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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel

(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided. 

“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”

Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.

Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.

Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own,  he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.

Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves. 

Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel. 

“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.

Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.” 

Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations. 

So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?

There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways. 

Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.

The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis. 

What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”

With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.

You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity. 

More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means. 

Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.

The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism. 

Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)

One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal. 

Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors. 

The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?

The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth. 

If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.

Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation. 

Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.

So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?

For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction. 

So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else. 

And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.

I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.

Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.

An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)

You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?

I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant. 

I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons. 

That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen. 

As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?

No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.

Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that. 

So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.

—
The post What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Eisenkot outlines 3 paths to Israeli government, signaling urgency and openness to Arab-party backing

(JTA) — Gadi Eisenkot outlined three tracks he is pursuing to build a coalition, including a minority government that would need the outside support of Arab-led parties, saying that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was putting Israel “in a very dangerous place” with his anti-Arab rhetoric.

Each option Eisenkot presented Friday in a lengthy post on X could involve breaking a promise that at least one of the parties in the “change” bloc Eisenkot leads had made: not to rely on the Arab parties; not to join with Netanyahu; or not to work with the haredi Orthodox parties as long as they refuse to compromise on military service.

One of his partners, Avigdor Liberman, who leads the Yisrael Beytenu party, said the option of joining with the haredim was the likeliest.

Eisenkot, who leads the Yashar party, described an urgency to form a coalition spurred in part by Netanyahu’s relentless rhetoric targeting the Arab parties, which Eisenkot said was placing the Arab Israeli population at risk of attack. Forming a coalition under the conditions Eisenkot lays out would remove Netanyahu from his role as prime minister, depriving him of a powerful pulpit.

 

 

“We are in a very dangerous place. A place where the outgoing prime minister is acting in ways we have never seen before,” he said.

“Israeli society, our democracy, and our standing and position on the international stage are all approaching a point of no return,” he said. “The path from a violent campaign of delegitimization against 21% of the population and labeling them ‘supporters of terrorism’ to actual violence could also be short. The writing is on the wall.”

President Isaac Herzog last week gave Eisenkot the mandate to form a government within 28 days, after 67 members of the parliament, or Knesset – including the “change” bloc and the 19 Knesset members belonging to Arab-led parties – gave their nod to the former Israel Defense Forces. Netanyahu got the approval of 46 lawmakers, and seven abstained. If Eisenkot does not get a government together by Dec. 6, he can ask Herzog for a 14-day extension.

The first option Eisenkot raised was forming a government with the support of the ultra-Orthodox, or haredi, parties. Such a move would have been almost unthinkable until recently, given the longstanding and close alliance between Netanyahu and the haredi parties, as well as the central campaign promises of the anti-Netanyahu bloc to bring about fundamental changes to the state’s relationship with the ultra-Orthodox community, including mandatory military service – a position the haredi parties strongly oppose.

“Serious discussions are underway with the ultra-Orthodox parties, aimed at finding solutions and formulas that will strengthen the IDF, address security needs and preserve the status of those who study Torah, as we promised during the election campaign,” Eisenkot wrote in his post.

He stressed that the negotiations did not amount to “backing down on the issue of military service,” but rather involved formulating an arrangement based on the principles of his party’s “Service for All” framework, which would codify non-military service as an option for some sectors. All four parties in the change bloc ran on a platform of ending the vast exemptions from military service haredi Jews have enjoyed for decades.

The negotiations appear to have led one of the two ultra-Orthodox parties, United Torah Judaism, to refrain from recommending Netanyahu to the president as the candidate to form the next government. The other haredi party, Shas, which is considered more right-wing and closer to Netanyahu, has so far given no indication that it intends to cross political lines and join the anti-Netanyahu bloc. Without Shas, the bloc would have to settle for a minority government.

Liberman  said in an interview with Channel 12 News on Friday evening, hours after Eisenkot’s post, that forming a government with the support of the ultra-Orthodox parties was “the only practical option.” He said he was convinced that a government supported by both haredi parties could be formed. According to Liberman, the bloc should be willing to “sacrifice” its pledge not to cooperate with the ultra-Orthodox and to fundamentally change the state’s relationship with their community in pursuit of its primary goal: “an end to Bibi’s rule.”

