Pro-Hamas demonstrators, many of whom are college students, in New York City on May 11, 2024. Photo: John Lamparski via Reuters Connect

The Lancet has a history of publishing agenda-driven and politicized anti-Israel content that goes way beyond the field of healthcare and medicine.

In July 2024, the medical journal was called out for outrageously claiming that as many as 186,000 Gazans had been killed in the current war. Many media outlets rushed to print dramatic headlines under the imprimatur of The Lancet — a significant error given that the casualty claims came not from a peer-reviewed study but from a letter sent to The Lancet, whose writers included at least one with a history of defending Palestinian terrorism.

Now, The Lancet has published a study claiming that the Gaza death toll may have been underreported by 41%.

While this time claims concerning Gaza casualty figures appear in The Lancet in the form of an actual scientific study, the recent report still has numerous similarities with the previous claims, namely a reliance on faulty Hamas sources and a disturbing lack of impartiality on the part of its authors, including one who justified Hamas’ October 7 massacre.

Faulty Science

Even without delving deeply into the numbers, The Lancet’s study is based on a false premise: the accuracy of Palestinian Ministry of Health casualty figures. Openly stating that its methodology is based on this source is effectively admitting that Hamas provides the numbers:

We used a three-list capture–recapture analysis using data from Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH) hospital lists, an MoH online survey, and social media obituaries.

Furthermore, experts found faults in the study’s number-crunching as well as it other sources, and published their conclusions online:

Again @TheLancet medical journal published pseudo-scientific Palestinian propaganda, dressed up with graphs, meaningless algorithms & fake data from Hamas/Palestinian sources, UN agencies that parrot Hamas etal, and “Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor” – a notorius Hamas-run NGO… pic.twitter.com/SdfDpRuvND

— Prof Gerald M Steinberg (@GeraldNGOM) January 10, 2025

Who’s Behind the Study?

Most disturbingly, the study’s authors were exposed by media analyst Eitan Fischberger. One of them posted about Israel’s “terror” in Lebanon, another accused Israel of committing a genocide, and yet another justified Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel:

Many media outlets are buzzing about a new @TheLancet study claiming Gaza deaths are undercounted by 41%.

I’ll leave the number-crunching to others, but it’s worth noting that most of the study’s authors are radically anti-Israel—which is already cause to doubt their analysis  pic.twitter.com/F45XcZvYIh

— Eitan Fischberger (@EFischberger) January 10, 2025

The Media Coverage

Throughout the conflict, the media have unquestioningly republished Gazan casualty figures whose ultimate source is Hamas. They’ve quoted Hamas’ numbers uncritically, while adding caveats whenever Israel has offered its own estimates, particularly concerning the number of dead terrorists.

So it’s hardly surprising that numerous outlets saw fit to cover The Lancet’s study.

Disappointingly, given its previous in-depth coverage of the Henry Jackson Society’s study on inflated Gaza casualty figures, The Telegraph‘s report on The Lancet study failed even to mention that the Palestinian Ministry of Health’s data was courtesy of the Hamas-run ministry in Gaza.

The BBC and The Guardian, meanwhile, took the opportunity to blame Israel for not letting foreign journalists into Gaza as the reason why casualty figures could not be independently verified by the media.

These outlets and Reuters did at least include some Israeli reaction (albeit relatively generic), as well as the fact that the study’s figures don’t differentiate between combatants and civilians.

Outlets like CNN and Politico, however, simply parroted the study without any caveat.

For example, here’s Politico’s headline as opposed to the more careful phrasing of Reuters:

But the fact remains that all these outlets should have been more critical of The Lancet’s study, which was thoroughly debunked on social media. Because, unlike those who did the debunking, journalists still have no issue with relying on sources like the Hamas-run Ministry of Health in their everyday reporting, and nor did they do any due diligence on the study’s authors.

Thanks to The Lancet’s professional (albeit undeserved) reputation and the media’s penchant for reporting a source that it treats as beyond criticism, this latest anti-Israel claim has the potential to become part of a narrative that has already accepted disputed casualty figures as fact.

The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.

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Top rebel commander Abu Mohammed al-Golani speaks to a crowd at Ummayad Mosque in Damascus, after Syrian rebels announced that they have ousted President Bashar al-Assad, Syria, Dec. 8, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano

The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 revived several Turkish-led energy infrastructure projects that had been abandoned due to the Syrian civil war. While some of these projects undermine Israel’s interest in becoming an “energy corridor” between Europe and the Arab Gulf States, others have the potential to open up new markets in the region for Israeli gas and electricity exports. This article will highlight three of these potential projects and examine their implications for Israeli regional interests: 1) a joint Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline through Syria; 2) an extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline to Turkey; and 3) new oil pipelines from the Arab Gulf States to Syria to replace Iranian oil supplies.

The Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project through Syria

Soon after the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish media outlets began reporting on their government’s desire to revive an old plan to construct a gas pipeline between Qatar and Turkey through Syria. The pipeline was first announced in 2009 and was primarily promoted by Turkey. Qatar ultimately abandoned it due to technical and political difficulties, including the eruption of the civil war in Syria, high-profile disputes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and between Turkey and Assad’s regime, and the crash in oil prices in 2014 that put many regional energy infrastructure plans on hold. Now that the Assad regime has fallen and relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have warmed, Turkey is again interested in advancing the Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project.

 Proposed Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline

A joint gas pipeline with Qatar would serve several important Turkish interests. It would allow Turkey to strengthen its position as the main transit country for non-Russian gas to Europe; provide Turkey with an additional source of cheap gas to serve southeastern Turkey, which suffers from winter power outages due to unreliable supply from Iran and Iraq; and strengthen Turkish and Qatari ties with the new regime in Syria.

At this stage, there is no clear timeline for the pipeline’s construction and no estimate regarding the expected capacity or cost of such a project. Qatar likely wants to wait and see that the new regime in Syria is able to gain control over the center of the country before it makes any investment decisions. As a rule, energy companies do not invest in multibillion-dollar cross-border gas pipelines if they’re not certain that the transit country will remain stable and reliable for the next 10-15 years, which is the necessary period to recover a pipeline’s cost. This is especially important in areas of central Syria where the proposed pipeline will need to pass – areas that are still seeing activity by ISIS and similar groups and will therefore require strong security guarantees.

In the meantime, Qatar prefers to focus on securing its maritime transport routes to Europe, as it has become a major LNG supplier to Europe following the war in Ukraine. Qatar is also investing heavily in potential gas production projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, which will give it closer access to Europe and provide it with some leverage in the ongoing Turkey-Cyprus maritime dispute. These investments include the recent acquisition of a 23% stake in an Egyptian gas field and a partnership in two new drilling operations in Cypriot waters.

For Israel, the energy connection created between Turkey and Qatar through Syria could undermine some of its own ambitions to become part of an economic corridor between Europe and the Arab Gulf States, also known as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). If a new gas pipeline between Qatar and Turkey is successfully established, it will be much easier to supplement that route with additional infrastructure, such as roads, rails, and electricity cables. It would thus be easier for the UAE and other Arab Gulf States to connect to it and export dry gas and other products to Europe through Turkey than to construct a brand-new corridor through Jordan and Israel to reach the Eastern Mediterranean.

While it is clear that the UAE won’t want to depend on Qatar or Turkey as transit partners, their appeal as an alternative will grow for the UAE so long as the war in Gaza continues and Israel’s status as an island of regional stability continues to erode. Israel should be mindful that the continuation of the war and subsequent delays to Saudi-Israeli normalization could eventually lead to a point where a lucrative regional economic plan completely bypasses Israel on its way to Europe. Israel should continue to promote the idea of an East-Mediterranean corridor with Cyprus and Greece, especially to potential investors in Europe and the US, as an essential component of regional economic plans.

Turkish connection to the Arab Gas Pipeline in Syria

While Turkey’s pipeline plans with Qatar may undermine Israeli interests, another Turkish plan might help Israel open up new markets for its natural gas exports. Over the past month, Turkey has been reexamining the possibility of connecting to the Arab Gas Pipeline through its mostly neglected section in Syria. The Arab Gas Pipeline, inaugurated in 2003, was initially designed to allow Egypt to export natural gas northward to Jordan and Syria. Plans to extend the pipeline further to Turkey were signed in 2006 and 2008 but abandoned in 2009, primarily due to financial disputes and the fact that Egypt was running out of gas to export. Today, the pipeline mainly serves Israel, as it transits Israeli gas to Jordan and southward to Egypt while the Syrian section remains unused. The pipeline can transfer about 10 BCM of natural gas annually, but this amount can be increased to 15 BCM, given pipeline upgrades with additional compression stations.

