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What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel

(JTA) — Eric Alterman, born in 1960, says the view of Israel he absorbed growing up in a Jewish family in suburban Scarsdale, New York, was decidedly one-sided. 

“I went on this nerdy presidential classroom thing when I was in high school,” he recalls, “and some Christian kid from the South raised his hand and said to the rabbi, ‘I don’t get it, if the Jews could have a state, why can’t the Palestinians?’ And I was like, ‘How dare you?’”

Alterman would go on to attend Cornell University, where he wrote his honors thesis on Israel, Vietnam and neoconservatism; spend a semester abroad at Tel Aviv University; study Israeli military history while earning his master’s degree in international relations at Yale, and research a dissertation on American liberalism and the founding of Israel as a doctoral student at Stanford.

Although he frequently writes about Israel as a contributing writer at the Nation and the American Prospect, Alterman is best known for his liberal analysis of the media and U.S. politics. He’s written 11 previous books, including one on Bruce Springsteen.

Yet he never stopped thinking about the widening gap between the idealized Israel of his youth and the reality of its relations with the Palestinians, its Arab neighbors and the West. Even when Israel’s revisionist historians were uncovering evidence of massacres and forced expulsions of Palestinians during the War of Independence, and Israeli politicians and intellectuals began asking why, indeed, the Palestinians didn’t deserve a state of their own,  he saw that such discussions were considered blasphemous in most American Jewish circles.

Alterman, now a CUNY Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, explores that gap in his latest book, We Are Not One: A History of America’s Fight Over Israel.” The book surveys U.S.-Israel relations, but with a focus on the ways defending Israel have shaped public discourse. It’s a book about arguments: within the administrations of 14 presidents, between Washington and Jerusalem, and mostly among Jews themselves. 

Earlier this month we spoke about how the pro-Isael lobby became a powerful political force, the Jewish organizations and pundits who fight to limit the range of debate over Israel, and what he thinks is the high price American Jews have paid for tying their identities so closely to Israel. 

“I try to take on shibboleths that in the past have shut down conversation and take them apart and sympathetically show the complexity of the actual situation that lies beneath — so that [criticism and disagreement] over Israel can be understood rather than whisked away by changing the subject, or what-aboutism, or by demonizing the person who is raising them,” said Alterman.

Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Let me start by congratulating you: It’s the first book about U.S.-Israel relations with a chapter named after a Bruce Springsteen album: “Working on a Dream.” 

Eric Alterman: Nobody else has caught that. But it’s not about U.S.-Israel relations. It’s the first book about the debate over Israel in the United States. There’s a million books on U.S.-Israel relations. 

So let’s define that more narrowly. The title reminds me of the United Jewish Appeal slogan over the years, “We Are One,” which was about American Jewish solidarity. So who is the “we” in your title, “We Are Not One”?

There are three or four different meanings. The “we” in this book are obviously the United States and Israel. An awful lot of people argue that the United States and Israel have identical interests in the world and that’s crazy, because Israel is this tiny little country in the Middle East and we’re a global superpower thousands of miles away. So obviously, we’re going to have differences. Number two, American Jews and Israeli Jews are very different people. They have very different life experiences. And they see things quite differently as evidenced by the political split between them. The title also refers specifically just to Americans, because we can’t even discuss most things anymore. The pro-Israel community, such as it ever was, is enormously split and it’s split in angry ways. 

Much of your book is about what happens to American Jews when the idealized portrait of Israel’s founding and its presumed blamelessness in its actions toward the Palestinians comes up against reality. In that context, tell me a little about your choice to devote a chapter to the Leon Uris novel “Exodus,” an extremely sanitized version of Israel’s founding, and the 1960 movie based on it.

The influence of “Exodus” is something I didn’t understand until I wrote the book. It’s crazy, because Leon Uris was this egomaniac who wrote kind of a shitty book and said that he wanted to add a new chapter to the Bible, and he kind of succeeded. I was born in 1960. When I was growing up in suburban New York, every single family had “Exodus” on their shelves. When the movie came out Israelis understood this. They said, “We can just shut down our public relations office now.” And from the standpoint of reality the movie is worse than the book because it has Nazis — the Arabs in the book are working with Nazism. Uris didn’t have the nerve to do that. So the book created this idealized Israel and this idea of [Palestinians as] evil, subhuman Nazis. 

