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Why IDF Intelligence Needs to Be Better — And How to Improve It
Troops from the IDF’s 98th Division operating in Jabalia, the northern Gaza Strip, May 2024. Photo: Israel Defense Forces.
The IDF’s current mechanism for determining and providing intelligence assessments rigidifies the thinking of intelligence analysts, and increases the risk that they will not recognize changes in the behavioral patterns of the adversary that affect the predictive ability and relevance of the forecast. Providing assessments should be the beginning of the process, not the end. A structured, open, and ongoing discussion of an assessment can make both the process and the product more dynamic in the face of changing conditions.
The current intelligence assessment process increases the risk of forecast error
At the core of intelligence assessment stands the forecast. If the adversary’s behavioral dynamics form a linear regression — that is, they adhere to familiar patterns — then it is possible to draw a straight line from the present to the future and score high prediction levels (90% or better). This applies to most current and tactical engagements of intelligence. Assessment based on familiar patterns, combined with reasonable risk analysis, makes intelligence an effective support tool for political and operational decision-making.
Difficulties arise when the adversary’s behavior diverges from the expected. In this situation, the ability to predict decreases significantly; and the risk grows that the intelligence forecast will lead to decisions that do not correspond to reality. In such a situation, decision-makers must rely to a greater degree on risk management.
It is a serious problem when familiar patterns are disrupted and can no longer serve as a basis for assessment. To make matters worse, limitations on human thinking make it difficult for analysts to identify this problem when it arises. This increases the risk that intelligence predictions will actually serve the enemy, because our side will make decisions based on those predictions that the enemy is prepared to disrupt, circumvent, or even exploit.
Once an intelligence assessment has been formulated, it becomes an inflexible entity. Predictions about the future become a fixed reality (a “concept”) about the present. After the assessment is given to the client (the decision-maker, the commander), it becomes even more fixed among intelligence analysts. This is in order to prevent situations that are perceived as unprofessional, including changing the assessment as a result of dynamics with the client or frequently updating the assessment in a way that makes it difficult for the decision-maker to form policy decisions.
Because intelligence assessments tend to set like concrete after they have been turned over to the client, intelligence analysts generally shift their focus to the implications of the assessment for intelligence gathering, assimilating the assessment among the clients, and providing recommendations for policy and action stemming from it. All this activity diverts focus away from the implications of the assessment for the intelligence assessment process itself.
The problem can be summarized as follows: The mechanism for determining and providing intelligence assessments rigidifies the thinking of intelligence analysts, and increases the risk that they will not recognize changes in the behavioral patterns of the adversary that affect the predictive ability and relevance of the forecast.
A solution: Assessment as an ongoing process
To overcome this problem, the providing of an assessment should be viewed as the beginning of the process, not the end. To paraphrase Eisenhower on military planning, “Assessment is everything and nothing”. Intelligence analysts should remain within the assessment process even after providing it to the client.
What would this mean in practice? It would mean examining the assessment against many parameters and continuing to do so systematically, even after the assessment has been submitted. Discussions about the assessment should be open, transparent, and structured for the participation of both the intelligence analysts and the clients so that gaps in the forecast can be identified early.
Parameters for the ongoing review of an assessment can include:
- Verification and validity: These are recognized existing parameters within which the analyst examines whether developments with the subject strengthen or weaken the assessment. As we have seen many times, these criteria are the first victims of cognitive biases that make it difficult for the analyst to detach himself from the assessment.
- Evaluation context: What circumstances underlying the prediction are connected not to the adversary but to other circles, like the adversary’s partners, regional factors, international factors, and the internal context? Variations in the broader circumstances can affect the validity of the evaluation, even if no apparent change is identified in the subject.
- Assessment levels: If a strategic early warning has been issued, what are its implications for operational and tactical early warnings, and how does the sequence of forecasting change between levels? Does a sequence of tactical early warnings indicate a strategic early warning? Are the actions of the adversary consistent with its policy? What is the meaning of continuity or lack of continuity in the approach between different levels?
- Projection: This refers to the projection of an assessment of a particular issue onto assessments of other issues and topics. For example, is the predicted behavior of an adversary likely to affect the behavior of one of his allies? Is the predicted weakening of an adversary likely to lead to a deeper and broader change in other circles?
- Impact of responding to opportunities and risks: If the assessment indicates an opportunity, what are the implications of acting or not acting in response to it? Does inaction in response to the opportunity influence the forecast? And conversely, with regard to risks: If the assessment indicates a risk, is it a self-fulfilling prophecy? In other words, would caution in the face of the risk lead to its realization?
- Meaning of continuity or change: If the forecast indicates continuity, what are the indications if change in fact occurs? If the forecast indicates change, what needs to happen so that change does not materialize?
- The price of error: How does the cost of a prediction error affect the validity of the assessment? Isn’t the validity of a prediction that excludes extreme scenarios (military attack, nuclear weapons proliferation, regime collapse) weakened by the heavy cost of an error?
- Use of the assessment: What is the intelligence assessment being used for? If it is not used, or if, in the intelligence analysts’ view, its use is contrary to its content, what does that say about the assessment itself and its logic and clarity?
- Realization: If the prediction comes to pass, why did it do so? Did this show that the estimate was correct, or was it merely a coincidence? Conversely, does the failure of a prediction necessarily indicate that the estimate was incorrect?
Continuous engagement in the assessment process will improve its quality
A structured, open, and ongoing discussion of an assessment during and after its construction can free intelligence analysts from fixations, create more dynamism in the process and product, and improve and refine the product over time and in the face of changing conditions. This takes broader contexts than the adversary himself into account. It is not about changing estimates due to external influences. Rather, it is about developing a more comprehensive, broad, and rich view of the act of intelligence assessment.