The Arab Gas Pipeline

If Turkey does in fact connect to the Arab Gas Pipeline in its Syrian section, Israel could theoretically transit gas northward through Jordan to Turkey and from there to Europe (either directly or through swap deals). Such a plan is not likely to occur without a significant improvement in Israel-Turkey diplomatic relations, as well as normalization between Israel and the new regime in Syria. But even if none of those things occurs, Israeli gas can still reach Turkey if Jordan or Egypt serves as an “end user” for Israeli gas that they then sell onward to Turkey. A similar arrangement has existed over the past two years: Israeli gas is exported to Egypt, which then liquefies it and exports it to Turkey and other destinations.

There is a snag, however. Any arrangement Israel creates to sell dry gas by pipeline to Turkey, even indirectly, could be perceived by Cyprus and Greece as undermining their interests with Israel. Additionally, the new pipeline connection might undermine some of the goals of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The Turkish plan to connect to the Arab Gas Pipeline in Syria is only one of several plans for major infrastructure connections between the two countries. Turkish officials have already discussed projects that advance cross-border road, rail, and communication infrastructure with the new Syrian regime. Such projects would further cement Turkey’s influence in Syria and could provide Ankara with several benefits. One would be the drafting of a new maritime border agreement between Turkey and Syria that would challenge Cyprus’s maritime claims and undermine cooperation in the EMGF.

Israel should take steps to assuage such concerns from Cyprus and Greece. It should make clear that any opportunity Israel may have to export gas through Turkey would not contradict its plans to advance joint infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even if the pipeline plans in Syria materialize, Israeli gas companies won’t want to rely on Syria and Turkey as the main transit countries for their gas and would only use it cautiously and in limited amounts. Moreover, Israeli energy companies are not keen to rely on Egypt and Jordan as end users to sell Israeli gas to Turkey, partly over debt payment issues. They would still prefer a more direct route to new markets to diversify their portfolio, such as a joint LNG project with Cyprus.

Non-Iranian oil pipelines and electricity connections to Syria

The new regime in Syria has energy interests beyond using the country as a transit area for gas pipelines. Syria is in desperate need of a stable supply of oil now that it is without a regular supply of Iranian crude oil and fuels. During Assad’s regime, Syria received about 90% of its oil supply from Iran (60,000-70,000 barrels per day), with another 10% coming from local Syrian oil fields. In addition, Hezbollah smuggled fuel to Syria through Lebanon (despite Lebanon’s own problems with severe oil shortages). Syria’s new reality is very different. Immediately following the collapse of Assad’s regime, Iran cut off all oil shipments to Syria. At the same time, Israel bombed Hezbollah’s smuggling routes to Syria, thereby preventing fuel from being smuggled in from Lebanon.

Oil and Gas Pipelines in Syria

Under these new circumstances, Syria is now seeking cooperation agreements to receive regular oil supplies from one or more of its neighbors. The most immediate means would be cross-border truck shipments, which are expensive and infrequent. In the long term, Syria will seek new pipeline projects to ensure a consistent flow. The most obvious source would be the existing oil pipeline between Syria and Kirkuk in Iraq, which stopped operations in the 1980s and would require rehabilitation. However, those oil fields are now under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, which might provoke opposition from Turkey.

Additionally, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia are all examining the possibility of becoming Syria’s new oil supplier as part of the regional game to gain a political foothold with the new Syrian regime. In the coming months, we should expect to see many movements in this direction. Saudi Arabia is highly motivated to supply oil to Syria instead of Qatar and possibly thwart other Qatari plans to strengthen its presence in Syria together with Turkey.

It seems that at this stage, Israel has not yet made a clear decision regarding the nature of its relationship with the new regime in Syria. This is understandable, considering the numerous political scenarios that could still occur in Syria that would completely change existing calculations. However, in terms of potential, a normalization agreement between Israel and Syria could open new energy routes and economic opportunities for Israel, including natural gas exports, assistance in oil supply, the establishment of joint wind turbines in the Golan Heights, and more. If Israel is slow to react to developments surrounding new energy infrastructure in Syria, especially those led by Turkey, it might lose a valuable economic and political opportunity to become an integral part of a new regional energy corridor.

Dr. Elai Rettig is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Studies and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in energy geopolitics and national security. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post If Israel Hesitates, It Could Lose Some Benefits of Working with a New, Post-Assad Syria on Energy first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Pro-Hamas demonstrators, many of whom are college students, in New York City on May 11, 2024. Photo: John Lamparski via Reuters Connect

The United States Supreme Court has rejected a petition for it to hear a right to work case brought by a group of City University of New York (CUNY) professors who sued to sever ties with the public sector union which represents them and they consider antisemitic, The Algemeiner has learned from a plaintiff in the case.