The second path outlined by Eisenkot was a unity government with Likud. Negotiating teams from the two parties met earlier this week. “As for the contacts with Likud, we are making sincere and genuine efforts on our part. Unfortunately, however, there is a wide gap between the Likud’s rhetoric and their action and actual willingness to move forward,” Eisenkot said. He nevertheless made clear that “I intend to give this track another chance.”

Eisenkot did not name the “gap,” but reports have said talks have foundered on Netanyahu’s role in a unity government. Netanyahu reportedly is insisting on serving as prime minister in the first part of a “rotation” agreement that would see the premiership rotated among bloc leaders.

Liberman ruled out sitting in a government with Netanyahu under any circumstances, including a rotation agreement in which Netanyahu would serve as prime minister second after Eisenkot. Another leader of the opposition bloc, Naftali Bennett of the B’Yachad party, held lengthy talks with Netanyahu in the Knesset this week, triggering a wave of speculation that he was advancing the possibility of a unity government. But Bennett would still need to convince the other parties in his bloc to join him in doing so, as his party isn’t large enough to secure a parliamentary majority with Netanyahu on his own.

The third option Eisenkot raised at the end of his post was the formation of a “national emergency government.” He clarified that he would pursue this track only if “the necessary conditions for the formation of a broad government through the channels I am leading do not materialize.”

Although he did not explicitly say so in his post, Eisenkot appears to be referring to the possibility of a minority government that would rely on the votes of the Arab-led parties to secure the parliamentary majority needed to form a government without actually including Arab ministers in the government itself.

But the proposal faces significant opposition within Eisenkot’s own bloc, potentially jeopardizing the entire initiative. Liberman stressed that he would “categorically” vote against a narrow government relying on the support of the Arab-led parties. Channel 12 News also reported that Bennett had told leaders of the opposition bloc that he opposed forming a government dependent on Arab-led parties.

One of the two parties, Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, served in a coalition under Bennett from 2021-2022. Bennett has praised Abbas as a worthy partner but has also argued that including Arab-led parties in the government after the deadly Hamas-led attacks of Oct. 7, 2023 is untenable. Netanyahu has seized on the radical statements of some members of the other Arab-led party, the Joint List, to depict both parties as supporting terrorism.

Liberman and Bennett both argued that relying on the Arab-led parties would give Netanyahu a massive boost ahead of future elections.

Eisenkot, however, signaled that he was prepared to put that opposition to the test. In his post, he stressed that “all members of Knesset will have to follow their conscience and decide whether a new government will be formed, or whether they are willing to drag the State of Israel into another election while Netanyahu remains prime minister of a transitional government.

“It would be foolish to think that we have the luxury of delaying and losing the window of opportunity that has opened up, a window that may never open again. What is at stake is Israel’s future,” Eisenkot said.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post Eisenkot outlines 3 paths to Israeli government, signaling urgency and openness to Arab-party backing appeared first on The Forward.

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After devastating midterms, Jewish right-wingers lick wounds – and plan for 2028

(JTA) — NEW YORK – Anti-Israel rhetoric, “radical Islam” and the voting habits of young Jews were among the many concerns voiced this week at two of the first major events for Jewish conservatives held since Democrats’ sweeping victories in the midterm elections.

Speakers and attendees at both the Tikvah Fund’s Jewish Leadership Conference and the Zionist Organization of America’s annual gala, each held on Sunday in Manhattan, railed against the growing contingent of Democratic Socialists of America members entering Congress.

As they reeled from that “difficult Tuesday night,” as ZOA emcee Shabbos Kestenbaum referred to it, some advocated for a boost in Jewish education in hopes that young Jews would prioritize pro-Israel candidates. Others said the pendulum could swing back to a GOP victory in 2028 — but also expressed antipathy toward Vice President JD Vance, seen as the favorite to lead the party’s ticket.

