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The Different Options for Administering Israel’s Holiest Sites
Italian operatic tenor Andrea Bocelli at the Western Wall in Jerusalem on June 9, 2022. Photo: Screenshot/TheKotel.org.
The Temple Mount, the Western Wall, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher — these are places of utmost importance to multiple religious groups, and they often give rise to bitter disputes and even acts of violence.
The question of how to effectively govern and manage such sites is of paramount practical significance. Until recently, no systematic models of governance for contested sacred sites have been proposed. This article describes a typology of five governance models in terms of their attributes, advantages, and disadvantages, so that decision-makers, scholars, religious figures, and other stakeholders can apply them as needed to different sacred sites.
Sacred sites are defined as “thick sites” — which means a site, typically but not necessarily religious, that is imbued with different and incompatible meanings by different agents. From these agents’ point of view, these meanings are highly significant and the sites are therefore irreplaceable.
Thick sites are not mere locations. They exist in specific public spaces and cannot be moved or replaced. This means that members of different religious groups all insist on conducting their activities in the same location, often simultaneously.
Unlike the Lockean-Madisonian solution, according to which religious practice is kept a private affair, thick sites contain different religious communities that each maintain their own place of worship within the site. These sites are thus focal points for intense inter-religious competition over ownership, governance, access, religious rights, and other aspects of control.
This raises the question of how to govern such sites effectively. What models of governance can promote social order and a measure of religious liberty at these sites?
The following is a brief, induction-based description of five main models for the effective governance and management of contested holy, or “thick,” sites:
The “Non-Intervention” Model: In this model, the state withdraws from religious or substantive management of the holy site, and does not finance the salaries of clerics, clergy, or religious personnel. The state focuses on providing services like security and cleaning. An example of this model is the management of “Devil’s Tower” in Wyoming, US, which is sacred to about 20 Native American tribes.
The “Divide and Separate” Model: Here, the government divides the thick site and separates competing groups, either spatially or temporally. This bureaucratic separation minimizes contact between rival groups, potentially cooling tensions, as contact between the groups is either minimized or banned completely. An example was the proposal (not ultimately accepted) to manage the Babri Masjid/Ram Janmabhoomi site in Ayodhya, India, which is embroiled in a dispute between Hindus and Muslims. This model also applies to the Cave of the Patriarchs.
The “Preference” Model: In this model, one group is given priority or advantages in certain aspects of site management over other groups. These advantages can include ownership rights, religious usage rights, and entry. The Western Wall illustrates this model, with Orthodox Judaism enjoying privileged status. Thus (to mention a few examples), the Rabbi of the Wall (a governmental position) is always Orthodox, space is allocated unequally between men and women with the advantage given to the men, and access to Torah scrolls is denied to women in their section of the Wall.
The “Status Quo” Model: This model “freezes” an existing situation — an allocation of ownership, usage, and entry rights to competing religious groups at a given thick site — at a specific point in time. That is, it locks in the status quo. While this ensures stability, it may not guarantee fairness, as the fairness of the allocation framework being maintained in perpetuity is not discussed at all. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, which is crucially important to multiple Christian groups, is an example of this model. At this church, the status quo from the days of Ottoman rule has been meticulously preserved throughout British, Jordanian and Israeli rule.
The “Closure” Model: This model involves a ban on entering or practicing religion at the site, either selectively or absolutely. The ban can apply to entrance, religious practice, or a combination and can be selective by group or by period. It is a strict tool that infringes on the religious freedom of observers of the restricted religion but can be justified in cases where there is a significant risk to public order, as is the case on the Temple Mount. At that site, Jews may enter but are not allowed to pray.
The suggested novel typology is rooted in field cases, and is a tool that can benefit both policymakers and academics. Researchers can use it to understand and analyze conflicts surrounding thick sites worldwide. Politicians can employ it to resolve these conflicts by considering various governance models, their pros and cons, and their suitability for specific cases.