“For the past three years, our clients have bravely fought for their rights while enduring tremendous pressure to stay silent,” the plaintiffs’ attorney, Nathan McGrath, president and general counsel of the Fairness Center, told The Algemeiner in a statement on Monday. “They are disappointed that the court did not take their case, but they are pleased that their litigation has exposed union officials’ actions that they consider to be antisemitic.”

The professors — Avraham Goldstein, Michael Goldstein, Frimette Kass-Shraibman, Mitchell Langbert, Jeffrey Lax, and Maria Pagano — five of whom are Jewish, resigned from CUNY’s Professional Staff Congress (PSC-CUNY) after it passed a resolution during Israel’s May 2021 war with Hamas that declared solidarity with Palestinians and accused the Jewish state of ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and crimes against humanity.

The professors, however, were required to remain in the union’s “bargaining unit,” due to New York State’s “Taylor Law,” which requires state public employers to bargain collectively with unions. The plaintiffs argued this amounted to a denial of their right to freedom of speech and association by forcing them to be represented in collective bargaining negotiations by an organization they claimed holds antisemitic views. Beyond the plaintiffs, 263 other professors and staff have resigned from the union as well, according to the website of the Resign.PSC campaign, which accuses the body of having “violated its mandate” by weighing in on a contentious political issue.

“The core issue in this case is straightforward: can the government force Jewish professors to accept the representation of an advocacy group they rightly consider to be antisemitic?” said the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari, a legal document that allows a higher court to review a lower court’s decision. “The answer plainly should be ‘no.’ The First Amendment [of the US Constitution] protects the rights of individuals, and especially religious dissenters, to disaffiliate themselves from associations and speech they abhor.”

A New York district judge dismissed the professors’ suit in November 2022, ruling that several previous cases have affirmed the constitutionality of compulsory union representation. In appealing the decision, the National Right to Work Foundation, as well its co-litigant, the Fairness Center, argued that the judge’s argument is incorrect. The Supreme Court’s declining to hear the case affirms that ruling, however, and sees its 6-3 conservative majority forgo a chance to issue a landmark ruling which would have gutted the power of public sector unions across the country.

“I’m certainly disappointed that the Supreme Court did not take our case, but if our openly antisemitic PSC-CUNY union thinks this fight is over, they should think again. We’re just getting started,” CUNY Law professor Jeffrey Lax told The Algemeiner. “It is outrageous that the same PSC delegate leaders who chant ‘Zionism out of CUNY’ and who virulently support BDS and the illegal, Jew-harassing campus Gaza encampments then argue that they should bargain for our terms of employment at CUNY. In reality, it’s not merely cruel and despicable, it is downright mutually exclusive to openly argue that Zionist Jews should not work at CUNY and at the same time feign to represent the interests of those same Zionist Jews, like me, in negotiating the terms of our employment.”

Allegations of antisemitism at the City University of New York have caused a burst of legal activity in recent years.

Last year, the US Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) resolved half a dozen investigations of antisemitism on CUNY campuses, a consortium of undergraduate colleges located throughout New York City’s five boroughs.

The inquiries, which reviewed incidents that happened as far back as 2020, were aimed at determining whether school officials neglected to prevent and respond to antisemitic discrimination, bullying, and harassment. Hunter College and CUNY Law combined for three resolutions in total, representing half of all the antisemitism cases settled by OCR. Baruch College, Brooklyn College, and CUNY’s Central Office were the subjects of three other investigations.

One of the cases which OCR resolved, involving Brooklyn College, prompted widespread concern when it was announced in 2022. According to witness testimony provided by the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law — which filed the complaint prompting the investigation — Jewish students enrolled in the college’s Mental Health Counseling (MCH) program were repeatedly pressured into saying that Jews are white people who should be excluded from discussions about social justice.

The badgering of Jewish students, the students said at the time, became so severe that one student said in a WhatsApp group chat that she wanted to “strangle” a Jewish classmate.

As part of an agreement with the federal agency, CUNY will, among other steps, “reopen” past internal investigations of antisemitic conduct, report to OCR on its progress, and train its employees to conduct “thorough and impartial investigations” of any bigoted conduct reported by them. CUNY also agreed to issue climate surveys, a series of questions posed to students to measure their opinions on discrimination at their school and administrators’ handling of it.

Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.

The post US Supreme Court Declines to Hear CUNY Professors’ Case to Cut Ties With ‘Antisemitic’ Union first appeared on Algemeiner.com.