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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel
(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided.
“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”
Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.
Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.
Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own, he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.
Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves.
Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel.
“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.”
Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations.
So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?
There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways.
Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.
The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis.
What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”
With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.
You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity.
More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means.
Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.
The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism.
Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)
One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal.
Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors.
The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?
The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth.
If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.
Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation.
Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.
So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?
For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction.
So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else.
And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.
I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.
Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.
An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)
You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?
I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant.
I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons.
That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen.
As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?
No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.
Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that.
So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.
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Authentic Hasidic tales, translated into Polish
פֿאַר חסידישע מעשׂיות איז שטענדיק פֿאַראַן אַן עולם. אָט, אַ שטײגער, װעט באַלד אַרױס אַ נײַע דײַטשישע איבערזעצונג פֿון דעם פּױלישן שרײַבער סטאַניסלאַװ װינצענטס בעל־שם־טובֿ־לעגענדעס. װעגן דעם האָט זיך אַ מאָל (אױף פּױליש) באַקלאָגט דער ייִדישער קריטיקער בער מאַרק, אַז דװקא די „פֿינצטערע חסידות“ נעמט אױס בײַם ניט־ייִדישן לײענער־עולם.
דאָ ניט לאַנג האָט מען אױך אַרױסגעלאָזט פֿון ס׳נײַ די זכרונות פֿון עסטרײַכישן אױטאָר זאָמאַ (שלמה) מאָרגנשטערן, װאָס דערצײלט װעגן דער חסידישער גאַליציע פֿון זײַנע קינדער־יאָרן.
בנוגע דער באַליבטקײט און דעם כּישוף פֿון חסידיזם האָט װאָלף לאַצקי־באַרטאָלדי, מיט אַ יאָר הונדערט צוריק, געשריבן: „אונדזער ייִדישקײט איז פֿאַרגליװערט, אָבער מיט חסידות קאָן מען נאָך מגייר זײַן. והא ראַיה: משׂכּילים און פֿאַרשײַטע אַפּיקורסים האָבן זיך אומגעקערט צו ייִדישקײט אױפֿן װעג פֿון דער חסידות.“
אױך אין פּױלן איז לעצטנס אַרױס אַ נײַער באַנד חסידישע מעשׂיות. נאָר דאָס איז אַ בוך פֿון אַן אַנדער פֿאַרנעם, פֿון אַן אַנדער מדרגה. דאָ גײט ניט דװקא אין חסידישן ראָמאַנטיזם, נאָר אין אַ זאַמלונג עכטע חסידישע מעשׂיות מכּל־המינים, איבערגעזעצטע אױף פּױליש. אַזאַ כּוללדיקע זאַמלונג באַװײַזט זיך צום ערשטן מאָל אין װאָסער ניט איז לשון.
נאָך אַ חידוש: דער באַנד פֿון כּמעט 1,000 זײַטלעך גײט אַרױס אין דער ערשטער סעריע פֿון דער פּוילישער „נאַציאָנאַלער ביבליאָטעק“. אין דער צװײטער סעריע גיט מען אַרױס װערק פֿון דער „פֿרעמדער“ ליטעראַטור, אין דער ערשטער — װערק פֿון דער פּױלישער ליטעראַטור גופֿא. ס׳איז ניט דאָס ערשטע מאָל װאָס מע נעמט אַרײַן אין דער ערשטער סעריע אױך װערק אָנגעשריבענע לכתּחילה אױף אַן אַנדער שפּראַך. ס׳איז אָבער פֿון די געצײלטע בענד װאָס נעמען אַרײַן ליטעראַטור ניט פֿון קײן קריסטלעכע מחברים, און דערצו פֿון אַ נאַציאָנאַלער מינדערהײט.
ניט געקוקט אױף דעם פֿאַקט װאָס אָט די געקליבענע חסידישע מעשׂיות זאָלן מיט זיך פֿאָרשטעלן אַ חלק פּױלישע קולטור־נחלה, רעכנט מען זיך אָבער ניט מיט קײן מלוכישע גרענעצן. פֿאַרקערט, מע האָט זיך באַמיט צונױפֿזאַמלען מעשׂיות פֿון גאַנץ ייִדישלאַנד, אױך פֿון די „נײַע“ גלותן מעבֿר־לים, און פֿון אַלע תּקופֿות.
