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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel
(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided.
“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”
Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.
Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.
Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own, he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.
Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, “We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves.
Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel.
“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.”
Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations.
So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?
There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways.
Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.
The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis.
What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”
With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.
You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity.
More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means.
Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.
The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism.
Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)
One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal.
Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors.
The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?
The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth.
If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.
Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation.
Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.
So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?
For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction.
So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else.
And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.
I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.
Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.
An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)
You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?
I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant.
I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons.
That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen.
As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?
No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.
Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that.
So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.
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University of Toronto Jewish Studies Department Targeted With Anti-Israel Posters
Students walk outside one of the exam buildings on the campus of the University of Toronto in Toronto, Canada, on Dec. 13, 2025. Photo: Mike Campbell via Reuters Connect
Agitators at the University of Toronto kicked off the new academic year by tacking posters promoting anti-Israel propaganda near the Jewish Studies Department, continuing to fuel concerns of a hostile environment for Jews and Israelis.
The posters accused Israel of being a “colonial settler state” and claimed that Israeli officials have uttered the falsehood themselves. According to The J.CA, an online Jewish media outlet, the posters also came with QR codes linked to a website containing atrocity propaganda regarding Israel’s conduct in the war with Hamas in Gaza.
“Some claims reference the destruction of universities and the deaths of academics and students, without attribution to independent or verifiable sources,” the outlet said. “Several QR codes direct viewers to advocacy materials calling for political action against Israel.”
Speaking to The J.CA, a local Jewish organization said, “Posting highly charged political material outside Jewish Studies is not neutral. It sends a message to Jewish students that their academic spaces are contested and that their identity is inseparable from geopolitical accusations.”
The Algemeiner reached out to the University of Toronto for comment and is waiting to hear back.
The school previously faced antisemitic incidents and came under fire for refusing, in response, to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which is widely used by governments, corporations, and nonprofits around the world.
According to the definition, antisemitism “is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It provides 11 specific, contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere. Beyond classic antisemitic behavior associated with the likes of the medieval period and Nazi Germany, the examples include denial of the Holocaust and newer forms of antisemitism targeting Israel such as demonizing the Jewish state, denying its right to exist, and holding it to standards not expected of any other democratic state.
In 2022, the university said it believes that IHRA’s definition “is both insufficiently responsive to many of the most troubling instances of antisemitism in the university context and in tension with the university as a place where difficult and controversial questions are addressed.” It added that “protecting these freedoms is essential to our university’s mandate and mission of discovery, research and education, which can only thrive in an environment of free expression and critical inquiry.”
Critics have argued the IHRA definition unfairly categorizes criticism of Israel as antisemitic. Proponents counter that the definition makes a clear distinction between legitimate criticism of the Israeli government and efforts to demonize and delegitimize the world’s only Jewish state. According to research and civil rights groups, anti-Israel animus has motivated an increasingly significant percentage of antisemitic incidents, especially following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel.
The University of Toronto has witnessed multiple examples of such outrages in recent years.
In 2021, for example, a student union at the Scarborough Campus passed a resolution which called for sourcing kosher food from providers that do not support Israel, a measure which would have effectively banned kosher food on campus, while a second motion was stripped of language proposed to protect Jewish students. The measure also endorsed the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign — and, in another provision that would have marginalized Jews, pledged to “refrain from engaging with organizations, services, or participating in events that further normalize Israeli apartheid.”
Earlier that year, the University of Toronto Students’ Union (UTSU) voted to sign an open letter accusing Israel of “genocide and demanding the cancellation of trips to Israel. Then in February 2022, it endorsed a motion linked to the BDS campaign against Israel.
Campus antisemitism continues to affect Jewish faculty, students, and staff at colleges across Canada.
In November, a pro-Hamas mob spilled blood and caused the hospitalization of at least one Jewish student at Toronto Metropolitan University after forcibly breaching a venue in which the advocacy group Students Supporting Israel had convened for an event featuring veterans of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
The former soldiers agreed to meet Students Supporting Israel (SSI) to discuss their experiences at a “private space” on campus which had to be reserved because TMU denied the group a room reservation and, therefore, security personnel that would have been afforded to it. However, someone leaked the event location, leading to one of the most violent incidents of campus antisemitism since Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel sparked a surge of anti-Jewish hostility in higher education.
