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The Different Options for Administering Israel’s Holiest Sites
Italian operatic tenor Andrea Bocelli at the Western Wall in Jerusalem on June 9, 2022. Photo: Screenshot/TheKotel.org.
The Temple Mount, the Western Wall, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher — these are places of utmost importance to multiple religious groups, and they often give rise to bitter disputes and even acts of violence.
The question of how to effectively govern and manage such sites is of paramount practical significance. Until recently, no systematic models of governance for contested sacred sites have been proposed. This article describes a typology of five governance models in terms of their attributes, advantages, and disadvantages, so that decision-makers, scholars, religious figures, and other stakeholders can apply them as needed to different sacred sites.
Sacred sites are defined as “thick sites” — which means a site, typically but not necessarily religious, that is imbued with different and incompatible meanings by different agents. From these agents’ point of view, these meanings are highly significant and the sites are therefore irreplaceable.
Thick sites are not mere locations. They exist in specific public spaces and cannot be moved or replaced. This means that members of different religious groups all insist on conducting their activities in the same location, often simultaneously.
Unlike the Lockean-Madisonian solution, according to which religious practice is kept a private affair, thick sites contain different religious communities that each maintain their own place of worship within the site. These sites are thus focal points for intense inter-religious competition over ownership, governance, access, religious rights, and other aspects of control.
This raises the question of how to govern such sites effectively. What models of governance can promote social order and a measure of religious liberty at these sites?
The following is a brief, induction-based description of five main models for the effective governance and management of contested holy, or “thick,” sites:
The “Non-Intervention” Model: In this model, the state withdraws from religious or substantive management of the holy site, and does not finance the salaries of clerics, clergy, or religious personnel. The state focuses on providing services like security and cleaning. An example of this model is the management of “Devil’s Tower” in Wyoming, US, which is sacred to about 20 Native American tribes.
The “Divide and Separate” Model: Here, the government divides the thick site and separates competing groups, either spatially or temporally. This bureaucratic separation minimizes contact between rival groups, potentially cooling tensions, as contact between the groups is either minimized or banned completely. An example was the proposal (not ultimately accepted) to manage the Babri Masjid/Ram Janmabhoomi site in Ayodhya, India, which is embroiled in a dispute between Hindus and Muslims. This model also applies to the Cave of the Patriarchs.
The “Preference” Model: In this model, one group is given priority or advantages in certain aspects of site management over other groups. These advantages can include ownership rights, religious usage rights, and entry. The Western Wall illustrates this model, with Orthodox Judaism enjoying privileged status. Thus (to mention a few examples), the Rabbi of the Wall (a governmental position) is always Orthodox, space is allocated unequally between men and women with the advantage given to the men, and access to Torah scrolls is denied to women in their section of the Wall.
The “Status Quo” Model: This model “freezes” an existing situation — an allocation of ownership, usage, and entry rights to competing religious groups at a given thick site — at a specific point in time. That is, it locks in the status quo. While this ensures stability, it may not guarantee fairness, as the fairness of the allocation framework being maintained in perpetuity is not discussed at all. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, which is crucially important to multiple Christian groups, is an example of this model. At this church, the status quo from the days of Ottoman rule has been meticulously preserved throughout British, Jordanian and Israeli rule.
The “Closure” Model: This model involves a ban on entering or practicing religion at the site, either selectively or absolutely. The ban can apply to entrance, religious practice, or a combination and can be selective by group or by period. It is a strict tool that infringes on the religious freedom of observers of the restricted religion but can be justified in cases where there is a significant risk to public order, as is the case on the Temple Mount. At that site, Jews may enter but are not allowed to pray.
The suggested novel typology is rooted in field cases, and is a tool that can benefit both policymakers and academics. Researchers can use it to understand and analyze conflicts surrounding thick sites worldwide. Politicians can employ it to resolve these conflicts by considering various governance models, their pros and cons, and their suitability for specific cases.
This short paper is grounded in the joint research conducted by Nahshon Perez and Yuval Jobani, which was fully developed in the book Governing the Sacred: Political Toleration in Five Contested Sacred Sites (Oxford University Press, 2020). This research project was funded by an Israel Science Foundation grant (688/18).
Nahshon Perez, PhD, serves as a professor in the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University. His academic interests encompass contemporary political theory, contested sacred sites, past injustices and reparations, and the intersection of religion and politics. His latest book is: Worldly Politics and Divine Institutions: Contemporary Entanglements of Faith and Government, which was published by Oxford University Press in 2023. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Smotrich Says Defense Ministry to Spur Voluntary Emigration from Gaza