This short paper is grounded in the joint research conducted by Nahshon Perez and Yuval Jobani, which was fully developed in the book Governing the Sacred: Political Toleration in Five Contested Sacred Sites (Oxford University Press, 2020). This research project was funded by an Israel Science Foundation grant (688/18).
Nahshon Perez, PhD, serves as a professor in the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University. His academic interests encompass contemporary political theory, contested sacred sites, past injustices and reparations, and the intersection of religion and politics. His latest book is: Worldly Politics and Divine Institutions: Contemporary Entanglements of Faith and Government, which was published by Oxford University Press in 2023. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Driver Kills 10 Ramming Truck Into New Orleans Crowd in New Year’s Day Attack
Police officers stand at the scene where a truck drove into a large crowd on Bourbon Street in the French Quarter of New Orleans, Louisiana, US, Jan. 1, 2025 in this screengrab taken from a video. Photo: ABC Affiliate WGNO/Handout via REUTERS
A driver crashed his pickup truck into a crowd celebrating New Year’s Day in New Orleans‘ French Quarter and opened fire, killing 10 people and injuring more than 35, including two Israelis, in an early morning attack the FBI said was a potential act of terrorism.
The suspect, described by one city leader as being in “full military gear,” died after a shootout with police, law enforcement officials said.
“This man was trying to run over as many people as he could,” Police Chief Anne Kirkpatrick said at a televised press conference on Wednesday. “He was hell-bent on creating the carnage and the damage that he did.”
The incident occurred at 3:15 am (0915 GMT) at the intersection of Canal and Bourbon Streets, a historic tourist destination in the city’s French Quarter known for attracting large crowds with its music and bars.
Kirkpatrick said the driver, who swerved around barricades, fired at police and struck two police officers from the vehicle after it crashed. The officers were in stable condition, she added.
“We know the perpetrator has been killed,” said New Orleans City Councilman Oliver Thomas. “As we search for a motive, remember there is no making sense of evil.”
Officials did not immediately name the suspect.
NBC News, citing three unnamed senior law enforcement sources, identified the suspect as Shamsud Din Jabbar, 42.
NOLA.com, citing one unidentified law enforcement source, reported that same suspect was carrying an ISIS flag in the truck. Reuters was unable to verify the reports and the US Army did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The Israeli Foreign Ministry announced that it had made contact with the families of the victims and the hospitals where they were being treated.
More than 300 officers were on duty at the time of the incident, police said. The city hosts the Sugar Bowl, a classic American college football game, each New Year’s Day, and will also be the site of the NFL Super Bowl on Feb. 9.
New Orleans Mayor LaToya Cantrell called the incident a terrorist attack.
The FBI said in a statement that it was investigating the incident as an act of terrorism. Initially, Alethea Duncan, an assistant special agent in charge of the FBI’s New Orleans field office, had said it was not a terrorist event.
Duncan said a suspected improvised explosive device was found but provided no further details.
“From what I understand, there is a potential that other suspects could be involved in this, and all hands on deck on determining who these individuals are and finding them,” New Orleans City Council President Helena Moreno told 4WWLTV.
“Information that I received is that this individual was in full military gear, that he is apparently not local, and that he was prepared, and that he was very prepared to inflict horrific pain on the people on Bourbon Street,” Moreno said.
‘HORRIFIC ACT’
Verified video taken by an onlooker shows at least two twisted bodies in the street, with one of them lying in what appears to be a puddle of blood. A bystander is seen kneeling over one of the bodies as a group of uniformed military personnel in green uniforms and carrying firearms runs past.
The injured were taken to at least five hospitals, according to NOLA Ready, the city’s emergency preparedness department.
A couple told CBS News that they heard crashing noises coming from down the street and then saw a white truck slam through a barricade “at a high rate of speed.”
Zion Parsons, 18, told NOLA.com that he and his two friends were leaving a Bourbon Street eatery when they heard a commotion and saw a white car barreling toward them.
He said he dodged the vehicle, but one of his friends was struck, with her leg “twisted and contorted above and around her back.”