What most Americans don’t understand, or choose not to understand, is that before the 1940s most Jews were anti-Zionist, or non-Zionist. This changed in the 1940s, when, as a result in part of the Holocaust, and the reaction to that, and the triumph of Zionists, they became intensely pro-Zionist, leading up to the creation of Israel. But after that, they kind of forgot about Israel. One might have given their children JNF boxes to carry on Halloween instead of UNICEF boxes, or maybe they paid to plant trees. But Israel doesn’t show up in the American Jewish Committee’s 1966 annual report until page 35 or 36, and Nathan Glazer’s 1957 book “American Judaism” says that the creation of the Jewish state has had “remarkably slight effects on the inner life of American Jewry.”

With the events of 1967, Uris’ idealized notion of Israel came together with this terrible fear of a second Holocaust, and the terror and shame and frightening nature of that combined to transform American Judaism overnight to an enormous degree.

You are referring to Israel’s lightning victory in the Six-Day War, which even non-religious Jews saw as a kind of miracle, and redemption two decades after the Holocaust. And that transformation, you argue, put defense of Israel, combined with Holocaust consciousness, at the center of Jewish identity. 

More than just the center: It basically comprised almost all of it, for many secular Jews. I quote the neoconservative Irving Kristol in the book saying in 1976 that “the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel” was 100% of what Judaism means. 

Which in turn led to a the tremendous pro-Israel lobbying efforts, political activism and punditry.

The budgets of American Jewish organizations overnight went from social services and liberal social justice causes to defense of Israel. And rabbis were replaced at the center of public discourse by the heads of these organizations — most of whom had no religious training or knowledge of history or Judaism. 

Joe Biden, then vice president, speaks at the AIPAC 2016 Policy Conference in Washington, DC, March 20, 2016.
(Molly Riley/AFP via Getty Images)

One distinction you repeatedly make is between what most Jews believe compared to the Jewish organizations that claim to represent them. Surveys show the rank and file is consistently more liberal on Israel and less hawkish than the big organizations — a gap that showed up markedly around the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal

Right. The big mistake that so many in the media make is that they go to the heads of these organizations who pretend to speak for American Jews when they don’t speak for American Jews. They speak for their boards and their donors. 

The shift to Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel coincides with an era in which there is seldom daylight between what Israel wants and what the United States wants or agrees to — often to the frustration of presidents. You are critical of those who exaggerate the pro-Israel lobby’s influence — folks like Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, authors of the 2007 book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” — but, at the same time, you write, referring to the Israel debate in America, about “the continued stranglehold that money, power, organizational structure, and clearly defined paths to personal career advancement continue to hold over the shape of foreign policy.” How will you respond to critics who will say your book is trafficking in the myth of Jewish power and its conspiracy-minded hold over American policy?

The short answer is, that’s why I wrote a 500-page book — basically, for two reasons: One, everything is incredibly complicated. And some of those complications are consistent with antisemitic myths, and therefore they have to be teased out and broken down in such a way that you’re telling the truth rather than portraying the myth. 

If you say things without context, they sound antisemitic. I say that yes, Jews are very powerful in the media and many use that power on or about Israel. But I think if you lay out the examples that I use, if you look at them and examine them, I don’t see how you can conclude otherwise. The people I describe often say that about themselves — how much power and influence they yield.

Secondly, I’ve always found it just about impossible to discuss Israel with anyone, because you have to share exactly the same assumptions with that person. And if you don’t, then they take it personally, or you’re an antisemite, or, at best, you’re insufficiently sensitive to how important antisemitism is. And if you describe ways in which American Jews act in ways that are consistent with antisemitic myth, it has a way of shutting down the conversation. 

Undoubtedly there’s some criticism of Israel that is motivated by antisemitism, but there’s an awful lot of reasons to be critical of Israel, particularly if you are a Palestinian or care about Palestinians. This accusation [antisemitism] has shut down the discourse and part of my hopes in demonstrating the complexities of this history is to open this up.

So let me ask about your own stake in this. Your educational background and relationship to Israel are similar in many ways to the writers and thinkers in your book who tolerate no criticism of Israel. I don’t know if you call yourself a Zionist, but you have some connection to Israel, and you’re also willing to tolerate critiques of Israel. What’s the difference between you and some of the other people who went on the same journey?

