Part One of this article appeared here.

Former UK Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sachs referred in one of his articles to the book Radical Uncertainty by British economists John Kay and Mervin King. The book makes a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk can be calculated, but uncertainty cannot. Therefore, in situations of uncertainty, the authors recommend focusing on understanding the situation. This should be accomplished not by calculating probabilities but by observing what is actually happening on the ground with eyes that are open to new perspectives and new threats.

This approach should apply to the current shake-up of the regional system in the Middle East.

The Turkish orientation towards the leadership of al-Julani, leader of the rebels, warrants great concern. Turkish President Erdogan has never hid his ambition to renew the Ottoman Empire. The prospect of an occupation of Damascus by Sunni Muslim forces has an exciting power that could reunify radical Islamic forces to the point of reestablishing an al-Qaeda state in Syria. The third purpose of the IDF’s operations in the region is to focus on these concerns.

Meanwhile, under Erdogan’s leadership, the Kurdish region east of the Euphrates River is under threat of a military attack meant to eliminate it. This will test the ability of the American administration to stand up for its Kurdish allies.

With the collapse of the state order built with the Sykes-Picot Agreements at the end of World War I, an opportunity has arisen to correct an injustice. The international community’s concern for the right to self-determination of minorities has focused over the past century mainly on the Palestinians — but some 30 million Kurds have been trapped for a century without any possibility of a state.

The United States, as a superpower, is facing an unprecedented challenge to its ability to influence emerging trends in the regional chaos that has arisen in Syria.

In all of Israel’s past wars, including the War of Independence, the end of the war was determined by agreements with countries with a recognized identity that existed before the war and continued to exist after it. Now, for the first time, the State of Israel is facing an unknown reality.

Israeli disillusionment in Syria

The collapse of the Assad regime and the trends emerging in Syria in recent weeks required the State of Israel to respond immediately, which entailed abandoning its longstanding security perception of the “villa in the jungle.” In addition to needing to defensively penetrate the expanses of the buffer zone between Israel and Syria, Israel had to assign a special strategic purpose to the effort to maintain Israeli control of the Syrian space in front of the border: to project Israeli military power onto the trends developing in Syria.

This expressed the understanding that if Israel were to take a passive position of simple observation in defending the Golan Heights border line without daring to go beyond the “walls of the villa,” it would not have the appropriate levers to create a position of influence and bargaining to secure Israeli security interests in the emerging system in Syria and Lebanon. Miraculously, the developments in Syria forced Israeli security policy to shatter the barriers of the “villa” perception that had bound it.

A controversy from the beginning

From the beginning of the Zionist enterprise, the Jewish community both openly and covertly struggled with the tension between the two trends — convergence to the borders of the “villa” or integration into the Arab space. This tension was also expressed architecturally. While the settlements of the first aliyah were built along a main axis, such as Kfar Tavor and Yavne’al, in a way that allowed the movement of Arabs and Jews through the colony, the settlements built in the third aliyah and onwards were built off the main road in the form of a closed camp. As a result, with the confrontation of events (especially those of 1936-39, and the activity of Yitzhak Sadeh and Orde Wingate’s field companies), a dispute arose over the question of exiting the fence into the space.

In her book The Sword of the Dove, Anita Shapira describes the way in which Wingate tried to lead his men into active defense activities outside the fence. Wingate’s approach provoked resistance among the kibbutzim of the Jezreel Valley, stemming from this question: where is the line along which it is clear to everyone that they are defending their existence? Is it the fence line or is it beyond it? This debate was not only conducted in the moral dimension. It began as an operational issue. Sadeh’s and Wingate’s concept of defense required engaging in friction in the space outside the fences of the settlements. This was the concept of the guards at the beginning of the formation of the Hebrew defense force. For them, free movement in the space outside the settlements was not only a necessity to fulfill the defense mission but an expression of their desire to integrate into the space in the cultural dimension as well.

Recognizing the need for active regional integration, the State of Israel, under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, turned to proactive activity in areas outside the country’s borders in its early years. While Israel was still under a regime of economic austerity, Israeli delegations operated in African countries in the fields of agriculture and security. In the 1960s, Israeli paratroopers assisted the Iraqi Kurds in fighting against the Iraqi army.

The essence of the perceptual gap

Between the approach that confines itself within the borders of the “villa” and the approach that requires active involvement in the space beyond the borders, there is a deep gap in the perception of reality. The aspiration for confinement is based on the assumption that a country’s security situation can be stabilized by creating a status quo of borders, with each country limiting itself to activity within those borders. Switzerland, for example, succeeded in maintaining a status quo that is perceived as final and permanent within European historical circumstances.

The second approach does not hold with the assumption of the ability to preserve one’s existence in a stable and final status quo. Human reality, certainly in terms of the system of ties between countries, is subject to change and unexpected upheaval. The strategic position of a country is examined in this approach not only by what it manages to stabilize within its sovereign territory, but also by the alliances it maintains with entities in the space and its ability to actively engage in spheres of influence that shape regional trends. This is how Turkey operates in Libya and the Horn of Africa and is the thinking behind its current moves to establish military bases in the heart of Syria. Egypt has recently been involved militarily in Somalia, and Qatar, through its financial capabilities, is operating both in the region and far across the ocean.

The Mossad and its agents have operated and continue to operate with distinction in both close and distant circles outside the State of Israel. However, an overt presence is also required. The trend of Israeli confinement within the borders of the “villa” — with its security and cultural implication — has been revealed as a failure. In this dimension as in others, the Israeli national security concept requires a fundamental update.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post The Future of Syria Is Uncertain; Here’s What Israel Should Be Doing (PART TWO) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.