Connect with us
The Residences advertisement

Uncategorized

What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel

(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided. 

“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”

Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.

Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.

Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own,  he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.

Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves. 

Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel. 

“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.

Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.” 

Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations. 

So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?

There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways. 

Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.

The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis. 

What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”

With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.

You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity. 

More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means. 

Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.

The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism. 

Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)

One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal. 

Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors. 

The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?

The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth. 

If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.

Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation. 

Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.

So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?

For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction. 

So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else. 

And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.

I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.

Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.

An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)

You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?

I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant. 

I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons. 

That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen. 

As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?

No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.

Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that. 

So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.

—
The post What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Uncategorized

Can Palestinian Christians undermine Christian Zionism?

Americans tend to associate Palestinians with Islam. And studies show that most Americans view Islam in a negative light; a Pew study found that this has actually gotten worse since 9/11 — more than 50% of Americans surveyed in 2026 agreed with the statement that Islam encouraged violence, double the 25% who agreed with that statement in 2002.

Since Oct. 7, some Christian groups and influencers in the U.S. have been trying to change this association, drawing the attention of their fellow American Christians to the plight of — and the existence of — Palestinian Christians in the hopes of activating their empathy toward Palestinians.

American Christians have historically advocated strongly for their fellow Christians abroad. In 1998, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act in response to the civil war in Sudan that saw an Islamist government oppressing Christian citizens. Earlier this year, Congress passed a resolution expressing concern for Coptic Christians in Egypt. And another Pew study found that the vast majority of groups advocating for religious freedoms abroad are Christian.

In short, the U.S. is a Christian country, and many of its citizens feel connected to Christians in trouble abroad.

But this has been somewhat less true when it comes to Israel where American Christian views over the past several decades have been shaped by Christian Zionism. Evangelicals hold immense political sway through lobbying groups and voting power, and most adhere to a theology that demands support for Israel, and for Jews to return to the biblical land, in order to bring about the End Times and the return of Jesus. There is such a strong moral alignment between Israel and God — their Christian God — that some American evangelicals seem to be shocked when they learn that Israel did not distinguish between Palestinian Christians and Palestinian Muslims in Gaza. Instead, they associated Palestinians with the violence they connect to Islam — a narrative that gels easily with Israel’s justifications for its crackdown in Gaza to eliminate Hamas.

Church collapse shifts the church

However, in 2025, Israel struck the only Catholic church in Gaza, killing three people and injuring nine others, in addition to destroying an ancient Christian historical site. The IDF claimed it was accidental, but the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierbattista Pizzaballa, harshly criticized the destruction, and claimed that Israel had been “targeting innocent civilians.”

With this strike, American evangelicals began to take note of the plight of Palestinian Christians. Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador, wrote a harsh letter to Israel’s minister of the interior about its hostility to Christians, threatening visa restrictions. Trump called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to complain. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, a staunch Republican but also a devout Christian, voted with Democrats to deny funding to Israel.

“Israel bombed the Catholic Church in Gaza, and that entire population is being wiped out as they continue their aggressive war in Gaza,” Greene said, to explain why she crossed party lines.

Since then, Christian influencers have drawn attention to Palestinian Christians’ treatment in Israel. Sometimes, these efforts are humanitarian and informational, such as those of the Palestinian Christian Alliance for Peace, an organization that grew out of the progressive mainline Protestant United Methodist Church’s movement to divest from Israel.

Other influencers, like Tucker Carlson, have taken more of a shockjock approach. Carlson has regularly interviewed Palestinian clergy, including Bethlehem-based Lutheran priest Munther Isaac; Mother Agapia, an American Greek Orthodox nun who immigrated to the Holy Land; and Hosan Naoum, an Anglican archbishop in Jerusalem. All of them emphasize a direct throughline from Jesus to Palestinian Christians, depicting them as upholding the most original form of Christianity.

When Carlson speaks on the subject, he often omits that the people in question are Palestinian, referring to them simply as Christians in astonished tones, playing the audience he imagines, then trying to walk his viewers step by step away from their prior assumptions

“So Christian churches in the United States send more money to Jewish settlements in the West Bank than they do to Christians in Jesus’ own town of Nazareth?” Carlson asked Naoum, in tones of total befuddlement. “When people in the American media say Palestinian, it means someone who is an Islamist, basically — but you’re saying a lot of those Palestinian refugees were Christians!”