Six suspects, including Qabil Ibrahim, 26, were ultimately arrested on suspicion of being involved in the incident and appeared in court this month.
Canadian Jews have been hit by a wave of antisemitic incidents, with at least 32 reported across five provinces in just the past week alone, according to data collected by the Jewish advocacy group B’nai Brith.
“Antisemitism in Canada is now accelerating at an increasing rate, spreading across provinces, platforms, and public spaces. That is a warning signal, and it demands more than piecemeal reactions” the group wrote on Wednesday in a letter urging Prime Minister Mark Carney to create a Royal Commission that would explore the problem and draft policy proposals for solving it.
According to the group’s latest audit of antisemitism in Canada released last year, antisemitic incidents in 2024 rose 7.4 percent from 2023, with 6,219 adding up to the highest total recorded since it began tracking such data in 1982. Seventeen incidents occurred on average every day, while online antisemitism exploded a harrowing 161 percent since 2022. As standalone provinces, Quebec and Alberta saw the largest percentage increases, by 215 percent and 160 percent, respectively.
According to the report, incidents included someone firing a gun at a Jewish school for girls in Toronto, Ontario; a man trying to burn down the Tzedeck Synagogue in Vancouver, British Columbia; and a newspaper in Quebec depicting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as the vampire Nosferatu, a Nazi-era trope.
“We cannot permit this to become normalized,” B’nai Brith Canada research and advocacy director Richard Robertson said in a statement. “Antisemitism is not only a threat to Jews — it represents a total repudiation of Canadian values. Those who foment hate against any marginalized group stand in direct opposition to our multicultural, diverse national identity.”
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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Iranian Regime Crackdown Went Beyond Protesters, Hitting Bystanders Too, Witnesses Say
People attend the funeral of the security forces who were killed in the protests that erupted over the collapse of the currency’s value in Tehran, Iran, Jan. 14, 2026. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
Art student Arash was walking home through the streets of Tehran when a shotgun blast ended his life. He had not shouted slogans, joined protesters, or raised a fist.
A friend, speaking by telephone from the Iranian capital, described the moment in a voice cracking with grief: Arash fell instantly, lifeless on the pavement. He was 22.
The friend, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to fear for his security, said they had paused on the sidewalk to watch a protest in nearby Vanak Square when security forces in black uniforms arrived and began firing randomly toward the demonstrators.
Arash’s death on Jan. 8 is an example of what witnesses say has been a reality of the country’s latest anti-government protests — bystanders uninvolved in the unrest caught in gunfire, or killed as they tried to flee the chaos.
Reuters was unable to independently verify this account or similar witness reports of deaths during the state’s crackdown on the unrest, and could not determine how many of the thousands killed were bystanders or people merely near the protests when they were shot.
But accounts from families and witnesses suggest that indiscriminate force used by security forces to crush the unrest killed many civilians who were not participating, leaving relatives to scour hospitals, morgues, and detention centers for answers.
UNLAWFUL LETHAL FORCE USED IN IRAN, AMNESTY REPORTS
Officials in Iran could not be reached for comment about the deaths described in this story as authorities began blocking telephone lines and internet connections from Jan. 8, when protests spread nationwide. From Jan. 13, Iranians have been able to make outgoing international phone calls, while calls into the country remain blocked.
There was no immediate response to requests for comment sent to the Iranian UN missions in Geneva and New York.
Authorities have blamed the unrest and deaths on “terrorists and rioters” backed by exiled opponents and foreign adversaries, the United States and Israel. State TV aired footage of burned police and government buildings, mosques and smashed banks it said had been attacked by “terrorists and rioters.”
The US-based HRANA rights group said it has so far verified 4,519 unrest-linked deaths, including 4,251 protesters, 197 security personnel, 35 people aged under 18 and 38 bystanders who it says were neither protesters nor security personnel.
HRANA has 9,049 additional deaths under review. An Iranian official told Reuters the confirmed death toll until Sunday was more than 5,000, including 500 members of the security forces.