For the longest time I was comfortable with the words “liberal Zionist,” but I don’t think they have any meaning anymore. I don’t think it’s possible to be a liberal Zionist — you have to choose. Israel is the only putatively democratic country that prefers Trump to either Obama or Biden, and it’s not even close. And young Israelis are moving further in that direction and young American Jews are moving further in the opposite direction. 

So you ask me if I am a liberal Zionist. I don’t think the word “Zionist” is useful at all anymore, because Israel is a country and it’s not going anywhere. I sometimes call myself an anti-anti-Zionist, because anti-Zionism is dumb. I’m very anti-BDS. If I thought [the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement] could end occupation, I would support it, even though the idea of boycotting Jews puts a bad taste in my mouth. But the theory behind BDS apparently, and I’ve spent a lot of time on this, is that the world will force Israel to give up its identity and turn the country over to its enemies. It’s inconceivable that Israel would do that and inconceivable the United States would pressure them to do that. So BDS is entirely performative. It’s more of a political fashion statement than anything else. 

And to me, it speaks to the failure of Palestinian politics throughout history. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Palestinians and their bad politics because it’s based on two problems. One is that they have never been able to see the future very well. So they should have agreed in 1921 and 1937, or whenever they would have had the majority and they were being given a country by the British. They should have taken the lousy offer from Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000. I kind of get it because they have so many competing constituencies, and it’s impossible to satisfy all of them at the same time. I understand that. It’s hard to imagine a Palestinian politician who could say yes, and if you look at Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in both cases, it’s hard to imagine making peace with them.

I read that in your book, and my first thought was, well, isn’t that basically just confirming what the pro-Israel right has always said — that Israel has no partner for peace? So maybe the best it can do is maintain a status quo that assures some security for Israel and a workable something for the Palestinians.

Well, number one I hold Israel significantly responsible for the conditions under which that has developed and that they can change those. And number two, that’s no excuse for the way Palestinians are treated, either in the occupation or in Israel. So yes, I agree. There’s no one to make peace with today, but there are many steps Israel could take that could vastly improve the lives of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel. And there are a lot of steps they could take that could build confidence for a future that could weaken Hamas, that could strengthen the Palestinian Authority, so that one day peace would be possible. But they do the opposite.

An Israel supporter at a New York rally to tell the United Nations “no more anti-Israel documents or resolutions,” Jan. 12, 2017. (Don Emmert/AFP via Getty Images)

You talk about funding of Israel studies and Jewish studies departments as a reaction against fears of a pro-Palestinian takeover of academia. At the same time, you write how Palestinian supporters “succeeded in colonizing Middle East studies departments, student faculty organizations, and far-left political organizations.” Why does that matter in the long run if, as you also write, nothing’s really going to change American policy on Israel?

I gave a talk before the book came out at Tel Aviv University and someone asked me that question. I said, You care about these transformations for two reasons. One, you really will be all alone in the world. You’ll have the support of conservative [Evangelical] Christians who are in many respects antisemitic and are using you for their own purposes. So if you lose American Jews, you will be existentially alone in a way you’re not now and that strikes me as very unpleasant. 

I do think that the quote-unquote pro-Israel community has a stranglehold on American politics that I can’t see changing anytime soon, and I think the change in the Democratic Party [that it will turn more pro-Palestinian] is very much exaggerated by both sides for their own reasons. 

That being said, the people who are being trained now to be in the State Department and the National Security Council and the Defense Department and the think tanks and the places where the intellectual foundation of U.S. policy is made are learning something very different from what you and I learned in college. Right now, there’s no such thing as an influential Palestinian lobby in this country. There’s no pushing back. There’s no percentage for anyone opposing Israel who has a career interest in the future. That will change, and the whole shaping of the discourse will change and that will change the relationship between the United States and Israel. It’s not going to happen anytime soon, but it’s definitely going to happen. 

As Jews in this country have remained largely liberal, Israel appears to be getting more illiberal, as we’ve seen with a new government that is more right-wing than any previously. And Israel has become more of a divisive element among Jews than a unifying force. As this gap appears to be widening, do you have any real hope for changing the discourse?