Palestinians, both Christian and Muslim, are being attacked and oppressed by Israeli settlers and soldiers; this much has been established, including by many Jewish groups. But many of these Christian influencers, including Carlson, who are now advocating for Palestinians, have a history of antisemitism, which frames their exposés on Israeli violence — Jews, they believe, killed Jesus. Now, they highlight Jews destroying the Christian-owned olive groves in Taybeh or Bethlehem, bombing a church in Gaza, or spitting on a priest. The implication is clear.

An increasing number of viral videos featuring Israelis opposing Christianity in some way are now being shared virally: Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem’s Old City spitting on Christians, an IDF soldier taking an axe to a statue of Jesus in southern Lebanon. Even the Christian Broadcasting Network, an evangelical channel that has historically been extremely Zionist, aired a number of clips about Jewish attacks on Christians and Christian holy sites.

But the sympathy only holds among the Christian influencers if the victims are Christian; though they may criticize violence against Palestinians at large, the argument is clearly weaker. As Candace Owens, a devout Catholic and outspoken antisemite put it, “The biggest issue that I have, by the way, with Israel, and talking about them being above reproach, is the fact that they are supplying the arms to murder Christians.”

Yet many of these videos rely on separating Palestinian Christians from Palestinians more generally for greater emotional impact in the U.S. And the reality is that Palestinian Christians are still Palestinians, first and foremost, a tougher sell to the American Christian populace, which is still largely rooted in Zionism.

To address this, two Christian conferences —Not In Christ’s Name last week in D.C. and the Crossroads Conference in Atlanta earlier this month — invited Palestinian priests Issa Thaljieh and Munther Isaac, both from Bethlehem, to speak. Their testimony was meant to describe the experience of Palestinian Christians, to address Christian Zionism and to be “an invitation to American evangelicals to meet Palestinian Christians, and to reckon with the ways their theology harms Palestinians on the ground.”

But because of Trump’s blanket ban on Palestinian Authority passport holders, neither of them could get a visa — even though they’re priests.

The post Can Palestinian Christians undermine Christian Zionism? appeared first on The Forward.

Continue Reading

Uncategorized

For Jewish democrats walking a fine line on Israel, Hannah Arendt charts a path forward

As I periodically lifted my jaw back into place while watching the returns roll in from the midterm elections, I could not help but wonder what Hannah Arendt might have made of this event. In particular, what would this firmly secularist, proudly Jewish, and merciless theorist, one whose worldview was shaped by the experience of the horrors of the 20th century, have thought about the sudden and shocking eruption of religion in the ranks of the Democratic Party.

Riding the crest of the blue tsunami that swept across our country two weeks ago were women and men of faith. “After decades of a religious right,” the Wall Street Journal announced, “Democrats find a religious left.” Not just any religion, mind you, but specifically the Christian religion. “The religious left has a Jesus-speak secret sauce that works,” theologian Anthony Bradley declared.

Statistics seem to support this claim: Among the 257 Democrats who, at last count, will take their places in the 120th Congress, nine either studied or graduated from seminary or divinity school. Hardly a stunning number in terms of percentage, but very stunning in terms of recent history. After the Jimmy Carter parenthesis, the Democratic Party was long seen as, at best, the friend of secular values and, at worst, the enemy of religious values. (It was not even 20 years ago that then-presidential candidate Barack Obama described working class voters as those who bitterly “cling to their guns or religion.”)

This attitude towards religion-clinging, especially within the suddenly bigger tent of a resurrected Democratic Party, seems to be over, then. Rather than clinging, the time for bringing back religion seems to have arrived. Right?

Not quite. In May, a Politico poll revealed that, for Democratic voters, being Jewish was more of a handicap for a politician running for office than being Christian. (Interestingly, atheists are as mistrusted as Jews; tragically, Muslims are even more mistrusted than both atheists and Jews.) Though the poll did not explore the sources of this mistrust, one element may well be antisemitic sentiment found mostly on the party’s leftwing fringe.

But most of this mistrust no doubt results from Israel’s military response to the Hamas massacre of Oct. 7, 2023 which the International Criminal Court labeled war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2024, and has since been described by other critics, including the Israeli-American Holocaust scholar Omer Bartov, as genocidal.

One of the many consequences of the catastrophic state of affairs in Gaza is that support for Israel among Democratic voters has cratered. Whereas about one-half of Democrats and Independents had favorable views of Israel in 2022, an August poll by the Pew Research Foundation found that the percentage had dropped to nearly 20%. Fairly or not, this has placed Democratic Jewish politicians, especially those with presidential ambitions, in a fiendishly fraught position.

