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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel
(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided.
“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”
Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.
Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.
Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own, he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.
Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves.
Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel.
“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.”
Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations.
So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?
There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways.
Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.
The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis.
What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”
With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.
You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity.
More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means.
Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.
The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism.
Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)
One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal.
Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors.
The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?
The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth.
If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.
Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation.
Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.
So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?
For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction.
So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else.
And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.
I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.
Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.
An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)
You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?
I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant.
I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons.
That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen.
As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?
No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.
Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that.
So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.
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A last-ditch effort to dismantle Israeli democracy
As Israelis prepare for what may be the most consequential election in the country’s history on Oct. 27, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition has launched an extraordinary legislative blitz before the Knesset’s coming summer recess, which begins at the end of this week. Already the coalition has passed a pair of laws legitimizing Haredi draft evasion; the plan also includes a series of bills weakening democratic oversight.
Viewed individually, these initiatives appear to be about technical legal questions that might appear arcane to anyone not steeped in Israeli constitutional law. Viewed together, they’re clearly a coordinated attempt to weaken nearly every independent institution capable of restraining executive power.
That includes the civil service and the office of the attorney general, as well as independent regulators and the mechanism by which the greatest governmental failure in Israeli history, the Oct. 7 massacre, will eventually be investigated.
The legislative package is, in other words, a constitutional project meant to entrench elected autocracy.
The comparison many Israelis now invoke is Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not abolish elections. Instead, he gradually weakened the institutions capable of constraining executive power while maintaining democratic forms. Today Turkey ranks 163rd out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index.
Critics don’t fear that Israel will become Turkey overnight. But they understand that democracies can erode incrementally through legal mechanisms enacted by elected governments.
The Basic Law: Torah Study
The cornerstone of the legislative effort recognizes long-term Torah study as a meaningful service to the state and the Jewish people. This is critical for entrenching the support of the Haredi community for Netanyahu; without them, he has no hope of a majority.
It was passed into law late Monday, despite wall-to-wall opposition by parties not in Netanyahu’s coalition.
Few Jewish Israelis dispute the historic importance of Torah study. Critics object instead to the law’s practical purpose, which is to provide constitutional protection for the continued exemption of huge numbers of Haredi yeshiva students from military service, making future judicial intervention far more difficult.
The law also aims to ensure such students will receive the same amount of financial support as military veterans.
In nearly three years of war, reservists have repeatedly returned to the front — sometimes for hundreds of days a year — while tens of thousands of Haredi youth have remained exempt. In that context, it’s no surprise that the vast majority of Israelis oppose the exemptions. Only about a fifth support them — just slightly more than the country’s Haredi population.
A linked proposal blocking arrests of Haredi draft evaders passed Tuesday, again in the face of massive mobilization by the opposition and howls of protest from chiefs of the security establishment. Israel Defense Forces chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir warned that the move would encourage evasion and, in a rare direct rebuke to the government, said it was “clearly and unequivocally inconsistent with the IDF’s needs.”
The government’s argument is that criminal law cannot resolve a social dispute decades in the making. But the practical consequence is to create two classes of citizens: those who face legal consequences for refusing military service, and those who do not. During the Israeli military’s gravest manpower crisis in generations, that distinction is both morally and constitutionally corrosive.
Weakening legal safeguards
Another proposal would split the Attorney General’s dual function as legal adviser to the government and chief public prosecutor.
Supporters note that several democracies separate those roles. But Israel’s institutional structure is unusual, and that the Attorney General has long served as one of the principal safeguards against executive abuse. This office, critics contend, is essential in a country that has no constitution, no bicameral parliament, no federal structure, and no legislators beholden to voters directly instead of party leadership.
Weakening that office becomes especially troubling when the sitting prime minister remains on trial.
At the same time, the coalition has advanced legislation that would weaken legal advisers to cabinet ministers. Right now, those advisers must answer primarily to professional legal standards. The coalition wants them to become substantially more accountable to the ministers themselves — transforming lawyers whose job is to prevent unlawful government action into political employees expected to facilitate it.
