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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel
(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided.
“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”
Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.
Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.
Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own, he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.
Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves.
Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel.
“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.”
Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations.
So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?
There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways.
Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.
The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis.
What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”
With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.
You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity.
More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means.
Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.
The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism.
Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)
One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal.
Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors.
The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?
The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth.
If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.
Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation.
Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.
So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?
For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction.
So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else.
And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.
I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.
Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.
An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)
You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?
I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant.
I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons.
That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen.
As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?
No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.
Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that.
So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.
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The post What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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The Iran war ended terribly for the US, and even worse for Israel
A war that began with immense ambition has ended with profound setbacks for both the United States and Israel.
With an emerging U.S.-Iran peace agreement, what initially appeared to be a historic demonstration of military dominance evolved into a vivid illustration of the limits of both Israeli and American power. The conflict also exposed profound failures in strategic competence within that alliance. Washington and Jerusalem planned effectively for the initial decapitation strikes, but were unprepared for the economic and geopolitical consequences that followed.
The result is a war that may ultimately strengthen the Iranian regime politically, despite the damage it suffered militarily; has weakened international perceptions of American military might; and has diminished both Israel’s own strategic circumstances and its most important alliance.
The opening phase of the war appeared spectacularly successful. Israeli intelligence and airpower decapitated large portions of Iran’s military and security leadership with astonishing speed, including by assassinating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Key military infrastructure suffered major damage, and for a brief moment, it seemed plausible that the Iranian regime might genuinely face collapse or surrender on terms dictated by Washington and Jerusalem.
That perception proved short-lived.
Iran shifted the battlefield away from conventional military confrontation and toward economic coercion. Its closure of the Strait of Hormuz exposed the extraordinary vulnerability of the global economy to relatively inexpensive forms of pressure. Energy markets panicked almost immediately. Governments across Europe, Asia, and the Gulf pushed urgently for de-escalation.
The central strategic reality became impossible to ignore: the U.S.could not tolerate sustained economic disruption, and the Iranian regime has a strong stomach for suffering. The overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. and Israel effectively ceased to matter.
That asymmetry changed the balance of the conflict. And the resulting agreement appears to preserve much of Iran’s architecture of mischief, which the regime’s many critics had hoped to see dismantled.
Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities have been harmed but can be rebuilt; long-term reductions to that firepower are reportedly not on the table in a planned 60-day negotiation. The regime’s regional proxy network — including Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad — survives, even though Hezbollah and Hamas have been battered.
And as Israel is not a party to the ceasefire, it cannot advocate for more stringent terms on this front.
The regime itself remains firmly in power and may receive enormous sanctions relief and renewed economic access. Demands for democratic reforms seem to have been set aside, as has any kind of punishment for the regime’s massacre of thousands — and by some reports tens of thousands — of domestic protestors in January.
The latter aspect is especially galling given that President Donald Trump was driven to intervene because of the January massacre, after he promised Iranians that “help is on its way.” Upon launching the war, he declared that it would enable Iranians to “take your country back.”
Ironically, Trump in his first term pulled out of former President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal over objections that it provided funds for the regime while allowing it to run riot. Now, he is settling for an effective reconstitution of that deal — except one with substantially less American leverage.
The implications extend far beyond Iran itself. The war demonstrated that Tehran can generate immediate global economic panic through relatively cheap tools and can leverage that panic into diplomatic concessions. Before the war, fears about Iran’s ability to blackmail the world economy remained somewhat theoretical. After the war, those fears became a demonstrated geopolitical reality.
There is little evidence that either the American or Israeli governments understood in advance the degree to which the global economy had become vulnerable to this form of coercion. This, even though the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz was completely predictable and indeed expected by every strategist I’ve spoken to for decades.
This outcome may be most devastating for the Iranian people themselves. Many Iranians who despise the regime interpreted the opening phase of the conflict as evidence that the dictatorship might finally face genuine collapse. Instead, the regime not only survived but also regained leverage. The machinery of repression remains intact.
But this result is damaging for every party to this war aside from the Iranian regime.