The newly re-elected senator from Georgia, Jon Ossoff, who has long emphasized the vital role of Jewish values in his life, has become increasingly critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza. Not only has he lambasted the Netanyahu government’s actions in Gaza, but he was also among the first senators to vote in 2024 (and again in 2025 and 2026) for a measure that would block sales of offensive weapons to Israel. And while he refuses to address the question — a purity test for the party’s leftwing — of whether Israel’s government has committed genocide, Ossoff does not hesitate to affirm that the government has violated international laws of war.

Ossoff’s words and votes contrast, at times sharply, with those of Josh Shapiro, the governor of Pennsylvania. More so than Ossoff, Shapiro emphasizes — at some length in his recent book Where We Keep the Light: Stories from a Life of Service — his deep attachment not just to Judaism but also to Israel. He tends to speak about Israel and Gaza in a way which supporters might find even-handed while critics will find evasive. Thus, in an interview earlier this year on the podcast Pod Save America, he criticized the “lawlessness” of West Bank settlers against Palestinians, but rejected the term “apartheid” to describe the government’s policies towards those same Palestinians. Similarly, while he condemned Israeli policies last year that wrought widespread hunger in Gaza, he is reluctant to use American military support as leverage to use against this same government.

Just as these are not the only potential Jewish presidential candidates — Senator Elissa Slotkin of Michigan and Governor J.B. Pritzker of Illinois come to mind — their positions are not the only positions to be taken. Is there one position, though, that might be not just strategically best, but also ethically best?

This leads us to Arendt. In his graceful and thoughtful book, A World We Share: Hannah Arendt and the Power of Friendship in a Broken World, Roger Berkowitz explores Arendt’s understanding of friendship, the very stuff with which we build a shared world. Inspired by Aristotle’s claim that a healthy polis, or nation, is constituted by “a multitude of persons…differing in kind,” one that cultivates a diversity of ideas and beliefs. This alone, Arendt argued, gives us the “ability to truly see topics from various sides — that is, politically.”

Rather disturbingly, at least at first, Arendt insisted that the enemy of a shared world is truth. Arendt bristled at the notion that truth should be the north star of right-thinking friends or citizens. The primacy we reflexively give to truth, Arendt warned, entails the sacrifice of “human worth [and] friendship,” transforming our shared world into an inhuman world, one where conversation and dialogue are canceled by conformity and monologue. For Arendt, Berkowitz writes, “politics begins not in correctness but instead in dialogue — and in the fragile, human act of sharing the world with those who see it differently.”

This conviction on Arendt’s part was challenged time and again during her lifetime, whether by her youthful affair with Martin Heidegger or the much later affair that raged over her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. And, of course, it challenges our own convictions — namely, the unbudging certitude that I possess the truth — when confronted by events as tragic as Gaza transformed into rubble. (Or, for that matter, events as parodic as the Oval Office transformed into a Cheesecake Factory.) The awfully, perhaps fatally entangled nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict is presented by both sides, as Berkowitz writes, “within a framework of moral and political simplicity and reductive righteousness.”

Rather than each side taking a knife to this impossibly knotty affair, which opposing camps in the Democratic Party at times seem determined to so, might it not be better to sit down, to assess and discuss it?  Just as Arendt believed that sincere dialogue was vital to a nation, so too must it be for a political party. To his credit, Berkowitz acknowledges the contradictions and inconsistencies in Arendt’s own position on Israel and Palestine, as well as his own. It would equally be to the credit of Jewish Democrats to do the very same. To both their supporters and opponents, they must insist on the necessity of dialogue on a subject where the only truth is that tens of thousands of innocent lives have been taken since Oct. 7.

 

The post For Jewish democrats walking a fine line on Israel, Hannah Arendt charts a path forward appeared first on The Forward.

Continue Reading

Uncategorized

Is it a tornado or bomb warning? No, it’s the Shabbat siren!

One Friday, shortly after I moved to New York City, I was walking through Bedford-Stuyvesant when an air raid siren went off. As it wailed, a group of older Black men playing chess in the park stood up, shook hands and clapped each other on the back. “Shabbat Shalom!” they said to each other. “Gut shabbes!”

I have no idea if any of these men were Jewish. But they knew what the siren was for. After all, they go off every week in the very Jewish neighborhoods of Crown Heights, Borough Park, Midwood and Williamsburg, to mark the arrival of Shabbat. Twice, actually: Once 18 minutes before Shabbat, as a warning, and then moments before Shabbat begins. They also blare before holidays such as Passover, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur.