ZOA president Mort Klein urged attendees at the Ziegfeld Ballroom in midtown Manhattan to fight against the “dangerous policies” of the DSA, the group that has endorsed a contingent of left-wing, Israel-critical candidates in Congress, bringing their number in the Democratic caucus to eight when the next session starts in January. He denounced growing accusations of Israeli apartheid and genocide, likening them to antisemitic propaganda used in Nazi Germany and other historical periods.

In an interview after the event, Klein said the ZOA is urging President Donald Trump “to make a major address on antisemitism — an address purely on Jew hatred and Israel hatred, not general hatred.” The ZOA, he said, is also “urging, even demanding” members of Congress to make similar speeches, noting that he could only recall Florida Rep. Randy Fine and Texas Sen. Ted Cruz as having done so to his satisfaction. He added that he is pushing for Jewish leaders and rabbis to do the same and to speak about “the dangers of radical Islam.”

It is not a new strategy for the ZOA, but Klein said the group is doubling down because “whatever strategy is in place, it’s not being fulfilled in any way, shape or form.”

A number of speakers at the ZOA event denounced young Jewish voters and the efforts of the liberal Jewish Middle East advocacy group J Street. J Street bills itself as pro-Israel and pro-peace; speakers at the ZOA gala accused it of turning young Jews against Israel.

Alan Dershowitz, the prominent pro-Israel attorney whose clients have included Trump, O.J. Simpson and Jeffrey Epstein, called J Street “the most dangerous organization to Zionism, to Israel and I believe to the Jewish future in the United States.”

“It has fraudulently convinced many young people that they are pro-Israel and has given cover, has given a hechsher [kosher certification], to anti-Israel, anti-Zionist and, in more and more respects, anti-Jewish attitudes than any other organization,” Dershowitz said.

The problem, Dershowitz continued, is exemplified by the number of Jews who “tragically voted for [New York City Mayor Zohran] Mamdani, how many Jews voted for [Michigan Sen.-elect Abdul] El-Sayed.”

J Street did not endorse either candidate. The group did not return a request for comment.

Josh Katzen, publisher of the Jerusalem News Syndicate, blasted the “new generation” as he received an award from the ZOA for Middle East journalism.

“Not only do they not have an emotional attachment to Israel, they don’t have an emotional attachment to the United States. They don’t have any idea who are the good guys, and who are the bad guys,” Katzen said. “They don’t understand that Israel is America’s front-line defense in supporting Western civilization against the attack of Islam.”

Attendees at the ZOA event had misgivings about Jews who voted for left-wing Democratic candidates, and about Muslim candidates.

Hy Drusin, a board member of the West Side Republican Club, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that he’d coined the term “JINOs” — “Jews in Name Only” — for Jews who voted for “these Muslim socialists.”

According to Upper East Side resident Nathaniel Gravonsky, “The problem in New York City is too many Jews read The New York Times as their Torah.”

Rabbi Yehuda Kaploun, Trump’s special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, said in a speech that expanded Jewish education and stronger encouragement of young Jews to embrace their Jewish identity would set them on the right path, as opposed to voting for candidates like El-Sayed.

“For years, the Jewish community has followed the same playbook: more conferences, more photo ops and more nongovernmental organizations. It is a proven recipe, now, for failure,” Kaploun said.

Drusin opined to JTA that Jewish education would indeed “better the chances that [students] will remain Jewish or Jewish identified.” But, he added, “What Rabbi Kaploun urged has been urged for decades, centuries. Is it happening? Is it working? Spreading? Or is it declining? There are arguments and statistical evidence on both sides.”

Drusin said it was “disturbing” to see exit polls that had half of Jewish Michigan voters voting for El-Sayed, and that it would be tough to buck Jews’ “long tradition of knee-jerk affiliation with the Democrat Party.”

Earlier on Sunday, at the Jewish Leadership Conference, Cruz offered hope that the pendulum could very well swing back to the Republicans in 2028. He pointed to the election of then-Vice President George H.W. Bush in 1988, which came two years after Democrats — similar to this year’s results — won the midterms in commanding fashion and took control of the House and Senate.