All these bills are related to Netanyahu’s wider effort to weaken Israel’s judiciary in 2023, which sparked a spasm of protests that ended only with the Oct. 7 Hamas invasion and massacre. If Netanyahu wins another term in office in October, expect the most contentious parts of that overhaul to be revived, including a massive politicization of judicial appointments, and an “override” allowing parliament to overrule judicial decisions.
The Oct. 7 inquiry
Also related to the judicial overhaul — although it may not appear to be — is the inquiry over Israel’s security and intelligence failures on Oct. 7.
Rather than establishing the traditional independent state commission chaired by a retired Supreme Court justice, the coalition has promoted a political alternative — which is part and parcel of its efforts to undermine the Supreme Court by painting it as a tool of the liberal opposition.
Under the government’s proposal, which last week passed the first of three required readings, the inquiry would be made up equally by coalition and opposition supporters, but controlled by the coalition. That is meant to sound fair, but it politicizes the procedure by definition, and guarantees that findings would be disputed.
The principle is simple: A government should not exercise decisive influence over investigations into their own failures. The very purpose of an independent inquiry is to establish facts without interference by political interests. That is what happened in the wake of previous government failures, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre in Lebanon.
This trick comes after years in which Netanyahu insisted that no commission could exist while warfare continued, which raised concerns that this incentivized a forever war. At the same time, the Netanyahu social media machine has promoted the so-called “internal betrayal” conspiracy theory, claiming Israel’s security establishment purposely allowed the massacre in order to harm Netanyahu — a baseless claim that about a third of Israelis now actually believe. This, too, factors into Netanyahu’s culture war. Inciting against the security establishment, set up by Israel’s founding generations to be apolitical, is key to his plan to establish an autocracy.
In the background is the precedent set by the government last week when the cabinet announced that it would refuse to recognize the practical consequences of a binding Supreme Court ruling involving the Second Authority for Television and Radio. The move — again seemingly arcane — created a shocking precedent for future refusals to heed court challenges of all the above reforms and decisions.
That’s the real point of this plan: to set up the coming election as a battle between elected politicians and the court. If the Supreme Court strikes down any of this legislation while Netanyahu remains in power, he will spin their rulings to try and further delegitimize them, and entrench his own rule.
The good news is that Israel’s democratic traditions run deep. During the 2023 protests, millions of Israelis demonstrated that they are prepared to defend liberal democratic institutions with extraordinary persistence. And opposition leaders have vowed to repeal all these laws should they win the October election.
Netanyahu’s coalition has devoted enormous political capital not to rebuilding shattered public confidence, but rather to reshaping the institutions designed to hold them accountable. That is why Israelis must understand that what’s at stake isn’t one or two offputting laws. It’s about nothing less than whether Israel will remain a democracy.
The post A last-ditch effort to dismantle Israeli democracy appeared first on The Forward.
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The past engagement of Yiddish with Communism and its legacy today
דער „אינטערנאַציאָנאַלער אַרבעטער אָרדן“ איז געװען אַ מין יוצא־דופֿן צװישן אַמעריקאַנער עפֿנטלעכע און פּאָליטישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, צום גרויסן טייל — צוליב זײַן פֿילשפּראַכיקײט. ער האָט געהאַט ניט ווייניקער ווי זעכצן שפּראַך־בראַנזשעס פֿאַר פֿאַרשײדענע אמיגראַנטישע עדות. זײַן הױפּטצװעק איז געװען צו באַזאָרגן אַרבעטער מיט פֿינאַנציעלער פֿאַרזיכערונג און העלפֿן זײ אין זײער קאַמף פֿאַר בירגערלעכע און פּאָליטישע רעכט.
דער אָרדן האָט אויך געהאַט אַ ספּעציעלע בראַנזשע פֿאַר אַפֿריקאַנער אַמעריקאַנער ווײַל דער ענין פֿון ראַסע־יושרדיקײט איז געװען פּונקט אַזױ חשובֿ װי אַלע אַנדערע באַוועגונגען פֿאַר גערעכטיקייט.