No, I don’t have any hopes for that. I don’t have anything optimistic to say about Israel. I think, politically speaking, from the standpoint of American Jews, everything is going in the wrong direction. But by demonstrating just how different Israeli Jews are than American Jews, and how little Israeli Jews care what American Jews think, I do think that it presents an opportunity for American Jews to think about what it means to be an American Jew in the Diaspora. Roughly half of the Jews in the world live in the United States. And since 1967 American Jews have defined themselves vicariously through Israeli Jews and taking pride in Israel. They expressed their identities by defending Israel and attacking the media when the media didn’t defend Israel.

Meanwhile, American Jews hardly ever go to synagogue. According to Pew, 20% of American Jews regularly attend synagogue and half of them are Orthodox, who are 10% of the community. What brought me back into Judaism was studying Torah. And hardly any American Jews are ever exposed to that. 

So I think there’s an opportunity to reimagine Diaspora Jewry now that the Israel story doesn’t work, and it’s clear that it doesn’t work. Young American Jews are leaving or voting with their feet. They’re walking away. Israel-centric Judaism is in part responsible, although it’s not the whole story. Intermarriage is a big part of the story. The de-religionization of all groups is part of the story. But personally, I don’t see what a liberal American Jew would see in a Judaism that defines itself as it has for the past 50 years as defending Israel and remembering the Holocaust.


The post What American Jews fight about when they fight about Israel appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Academic BDS Gains Ground in Europe, Poses Strategic Threat to Israel, New Report Warns

Anti-Israel demonstration supporting the BDS movement, Paris France, June 8, 2024. Photo: Claire Serie / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect

Advocates of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel have intensified efforts to sever ties between the European Union and Israeli academic institutions, according to a new bombshell report published on Thursday.

Israel’s Association of University Heads (VERA) Task Force to Combat Academic Boycotts said it has documented a surge in “academic BDS” activity across Europe and other Western countries, including the United States, since the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel.

VERA warned that mounting political pressure against Israel’s participation in the European Union’s Horizon Europe research initiative could increasingly influence the continent’s approach to academic cooperation with the Jewish state. The report went so far as to call Brussels’ stance on BDS “closer to establishing itself as an official foreign policy.”

Founded in 2021 as a seven-year EU project, Horizon Europe funds research related to sustainability, climate change, medicine, and emerging technologies. Israel’s participation in the multi-billion-euro initiative has long reflected both the country’s scientific reputation and its integration into major European research networks.

In recent years, however, several member states and activist groups have challenged Israel’s participation in the program, while the share of Horizon funding awarded to Israeli researchers has declined sharply.

According to VERA’s report, which covered the period from October 2025 to April 2026, there has been a 150 percent increase in efforts to exclude Israel from Horizon Europe.

In 2022, Israeli researchers received 5.4 percent of all Horizon grants. By 2025, that figure had fallen
to 2.5 percent — a decline of more than 50 percent.

“Israel’s participation in the ‘Horizon Europe’ association agreements is a strategic objective and
national goal of the State of Israel. For adversaries in this arena, this represents a major vulnerability
for Israel,” the report said.

It seems for this reason anti-Israel activists have specifically targeted the program. Indeed, VERA found that nearly 25 percent of all recent boycott reports were associated with Horizon Europe.

“Participation in the Horizon program provides not only an irreplaceable boost of valuable funding, but also enables Israeli researchers to establish research partnerships, maintain interactions with researchers from European countries and from countries outside Europe, and influence from within the scientific-academic agenda of Europe,” the report explained.

“This is the most prestigious and largest scientific club in the world,” VERA added. “Israel has earned a place within it, and every effort must be made to remain there in order to preserve scientific leadership and maintain our status as the ‘Start-Up Nation.’”

However, the BDS movement and other efforts to weaken Israel’s international standing create “a significant threat to Israel’s continued participation in the existing Horizon agreements,” VERA warned, “and a serious danger to its inclusion in the next Horizon agreements that will be signed during 2027 and implemented in 2028 for the years ahead.”

The report described the BDS movement’s string of victories as posing a “clear and immediate danger” to Israeli scientific and academic interests, while calling for a broader effort to improve public perceptions of Israel and its military operations in the Middle East.

