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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel
(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided.
“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”
Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.
Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.
Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own, he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.
Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves.
Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel.
“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.”
Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations.
So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?
There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways.
Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.
The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis.
What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”
With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.
You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity.
More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means.
Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.
The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism.
Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)
One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal.
Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors.
The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?
The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth.
If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.
Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation.
Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.
So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?
For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction.
So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else.
And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.
I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.
Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.
An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)
You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?
I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant.
I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons.
That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen.
As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?
No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.
Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that.
So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.
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Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel
Rep. Hakeem Jeffries of New York, who is set to become the next speaker of the House, said in an interview published over the weekend that he plans to advance legislation targeting violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank when the new Congressional term begins in January, offering an early indication of how he intends to manage the growing divide over Israel within the Democratic Party.
“What I have made clear is that within the first 100 days, I think the most decisive step that we can take relative to the situation in the West Bank is to move the West Bank Settler Violence Protection and Prevention Act,” Jeffries said in an interview with The New York Times published Saturday. At least 225 incidents of settler violence were documented during 2025 and part of 2026 by Israeli watchdog Yesh Din.
The bill was introduced last year by Rep. Jerry Nadler, co-chair of the Congressional Jewish Caucus, who is retiring at the end of the year. It has 174 Democratic co-sponsors. France and the U.K. are among the countries that have already imposed sanctions on violent Israeli settlers. Former President Joe Biden announced similar measures in 2024, but President Donald Trump reversed them shortly after taking office in 2025.
At the same time, Jeffries stopped short of endorsing a pair of bills to block some U.S. weapons sales to Israel, a demand of progressive Democrats. “I haven’t articulated a position one way or the other with respect to any of these bills,” Jeffries said, “because we’re going to have a conversation about the steps that we need to take together as a caucus.”
The distinction is important for Jeffries, a longtime supporter of Israel, as he’s preparing to lead a Democratic majority that is increasingly divided over Israel. His approach suggests he wants to address concerns about Israeli government policies without endorsing measures to end some U.S. military support for Israel. Many Jewish Democrats have also criticized the policies of the current right-wing Israeli government, particularly on settlement expansion and violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
The party’s divide over Israel goes deeper
The Democratic Party’s sweeping midterm victories have given Jeffries considerable room to manage the debate over Israel without depending on the votes of its most progressive members. Jeffries was nominated Wednesday by an overwhelming majority of his Democratic colleagues to become speaker, pending a House floor vote when the new Congress convenes on Jan. 3. Only 11, including the six newly elected members affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America, voted against.
Rep. Ro Khanna of California, a Democrat who has pushed for restrictions on military assistance to Israel, acknowledged that political reality, saying that progressives “have not succeeded in getting any commitments yet on Gaza or Israel.”
The debate is unlikely to end with one vote. Jeffries will still face pressure from a growing movement inside Congress to end all U.S. military aid to Israel, including defensive and offensive weapons sales.
On Election Day earlier this month, President Donald Trump said that the U.S. would halt roughly $4 billion in annual aid to Israel by the end of 2026. He was unclear how he would implement that, given the current memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Israel runs through 2028.
Earlier this year, 103 of 212 Democrats supported a measure to eliminate the annual military assistance to Israel and another 10 abstained. Dozens also co-sponsored a pair of measures – the Block the Bombs Act and Ceasefire Compliance Act – that would restrict certain offensive arms sales to Israel and increase oversight of Israel’s policies in the West Bank and in Gaza. The DSA said in a post-election event that it is planning to use its growing influence to push for a full arms embargo against Israel and ultimately “break” the longstanding alliance between the U.S. and the Jewish state.
Jeffries’ long record of supporting Israel
Jeffries, 56, has consistently defended the U.S.-Israel relationship since his election to the House in 2012, even as other Democrats have become more critical of Israel’s government.
In recent weeks, progressive activists have resurfaced clips of Jeffries and Sen. Chuck Schumer expressing strong support for Israel in speeches each made to Jewish groups, arguing that the leadership is out of step with voters’ changing perspectives.