“You can just look and see bodies, just bodies of people, just bleeding, broken bones,” he said.
Louisiana US Senator Bill Cassidy said on CNN that despite the attack, law enforcement in New Orleans was ready for the Sugar Bowl on Wednesday night. “The Superdome has been locked down,” he said.
In response to vehicle attacks on pedestrian malls around the world, New Orleans was in the process of removing and replacing the steel barriers known as bollards that restrict vehicle traffic in the Bourbon Street pedestrian zone. The project’s status was unclear at the time of Wednesday’s attack.
Construction began in November 2024 and was scheduled to continue through February 2025, according to a city website.
Last month in Germany, a 50-year-old man was charged with multiple counts of murder and attempted murder after police said he plowed a car through crowds at a Christmas market in Magdeburg, killing five people and injuring scores.
President Joe Biden called the city’s mayor to offer full federal support. President-elect Donald Trump said his incoming administration would help New Orleans as it investigates and recovers from what he called an act of pure evil.
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Next Nuclear Talks Between Iran and Three European Countries Due on Jan. 13
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visits the Iranian centrifuges in Tehran, Iran, June 11, 2023. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
The next round of nuclear talks between Iran and three European countries will take place on Jan. 13 in Geneva, Iran‘s semi-official ISNA news agency cited the country’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi as saying on Wednesday.
Iran held talks about its disputed nuclear program in November, 2024 with Britain, France, and Germany.
Those discussions, the first since the US election, came after Tehran was angered by a European-backed resolution that accused Iran of poor cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog.
Tehran reacted to the resolution by informing the IAEA watchdog that it plans to install more uranium-enriching centrifuges at its enrichment plants.
UN nuclear watchdog chief Rafael Grossi told Reuters in December that Iran is “dramatically” accelerating its enrichment of uranium to up to 60 percent purity, closer to the roughly 90 percent level that is weapons grade. Tehran denies pursuing nuclear weapons and says its program is peaceful.
In 2018, the then administration of Donald Trump exited Iran‘s 2015 nuclear pact with six major powers and reimposed harsh sanctions on Iran, prompting Tehran to violate the pact’s nuclear limits, with moves such as rebuilding stockpiles of enriched uranium, refining it to higher fissile purity and installing advanced centrifuges to speed up output.
Indirect talks between US President Joe Biden’s administration and Tehran to try to revive the pact have failed, but Trump said during his election campaign in September: “We have to make a deal, because the consequences are impossible. We have to make a deal.”
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Is Now the Moment to Rid Syria of Its Chemical Weapons?
Khaled Brigade, a part of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), hold a military parade, after Syria’s Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Damascus, Syria, Dec. 27, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh
The matter of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program has long lingered. It was initiated in the 1970s by President Hafez al-Assad and steadily increased over time. The issue has reemerged multiple times: in efforts to reach an agreement to eliminate Syria’s under-declared CW arsenal (2013); in the Syrian military’s subsequent recurrent employment of CW against the rebels during the civil war; in the reestablishment of a Syrian CW alignment within certain installations; and in the US-UK-France raid on Syrian CW facilities (2018). The issue recently surfaced once again, amid the collapse of the Assad regime. Various CW facilities became uncontrolled, some of which were destroyed by Israel.
Apparently, all the sides involved – the rising new Syrian regime, NATO, Russia and Israel – are willing to eliminate Syria’s CW alignment. Radical rebel groups might be keen to capture residual Syrian CW (the extent and deployment of which are not clear), along with the associated expert personnel. Russia and Iran might rush to get rid of any traces of their assistance to the Syrian CW program, in terms of both classified technical knowhow and CW Convention violations. Related North Korean and Chinese rudimentary (yet curious) contributions might also be traceable. In addition, profound inquiry could finally reveal whether concealed CBW possessed by Saddam Hussein’s regime was smuggled into Syria 20 years ago. At any rate, the complete disarmament of Syria’s CW would reduce the number of Muslim states possessing CW to three – Iran, Pakistan and Egypt – thereby diminishing the menace of CW use in the Middle East.