VERA previously documented about 500 incidents of academic boycotts were reported just during the half-year through February 2025, a 66 percent increase compared to the six months following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack.

Since then, the onslaught has continued, although at a slower rate.

“There has been a relatively moderate increase in the number of reports concerning new academic
boycotts of all types, whether at the level of the individual researcher, the academic institution, or
professional associations. This is most likely the result of the fact that anyone who wished to boycott
Israeli researchers and institutions has already acted in this direction over the past two years, and
therefore, there are now fewer new participants in such boycotts,” VERA found.

“At the same time, there has been no decline in the scope or quantity of the existing boycotts. The
meaning is that the broad academic boycott trend continues, and there is clearly a pattern of
gradual strengthening,” the report added.

The initiatives included efforts to exclude Israeli academics from conferences, research collaborations, publications, and other forms of scholarly exchange.

In May 2024, for example, Ghent University in Belgium banned partnerships with Israeli universities altogether.

The exact number of academic boycotts remains unclear. According to the Israeli news outlet Ynet, which first reported on VERA’s latest findings, 1,120 boycott complaints were recorded during the period examined in the report. However, Daniel Chamovitz — president of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, a member of VERA — wrote that nearly 1,000 academic boycotts against Israeli universities have been recorded since the Oct. 7 attack, and a quarter of them came last summer.

“Academic boycotts do not pressure governments,” he posted on LinkedIn. “They isolate scientists. They sever the collaborations that science depends on, and they send a message to a generation of young researchers that their work is unwelcome. Not because of its quality, but because of their passport. That is not a political position. It is a betrayal of what science is for.”

The VERA report argued that the rise in academic boycott campaigns reflected a broader surge in antisemitism and anti-Zionist activism across Europe following the Oct. 7 attacks and the ensuing war in Gaza.

As previously reported by The Algemeiner, an overwhelming majority of 2,030 EU teachers surveyed in a study released in January said antisemitic incidents occur daily in classrooms and workplaces. Seventy-eight percent “encountered at least one antisemitic incident between students,” and 27 percent “witnessed nine or more such incidents.” Another 61 percent saw students promoting Holocaust denialism, while others reported students drawing or wearing Nazi symbols. Forty-two percent said they had witnessed “other teachers being antisemitic.”

Amid the academic boycott campaign, Europe has seen a relentless wave of antisemitic incidents on campuses across the continent.

At the University of Strasbourg, a group of Jewish students was assaulted by an individual shouting “Zionist fascists,” while the University of Vienna hosted an “Intifada Camp,” a pro-Hamas encampment.

At the Free University of Brussels campus in Solbosch, a pro-Hamas group illegally occupied an administrative building and renamed it after a terrorist. Elsewhere, anti-Zionist demonstrators damaged property to the tune of hundreds of thousands of Euros, desecrated Jewish religious symbols, graffitied Jewish students’ dormitories with swastikas, and assaulted Jewish student leaders.

Antisemitic violence in the streets of Europe’s major cities is perpetrated regularly, too. In July 2025, a group wielding knives attacked Jews walking home from an event on the Greek island of Rhodes. In Davos, Switzerland, a man spat on, attacked, and verbally abused a Jewish couple — behavior he reportedly repeated multiple times against other Jewish individuals.

Jewish communities across the West continue to face similar threats and require stronger governmental protections for their civil and human rights, the Special Envoys and Coordinators Combatting Antisemitism (SECCA) group proclaimed on Tuesday after convening in Geneva.

“Antisemitism is a threat to Jews — and that alone would be reason enough to fight it,” the group said.

“But it also erodes the very foundations of democratic societies: human rights, dignity, equality, and the rule of law. A society in which Jews cannot live openly and safely is one in which fundamental rights are under threat for everyone.”

Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.

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The profound internal contradiction that could spell doom for Hillel

Shortly after I graduated from Swarthmore College, it became the first campus to formally break with Hillel International. The campus Jewish organization began, instead, to call themselves an “Open Hillel,” then rebranded entirely after the parent organization threatened legal action over a civil rights panel it deemed too critical of Israel.

Swarthmore Jewish students lost the name, but they kept their integrity. Jewish students at Middlebury just faced the same question. They answered it the same way. And they were right to do so.