The war has transformed perceptions of American power. For decades, the U.S. has anchored a global system built on the assumption that Washington could manage regional crises with some strategy in mind. That strategy wasn’t always brilliant, but it was rarely clueless. With the Hormuz confrontation, the world watched the U.S. confront a regional adversary with vastly inferior capabilities and fail to control events.
For Israel, the alliance Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spent years cultivating with the American right and with Trump personally has become dangerously fragile. As pressure mounted to stabilize energy markets and prevent wider regional escalation, Trump increasingly presented himself not as a partner coordinating with Israel but as a superior authority managing Israeli actions. He repeatedly framed Israeli military action as dependent on his approval. He cursed Netanyahu in public. He presented Israel as a vassal doing his bidding — something no U.S. president has previously done.
This will destabilize Israel, where much of the governing right previously viewed Trump as a uniquely reliable ally who would support Israeli military objectives without hesitation or conditions.
Previous American presidents pressured Israel privately while still preserving the outward presentation of a relationship between sovereign allies. Trump discarded much of that convention. The new perception weakens Israel’s deterrence dramatically. Plus, with bipartisan support for Israel in Washington even more completely collapsed than after the deleterious war in Gaza, and relations with much of Europe — Israel’s top trading partner — similarly deteriorated, Israel finds itself at a new peak of dangerous international isolation.
This strategic shipwreck bears no resemblance to the sweeping regional transformation that supporters of the war — myself included — initially envisioned. I assumed, partly because of the first days’ successes, that Trump and Netanyahu had a plan. This is not a mistake serious people are likely to make again.
The post The Iran war ended terribly for the US, and even worse for Israel appeared first on The Forward.
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Would Judaism have an issue with ‘Disclosure Day?’
Steven Spielberg is in his aliens exist era — but in truth, he’s been there since at least 1977. That’s when the director said NASA sent him a 20-page letter objecting to the release of Close Encounters of the Third Kind, fearful the public might take to watching the stars the way they did beaches after Jaws. Did this indicate there was something to hide?
“I really found my faith when I heard that the Government was opposed to the film,” he said.
Spielberg’s fascination with UFOs goes back even further. In 1964, five years before the moon landing, he made the 8 millimeter alien invasion flick Firelight, a 17-year-old’s dry run at the topics he’d later handle with Roy Neary and his mesa-like mound of mashed potatoes and the world’s loudest game of Simon.
He’d return to aliens again, with E.T., War of the Worlds and the critically reviled Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull. But the 79-year-old director has never been so forthcoming with his views on alien life as he has been on this current press tour for Disclosure Day, where he made the controversial claim that first contact might pose a problem for the faithful.
“Is God, our God only on this planet, or is God a God for every system where there’s civilization, intelligent life, and even developing life?” Spielberg asked on CBS Sunday Morning. This is one of the questions posed by Disclosure Day, which is about the tug of war between a group dedicated to broadcasting the truth about intelligent extraterrestrial beings, and the shady agency determined to keep it under wraps.
Many in the church — meaning Christians, who are represented in the film by ex-novitiate Jane (Eve Hewson) — have said such a disclosure would be a nonissue for their belief. But what of Spielberg’s own coreligionists?
“Within the classic Jewish perspective is the idea that to embrace reality is to embrace our creator,” Rabbi Josh Breindel, whose teachings on speculative fiction earned him the moniker “sci-fi rabbi,” said in an interview. “So, if we were to have irrefutable proof of alien life, then that’s an opportunity for us to celebrate our creator in whose image we were made, and then maybe to probe and say, ‘Where do we see echoes or resonances of that image in this other life form in their sentient discourse?’”
We need not only take Rabbi Breindel’s word for it. The question pops up as early as the Middle Ages.
Writing in the 14th Century, the Spanish philosopher Hasdai Crescas claimed life on other planets wouldn’t be an issue for Jewish faith. Our texts feature many apparent allusions to other worlds in which God has dominion.
A place called Meroz, mentioned in the Book of Judges, has been interpreted as being another planet. The school of Merkabah mysticism, inspired by Ezekiel’s vision of the wheel, is a sort of Judaism-forward UFO watcher group. If we’re talking biblically accurate angels, or even the revelation at Sinai, there’s plenty in the Hebrew Bible that appears otherworldly.