Not everyone feels so positively about the Shabbat sirens, however — or, as one Redditor called them, “shalarms.” They’ve startled and panicked plenty of newer, unfamiliar residents. On Reddit, transplants near the Jewish neighborhoods often ask their fellow residents if there is some sort of bomb or tornado warning. A friend of mine told me she had to Google it when she first moved to the area, confused by the weekly wailing.

But why air raid sirens? Who runs them? Why aren’t there similar alarms in most Jewish neighborhoods, or other cities with many Jews? (A siren briefly made an appearance in London, and was quickly removed.) And how on earth did this custom develop in the first place? The mystery is surprisingly difficult to solve.

Of sirens and shofars

According to the Talmud, in the tractate Shabbat, Jews are supposed to announce the approach of the Sabbath with six blasts of a shofar, each of which corresponds to an act of preparation for the evening:

“The first blast is in order to stop the people from work in the fields. The second blast is to stop those who are working in the city, and to inform the proprietors to close the stores. The third is to inform them to light the Shabbat light.”

The Talmud instructs there be a pause after the third blast that lasts “the length of time it takes to fry a small fish or to stick bread to the sides of the oven” so that anyone who forgot to cook “and needs those foods for Shabbat may do so then.”

As Jews were ousted from Jerusalem in the early second century, this practice fell out of favor — it drew too much attention to an already-persecuted group. But some version of the practice was kept alive in many Jewish communities around the world. Some places, including Krakow in Poland, had a town crier who would go through the Jewish neighborhoods to remind people of the incoming Sabbath. In Jerusalem in the 1930s, someone would walk through Mahane Yehuda market to warn shopkeepers that it was time to shutter their stores. And in Djerba, Tunisia, someone still blows a shofar on a roof in the Jewish neighborhood.

Perhaps this is what inspired the sirens — though the air raid sirens heard in Brooklyn do not give blasts in the sound of a shofar, nor are there six of them. They do seem to operate by a similar logic, however; a gap of 15 minutes between the two sirens allows people to rush home, take a quick shower or finish frying a small fish, apparently. In today’s New York City, no one needs time to trudge back from a field, but a warning call is still relevant.

And sirens announce Shabbat in religious cities across Israel, including in Jerusalem, differentiated from the sirens that warn of missile fire only by cadence — a steady tone for Shabbat, an oscillating pitch for rockets. (During times of war, to reduce confusion and blood pressure, Jerusalem has sometimes broadcast religious melodies instead of a siren.)

Battles over noise

The Brooklyn sirens are independently operated and they don’t come from one central authority in any given neighborhood; there are multiple in the Orthodox area of Midwood in Brooklyn, on top of various yeshivas, and several throughout the Satmar areas of Williamsburg and the edges of Bed-Stuy. Crown Heights seems to have only a single horn, on top of the synagogue Chevra Shas — but it’s powerful enough to reach my apartment, more than half a mile away.

They are not universally beloved; neighbors have complained about the noise level and disruption, filing complaints with the city for sirens that have reached as high as 106 decibels — about the same as a jackhammer —  sometimes resulting in tickets from the city’s Environmental Protection Agency issued to the yeshivas or synagogues housing each alarm. There have been Change.org petitions to ban them, and people have regularly called the police on their local sirens.

But the synagogues operating the alarms have resisted, pointing out that noise limits have exemptions for religious institutions, and citing nearby churches bells and mosque calls to prayer that reach similar decibel levels.

A similar interfaith alliance has been forged in Israel. In 2016, Orthodox political parties in Israel, which usually stand in opposition to Arab parties, blocked a bill requiring mosques to lower their volume for the call to prayer. Their fear was that any ruling about religious noise ordinances would limit the Shabbos siren too.

Some cities, often more religious ones like Jerusalem or Bnei Barak, run Shabbat sirens municipally, but in others, they are installed and distributed by an organization called Noam Kedushat — which specializes in speakers that play melodies instead of a loud tone — or are even operated by individuals off of their own roofs. There have been feuds over the sirens, particularly in religiously divided cities; progressive party Meretz tried to block the sirens in Tel Aviv, categorizing them as noise disturbances, and there have been lawsuits in Beer Sheva over a Shabbat speaker one woman installed on her house.

As religion increasingly splits Israeli politics, the sirens have become increasingly contentious; secular residents regard them as an annoyance or impediment akin to the fact that Israel’s public transit does not run on Shabbat. This year, a group of activists claimed the sirens amounted to “religious coercion.”