אױך זשאַנערן פֿון פֿאַרשײדענע סאָרטן זײַנען דאָ פֿאַראַן: לענגערע דערצײלונגען, כּמו־װיסנשאַפֿטלעכע כראָניקעס און גאָר קורצע מעשׂהלעך. לאָמיר עפּעס פּאָסמאַקעװען פֿון אָט דער פֿיל־מיניקער זאַמלונג.
נאַט אײַך אַ מעשׂה פֿון די סאַמע ערשטע דורות חסידישע גוטע־ייִדן: די הײליקע ברידער ר׳ אלימלך און ר׳ זושע זצ״ל זײַנען אַװעק אָפּריכטן גלות כּדי צוצוציִען ייִדן צו חסידות. זײ האָבן אַזש אָנגעשפּאַרט ביז צו דער דײַטשישער גרענעץ אין קאַטאָװיץ. װען זײ האָבן זיך גענומען גײן װײַטער, האָט זיך אָבער באַװיזן דער שׂטן און געזאָגט זײ: טאָמער װעט איר אַריבער די דײַטשישע גרענעץ, טאָ זײַט װיסן אַז דעמאָלט װעל איך פֿאַרװאַנדלען אַלע ייִדן — אין חסידים. די ברידער האָבן זיך שטאַרק איבערגעשראָקן, אַז זײ האָבן דערזען, װי שלעכט ס׳װעט זײַן פֿאַר דער חסידות, װען די ברײטע מאַסן זאָלן זיך אײַנשליסן אין אירע רײען, װאָרן דעמאָלט װעט די חסידות אין גאַנצן פֿאַרלױרן גײן. און זײ האָבן זיך אומגעקערט אַהײם, אין זײער לאַנד.
טשיקאַװע: יענע ערשטע פֿאַרשפּרײטער פֿון חסידישקײט האָבן גאָר מורא געקראָגן זײער נײַע תּורה זאָל זיך ניט צעשפּרײטן צו פֿיל, כּדי זי זאָל חלילה ניט אָנװערן איר תּמצית. אַנדערש מיט עטלעכע דורות שפּעטער — אַזאַ מין ליטעראַרישער נבֿיא פֿונעם בעל־שם־טובֿס תּורה װי מאַרטין מרדכי בובער האָט דאָך געהאַלטן, אַז דאָס פֿירט דװקא ער צוריק צום לכתּחילהדיקן קװאַל, װען ער האָט ברײט אױפֿגעפּראַלט „די שערי־תּשובֿה פֿון חסידישן ראָמאַנטיזם“. אַזױ צי אַנדערש, האָט די ליטעראַרישע חסידות לױט בובערס און פּרצעס נוסח טאַקע אַנטפּלעקט דעם „נפֿשות־באַשאַפֿנדיקן כּוח“ פֿון דער חסידות (ציטאַטן פֿון לאַצקי־באַרטאָלדי).
די אַרױסגעבער פֿון דער פּױלישער אַנטאָלאָגיע „חסידישע מעשׂיות“, די פֿאָרשער מאַרטשין װאָדזשינסקי און װױטשיעך טװאָרעק, זשאַלעװען ניט קײן כּוחות אױף מפֿרסם צו זײַן דאָס בוך. אַחוץ די געװײנטלעכע מיטלען — ליטעראַרישע אָװנטן, נסיעות אױף ביכער־ירידן, ראַדיאָ־אינטערװיוען און דאָס גלײַכן — לאָזן זײ אַרױס אַ שײנע סעריע פֿילמעלעך מיט מער־װײניקער באַרימטע פּערזענלעכקײטן װאָס לײענען אָדער דערצײלן איבער מעשׂיות פֿון דער אַנטאָלאָגיע.
די אױבן געבראַכטע מעשׂה, למשל, לײענט זײערער אַ קאָלעגע פֿון ברעסלױער אוניװערסיטעט, דער פֿילאָלאָג יאַן מיאָדעק. מיאָדעקן קען אין פּױלן שיִער ניט יעדעס קינד. ער גיט שױן צענדליקער יאָרן עצות װי אַזױ צו רעדן אַ לײַטיש פּױליש. בײַ גלײַך מיט די אַנדערע פֿאָרלײענער, גיט אױך מיאָדעק אַ מאָל צו אַ זאַץ בשעתן לײענען. דער רבי ר׳ אלימלך און זײַן ברודער ר׳ משולם־זושע קערן זיך אום אַהײם, אין זײער לאַנד — קײן פּױלן, הײסט עס, גיט צו מיאָדעק און קוקט דעם צושױער־עולם אין די אױגן אַרײַן.