The protests began on Dec. 28 as modest demonstrations in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar over economic hardship and quickly spread nationwide.
INDISCRIMINATE FIRE REPORTED BY WITNESSES
Within days crowds in cities and towns were calling for an end to clerical rule, and state TV showed footage of what it called “rioters” burning images of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Amnesty International said in a report it had documented security forces positioned on streets, rooftops — including those of residential buildings, mosques, and police stations — repeatedly firing rifles and shotguns loaded with metal pellets, often aiming at unarmed individuals’ heads and torsos.
It said the evidence points to a coordinated nationwide escalation in the security forces’ unlawful use of lethal force against mostly peaceful protesters and bystanders since the evening of Jan. 8.
The unrest has posed one of the gravest threats to Iran’s clerical establishment in years, with US President Donald Trump repeatedly threatening to intervene if protesters continued to be killed on the streets or were executed.
Iran‘s judiciary has indicated that execution of those detained during protests may go ahead.
Numerous accounts from inside Iran, including from people who have since left the country, said security forces fired live ammunition indiscriminately, turning streets — particularly on Ja. 8 and 9 — into what witnesses likened to war zones.
Among the victims was Fariba, a 16-year-old girl described by her mother, Manijeh, as curious and full of life.
On a night when she went with her mother to a nearby square simply to observe, security forces on motorcycles attacked the protesters.
‘THEY KILLED MY CHILD,’ SAYS MOTHER OF 16-YEAR-OLD
Manijeh clutched her daughter’s hand and sought shelter behind a parked car amid the gunfire. In the ensuing panic, she lost her grip and mother and daughter became separated.
“I searched street after street, screaming her name,” Manijeh recounted, sobbing over the phone. “She was gone.”
That night, the family scoured police stations and hospitals. They found Fariba two days later in a black body bag inside the Kahrizak Forensic Medical Center in south Tehran, shot in the heart, her body cold.
Officials told the family that “terrorists” had killed her.
“No,” her mother said. “I was there that night. The security forces opened fire on people. They killed my child.”
Videos on social media showed footage of families searching for their relatives among hundreds of body bags in morgues and the Kahrizak Center. Reuters verified the location of the videos as Kahrizak Center, although the identity of the people and the date when the videos were filmed could not be verified.
A physician who left Iran on Jan. 14 said hospitals were overwhelmed with gunshot victims. In Karaj, west of Tehran, a resident described security forces deploying automatic rifles against protesters and bystanders on Jan. 8.
Similar accounts emerged from the western city of Kermanshah, where Revolutionary Guards used armored vehicles and tanks to contain demonstrations.
‘THEY SMASHED DOORS, CURSING,’ SAYS BROTHER OF MISSING WOMAN
In Isfahan, the brother of a 43-year-old man recounted holding his sibling’s blood-soaked body after security forces shot him. “His only act was sheltering teenage protesters fleeing into his shop,” said Masoud, 38, by telephone.
Like other Iranians interviewed for this story, Masoud asked for his full name to be withheld for fear of reprisals.
In another case, the family of Nastaran, a 28-year-old elementary school teacher in Tehran, spent days searching for her after she visited a cousin on Jan. 9 and never returned.
They found her body in a warehouse near Tehran. She had been shot by security forces, said Nastaran’s father.
Authorities allowed retrieval only on condition of burial in the family’s hometown in central Iran and pressured them to blame “terrorists” — a claim the relatives rejected, he said.
Another family in the northern city of Rasht said security forces stormed their apartment after spotting their 33-year-old daughter, Sepideh, watching protests from a window.
“They smashed doors, cursing and yelling. They detained her. We don’t know where she is,” said Morteza, her brother.
“My sister’s two young children cry for her; her husband has been warned of arrest if he keeps searching for her.”
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Trump Warns Hamas: Give Up Weapons or Be ‘Blown Away’
Palestinian Hamas terrorists stand guard at a site as Hamas says it continues to search for the bodies of deceased hostages, in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip, Dec. 3, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Stringer
US President Donald Trump on Wednesday warned Hamas will be “blown away” if the Palestinian terrorist group doesn’t agree to disarm in accordance with his 20-point peace plan to end the war in Gaza.