די מחברים פֿונעם זאַמלבוך „פֿונעם פֿאָלקספֿראָנט צו דער קאַלטער מלחמה“, רעדאַקטירט פֿון עליסאַ סאַמפּסאָן און ראָבערט זעקער, באַהאַנדלען די טעטיקײט פֿון צוויי בראַנזשעס אינעם „אָרדן“: דער ייִדישער און דער אַפֿריקאַנער־אַמעריקאַנער. דאָס רובֿ פֿאָרשונגען אינעם בוך שעפּן מאַטעריאַל פֿון דער אַרכיװאַלער זאַמלונג בײַם קאָרנעל־אוניװערסיטעט.
דער אָרדן איז געגרינדט געוואָרן אין 1930. נאָך דער פּאָליטישער שפּאַלטונג אינעם ייִדישן „אַרבעטער רינג“, האָבן אַרום 500 מיטגלידער פֿאַרלאָזט די אָרגאַניזאַציע און געשאַפֿן אַן אײגענע פּאָליטישע גרופּע, באַקאַנט ווי „די לינקע“. די דאָזיקע גרופּע איז געװאָרן די ייִדישע בראַנזשע אינעם נײַעם „אינטערנאַציאָנאַלן אַרבעטער אָרדן“.
פֿון סאַמע אָנהײב איז דער אָרדן געװען נאָענט פֿאַרבונדן מיט דער אַמעריקאַנער קאָמוניסטישער פּאַרטײ, און די פּאָליטישע ליניע פֿון דער דאָזיקער פּאַרטײ איז דיקטירט געװאָרן פֿונעם קאָמוניסטישן אינטערנאַציאָנאַל אין מאָסקװע.
אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָט סטאַלין בדעה געהאַט צו שאַפֿן אַ ברײטן פֿאָלקספֿראָנט (פּאָפּולערן פֿראָנט), װאָס זאָל אַרײַננעמען כּלערלײ פּראָגרעסיװע אָבער ניט אױסגעשפּראָכן קאָמוניסטישע קולטורעלע, עפֿנטלעכע און פּראָפֿעסיאָנעלע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, כּלומרשט ניט קײן קאָמוניסטישע, אָבער סימפּאַטעטישע פֿאַרן סאָװעטן פֿאַרבאַנד.
דער אָרדן איז געװען אַזאַ מין אָרגאַניזאַציע. ער האָט צוגעצױגן מאַסן אַרבעטער, דער עיקר אימיגראַנטן, צוליב צוטריטלעכע פֿאַרזיכערונגען און פֿאַרשײדענע אַקטיװיטעטן אױף זײערע שפּראַכן.
לרובֿ זײַנען די מיטגלידער ניט געװען קײן קאָמוניסטן און האָבן געהאַט אַ קנאַפּן אינטערעס אין דער קאָמוניסטישער אידעאָלאָגיע, הגם די אָנפֿירער פֿונעם אָרדן, אַזעלכע װי משה אָלגין, זײַנען טאַקע יאָ געװען פּאַרטײ־מיטגלידער.
דערבײַ האָט די אַמעריקאַנער קאָמוניסטישע פּאַרטײ ניט געװאָלט שאַפֿן אַן אײַנדרוק, אַז זי איז אַן אָרגאַניזאַציע פֿון אימיגראַנטן. דערפֿאַר האָט די פּאַרטײ ניט אונטערגעהאַלטן נאָענטע באַציִונגען מיטן אָרדן.
אָפֿיציעל האָט די פּאַרטײ באַװיליקט די קולטורעלע און לינגװיסטישע אַמעריקאַניזאַציע פֿון אימיגראַנטן, בעת דער אָרדן האָט געפֿירט די אַרבעט אױף די שפּראַכן פֿון זײַנע מיטגלידער: ייִדיש, איטאַליעניש, פֿיניש, סלאָװאַקיש, פּױליש און אַנדערע, און דערבײַ אַ ביסל אָפּגעשוואַכט זײער אַסימילאַציע.