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich attends an inauguration event for Israel’s new light rail line for the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, in Petah Tikva, Israel, Aug. 17, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
i24 News – Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said on Sunday that the government would establish an administration to encourage the voluntary migration of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.
“We are establishing a migration administration, we are preparing for this under the leadership of the Prime Minister [Benjamin Netanyahu] and Defense Minister [Israel Katz],” he said at a Land of Israel Caucus at the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. “The budget will not be an obstacle.”
Referring to the plan championed by US President Donald Trump, Smotrich noted the “profound and deep hatred towards Israel” in Gaza, adding that “sources in the American government” agreed “that it’s impossible for two million people with hatred towards Israel to remain at a stone’s throw from the border.”
The administration would be under the Defense Ministry, with the goal of facilitating Trump’s plan to build a “Riviera of the Middle East” and the relocation of hundreds of thousands of Gazans for rebuilding efforts.
“If we remove 5,000 a day, it will take a year,” Smotrich said. “The logistics are complex because you need to know who is going to which country. It’s a potential for historical change.”
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Defense Ministry: 16,000 Wounded in War, About Half Under 30

A general view shows the plenum at the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, in Jerusalem. Photo: REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun
i24 News – The Knesset’s (Israeli parliament’s) Special Committee for Foreign Workers held a discussion on Sunday to examine the needs of wounded and disabled IDF soldiers and the response foreign caregivers could provide.
During the discussion, data from the Defense Minister revealed that the number of registered IDF wounded and disabled veterans rose from 62,000 to 78,000 since the war began on October 7, 2023. “Most of them are reservists and 51 percent of the wounded are up to 30 years old,” the ministry’s report said. The number will increase, the ministry assesses, as post-trauma cases emerge.
The committee chairwoman, Knesset member Etty Atiya (Likud), emphasized the need to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy for the wounded and to remove obstacles. “There is no dispute that the IDF disabled have sacrificed their bodies and souls for the people of Israel, for the state of Israel,” she said. Addressing the veterans, she continued: “And we, as public representatives and public servants alike, must do everything, but everything, to improve your lives in any way possible, to alleviate your pain and the distress of your family members who are no less affected than you.”
Currently, extensions are being given to the IDF veterans on a three-month basis, which Atiya said creates uncertainty and fear among the patients.
“The committee calls on the Interior Minister [Moshe Arbel] to approve as soon as possible the temporary order on our table, so that it will reach the approval of the Knesset,” she said, adding that she “intends to personally approach the Director General of the Population Authority [Shlomo Mor-Yosef] on the matter in order to promote a quick and stable solution.”
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Over 1,300 Killed in Syria as New Regime Accused of Massacring Civilians

Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad speaks during an interview with Sky News Arabia in Damascus, Syria in this handout picture released by the Syrian Presidency on August 8, 2023. Syrian Presidency/Handout via REUTERS
i24 News – Over 1,300 people were killed in two days of fighting in Syria between security forces under the new Syrian Islamist leaders and fighters from ousted president Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite sect on the other hand, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights on Sunday.
Since Thursday, 1,311 people had been killed, according to the Observatory, including 830 civilians, mainly Alawites, 231 Syrian government security personnel, and 250 Assad loyalists.
The intense fighting broke out late last week as the Alawite militias launched an offensive against the new government’s fighters in the coastal region of the country, prompting a massive deployment ordered by new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa.
“We must preserve national unity and civil peace as much as possible and… we will be able to live together in this country,” al-Sharaa said, as quoted in the BBC.
The death toll represents the most severe escalations since Assad was ousted late last year, and is one of the most costly in terms of human lives since the civil war began in 2011.
The counter-offensive launched by al-Sharaa’s forces was marked by reported revenge killings and atrocities in the Latakia region, a stronghold of the Alawite minority in the country.
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