It should be clear within three weeks whether Hamas will agree to give up its weapons, Trump added.
“That’s what they agreed to. They’ve got to do it. And we’re going to know … over the next two or three days — certainly over the next three weeks — whether or not they’re going to do it,” he said in a question-and-answer session following his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos.
“If they don’t do it, they’ll be blown away very quickly. They’ll be blown away, Trump added.
His comments came one week after US special envoy Steve Witkoff announced the launch of phase two of Trump’s plan to end the conflict in Gaza, describing the process as “moving from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”
Witkoff also warned Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that ruled Gaza before the war and still controls nearly half the enclave’s territory, to remain committed to the terms of the agreement.
“Phase Two establishes a transitional technocratic Palestinian administration in Gaza, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), and begins the full demilitarization and reconstruction of Gaza, primarily the disarmament of all unauthorized personnel,” Witkoff posted on social media. “The US expects Hamas to comply fully with its obligations, including the immediate return of the final deceased hostage. Failure to do so will bring serious consequences.”
Under phase one of Trump’s peace plan, a ceasefire took effect and Hamas was required to release all remaining hostages, both living and deceased, who were kidnapped by Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists during the group’s invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.
Everyone was released except for Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, the last remaining slain hostage in Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly spoke last week with Gvili’s parents, who have adamantly opposed moving to the second phase of Trump’s plan until their son’s body is returned.
Gvili’s return “is at the top of Israel’s priorities,” Netanyahu’s office said in a statement, according to the Times of Israel. “Hamas is required to comply with the terms of the agreement and make a 100% effort to return all fallen hostages, until the very last one — Ran Gvili, a hero of Israel.”
In exchange for Hamas’s releasing nearly all the hostages, Israel freed thousands of Palestinian prisoners, including many serving life sentences for terrorism, and partially withdrew its military forces in Gaza to a newly drawn “Yellow Line,” roughly dividing the enclave between east and west.
Currently, the Israeli military controls 58 percent of Gaza’s territory, and Hamas has moved to reestablish control over the rest of the enclave. However, most of the Gazan population is located in the Hamas-controlled portion, where the Islamist group has been imposing a brutal crackdown.
The second stage of the US-backed peace plan is supposed to establish an interim administrative authority, a so-called “technocratic government,” deploy an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to oversee security in Gaza, and begin the demilitarization of Hamas.
However, Hamas has repeatedly refused to disarm, despite the plan’s call for the terrorist group to do so and relinquish any governing role in Gaza. Further Israeli military withdrawals are tied to Hamas’s disarmament.
Still, the peace plan is moving forward with a transitional technocratic Palestinian administration in Gaza. The newly established 15-member body is led by Ali Shaath, a former deputy minister in the Palestinian Authority.
The Palestinian technocratic body will be overseen by an international Board of Peace to govern Gaza for a transitional period. Nickolay Mladenov, a former UN Middle East envoy, will represent the board on the ground. Other members tapped by Mladenov include people from the private sector and NGOs.
It’s unclear how many total members will be on the Board of Peace. Trump has invited dozens of world leaders to join the US-led initiative, which he would chair and would initially seek to end the conflict in Gaza but then tackle wars elsewhere.
Since the start of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in October, both sides have repeatedly accused each other of violations. Israel has carried out several operations targeting terrorist operatives as the Palestinian group ramps up efforts to reassert control over the war-torn enclave.
Efforts to advance the ceasefire deal have stalled, with no agreement on crucial next steps, including the start of reconstruction in the enclave and the deployment of the ISF.
The international force is supposed to oversee the Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, train local security forces, secure Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt, and protect civilians while maintaining humanitarian corridors.
Turkey, a longtime backer of Hamas, has been trying to expand its role in Gaza’s post-war reconstruction efforts, which experts warn could potentially strengthen Hamas’s terrorist infrastructure.
While Turkey insists on participating in the ISF, Israeli officials have repeatedly rejected any Turkish involvement in post-war Gaza.
Turkey will have a representative on the Board of Peace.