פֿאַרשטײט זיך אַז די אַרױסגעבער האָבן ניט אײנע אַליין באַװיזן אױפֿטאָן אַזאַ עובֿדה פֿון „אומקערן אַהײם“ די פּױלישע צדיקים מיט זײערע מעשׂיות. זײ האָט געהאָלפֿן אַ גאַנצע בריגאַדע איבערזעצער: צװישן זײ זײַנען דאָ דערפֿאַרענע מיט אַ לאַנגן סטאַזש און אַ נאָמען, נאָר אױך אָנהײבער אינעם פֿאַך, תּלמידים פֿון די אַרױסגעבער, װאָס האָבן זיך אַזױ אַרום געדרוקט צום ערשטן מאָל. צו זאָגן דעם גאַנצן אמת, בין איך הקטן אַלײן בײַגעװען בײַ די ערשטע שטאַפּלען פֿון פּראָיעקט. אַזױ האָב איך געקענט זען אַז מע לאָזט ניט אױף הפֿקר די איבערזעצער, נאָר מע זאָרגט מע זאָל זײ געבן אַן אָרנטלעכן אַרײַנפֿיר אינעם חסידיזם.
דערמיט האָט זיך פֿאַרנומען ניט אַבי װער, נאָר װיכטיקע מומחים, בתוכם די לינגוויסטקע לילי קאַהן װאָס האָט אײַנגעפֿירט דעם עולם אין די כּללים פֿון חסידישן לשון־קודש, צי דער היסטאָריקער גדי סגיבֿ (סאַגיװ) װאָס האָט אָפּגעהאַלטן אַ װאַרשטאַט װעגן חסידישן שטײגער דערצײלן מעשׂיות.
אױך דער פּױלישער לײענער װאָס נעמט אין האַנט אַרײַן דעם באַנד „חסידישע מעשׂיות“, איז זוכה צו אַן אַרײַנפֿיר, װי גאָט האָט געבאָטן. די רעדאַקטאָרן זײַנען מקדים די דערצײלונגען מיט „אַ װאָרט אַפֿריִער“ פֿון אַ צװײ הונדערט זײַטלעך — אַ מין מאָנאָגראַפֿיע פֿאַר זיך און, בײַם הײַנטיקן טאָג, דער סאַמע גרונטיקער טראַקטאַט װעגן חסידיזם װאָס איז פֿאַראַן אױף דער פּױלישער שפּראַך.
די מעשׂיות גײען לױטן כראָנאָלאָגישן סדר. װײַטער האָט מען זײ אײַנגעטײלט לױט געאָגראַפֿיע און טעמעס. לאָמיר צום סוף ברענגען נאָך צװײ בײַשפּילן. אינעם חלק װעגן חורבן און װידערגעבורט געפֿינען מיר אַ מעשׂה — װעגן פּױלישן פּױפּס, יאַן פּאַװעל דעם צװײטן. דער בלאָזשעװער רבי, ר׳ ישׂראל שפּיראָ, גיט דאָרט איבער אַז אַ פּױפּס איז ער געװאָרן — אין זכות פֿון אַן עצה װאָס ער, יאַן פּאַװעל, דעמאָלט אַ יונגער גלח אױפֿן נאָמען קאַראָל װױטילאַ, האָט געעצהט אַ פּאָליאַטשקע פֿון די חסידי־אומות־העולם װאָס האָט אױסבאַהאַלטן אַ ייִדיש ייִנגל פֿון די נאַצישע רוצחים, אַז זי דאַרף איבערגעבן דאָס קינד די אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישע קרובֿים, עס זאָל װאַקסן בײַ די אײגענע און טאַקע אַ ייִדיש קינד.