Disclosure Day, written by David Koepp from a story by Spielberg, is a chase film about Danny Kelner (Josh O’Connor), a whistleblower for a U.S. government-aligned group called Wardex, intent on studying alien life and technology and keeping their findings suppressed. Danny is a math genius, and in a relationship with Jane, the ex-nun played by Hewson. He’s carrying sacred cargo: a backpack full of flash drives with evidence of spacecrafts and a weird rod made by the alien life forms whose precise capabilities include, but are not limited to, letting you turn invisible or allowing you to control someone else’s body and swap eye colors with them in the process.
In an effort to explain why men in black SUVs are chasing them, Danny shows Jane footage of an alien interrogation. Her response to seeing a small creature tortured by humans is an odd one: She thinks people will worship them as deities.
Here the film stumbles. Jane’s concern about a breakdown in belief may be justified in the realization that we’re not alone, but her leap to calling extraterrestrials “supreme beings” feels unwarranted. Yes, they have impressive technology. Also yes, a human can wield their magic baton MacGuffins, provided they’re wearing surgical gloves.
The faith subplot takes a backseat in the end to a familiar Spielbergian preoccupation: his parents and what he’s inherited from them. We learn the aliens taught Danny math, “the language of the book of the universe,” and made Emily Blunt’s character, Margaret, a Kansas City weatherperson, into a supreme empath, like Star Trek’s Deanna Troi cranked up to 11. As established in The Fabelmans, Spielberg, a product of his engineer father and musician mother, is naturally both. (Gilding the lily of the parental metaphor, there’s a sequence with a train that’s hauling pianos.)
On their phones and on TV, the world will bear witness to “disclosure,” including scenes of emaciated and disemboweled little green men, recalling both images from the Holocaust and current conflicts including Gaza. (Spielberg made it so the coverup for these cruel experiments began in 1947, probably just to align with the year of the Roswell incident, but before that was explained, I was thinking of the UN partition plan.)
Sometime before, Jane makes a call to the abbess at her old nunnery.
Paraphrasing Genesis, she says God made humans his supreme creation, to which the Abbess (Elizabeth Marvel), applies a close reading: “his supreme creation on Earth.”
This view is consistent with rabbinic thought, and the Abbess’ subsequent line, “why would He make such a vast universe, yet save it only for us,” is essentially what the Lubavitcher Rebbe told microbiologist Velvl Greene: “for you to sit here and say there is no life outside of planet Earth is to put limitations on the Creator, and that is not something any of His creatures can do!”
A better question for Jews, perhaps, is if these aliens have a separate covenant with the creator.
If one is interested in the Catholic view, know that Pope Francis said he’d baptize aliens. As for how other sci-fi writers have treated on Jews in Space, Dune scribe Frank Herbert seems to believe the faith was uniquely durable, having made it the only religion from an Earthbound society to survive in an intergalactic reality.
One thing that’s striking about Spielberg’s latest foray into the galaxy is its implications for geo-politics.
The backdrop of Disclosure Day is one of military escalation said to rival the Cuban Missile Crisis. Colin Firth’s foppish Brit bad guy warns that the truth would “tip the balance in an already destabilized world.” This runs counter to works like Watchmen and Independence Day, which posit a great common cause when people are confronted with life forms from outer space.
The difference is that these aliens are no invaders. They come in peace to teach us a lesson in empathy. That, the film seems to say, is the true threat to the world order: that humans behave with humanity.
In the final minutes of the film, the truth comes out and we are given a simple message, conveyed first through click consonants, then a math equation, and finally a single English word: “Listen.”
“I saw that, and I was like, ‘Oh, that’s Shema,’” Breindel said. “If you get it you get it.”
The post Would Judaism have an issue with ‘Disclosure Day?’ appeared first on The Forward.
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14 arrested during rival protests outside Israeli real estate event held at London synagogue
(JTA) — LONDON — Fourteen people were arrested following clashes between pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups on Sunday outside an event promoting Israeli real estate being held at a London synagogue.