But hopes of a 2028 Republican victory were accompanied by doubts about the current vice president, who is seen as Trump’s likeliest successor to lead the GOP. Vance has drawn the ire of Jewish conservatives over his reprimanding of Israeli officials, indulgence of anti-Israel conspiracy theories and his silence on his friend Tucker Carlson, a prominent media personality who promotes such narratives.

Most recently, Vance outraged a number of pro-Israel Republicans when he blamed the party’s midterm losses in part on the current U.S.-Israel relationship, and listed “change our relationship to Israel” among four strategies to bring back voters.

“I’m disgusted with it,” Drusin said about Vance’s post. “That’s why I support [Secretary of State Marco] Rubio.”

Gravonsky, too, said he is “always going to pick Marco Rubio over JD Vance” in a hypothetical primary battle between the two, echoing a number of Jewish Republican voters and donors who say Rubio is their preferred 2028 candidate.

Cruz, speaking at the Tikvah Fund’s event, said he disagreed with Vance’s assessment that Israel was a major factor in the recent GOP losses.

Mike Huckabee, Trump’s ambassador to Israel, spoke at both events about the need for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship, though he did not address Vance’s comments head on. He did so in a subsequent interview with The Press Service of Israel, however, saying that “Israel was not the reason the midterm elections yielded disappointing results for the Republicans.”

Neil Cooper, a Republican Jewish Coalition member who attended the Jewish Leadership Conference on Sunday, called the vice president’s post a “political suicide note” that would alienate voters.

Should Vance emerge as the nominee, however, Cooper said he believes Jewish conservatives would “likely hold our noses and vote for Vance on the theory that, despite his flaws, he would nevertheless be preferable to a Democrat from a policy standpoint.”

But Cooper also predicted that any rightward realignment of American Jews — a demographic whose typical allegiance to the Democratic Party has been under a microscope amid shifting sentiment on Israel — would be dampened by Vance becoming the nominee.

If Jewish voters find Vance “repugnant,” Cooper said, it becomes “that much easier to revert to their default position and vote for the Democratic candidate.”

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post After devastating midterms, Jewish right-wingers lick wounds – and plan for 2028 appeared first on The Forward.

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Can Palestinian Christians undermine Christian Zionism?

Americans tend to associate Palestinians with Islam. And studies show that most Americans view Islam in a negative light; a Pew study found that this has actually gotten worse since 9/11 — more than 50% of Americans surveyed in 2026 agreed with the statement that Islam encouraged violence, double the 25% who agreed with that statement in 2002.

Since Oct. 7, some Christian groups and influencers in the U.S. have been trying to change this association, drawing the attention of their fellow American Christians to the plight of — and the existence of — Palestinian Christians in the hopes of activating their empathy toward Palestinians.

American Christians have historically advocated strongly for their fellow Christians abroad. In 1998, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act in response to the civil war in Sudan that saw an Islamist government oppressing Christian citizens. Earlier this year, Congress passed a resolution expressing concern for Coptic Christians in Egypt. And another Pew study found that the vast majority of groups advocating for religious freedoms abroad are Christian.

In short, the U.S. is a Christian country, and many of its citizens feel connected to Christians in trouble abroad.

But this has been somewhat less true when it comes to Israel where American Christian views over the past several decades have been shaped by Christian Zionism. Evangelicals hold immense political sway through lobbying groups and voting power, and most adhere to a theology that demands support for Israel, and for Jews to return to the biblical land, in order to bring about the End Times and the return of Jesus. There is such a strong moral alignment between Israel and God — their Christian God — that some American evangelicals seem to be shocked when they learn that Israel did not distinguish between Palestinian Christians and Palestinian Muslims in Gaza. Instead, they associated Palestinians with the violence they connect to Islam — a narrative that gels easily with Israel’s justifications for its crackdown in Gaza to eliminate Hamas.