Among them: declaring, “Israel today, Israel tomorrow, Israel forever,” at a 2014 rally in support of Israel; in 2023, describing Jerusalem as New York City’s sixth borough; and, in 2025, saying that the U.S. “can’t take our foot off the gas pedal until Iran is brought to its knees.”
In the Times interview, Jeffries said the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza was “unacceptable, unsustainable and un-American.” He also said the early moves made by the incoming Congress will make a two-state solution more viable. In a new memoir published last week, Biden warned Israelis they may not be able to count on the same level of support from future American leaders if the status quo continues. “I hope Israel wakes up,” he writes. “The days of American leaders like me — passionate defenders of Israel to the core — are passing.”
Even if the House passes the settler sanctions bill, it could face a Republican filibuster in the Senate or a veto from Trump.
For now, Jeffries has the votes and the political standing to set the agenda on settler violence, but without making major concessions to the Democratic Party’s most outspoken Israel critics.
The post Rep. Hakeem Jeffries prioritizes settler violence as Democratic majority remains divided over Israel appeared first on The Forward.
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Mark Ruffalo opposes Schumer for Senate leader, citing “religious beliefs and loyalties”
(JTA) — Actor Mark Ruffalo, an outspoken progressive and Israel critic, cited concerns over “entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties” in endorsing U.S. Sen. Chris Van Hollen for Senate majority leader over U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer, the current Democratic caucus leader and a Jewish lawmaker from New York.
In a Saturday post on X, Ruffalo framed his endorsement of Van Hollen – and concerns about religious beliefs and loyalty – as being more than just about Israel.
“Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times,” Ruffalo posted. “We need Justice, we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties.”
Israel is just one issue in a whole host of reasons Van Hollen is the right leader for our times. We need Justice , we need leadership that follows the will of the people not entrenched religious beliefs and loyalties. Does not follow entrenched fossil fuel and corporate interests, nor throws a blind eye to the hard realties we face today. Van Hollen has showed he is willing to face these difficult times with the law, with integrity and the strength and spirit to fight the social and moral corruption that has set in with age old presumptions and the comfort that comes with unchecked power over decades. We have absolutely nothing to lose by replacing Sen Schumer. We can only gain more justice and freedom. Put pressure on your senators. Now is the time. Keep the momentum of this election going. Thank you, Senator Schumer, but it’s time to move aside.
https://t.co/GkpK4YG7dF
— Mark Ruffalo (@MarkRuffalo) November 21, 2026
Schumer is the highest-ranking Jewish elected official in U.S. history and has led the Senate’s Democratic caucus since 2017, including as majority leader from 2021 until 2025. Since the midterm elections, Schumer, the pro-Israel stalwart, has faced a chorus of progressive voices who are seeking a change in the leadership of the Democratic caucus.
Three veteran senators – Vermont independent Sen. Bernie Sanders, Democratic Sens. Elissa Slotkin of Michigan and Jeff Merkley of Oregon –have endorsed Van Hollen of Maryland for majority leader. Van Hollen also has the support of two newly elected senators who will take office in January, Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan and Peggy Flanagan of Minnesota.
Van Hollen is an outspoken critic of Israel who has led efforts to investigate the country’s human rights practices and pressure its right-wing government. He has drawn blowback from some Jewish leaders in recent years over his criticism of Israel and of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group.
Schumer, who has longstanding ties to AIPAC and the pro-Israel community, has described himself as a “Shomer Yisrael” (“guardian of Israel”), noting that his surname derives from the Hebrew word shomer. Still, he has become increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent years, going so far as giving a speech from the Senate floor in 2024 calling for new elections and leadership in Israel.
Ruffalo, known for his work in “The Avengers” franchise, “Spotlight” and “The Kids Are All Right,” has been a divisive figure in the Jewish community. In an August Instagram Story, he linked Skydance CEO David Ellison, the chief driver of the then-proposed Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, to tech giant Oracle, which Ruffalo accused of powering “an apartheid system of oppression” in Gaza.