די פּראָ־סאָװעטישע פּאָליטיק פֿונעם אָרדן אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָט ניט דערלאָזט זײַנע ייִדישע מיטגלידער מיטאַרבעטן מיט אַנדערע ייִדישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס, בפֿרט ציוניסטישע. דאָס האָט זיך אָבער געביטן בעת דער צװײטער װעלט־מלחמה, שרײַבט סאַמפּסאָן. אַ היפּשע ראָלע האָט דערבײַ געשפּילט דער באַזוך פֿון די אָנפֿירער פֿונעם מאָסקװער ייִדישן אַנטי־פֿאַשיסטישן קאָמיטעט שלמה מיכאָעלס און איציק פֿעפֿער אין אַמעריקע אין 1943. פֿעפֿער האָט ספּעציעל באַזוכט דעם קעמפּ „קינדערלאַנד“.
צוליב דער נײַער „אַחדות“־פּאָליטיק איז די ייִדישע בראַנזשע פֿונעם אָרדן אַרײַנגענומען געװאָרן אין דער הױפּטשטראָמיקער „אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישער קאָנפֿערענץ“, װוּ זי האָט מיטגעאַרבעט אַפֿילו מיט די ציוניסטן.
אין 1944 איז די ייִדישע בראַנזשע געװאָרן אַ מין אומאָפּהענגיקע אָרגאַניזאַציע — דער „ייִדישער פֿראַטערנאַלער פֿאָלקס־אָרדן“. דער נײַער אָרדן האָט זיך דערװײַטערט פֿון זײַן קאָמוניסטישן עיזבֿון און זיך אָפּגעגעבן, דער עיקר, מיט ייִדישע ענינים. נאָך 1945 האָבן זײ זיך אָפּגעגעבן מיט דער הילף פֿאַר דער שארית־הפּליטה אין אײראָפּע.
די קאַלטע מלחמה איז געװען אַ טאָפּלטע מפּלה. אין אַמעריקע האָבן זיך אָנגעהױבן רדיפֿות אױף קאָמוניסטן, בעת אינעם סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד האָט סטאַלין צו נישט געמאַכט די גאַנצע ייִדישע קולטור. סוף־כּל־סוף איז דער אַמעריקאַנער „פֿאָלקס־אָרדן“ ליקװידירט געװאָרן אין 1955.
בילדונג איז געװען אַ װיכטיקער טײל פֿון זייער פּאָליטישער אַרבעט. אין 1926 האָבן די לינקע ייִדישיסטן אין ניו־יאָרק געשאַפֿן דעם „ייִדישן אַרבעטער אוניװערסיטעט“, װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו דערציִען אַ נײַעם דור פּאָליטישע אַקטיװיסטן, װאָס זאָלן זײַן באַהאַװנט סײַ אין דער ייִדישער קולטור און סײַ אין דער מאַרקסיסטישער טעאָריע.
דאָס איז געװען „אײנע פֿון די אַנשטאַלטן אינעם גערעם פֿונעם ברײטערן פּראָיעקט פֿון ייִדישע קאָמוניסטן צו שאַפֿן אַן אײגענע קולטור־װעלט“, שרײַבט דילאַן קאַופֿמאַן־אָבסטלער. צו דעם דאָזיקן פּראָיעקט האָבן געהערט אױך קעמפּ „קינדערלאַנד“, דער װױנונג־קאָאָפּעראַטיװ אין דער בראָנקס — די „אַמאַלגאַמייטעד“ — און די קאָמוניסטישע צײַטונג „מאָרגן־פֿרײַהײט“.
אַלע ייִדישע קאָמוניסטישע פּראָיעקטן, און דער אוניװערסיטעט בתוכם, האָבן געהאַט אַן אינערלעכע סתּירה אין זײער תּוך. פֿון אײן זײַט איז זײער ציל געװען אָפּצוהיטן ייִדיש און די װעלטלעכע ייִדישע קולטור אינעם אַמעריקאַנער „שמעלצטאָפּ“. פֿון דער אַנדערער זײַט האָט מען געגלױבט אינעם אַלװעלטלעכן קאָמוניסטישן אינטערנאַציאָנאַל אָן קײן שום נאַציאָנאַלע גרענעצן.
די דאָזיקע סתּירה האָט גורם געװען שפּאַנונגען אין דער ייִדישער קאָמוניסטישער סבֿיבֿה. אין די 1930ער יאָרן זײַנען זײ נאָך געװען ביכולת צו געפֿינען אַ פּשרה. מען האָט געטענהט, אַז ייִדיש איז געװען דער סאַמע פּאַסיקסטער מיטל צו פֿאַרשפּרײטן קאָמוניסטישע אידעען בײַ די ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן.