אַז מע האַלט שױן בײַ חסידישע מעשׂיות װעגן די קאַטױלן, איז אָט נאָך אַן אינטערעסאַנטע דוגמא, אַ מעשׂה װעגן כּוח פֿון דערצײלן מעשׂיות. אַ מאָל איז געװען אַ ייִד, און זײַן װײַב האָט ניט געבױרן קײן קינדער, האָט ער געבעטן אַן עצה בײַ ר׳ מרדכי טשערנאָבליער און ר׳ ישׂראלטשקע רוזשינער זי״ע, װאָס האָבן זיך פּונקט פֿאַרהאַלטן אין אײן שטעטל. דעמאָלט האָט דער רוזשינער רבי איבערגעגעבן אַ מעשׂה, אַ סגולה פֿאַר װײַבער װאָס קענען נעבעך קײן קינדער ניט האָבן.
ס׳האָט געטראָפֿן אין רױם, אַז אַ פֿרומער קריסט האָט געהאַט אַ טאָכטער, װאָס ער האָט זי געלערנט אַלע קאַטױלישע דינים און מנהגים. איז זי אונטערגעװאַקסן אַ געלערנטע. די יונגע פֿרױ האָט אָבער מקנא געװען די גלחים װאָס פֿאַרמאָגן אַ סך כּוח און מאַכט. האָט זי זיך איבערגעטאָן אין מאַנסבילשע קלײדער און איז אַװעק אין טעאָלאָגישן סעמינאַר. זי האָט אַזש אַריבערגעשטיגן אַלעמען דאָרט מיט איר בקיאות און קענטעניש. װען מע האָט געדאַרפֿט צוקלײַבן אַ נײַעם פּױפּס, האָט מען דעריבער אױסגעװײלט זי װי דעם ממלא־מקומו. איז זי אָבער אַראָפּ פֿון גלײַכן װעג און פֿאַרגאַנגען אין טראָגן. פּונקט װען מע האָט געהאַלטן אין פּראַװען אַ גרױסע חגא אױף די גאַסן פֿון שטאָט, האָט זי געקראָגן די װײען און געגאַנגען צו קינד. פֿון דעמאָלט אָן איז מען בודק צי דער מענטש איז ניט אַ מאָל אַ נקבֿה, אײדער מע קלײַבט אים אױס פֿאַר אַ פּױפּס.
בײַם פֿאַרענדיקן די מעשׂה האָט דער רוזשינער באַלד אױסגערופֿן: מזל־טובֿ, דײַן װײַב קומט אַ מזל־טובֿ, זי האָט ערשט געהאַט אַ זון. די דאָזיקע מעשׂה טוט אַ פּעולה, אַפֿילו אַ פּשוטער בשׂר־דם זאָל זי איבערדערצײלן.
אױך דעם פּױלישן לײענער־עולם קומט אַ מזל־טובֿ װאָס ער האָט זוכה געװען צו אַזאַ גאָלדענעם צוגאָב צו דער פּױלישער קולטור־ירושה. ס׳װילט זיך אױך מאַכן אַ שהחיינו לכּבֿוד די חסידישע מעשׂיות װאָס מע האָט זײ אײַנגעבירגערט אינעם פּױלישן ליטעראַרישן קאַנאָן אױף אַזאַ לײַטישן אופֿן.
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This national park would honor a Jewish philanthropist — if Republicans get back on board
The political climate is hardly favorable for a new national park centered on racial justice.
President Donald Trump this week called for sweeping budget cuts to the National Park Service and, in January, for the removal of slavery-related exhibits he said portray American history in a “woke manner.”
Yet a campaign to establish a national historic park honoring Julius Rosenwald — the Jewish philanthropist who funded schools for rural Black communities during the Jim Crow era — is pressing ahead.
Dorothy Canter, who launched the campaign in 2018, sees an opening for the park to finally become a reality. In February, Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) introduced legislation to create the Rosenwald National Historic Park, backed by seven Democratic co-sponsors.
But advancing the bill out of committee — much less to President Trump’s desk — will require Republican support. At a time when even the mildest celebration of diversity can be deemed an excess of the “woke” left, Canter is betting that Rosenwald’s story will be the exception.
“The environment is not the best, obviously, but this is a story that should appeal to anyone,” Canter told the Forward. “This is a positive story. Nobody can say it’s DEI.”
Rosenwald’s Legacy
Rosenwald was born in Springfield, Illinois, the son of German-Jewish immigrants. At 16, he dropped out of high school to pursue the family clothing business.
In 1895, he invested $37,500 in Sears, Roebuck & Company — a decision that would ultimately make him one of the wealthiest men in the United States in the early 20th century.