Originally, the overall Syrian CW alignment consisted of about 35 facilities in roughly 11 sites. However, it underwent many revisions, and its dimensions are now fairly obscure. The best way to attain a complete picture of the entire alignment (or what remains of it) might be to interrogate pertinent high-ranking Syrian (or Iranian in Syria) military and MoD figures and to locate genuine Syrian classified software and documents.
Basically, the components comprising the Syrian CW alignment include stocks of raw materials, final precursors of the binary nerve agents sarin and VX, sulfur mustard, chlorine, possibly some incapacitants, mechanical parts of the binary systems, and adjusted warheads. Selective bombardment of certain of these components would not cause environmental pollution but would prevent operability. In terms of installations, the alignment consists of development, production and storage facilities. Some of those facilities were attacked by the IDF “in order that they will not fall into the hands of extremists” (including Hezbollah, presumably), as noted by Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Since 2014, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has raised 26 questions over potential stockpiles with the Syrian authorities, but only seven have been resolved. “It is up to the international community to seize this opportunity … to eradicate this criminal program once and for all,” Fernando Arias, director general of the OPCW, said on December 12, 2024, at an emergency meeting of the implementing body for the international CW Convention.
Upon taking control of Syria, the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group pledged its “readiness to cooperate with the international community in everything related to monitoring weapons and sensitive areas”. The group also indicated that it would safeguard the country’s remaining CW stockpiles and ensure that they are not used against citizens. Further, one of the Syrian opposition leaders stressed that the opposition is committed to fully implementing CW disarmament in Syria.
Upon the collapse of the Assad regime, a senior Biden administration official said: “We are doing everything we can to prudently ensure that those (CW) materials are either not available to anyone or are cared for.” He further indicated that the Biden administration isn’t planning to send US troops into Syria to secure or destroy CW. Beyond that, he said that Washington will act at all costs to prevent any attempt by Syria or Iran to develop nuclear weapons. That last sentence is notable, as it pertains to the sphere of WMD at large rather than solely with regard to Iran. Also of note, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had intended to collect fresh environmental samples from suspected nuclear-related sites in Syria, but the collapse of the Assad regime disrupted this important monitoring.
As regards Iran, its military nuclear program is certainly in progress. Recently, then-IAEA head Rafael Grossi said that “Iran [has] developed much stronger capabilities… and is practically at the same level as nuclear-armed states.” Alongside that assessment, a report by the Office of the US Director of National Intelligence maintained that “Iran now has enough fissile material to make more than a dozen nuclear weapons.”
At any rate, the unequivocal statement by the above senior Biden administration official in reference to removing the nuclear WMD dimension echoes a previous statement (December 2021) by David Barnea, Head of the Mossad: “Iran will not have nuclear weapons, not in the coming years, and it never will. This is my commitment, and this is the commitment of the Mossad.”
Also worthy of mention is the possession of operational CW and BW arsenals by Iran, albeit a state party to the international CW and BW conventions. Iran is increasingly active in the area of weaponizing pharmacologically derived substances, both chemical and biological.
The third dimension of WMD – biological weapons – surfaced in the Syrian context in a press statement by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (December 10): “The United States reaffirms its full support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition…. The transition process and new government must also…. ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.” The Assad regime had an active BW program that was divided in two: the development of toxins (such as botulinum, ricin and cobra toxins) by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, and the development of pathogens (such as anthrax and Brucella) by that center plus the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria. Thus, the Syrian BW program constitutes a serious issue of its own. This is particularly true as Syria is not a state party to the international BW Convention.
Tight and meticulous cooperation and collaboration ought to be potentiated between the new Syrian regime and the international community for the purpose of dealing appropriately with all the above-detailed challenges in Syria, apart from those no less meaningful ones that concern Iran.
Dr. Dany Shoham is a former senior analyst in IDF military intelligence and the Ministry of Defense. He specializes in chemical and biological warfare in the Middle East and worldwide. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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