אָבער די דאָזיקע סתּירה איז געװאָרן נאָך שאַרפֿער בעת דער צװײטער װעלט־מלחמה, װען די טראַגעדיע פֿונעם ייִדישן חורבן איז געװאָרן װיכטיקער פֿאַר אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן אײדער דער קאָמוניסטישער חלום.
װי אַקטועל איז די דאָזיקע געשיכטע װעגן דעם שידוך צװישן ייִדישקײט און קאָמוניזם פֿאַרן הײַנטיקן פּאָליטישן סדר־היום? אין די 1930ער יאָרן האָבן ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן פֿון מזרח־אײראָפּע לרובֿ געהערט צו דעם אַרבעטער־קלאַס. זײ האָבן נאָך געהאַט זײער שפּראַך, ייִדיש, און פֿאַרמאָגט אַ שטאַרקע עטנישע אידענטיטעט. דערצו האָבן זײ געליטן פֿון אַנטיסעמיטיזם, װאָס איז געװען פֿאַרשפּרײט, דער עיקר, צװישן װײַסע אַמעריקאַנער נאַציאָנאַליסטן. אױף דעם דאָזיקן יסוד האָט מען געקענט בױען אַ ברײטע מאַסן־באַװעגונג, װאָס זאָל פֿאַראײניקן אימיגראַנטן און די אַפֿריקאַנער אַמעריקאַנער.
דער איצטיקער מצבֿ איז אַנדערש. הײַנט געהערן ייִדן אין אַמעריקע לרובֿ צו דעם מיטלשטאַנד, און זײער עטנישער אָפּשטאַם איז אַן ענין פֿאַר נאָסטאַלגישע מעשׂיות. אָבער זײער סאָציאַלער אױפֿקום האָט ניט בטל געמאַכט דעם אַנטיסעמיטיזם.
נאָך מער, הײַנט איז אַנטיסעמיטיזם פֿאַרשפּרײט אי בײַ די רעכטע „מאַגאַ“־נאַצינאַליסטן אי בײַ די ראַדילאַקע לינקע. כּדי צו װערן אַן „אײגענער“ בײַ די לינקע, מוז אַ ייִדישער אַקטיװיסט זיך אָפּלײקענען פֿון ציוניזם און מדינת־ישׂראל.
דאָ קומט צו נוץ די אַלטע ירושה פֿונעם ייִדישיסטישן קאָמוניזם. מען זעט דערין אַ מין אַלטערנאַטיװע ייִדישקײט, װאָס איז אי פּראָגרעסיװ אי אַנטי־ציוניסטיש. אָבער װי אַזױ קען מען מחיה־מתים זײַן די לעבעדיקע ייִדישע סבֿיבֿה פֿון יענער תּקופֿה? אין יענע יאָרן האָבן די ייִדן — ניט געקוקט אױף זייערע טיפֿע פּאָליטישע חילוקי־דעות —פֿאָרט געהאַט אַ וויכטיקע זאַך בשותּפֿות: די אײגענע שפּראַך און קולטור.
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‘The Winter’s Tale’ is one of Shakespeare’s most confounding plays; was it also his most Jewish?
We all know about Shakespeare’s anti-Jewish play. But did he also write a Jewish play? Well, not explicitly or consciously, but The Winter’s Tale, which begins performances July 25 at the Public Theater’s Delacorte Theater in Central Park, appears to be full of Jewish motifs — themes from the Hebrew Bible (filtered through the Christian Bible, of course).
The play is a tale of exile, the abandonment of a child, years in the wilderness, repentance, homecoming and redemption. It is reminiscent at least in part of the stories of Moses in Egypt and the Exodus, as well as Joseph and his brothers.
Daniel Sullivan, the play’s director at the Delacorte, told me over the phone that he thought the biblical connection was an interesting idea — “certainly a possibility,” he said. Sullivan, 86, was less certain whether Shakespeare had explored these biblical themes “knowledgeably or whether it was something he simply shared” with the time. A version of those themes can be found, for example, in the source of the play’s plot, the 1588 tragic pastoral romance novella Pandosto: The Triumph of Time by Robert Greene.