But guided by the Jewish value of tzedakah, he gave much of that fortune away. In 1911, he met Booker T. Washington, the formerly enslaved founder of the Tuskegee Institute, a training center for African American teachers. Washington urged Rosenwald to invest in Black education in the South.
Rosenwald would go on to help fund nearly 5,000 schools for Black students across 15 states. By 1928, one in three Black students in the rural South attended a Rosenwald school. Alumni of Rosenwald schools would include congressman John Lewis, poet Maya Angelou and civil rights activist Medgar Evers.
Canter, a retired biophysicist and national parks enthusiast, first learned about Rosenwald as an adult through a documentary — and was struck that this story of Black-Jewish cooperation was not more widely known.
“I knew that there was not one national park unit among the more than 400 that commemorated the life and legacy of a Jewish American, or told the story of Rosenwald schools,” Canter said. “And I can tell you that today, almost 11 years later, that is still the case.”
There are national historic sites and monuments honoring Jewish Americans, including the Rosenwald family home and the David Berger National Memorial. But a national historic park — a designation that often spans multiple sites and has greater cultural cache — has yet to honor a Jewish American.
Part of Rosenwald’s relative obscurity, Canter said, stems from his own philosophy. Rosenwald embraced a “give while you live” approach and did not believe in permanent endowments, requiring that the Rosenwald Fund spend all of its money within 25 years of his death.
That approach has yielded severe financial challenges decades later. Today, only about 10% of the more than 5,000 Rosenwald school structures remain, according to Brent Leggs, executive director of the African American Cultural Heritage Action Fund at the National Trust for Historic Preservation.
The Trust placed Rosenwald schools on its 2002 list of America’s 11 most endangered historic places, warning of an “urgent crisis of erasure, abandonment and deterioration.”
Many of the schools were built in rural areas that have since been abandoned, Leggs said, adding that the buildings were made of wood that has slowly decayed. The loss is personal for him: Upon researching the history for his job, Leggs discovered that both of his parents attended Rosenwald schools in Kentucky.
“It was a transcendent moment for me,” he said, “because I remember being at a school building that was literally vanishing history.”
The surviving schools have mixed ownership, Leggs said. Some act as local community centers, while others operate as commercial or office spaces, such as the Caldwell Rosenwald School in Huntersville, North Carolina — today, home to Burgess Supply, a carpet store.
A bipartisan issue?
In the final days of his first presidency, Trump gave a significant boost to the campaign for a Rosenwald national park.
He signed the Julius Rosenwald and the Rosenwald Schools Act into law, directing the Department of Interior to conduct a study assessing the feasibility of establishing the park. Eight Republicans had cosponsored the bill, and it passed with broad bipartisan support.
The study “resulted in positive findings,” concluding that the San Domingo School in Sharptown, Maryland, met all the criteria for a national park and recommending that Congress create a grant program to support the preservation of additional Rosenwald schools.
But Republican backing for a national park honoring Rosenwald’s legacy now appears to have waned.
The Forward called and emailed the three Republicans who cosponsored the 2020 bill and are still in office. None responded to the Forward’s question about their position on Durbin’s bill to establish the Rosenwald park.
A White House spokesperson directed the Forward to the national historic site at the Rosenwald family home but declined to say whether Trump was supportive of the national park commemorating Rosenwald schools.
Rep. Andy Harris, a Maryland Republican, went so far as to send a letter to President Joe Biden in 2024 expressing his support for “the expedited designation of a Julius Rosenwald And Rosenwald Schools National Park.”
His office did not respond to the Forward’s request for comment.
Nor did the office of Tim Scott, the Republican senator from South Carolina who previously advertised his support for the restoration of Rosenwald schools in his state. “Booker T. Washington helped build thousands of schools for Black children, advancing impactful educational opportunities throughout the South,” he tweeted in February 2024. “With the restoration of Rosenwald School, his legacy lives on in South Carolina. #BlackHistoryMonth”
‘A story for our time’
Durbin’s bill arrives just as the agency that would create a park faces drastic proposed cuts: Trump this week proposed funding for the already understaffed National Park Service be reduced by $736 million, or 25% of its budget.