In Brooklyn, however, even after Oct. 7 when antisemitism has risen, public feeling toward the sirens is generally warm. Every few months, a Reddit post pops up asking about the siren. And every time, commenters reliably identify the noise as “our Jewish friends,” “your Jewish neighbors” or something similarly friendly; some celebrate it as an announcement of the weekend.

At most, they find it slightly annoying, but not particularly bothersome. A woman at a bus stop on the same block as one of the sirens told me that it shocked her at first — “It was like a tsunami of sound,” she said. “But you get used to it. It’s annoying but it’s only on Fridays.”

As my friend Phil put it, they are part of the “delightful (noisy) fabric of the city.”  He likes to imagine “it’s two old siren nerds going up on the roof to crank the war surplus siren they lovingly maintain.”

But is that what’s happening?

A loud mystery

It’s not clear how long the sirens have been marking Shabbat in New York City; a 1991 New York Times article on the Crown Heights riots noted the sirens. In a 2014 article on a Chabad news site, a rabbi named Mendel Goldstein claimed to have invented the Crown Heights siren and said at the time of publication that he’d been running it for 30 years, placing that siren’s birth in the mid-1980s.

There is shockingly little information about the sirens publicly available — not who owns them, or how they run, or whether they’ve been updated over the decades. A 2014 article in Gothamist, ostensibly about the sirens, is in fact largely about the city’s history with actual air raid sirens, during World War II. No synagogue or yeshiva has ever commented to a mainstream news outlet about the noise complaints, and no one has gone on record explaining how they run in NYC. Somehow, the Shabbos versions remain elusive, even though they’re a hard-to-miss part of life in Brooklyn.

And despite the warm feelings many Brooklynites seem to hold toward the sirens, people are oddly close-lipped and even hostile about their origin story or their owners.

The air raid siren in Crown Heights, on the roof of a synagogue on Kingston Ave. Photo by Mira Fox

I went to find the source of the sound nearest me one Friday afternoon, and was standing there, staring up at it and waiting when it went off, as dozens of Chabad families streamed by me. One man, perhaps seeing an opportunity to bring me into the Chabad fold, stopped and smiled and asked me if I knew what the tall pole with flared air horn speakers on top was, I said I knew what it was, but nothing else about it, and that I was a journalist trying to discover its history; he speed-walked away.

I got a bit more of information from an elderly white-bearded man, who stopped to ask me if I was looking for a synagogue. He told me that the siren goes off automatically, programmed once a year — disappointing information for Phil’s romantic vision of old nerds maintaining their analog siren. But my most knowledgeable source yet peeled off to greet a friend when I tried to learn more.

After reaching out to a Chabad-run neighborhood news site for Crown Heights, I got a number for Mendel Goldstein. When he didn’t answer numerous calls or messages, I asked around and got the number for his nephew Levi. He answered, but while he was jovial, he was also openly suspicious of my intentions. He wanted to know who gave out his phone number, and asked what the piece was about.

“I want to make sure, you know, you’re depicting the siren in a positive light!” he told me. I related my story about the chess players, and he seemed pacified; he said he’d get back to me with his uncle on the phone. He did not.

I had a similar exchange with another Chabad representative, Motti Seligson; he was excited about the idea, and told me he loved the siren and grew up with it. When I told him about my experience trying to reach Goldstein, he opined that that the inventor, whoever it might truly be — he notably did not confirm Goldstein’s claim to invention — didn’t want to talk about it and just wanted to humbly serve his community without any fanfare, or no more fanfare than an air raid siren that can be heard for blocks already provided.

Still, Seligson promised me he’d find somebody who would chat about the siren. He also promised to find me the perfect Shabbos dinner that would connect me to the perfect Chabad shul. He never got back to me either, even after I followed up about dinner. I tried a Chabad-run library; no answer.

I may never know the true history of my Friday sirens. But for me, they symbolize everything I love about New York — its diversity, its quirks, the way Judaism is woven into the city in a way everyone, Jewish or not, knows about and appreciates. Judaism is part of being a New Yorker, whether it’s the people graciously explaining to concerned Redditors that the sirens announce the weekend instead of an incoming hurricane, or it’s the men playing chess in the park and pausing to wish each other a gut shabbes.

I think of it every Friday as the siren sings faintly through my own Crown Heights apartment windows. Though these days the Shabbat siren also serves as a disheartening reminder of how early the sun sets.

The post Is it a tornado or bomb warning? No, it’s the Shabbat siren! appeared first on The Forward.

Continue Reading

Copyright © 2017 - 2023 Jewish Post & News