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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel
(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided.
“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”
Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.
Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.
Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own, he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.
Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves.
Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel.
“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.”
Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations.
So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?
There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways.
Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.
The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis.
What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”
With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.
You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity.
More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means.
Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.
The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism.
Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)
One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal.
Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors.
The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?
The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth.
If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.
Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation.
Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.
So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?
For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction.
So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else.
And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.
I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.
Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.
An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)
You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?
I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant.
I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons.
That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen.
As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?
No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.
Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that.
So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.
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Why Hillel is under growing pressure from Zionist and anti-Zionist Jewish students
Hunter College’s cultural arts festival could have been a unique opportunity for Hillel, the Jewish campus organization, and Students for Justice in Palestine to participate in a joint event despite the groups’ opposing views on Israel. But after pushback, the student government decided to cancel the event, with one student leader involved in the decision saying, a “collab with SJP and Hillel in this political climate” was a mistake.
This cancellation was just the latest instance in which Hillel has been confronted with controversy. Earlier this year, another New York City university’s student government voted to defund Hillel and cut ties with it, though the effort failed. Last month at the University of Oregon, protesters burned an American-Israeli flag outside of a Hillel House, and flyers naming and attacking its director were distributed around campus. At Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, a festival similar to Hunter’s was canceled earlier this month due to the inclusion of Wildcats for Israel, a club housed within Hillel that describes itself as focused on Israeli culture and society.
Hillel International sees these instances as antisemitic and discriminatory attacks and insists that it is apolitical as an organization. In an interview with the Forward, Hillel International president Adam Lehman described the incidents as a “recent spate of efforts to demonize and exclude Hillel.”
Critics, however, argue that Hillel’s ties to Israel make it inherently political and thus a valid target for protests. Some anti-Zionist or progressive-leaning Jews also see the organization as exclusionary to them and other Jews holding similar beliefs.
Meanwhile, Hillel has faced questions about its commitment to pluralism. In October, a rabbi fired by Emory University’s Hillel says she was dismissed over her fiancé’s criticism of Israel and pro-Palestinian activism. Emory Hillel says the rabbi was dismissed because they lost confidence in her honesty and judgment. And at the University of Michigan, Hillel cut ties with J Street, a liberal Zionist advocacy organization that brands itself as “pro-Israel” and “pro-peace.”
At the same time, Hillel is the center of Jewish communal and religious life on many campuses, offering Shabbat meals, kosher food, religious services, and a place to gather with other Jewish students. Protesting Hillel as an institution, then, can mean protesting one of the primary spaces where Jewish students — irrespective of their opinion on Israel — find a home.
How big is the tent?
Speaking with the Forward, San Francisco Hillel Director Roger Feigelson shared a Hillel saying: “If you’ve seen one Hillel, you’ve seen one Hillel.”
The organization is active in 700 locations across America, and 850 globally. Each operates independently and tailors its programming to the needs of its individual community. Still, to be associated with Hillel International and to use the name, chapters need to abide by general guidelines.
On its website Hillel states it’s “committed to the support of Israel,” works to foster “an enduring relationship with Israel” for young Jews and holds a strict policy of not collaborating with organizations or speakers who do not support Israel’s existence.
These positions are more than enough for pro-Palestinian groups to stand opposed. But their grievances tend to focus directly on Hillel’s student trips to Israel: Birthright, Perspectives (which is offered to Jews and non-Jews) and Hillel on Base. The latter is a smaller, more recent initiative that brings students to “be on an IDF base in IDF uniform and alongside soldiers.”
Some pro-Palestinian student groups, such as Students for Justice in Palestine, have accused Hillel of recruiting students to the IDF. Lehman rejects this claim.
“We have a very clear and explicit mission, set of programs and activities that does not include recruitment into any military in the world,” Lehman said.
National Students for Justice in Palestine did not respond to a request for comment from the Forward.
Lehman acknowledged Hillel’s stance against the Boycott, Divest, and Sanctions movement, but said that all students are welcome at Hillel no matter their beliefs on Israel. He also argued that Hillel actively works to foster difficult conversations on Israel and often hosts Palestinian speakers. Any claim that Hillel is “limiting bridge-building,” is “absurd,” he said.
“It’s just that we’re not bringing speakers who are specifically advocating for the destruction of the Jewish and democratic state of Israel,” Lehman said. “Sadly, those speakers are all over campus all the time. So the fact that we maintain one space, where that is not the focus of rhetoric, is necessary to create a more welcoming environment for Jewish students.”
