Ana Faguy

Campus protests: Hundreds arrested at universities across US as Gaza demonstrations continue by Anna Lamche and Ido Vock

Apparently the BBC is of the opinion that expressions of support from designated terrorist organizations (along with the relevant question of related material support) is not a part of the story about US student protests that its audiences need to know.

Hadar Sela is the co-editor of CAMERA UK – an affiliate of the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA), where a version of this article first appeared.

The post Terrorist Groups Support US Campus Protests; Does Anyone Care? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.