Oracle was co-founded by Ellison’s father, Larry Ellison, one of the world’s richest men; both Ellisons are Jewish and prominent Israel supporters. Oracle also owns a stake in the social media network TikTok’s U.S. operations, and has long been a target of progressives who point to the company’s links to, and public support for, Israel.
In a social media post that was reported in September to be no longer available, Ruffalo described Larry Ellison as a “classic oligarch” who is “crushing workers and consolidating the wealth of the world for their own power and concentrated dominance.”
Ruffalo drew criticism from Jewish organizations, including the Jewish Federation Los Angeles, which said the actor’s comments “combined Jewish wealth, media control, secret technology and sinister global power,” drawing on “recognizable antisemitic tropes with a long and dangerous history.”
In response to the criticism, Ruffalo denied being antisemitic or anti-Israel, and said “criticizing the actions of the Israeli prime minister, a military technology contract, or the executives who supply it is not the same as criticizing Jewish people.” He added that “my views come from my own political convictions and should never be interpreted as hostility toward Jewish people, for whom I have deep love and respect.”
Some 170 notable Jewish personalities signed an open letter supporting him.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Israel does not need fake ‘unity’ with Netanyahu – it needs to move forward
For Israelis exhausted by years of political upheaval, bitter polarization and war, the appeal of national unity might seem obvious. Surely a country facing so many challenges would benefit from leaders putting aside their differences and working together.
Naftali Bennett breathed new life into this enduring hope by meeting last week with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently without coordinating with his presumed opposition partners. But this revived discussion of a government that united the opposition and Netanyahu’s Likud party was short-lived. Bennett has since advocated a broad government under former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, with Netanyahu as a junior partner or more.
Except that Netanyahu has so dramatically upset many Israelis that the possibility of him having any role in the next government has sparked a very animated discussion.
It begs questions: What exactly is a national unity government? Why has Israel repeatedly resorted to one? And when did the understandable yearning for national solidarity become confused with the notion that elections need not produce winners and losers?
Israel’s unity governments
Unity governments are largely an Israeli invention. Germany, whose parliamentary system resembles Israel’s in important respects, has repeatedly been governed by grand coalitions between its principal center-right and center-left parties. This tends to happen when there are many splinter formations who are so radical that the centrists on either side would rather “reach across the aisle.”
Israel’s experience with unity has taken on an additional significance. Its history of war and national emergency has imbued political unity with an almost sacred quality, drawing on the deeply rooted Jewish ideal of achdut or solidarity. But an agreement between rival politicians to share power is not the same thing as national solidarity.
Israel’s first national unity government was formed on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, when Menachem Begin’s opposition movement joined a Labor-led administration that already enjoyed a parliamentary majority. It was an emergency arrangement rather than a political necessity.
The defining precedent came in 1984, seven years after Begin’s historic election victory ended nearly three decades of Labor dominance. Israel had developed a competitive two-bloc system, with Labor on one side and Likud, supported by right-wing and religious parties, on the other.
Unlike Americans, Israelis do not directly elect their head of government. Also unlike Americans – where a vote in Wyoming is worth many votes in California – each vote counts the same. Israelis elect a 120-member Knesset, and the decisive question is which parties can assemble a parliamentary majority. The largest individual party is not necessarily the one that governs. In 2009, for example, Kadima won more seats than Likud, but Netanyahu formed the government because he could assemble a coalition.
In 1984, the rival blocs were effectively tied, 60–60. Neither could govern independently. Labor’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir therefore agreed to share power, rotating the premiership after two years.
The results were remarkable. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, retaining a security zone in the south, and implemented an economic stabilization program that brought runaway inflation under control. Peres honored the rotation agreement in 1986.
Yet unity had its limits. In 1987, Peres reached an understanding with Jordan’s King Hussein that might have opened an important diplomatic path toward resolving the Palestinian question. Shamir blocked it. The episode demonstrated how a government capable of making difficult decisions could also prevent them.