While Hillel is concerned about the growing sentiment toward it on certain campuses, Lehman said it’s not everywhere. Some schools have instituted clear antidiscrimination policies, he said, which help deter student groups from excluding Hillel based on Jewish identity.
He noted some students might not be aware that the way they are excluding Hillel and Jewish students is “textbook antisemitism.”
“That’s part of the problem,” Lehman said. “We need universities and student groups to take responsibility to educate themselves on the nature of identity-based discrimination.”
Anti-Zionist Jews and Hillel
Long before Oct. 7, 2023, Hillel faced criticism from Jewish students who felt the organization was unwelcoming to anti-Zionist perspectives.
Open Hillel, a movement that started at Swarthmore College in 2013, sought to pressure Hillel International to remove its restrictions on hosting speakers who are pro-BDS or anti-Zionist.
But Hillel International refused, threatening legal action over student groups that flouted its guidelines while still using the Hillel name. In 2019, Open Hillel shifted its strategy away from influencing Hillel from the inside and rebranded as “Judaism on Our Own Terms,” an anti-Zionist group that sought to create Jewish campus communal life entirely outside of Hillel.
Lehman is not concerned about the chapters that have cut ties through the Open Hillel movement. These instances happened years ago, and he said they pale in comparison to the growth of Hillel.
“We’ve doubled the number of Jewish students and other students that engage in Hillel programs and experiences during the past decade,” he said.
Judaism on Our Own Terms did not respond to the Forward’s request for comment and appears to have faded into the background on campuses as Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow have become growing spaces for anti-Zionist Jews since Oct. 7. They have also been among the student groups protesting Hillel.
“Through its programs and partnerships, Hillel materially supports those very acts of the Israeli government [that violate international law],” Jewish Voice for Peace wrote in a May statement. “Hillel advances a political agenda at odds with the majority of Jews on campus.”
Lehman finds this sentiment “highly problematic.”
“Hillel is definitively not a political organization,” Lehman said. “And it’s actually insulting and discriminatory to equate the fact that — like the majority of Jews around the world — Hillel sees Israel as reflective of a part of Jewish history, theology, culture and identity.”
Zionist enough?
Hillel’s collaboration with J Street, the liberal Zionist advocacy organization, has long been a way for some Hillel chapters to reach Jewish students who hold more critical views of Israel.
J Street is explicitly Zionist and opposes the movement to boycott Israel — positions that place it inside Hillel’s stated rules around collaborators. But its views on Israeli government policy are also considerably more critical than those of many pro-Israel organizations. For instance, J Street has called for conditioning U.S. aid to Israel and supports sanctions targeting West Bank settlements.
“A lot of Hillels do want to be bringing in progressive students, and they say that they want to be this tent of inclusivity,” Erin Beiner, the national director of J Street U, told the Forward. “And by having J Street U programming in their building, they’re able to signal to liberal, progressive students that they’re welcome there, too.”
But that relationship fractured at the University of Michigan this September, when Hillel gave its J Street chapter — a club that was housed within Hillel — a choice: either disaffiliate from the national J Street organization, or disaffiliate from Hillel.
The chapter voted to disaffiliate from Hillel. But students who spoke with the Forward say they were dismayed that they had to make the choice at all.
Adir Waxman, who serves on the board of Michigan Hillel’s conservative minyan and as outreach vice president of J Street Michigan, said he believed the ultimatum stemmed from disagreements over J Street’s political views.
Hillel “say(s) that specifically in regards to Israel, they want to be able to create a space where people who have differing views on Israel can come together,” Waxman told the Forward. “But when you go and kick out the space where liberal Jews on campus come together and talk about Israel, it sends a message that you don’t actually believe in pluralism.”
Waxman said it wasn’t the first time J Street had felt censored by Hillel leadership. In fall 2025, the group changed its name to “Dialogue Across Differences: A J Street Affiliate” amid what Waxman described as pressure from Hillel to distance itself from J Street.
The next semester, University of Michigan Hillel leadership canceled a planned J Street screening of No Other Land, the Oscar-winning documentary, co-directed by Israeli and Palestinian filmmakers, about life under Israeli occupation in the West Bank.
Evan Gerstein, who serves on Michigan Hillel’s board of trustees, said beginning in fall 2026, University of Michigan Hillel put a blanket ban on affiliating with national political advocacy organizations, irrespective of ideology.