What happened in Vermont is not just a local story about one campus organization. It is a story about a deep contradiction at the heart of Hillel International — one that the organization may no longer be able to sustain.

Hillel presents itself, publicly and forcefully, as the Jewish student organization at colleges and universities across the United States. It’s the home of Jewish campus life, where Jewish students celebrate the High Holidays, eat kosher meals, light Hanukkah candles and gather for Shabbat. It describes itself as the world’s largest Jewish campus organization, serving nearly 200,000 students at more than 850 colleges and universities. It is, at many of those colleges, the only such institution that exists.

Precisely because of that monopoly position, Hillel and its allies have argued — with some justification — that protests targeting Hillel are a form of antisemitism. To make Jewish students feel unwelcome at the one place on campus where they can observe their religious obligations, they argue, is to attack Jewish students as Jews, not merely to criticize a political organization.

That argument has real force. Jewish students deserve to celebrate their holidays without running a political gauntlet. No one should have to defend their views on the West Bank occupation before they can get a bowl of matzo ball soup.

But the problem is that Hillel is also an explicitly political organization. And as such, it should be fair game for protesters.

Hillel International has a mandatory political line that all affiliated chapters must enforce: Its guidelines declare that Hillel is “steadfastly committed to the support of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state,” and campus chapters are prohibited from partnering with or hosting any group or individual that supports the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, “delegitimizes” Israel by Hillel’s own definition, or questions Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state.

When the Middlebury Jewish students met with Hillel International representatives, they were told that board members must universally adopt the organization’s political values about Israel. Universally. There is no asterisk, no opt-out, no room for the challenging pluralism of Jewish life in 2026.

This, from an organization that recently used imagery showing the entire territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea as part of Israel, without distinguishing the West Bank and Gaza.

This is not a neutral cultural position. It is a political one, and a fairly aggressive one at that. Hillel sends students on trips to Israel through Birthright and similar programs and received $22 million from a $66 million Israeli government initiative called Mosaic International to promote pro-Israel sentiment in the U.S. These are choices a political organization makes.

So which is it? Is Hillel a cultural and religious organization that provides communal Jewish life for all students, in which case it has no business enforcing political litmus tests? Or is it a politically committed advocacy organization with a defined ideological position — in which case it cannot claim special immunity from protest on the grounds that criticizing it means attacking Jewish students’ ability to celebrate Passover?

The answer, uncomfortable as it is, is that Hillel is both. For students like those at Middlebury, the tension between those two identities has become impossible to manage. I suspect more will soon follow their lead.

This contradiction matters now more than ever, because the American Jewish community is changing.

A major recent survey by the Jewish Federations of North America found that 14% of Jews ages 18 to 34 identify as anti-Zionist. Even among younger Jews who support Israel’s existence, the survey found, less than half agreed that Israel makes them feel proud to be Jewish. The Jewish Electorate Institute’s most recent survey found that only about a third of American Jews self-identify as Zionist. As the government of Israel moves further and further to the right, the divide between American Jews and the state of Israel is only likely to grow.

Under current Hillel rules, the meaningful and growing number of Jewish students who identify as non-Zionist or anti-Zionist are effectively excluded. If they choose to participate, they are required to keep their politics at the door — but the organization doesn’t require the same of itself.

The Middlebury case illustrates the absurdity with unusual clarity.

The students’ discomfort with Hillel International began, they explained, after a November 2023 challah sale raised $656 for World Central Kitchen, an organization that provides food relief in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. That act of simple, universalist charity created friction with the chapter’s parent body. Co-president Caroline Jaffe put the stakes plainly: “How are we ever going to get to peace in Israel and Palestine if we can’t even have a Middlebury Jewish group and a Middlebury SJP” — Students for Justice in Palestine — “talk to each other in Vermont, pretty much as far removed as you could be?”

That should not be a radical question.

The solution is not to try to reform Hillel International from within; that project has been tried repeatedly, by the Open Hillel movement and others, and the structural incentives against change are too powerful. The solution is instead what the Middlebury students are pointing toward: decentralization.