Meanwhile, the president has sought to recast historical narratives at existing parks. In January, Trump ordered the National Park Service dismantle an exhibit about nine people enslaved by George Washington. Earlier this month, the Trump administration directed the removal of a pride flag from the Stonewall National Monument in New York City.
Yet Rosenwald’s story doesn’t fit neatly into the culture-war themes that Trump has singled out. Rosenwald himself was a political conservative, a laissez-faire businessman and steadfast Republican who believed in fostering economic self-sufficiency through education.
Dennis Ross, a former Republican congressman from Florida who retired from office in 2019 and has supported the Rosenwald park campaign, told the Forward he sees Rosenwald’s story as one conservatives should embrace.
“I’ve heard the argument that this is a way of trying to backdoor DEI. I totally disagree and take issue with that. This is showing what American history is all about,” Ross said. “If you were to dwell on the oppression of slavery, then maybe that argument might work. But I think the important thing is to look at the transition, the evolution from slavery to success.”
Canter is also optimistic, and said she plans to meet with a Republican senator — she declined to provide a name — whose staff has expressed interest in the park. As to whether Trump would sign the bill: She hopes the campaign will have the opportunity to put it on his desk.
“People with different backgrounds and cultures were able to come together, work together, find common ground and move this country forward,” Canter said. “So if that isn’t a story for our time, I don’t know what is.”
The post This national park would honor a Jewish philanthropist — if Republicans get back on board appeared first on The Forward.
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Trump Says Gas Prices May Remain High Through November Midterm Election
U.S. President Donald Trump takes questions from reporters while Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio look on, as they attend a meeting with oil industry executives, at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., January 9, 2026. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
US President Donald Trump said on Sunday that the price of oil and gasoline may remain high through November’s midterm elections, a rare acknowledgement of the potential political fallout from his decision to attack Iran six weeks ago.
“It could be, or the same, or maybe a little bit higher, but it should be around the same,” Trump, who is in Miami for the weekend, told Fox News’ “Sunday Morning Futures With Maria Bartiromo” when asked whether the cost of oil and gas would be lower by the fall.
The average price for regular gas at US service stations has exceeded $4 per gallon for most of April, according to data from GasBuddy. Trump’s comments on Sunday came after weeks of asserting that the spike in prices is a short-term phenomenon, though his top advisers are cognizant of the war’s economic impacts, officials have said.
Earlier on Sunday, Trump announced on social media that the US Navy would blockade the Strait of Hormuz and intercept any ship that paid a crossing fee to Iran, after marathon talks between the US and Iran in Pakistan over the weekend did not yield a peace deal.
“No one who pays an illegal toll will have safe passage on the high seas,” he wrote on Truth Social.
Any US blockade is likely to add more uncertainty to the eventual resolution of the conflict, which is currently subject to a tenuous two-week ceasefire. The new tactic is in response to Iran’s own closure of the strait’s critical shipping lanes, which has caused global oil prices to skyrocket about 50%.
UNPOPULAR WAR HITS TRUMP’S APPROVAL
The war began on February 28, when the US launched a joint bombing campaign with Israel against Iran. The scope quickly expanded as Iran and its allies attacked nearby countries, while Israel targeted Hezbollah with massive strikes in Lebanon.
The war has buffeted global financial markets and caused thousands of civilian deaths, mostly in Iran and Lebanon.
Trump’s political standing at home has suffered, with polls showing the war is unpopular among most Americans, who are frustrated by rising gasoline prices.
The president’s approval rating has hit the lowest levels of his second term in office, raising concern among Republicans that his party is poised to lose control of Congress in the midterm elections. A Democratic majority in either chamber could launch investigations into the Trump administration while blocking much of his legislative agenda.
US Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, questioned the strategy behind Trump’s planned blockade.
“I don’t understand how blockading the strait is going to somehow push the Iranians into opening it,” he told CNN’s “State of the Union” on Sunday.
In a separate appearance on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” Warner said the blockade would not undermine Iranian control of the waterway.
“The Iranians have hundreds of speedboats where they can still mine the strait or put bombs against tankers in closing the strait,” he said. “How is that going to ever bring down gas prices?”
Although Trump has repeatedly said that the war would be over soon, Republican US Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin told ABC News’ “This Week” on Sunday that achieving US aims in Iran “could take a long time.”
“It’s going to be a long-term project,” said Johnson, who was not asked about Trump’s proposed blockade. “I never thought this would be easy.”