“For now, that only affected one organization, which is J Street,” Gerstein said. “In no way are we saying you can’t have J Street views, nor are we saying you can’t have AIPAC views. We’ve decided to remove ourselves from national advocacy.”
As for the screening of No Other Land, Gerstein said Hillel and J Street weren’t able to come to an agreement on when and where to show the film.
Gerstein emphasized that students involved with J Street are still welcome at Hillel and able to host programming — just not with the J Street name.
For his part, Waxman still goes to Hillel, the only place he can find gender-egalitarian services on campus. But he said he feels less comfortable bringing his full self.
“It’s sad to see an organization that claims to be a pluralistic space drifting away from what it claims,” Waxman told the Forward. “Is it still religiously pluralistic? Yeah, of course it is. But pluralism doesn’t just mean religious pluralism. It means political pluralism.”
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Jewish lawmakers warn that defense bill provision could cause proselytizing
(JTA) — Jewish lawmakers are urging House and Senate Armed Services Committee leaders against including provisions in the annual defense bill that they fear could infringe upon religious freedoms.
Members of the Congressional Jewish Caucus sent a letter on Wednesday to the chairs and ranking members of the committees, warning that proposed provisions “could result in unwanted proselytization” and violate the rights of service members to their religious beliefs.
Led by Democratic Reps. Jerry Nadler of New York and Brad Schneider of Illinois, the letter asked the committee members to reject portions of the Military Chaplains Modernization Act from the final version of the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act.
While the lawmakers did not mention which specific portions they would like removed in their letter, they were likely referring to sections of the bill that have generated significant controversy.
The legislation would guarantee that chaplains “have the right to conduct public worship, provide counseling, teach, deliver sermons, advise, minister, and offer prayer in accordance with the chaplain’s sincerely held religious beliefs and the manner, form, and tenets of the chaplain’s religious-endorsing organization.”
“Those activities shall be free from censorship, undue restriction, or fear of retribution,” the text adds, essentially barring military leaders from stepping in and preventing religious coercion.
The letter, signed by all members of the Jewish Caucus, argued that military chaplains provide critical care “to service members of many faiths and traditions, as well as those who do not practice any specific religion.”
“Because chaplains serve a richly diverse military community, they must be required to protect the religious freedom of all those they serve,” the letter stated. “The language in these provisions would undermine that fundamental principle by broadly protecting chaplains who engage in unwelcome proselytization, violating service members’ freedom of religion.”
The writers added that ensuring these religious freedoms are particularly important to members of minority faiths, including Jewish service members, who may be serving in an area where a Jewish chaplain is not available. A failure to protect these rights also “undermines readiness and combat effectiveness, weakening our Armed Forces,” the lawmakers noted.
“We insist that the Department of Defense should uphold a clear and consistent approach to religious liberty across the Armed Forces, ensuring that service members are protected from unwanted religious advocacy and can access the pastoral care they seek,” the letter concluded.
Neither committee responded to requests for comment.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post Jewish lawmakers warn that defense bill provision could cause proselytizing appeared first on The Forward.
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Van Gogh painting with a complex Jewish history sells for record $190.4 million at auction
(JTA) — A Vincent van Gogh painting of blooming chestnut trees sold for $190.4 million at Sotheby’s on Wednesday night, after a last-minute dispute about its sale during the Nazi era threatened to derail the auction.
While the set a new auction record for a Van Gogh painting, the lead-up to the event was fraught with questions of ownership. The heirs of Samuel Fischer, a German Jewish publisher, last week asked Sotheby’s to postpone the sale of the 1890 piece, called “Châtaigniers en fleurs,” arguing that their ancestors sold it in 1936 under financial duress caused by the Nazis.
The family’s lawyer, Gunnar Schnabel, demanded that Sotheby’s prove that the 1936 transaction would have occurred “even without Nazi rule,” in an email shared with The New York Times.
A day before the auction, however, Sotheby’s announced in a statement that it had come to an agreement with “all of the legal descendants of Hedwig and Samuel Fischer” and the Blaquier-Arrieta family, the collectors who were selling the painting.
Noting that Van Gogh painted “Châtaigniers en Fleurs” in May 1890 during an “extraordinary period of creative intensity” in the final two months of his life, Sotheby’s described the piece as one of the most important of such works to remain in private hands.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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