Church collapse shifts the church

However, in 2025, Israel struck the only Catholic church in Gaza, killing three people and injuring nine others, in addition to destroying an ancient Christian historical site. The IDF claimed it was accidental, but the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierbattista Pizzaballa, harshly criticized the destruction, and claimed that Israel had been “targeting innocent civilians.”

With this strike, American evangelicals began to take note of the plight of Palestinian Christians. Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador, wrote a harsh letter to Israel’s minister of the interior about its hostility to Christians, threatening visa restrictions. Trump called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to complain. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, a staunch Republican but also a devout Christian, voted with Democrats to deny funding to Israel.

“Israel bombed the Catholic Church in Gaza, and that entire population is being wiped out as they continue their aggressive war in Gaza,” Greene said, to explain why she crossed party lines.

Since then, Christian influencers have drawn attention to Palestinian Christians’ treatment in Israel. Sometimes, these efforts are humanitarian and informational, such as those of the Palestinian Christian Alliance for Peace, an organization that grew out of the progressive mainline Protestant United Methodist Church’s movement to divest from Israel.

Other influencers, like Tucker Carlson, have taken more of a shockjock approach. Carlson has regularly interviewed Palestinian clergy, including Bethlehem-based Lutheran priest Munther Isaac; Mother Agapia, an American Greek Orthodox nun who immigrated to the Holy Land; and Hosan Naoum, an Anglican archbishop in Jerusalem. All of them emphasize a direct throughline from Jesus to Palestinian Christians, depicting them as upholding the most original form of Christianity.

When Carlson speaks on the subject, he often omits that the people in question are Palestinian, referring to them simply as Christians in astonished tones, playing the audience he imagines, then trying to walk his viewers step by step away from their prior assumptions

“So Christian churches in the United States send more money to Jewish settlements in the West Bank than they do to Christians in Jesus’ own town of Nazareth?” Carlson asked Naoum, in tones of total befuddlement. “When people in the American media say Palestinian, it means someone who is an Islamist, basically — but you’re saying a lot of those Palestinian refugees were Christians!”

Palestinians, both Christian and Muslim, are being attacked and oppressed by Israeli settlers and soldiers; this much has been established, including by many Jewish groups. But many of these Christian influencers, including Carlson, who are now advocating for Palestinians, have a history of antisemitism, which frames their exposés on Israeli violence — Jews, they believe, killed Jesus. Now, they highlight Jews destroying the Christian-owned olive groves in Taybeh or Bethlehem, bombing a church in Gaza, or spitting on a priest. The implication is clear.

An increasing number of viral videos featuring Israelis opposing Christianity in some way are now being shared virally: Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem’s Old City spitting on Christians, an IDF soldier taking an axe to a statue of Jesus in southern Lebanon. Even the Christian Broadcasting Network, an evangelical channel that has historically been extremely Zionist, aired a number of clips about Jewish attacks on Christians and Christian holy sites.

But the sympathy only holds among the Christian influencers if the victims are Christian; though they may criticize violence against Palestinians at large, the argument is clearly weaker. As Candace Owens, a devout Catholic and outspoken antisemite put it, “The biggest issue that I have, by the way, with Israel, and talking about them being above reproach, is the fact that they are supplying the arms to murder Christians.”

Yet many of these videos rely on separating Palestinian Christians from Palestinians more generally for greater emotional impact in the U.S. And the reality is that Palestinian Christians are still Palestinians, first and foremost, a tougher sell to the American Christian populace, which is still largely rooted in Zionism.

To address this, two Christian conferences —Not In Christ’s Name last week in D.C. and the Crossroads Conference in Atlanta earlier this month — invited Palestinian priests Issa Thaljieh and Munther Isaac, both from Bethlehem, to speak. Their testimony was meant to describe the experience of Palestinian Christians, to address Christian Zionism and to be “an invitation to American evangelicals to meet Palestinian Christians, and to reckon with the ways their theology harms Palestinians on the ground.”

But because of Trump’s blanket ban on Palestinian Authority passport holders, neither of them could get a visa — even though they’re priests.

The post Can Palestinian Christians undermine Christian Zionism? appeared first on The Forward.

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