Seven of those arrested came from pro-Israel groups, while six were affiliated with pro-Palestinian groups, the Metropolitan Police told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on Monday.
“The Great Israeli Real Estate Event” had drawn controversy for weeks, with multiple organizations including Amnesty International claiming the event organizers were selling “stolen” Palestinian lands in West Bank settlements and politicians including the mayor of London expressing opposition to the event.
The event organizers, meanwhile, told the Jewish News that all the properties being presented were located within Israel’s internationally recognized borders.
The event took place a day before a U.K. appeals court ruled that last year’s ban of a prominent anti-Israel group, Palestine Action, was legal.
The confrontation on Sunday followed similar ones in New York City and beyond over Israeli real estate events in recent months. A demonstration outside a Manhattan synagogue that was hosting such an event in November during which pro-Palestinian activists threatened violence spurred a new law constraining protests there.
London’s Metropolitan Police estimated that 1,000 people showed up to demonstrate outside Edgware United Synagogue, in northwest London. The department said it had coordinated with the Jewish Community Security Trust and deployed officers to deal with any disruptions. It also set up barriers to separate pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel groups.
During the confrontation, 14 arrests were made, including five for violent disorder, six for racial/religiously aggravated offenses, one for assault on an emergency worker, one for Public Order Act-related offenses, and one for common assault.
The Board of Deputies of British Jews’ acting president, Adam Cohen, said the group was “deeply disturbed at the wholly unjustified protest” outside a synagogue in a statement that reiterated that the event organizers had “publicly refuted claims that the event is marketing real estate over the Green Line” separating Israel from the West Bank.
The “false pretenses seems to be little more than an excuse to harass and intimidate members of the Jewish community,” Cohen said.
The protest was organized by an array of pro-Palestinian groups, including the International Centre of Justice for Palestinians, which issued a public letter criticizing the synagogue, and Jewish anti-Zionist groups. At least one Jewish anti-Zionist was arrested while protesting, according to a post by the groups on Instagram.
Under pressure ahead of the event, the original venue set to host it pulled out on Friday, the Jewish News reported. Registered attendees were sent messages via email and WhatsApp on Friday informing them of the change and learned about the new venue via an email at 11 p.m. Saturday that told them there would be ID checks and metal detectors at the doors.
The change in venue came following criticism from not just anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian organizations, but national politicians. Close to 100 members of parliament wrote a letter to Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper calling on her to investigate what they said was event at which “land in cities and towns built on the forced displacement of Palestinian people including properties in Israeli settlements across the occupied West Bank will be available for purchase.”
They also argued allowing the sale of these properties would contribute to settlement expansion, which the U.K. government regards as a violation of international law.
London Mayor Sadiq Khan also expressed “concerns” about the event on Friday after Green Party leader Zack Polanski, a prominent critic of Israel, asked him about it during a public availability.
“I condemn any attempt to sell property in the settlements, be that in London or anywhere else in the world,” Khan said. “I share concerns about the Great Israeli Real Estate taking place in our city, which I oppose.”
The Board of Deputies said it was “very disappointing” that public figures had not acknowledged the event organizers’ claims about no West Bank properties being presented “and instead inflamed tensions through partial and misleading commentary.”
This latest confrontation with anti-Israel demonstrators comes at a time of heightened tension in the U.K. Jewish community, and particularly in Jewish neighborhoods in London, where many residents feel unsafe after a string of incidents including the arson of four Hatzola ambulances in March; attempted attacks on three synagogues; and the stabbing of two Jewish men in the Orthodox neighborhood of Golders Green in late April. Dozens of people have been arrested in connection with the incidents.
As part of a crackdown meant to protect Jewish communities, the British government has adopted policies that give law enforcement new latitude to constrain protests.
“New measures under the Crime and Policing Act, called for by the Board and community partners, will from the end of the month give police new powers to impose conditions on protests near places of worship,” Cohen said. “We are calling on the police to ensure such protests are kept a significant distance from places of worship to prevent intimidation to members of the Jewish community.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post 14 arrested during rival protests outside Israeli real estate event held at London synagogue appeared first on The Forward.