Political pluralism within Jewish campus life is not a threat to Jewish students. It is a reflection of the actual diversity of Jewish opinion, which surveys consistently show to be far wider than Hillel International’s guidelines allow. An American Jewish community that can only cohere by suppressing internal dissent is far more fragile than one that has learned to argue openly and remain in relationship. The students at Middlebury, by renaming themselves the Jewish Association of Middlebury and insisting on a more pluralistic identity, are not abandoning Jewish community. They are building a community that is more honest about what it is and who it is for.

I remember the moment at Swarthmore when Jewish students stopped asking permission and started asking a different question: not “what will Hillel International allow?” but “what do our Jewish students actually need?” The answer turned out to be more interesting, more contested, and, in its way, more Jewish than anything the guidelines had room for.

The post The profound internal contradiction that could spell doom for Hillel appeared first on The Forward.

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US May Ask Israel to Put Palestinian Tax Money Toward Trump’s Gaza Plan, Sources Say

US President Donald Trump takes part in a charter announcement for his Board of Peace initiative aimed at resolving global conflicts, alongside the 56th annual World Economic Forum (WEF), in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 22, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse

The US is considering asking Israel to give some tax money it is withholding from the Palestinian Authority to Donald Trump’s Board of Peace to fund the US president’s post-war plan for Gaza, five sources familiar with the matter said.

The Trump administration has not yet decided whether to make a formal request to Israel, said three of the sources, officials with knowledge of US deliberations with Israel.

The two other sources, Palestinians with knowledge of the deliberations, said that under the proposal a portion of the tax money would go to a US-backed transitional government for Gaza and other funds to the PA if it makes reforms.

The PA puts the amount of tax being withheld at $5 billion.

The prospect of the Palestinians’ own tax money being repurposed toward Trump’s Gaza rebuilding plan, over which their government has had no input, could further sideline the Western-backed PA even as Israel‘s withholding of the funds begets a financial crisis in the West Bank.

The PA exercises limited self-rule in the West Bank but has not had any sway over Gaza since it was exiled from the territory after a brief civil war with terrorist group Hamas in 2007.

Trump’s plan for Gaza, shattered after more than two years of war, has been held up by a refusal by Hamas to lay down their weapons.

MONEY HELD IN A BANK DOES NOTHING’

The Board of Peace declined to comment on whether a proposal to use Palestinian tax money was under consideration.

A Board official said it had asked all parties to leverage resources to support Trump’s rebuild plan, estimated to cost $70 billion.

“That includes the Palestinian Authority and Israel. There is no doubt that money held in a bank does nothing to further the President’s 20-Point Plan,” the official said.

That appeared to refer to the PA tax revenue that Israel has withheld from the body in a long-running dispute over payments it makes to Palestinians and their families for carrying out terrorist attacks against Israelis.

Under this policy, official payments are made to Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, the families of “martyrs” killed in attacks on Israelis, and Palestinians injured in terrorist attacks.

Reports estimate that approximately 8 percent of the PA’s budget has been allocated to paying stipends to convicted terrorists and their families.

Israel collects taxes on imported goods on behalf of the PA and is meant to transfer the revenue under a longstanding arrangement. The PA is supposed to use the funds to pay civil servants and fund public services.

The sources did not say how much of the tax money Washington was considering asking Israel to transfer to the Board.

The US State Department, Israeli government, and PA did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The US and Israel have long pressured the PA to abolish payments to Palestinian prisoners and families of those killed by Israeli forces, arguing it encourages violence.

In response to US pressure, the PA in February 2025 said it was reforming the payment system, but the US said those changes did not go far enough. As punishment, Israel has withheld taxes it collects on the PA’s behalf, an amount that Palestinian officials say has reached $5 billion – well over half of the PA’s annual budget.

That has set off a financial crisis in the West Bank, with the PA slashing salaries of thousands of civil servants.

Israel accepted a US invitation to join the Board of Peace. The PA was not invited.

Under Trump’s plan, a group of Palestinian technocrats dubbed the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza would take control of Gaza from Hamas as the terrorists lay down their weapons.

Nickolay Mladenov, Trump’s Board of Peace envoy for Gaza, said during a press conference in Jerusalem on Wednesday that reconstruction planning was in advanced stages.

“We’re doing it sector by sector. We’re costing things. We’re coordinating with donors and we’re ready to begin in earnest once the conditions allow it,” Mladenov said, without mentioning the tax issue.

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