The 1988 election produced a different situation. Likud and its right-wing and religious allies had approximately 65 seats, enough to govern without Labor. Shamir nevertheless formed another unity government, this time without rotating the premiership. It collapsed in 1990.
Later unity governments under Ariel Sharon arose amid the trauma of the Second Intifada and, subsequently, to facilitate Israel’s disengagement from Gaza.
These experiences illustrate an important distinction. Some unity governments were born of parliamentary necessity, others of national emergency, and still others of a desire to implement policies that would otherwise be politically impossible. None demonstrated that bringing opposing parties into the same cabinet was generally pratical.
The most recent experiment came in 2020, when Netanyahu and Benny Gantz agreed to rotate the premiership after three inconclusive elections. Netanyahu would serve first, followed by Gantz. But the government collapsed over the failure to pass a budget, long before Gantz’s turn arrived. Gantz’s supporters accused Netanyahu of deliberately exploiting a loophole in the agreement; Netanyahu disputed responsibility.
The contrast with 1986, when Peres honored his commitment to Shamir, helps explain, in part, why Netanyahu has become so toxic.
Unity today?
That history raises questions about the present enthusiasm for unity. The first is whether there is a pressing karmic need for Netanyahu to be banished. The second is whether any new unity agreement could be sustained. The third, and perhaps the most fundamental, is what such a government could actually accomplish.
Israel faces profound disagreements over accountability for Oct. 7, judicial independence, military obligations for the ultra-Orthodox, the future of the West Bank and the place of Arab citizens in its democracy. These are not merely disputes over the pace of reform. They concern the direction in which the country should move.
A unity government that postponed these questions would not necessarily reconcile the country. It might simply institutionalize paralysis.
There is also a peculiar asymmetry in the Israeli discussion of unity.
When Netanyahu’s right-religious bloc won 64 Knesset seats in 2022, he formed a government without inviting his opponents to participate. Nobody seriously argued that the millions of Israelis who voted for opposition parties were thereby entitled to representation in the cabinet. Netanyahu had won a parliamentary majority and proceeded to govern.
That is how parliamentary democracy works.
Yet when the possibility arises that Netanyahu’s opponents might assemble a majority, the argument for unity frequently resurfaces. The implication is that the votes of Likud supporters must somehow be honored through Netanyahu’s continued participation in government, even if a different parliamentary majority is available.
The present situation is admittedly complicated. Netanyahu’s bloc lacks a majority, while Eisenkot and his prospective partners face difficult choices concerning cooperation with Arab parties and the ultra-Orthodox. A broad coalition may be one way to overcome those obstacles.
But political difficulty is not the same as democratic necessity. A parliamentary majority that includes Arab parties, or depends on their support, is no less legitimate than one that includes Likud. Nor does respecting the millions of Israelis who support Netanyahu require that he remain in government.
This is where the language of national unity becomes misleading. Reconciliation among citizens is an essential national objective. Sharing cabinet positions among politicians is a particular political arrangement, whose merits depend on the policies it can implement.
Israel’s history demonstrates that unity governments can accomplish extraordinary things when their participants share an urgent purpose. It also demonstrates how fundamental disagreements can turn them into mechanisms for mutual veto.
Bennett’s intervention has made the possibility of another such government a serious political question. But the discussion should not begin and end with the distribution of ministries, the order of a rotation or the reassuring symbolism of rival leaders sitting around the same cabinet table.
It should begin with what the government intends to do.
Democratic elections exist to allow citizens to choose between competing political programs. Sometimes the result makes cooperation between rivals unavoidable. Sometimes a national emergency makes it desirable. But unity cannot become a substitute for accepting that elections have consequences.
Israel needs national solidarity. Whether it needs another national unity government is an entirely different question. My answer is a categorical no. So extreme is Netanyahu’s chicanery that any deal with him would be a terrible mistake that would be a tragedy for Zionism itself. If Israel is to survive it needs Netanyahu out.
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