Scholars have written about these biblical allusions. But The Winter’s Tale is of course about much more than that. “I’ve always been amazed by it,” Sullivan said. “It’s a play that’s sort of impossible. It’s a difficult piece in terms of both its tragic and comic elements. But it’s also one of the most moving of all of Shakespeare’s plays and one of the most human.”
The play’s first half lurches into utter Shakespearean tragedy, then miraculously changes direction and turns into Shakespearean comedy. Leontes, king of Sicilia, becomes insanely jealous, believing his pregnant wife, Hermione, has been unfaithful with his longtime and childhood friend, the king of Bohemia. He imprisons her, she gives birth in prison, she is tried and collapses in court and it is announced that she has died.
Leontes and Hermione’s young son, Mamillius, dies of grief. Leontes exiles his newborn daughter, who is taken to the kingdom of Bohemia, where she is abandoned and discovered by a shepherd, who raises her as his own. Sixteen years pass before she returns to Sicilia, as the play begins its surprising metamorphosis. Hermione — magically — reappears and there is an (almost) happy denouement.
The opening part of the play is an intensely detailed —especially for the time it was written — example of irrational psychology, of Leontes’ jealousy and delusion — it is, Sullivan said, “very challenging” to direct.
And then, when you think all will be lost, as in King Lear, or Hamlet, or Othello, the playwright reverses the course of his tragic source material. (Things do not end happily for King Pandosto of Pandosto.)
Why does Sullivan think Shakespeare decided to veer away from his play’s, and Pandosto’s, disastrous path? One possibility, he said, is that Shakespeare could see that he could create “a fantastical element in it — that for 16 years Hermione has been hiding somewhere.” (In Pandosto the queen just dies.) “It’s sort of wonderfully out there in terms of a plot device. And I think that Shakespeare gloried in that. It goes from extremely tragic to very charming, and there aren’t a lot of Shakespeare’s plays that are like that,” Sullivan said.
But there’s something else. The play is, after all, a tale of redemption and forgiveness. It’s a late play, written around 1609-1611 — Shakespeare died in 1616 — and, Sullivan said, the play’s late birth perhaps had something to with its theme. “I think whether he knew the end was coming or not, certainly the idea of redemption is sort of the undergirding of this play.”
Even so, the ending is not a completely happy one. Mamillius, the royal family’s son, does not return. “That’s one of the elements of the play that Shakespeare buries a little bit,” Sullivan said.
Could Shakespeare have been thinking of his own young son, Hamnet, who died of the plague at age 11? “I think that’s probably true,” said Sullivan.
Still, Sullivan has managed in a way to bring back the king’s son. “One of the things we do with this,” he said, “is when the character of Time comes out to tell us what’s happened,” that 16 years have passed in the story, “we actually use the character of Mamillius as a sort of angel to tell us.”
Sullivan has been directing professionally for more than a half-century and has helmed more than 30 plays on Broadway. He won the directing Tony Award for David Auburn’s Proof in 2001, and has received seven other Tony nominations. He is also very much a Shakespeare maven. This is his 12th production for Free Shakespeare in the Park.
Directing Shakespeare has long been, and remains, special for Sullivan. “ I just love being around it more than anything else,” he said. “I love getting deeply into it, and researching it as much as I possibly can. I’ve done a lot of the plays more than once, and every time I come back to them they always seem completely different to me. I think about my own life and, in the way that I see things differently than I did 20 years ago, I see these plays differently.”
The Winter’s Tale contains perhaps the most famous stage direction in all of Shakespeare — “Exit, pursued by a bear.” This summer, will the Delacorte, long a home to scene-stealing raccoons, bear witness to a much larger stage creature?
“The one thing I really didn’t want to do was have a man in a bear suit chasing the actor across the stage. It’s just too funny. It’s possible that Shakespeare wanted it to be rather comic. But we find it rather tragic. So we’re doing it in a way that I think will be somewhat surprising. I’m not going to tell you. People will have to come and see.”
Performances of The Winter’s Tale run through Aug. 23 at the Delacorte.
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