The products of such an improvement could be more accurate and nuanced assessments, constant examination of the validity of assessments, continuous engagement with lower probability scenarios and not neglecting them after an assessment has been submitted, and expanding the potential for identifying problems in assessments as a result of more time spent on them.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Why IDF Intelligence Needs to Be Better — And How to Improve It first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Antisemites Target Synagogues in Spain, France Amid Surge in Jew Hatred Across Europe
The exterior wall of a synagogue in Girona, Spain, vandalized with antisemitic graffiti. Photo: Screenshot
Pro-Palestinian activists have vandalized synagogues in Spain and France in recent days, sparking public outrage and calls for authorities to step up protections.
These are only the latest incidents in a troubling wave of anti-Jewish hate crimes targeting Jewish communities across Europe which continues unabated.
On Thursday, the Jewish community of Girona, a city in Spain’s northeastern Catalonia region, filed a police complaint and urged authorities to take action after the outer wall of the city’s synagogue was defaced with an antisemitic slogan.
Unknown perpetrators defaced the synagogue’s walls with antisemitic graffiti, scrawling messages such as “Israel is a genocidal state, silence = complicity.”
The city’s Jewish community strongly condemned the incident, urging authorities to conduct a swift investigation, impose exemplary sanctions, and ensure robust security measures.
“Disguised as political activism, [this attack] seeks to stigmatize citizens for their faith — something intolerable in a democratic society,” the statement reads. “Tolerance and respect are values we must defend together.”
The European Jewish Association (EJA) also condemned the incident as a hate crime, urging the Spanish government to ensure the safety and protection of its Jewish citizens.
“This is yet another antisemitic attack, part of a wave we’ve seen daily for nearly two years,” the EJA wrote in a post on X.
This is what members of the Jewish community in Girona found this morning when they arrived at their synagogue to pray.
Antisemitic vandals had defaced the synagogue’s outer wall with the words:
“ISRAEL ESTAT GENOCIDA, SILENCI = CÒMPLICE”
Translation: “Israel is a genocidal… pic.twitter.com/ERj4z1hKOP— EJA – EIPA (@EJAssociation) September 4, 2025
In a separate incident, three pro-Palestinian activists were arrested on Thursday after trying to force their way into a synagogue in Nice, southeastern France, during an informational meeting on aliyah, the process of Jews immigrating to Israel.
According to local reports, several individuals attempted to forcibly enter the place of worship, sparking violent clashes and insults that left a pregnant woman injured.
Shortly after the incident, law enforcement arrested two women in their forties and a man in his sixties, taking them into custody as part of an investigation into aggravated violence.
The charges involve attacks on a vulnerable person, actions carried out by a group, religious motivation, and public religious insults.
Local authorities strongly condemned the act and announced that police officers would remain stationed outside the synagogue for as long as necessary.
Since the Hamas-led invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, antisemitic incidents have surged to alarming levels across Europe.
Jewish individuals have been facing a surge in hostility and targeted attacks, including vandalism of murals and businesses, as well as physical assaults.
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Iran’s Alliances With China, Russia Falter as Regime Faces Growing Isolation, Study Finds
Chinese Foreign Minister Wag Yi stands with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazeem Gharibabadi before a meeting regarding the Iranian nuclear issue at Diaoyutai State Guest House on March 14, 2025 in Beijing, China. Photo: Pool via REUTERS
As Iran continues to face major crises both at home and abroad, its ties to China and Russia are proving far weaker than they seem, leaving the regime to confront the fallout largely on its own, according to a new study.
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), an Israeli think tank, has released a report examining how the 12-day war with Israel in June exposed the limits of Iran’s alliances with China and Russia.
In the study, authors Raz Zimmt and Danny Citrinowicz note that both China and Russia favored cautious diplomacy over direct support at a time when the Iranian regime was most vulnerable.
“The policy of Moscow and Beijing, which consisted of fairly mild condemnations of the Israeli and US strikes in Iran, sparked criticism and disappointment in Tehran,” the report explains.
“It also reinforced the Iranian assessment that its reliance on Russia and China remains limited, particularly in the event of a military confrontation with Israel and the United States,” it continues.
Earlier this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Beijing, joining Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, as the three nations aim to project a united front against the West.
The high-profile gathering came after Pezeshkian and Putin held talks in China on Monday on the sidelines of the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin.
During a joint press conference, the Iranian president hailed Tehran’s cooperation with Moscow as “highly valuable,” adding that continued implementation of their 20-year treaty signed earlier this year would further strengthen ties and expand collaboration.
Putin also noted that the relationship between the two countries is “growing increasingly friendly and expanding” amid mounting pressure and sanctions from Western countries.
According to Zimmt and Citrinowicz, Iran has little room to maneuver, even more so now as the regime faces the imminent threat of UN sanctions being reimposed due to efforts by Britain, France, and Germany, forcing it to rely on its fragile alliances with Russia and China.
“It is clear that for now, Iran has no viable alternative to continuing its political, economic, and security partnership, as limited as it may be, with Russia and China, especially given the escalating tensions between Tehran and Europe,” the paper explains.
“Likewise, Russia and China, who view Iran as a junior partner in a coalition against the West and the United States, have no real alternative to Tehran, and they are expected to continue the partnership as long as it serves their interests,” it adds.
The authors argue that China and Russia could readily sacrifice Iran to further their strategic goals, including strengthening ties with Washington.
The study comes just days after an Iranian official accused Russia without evidence of providing intelligence to Israel during the 12-day Middle Eastern war in June which allegedly helped the Jewish state target and destroy Iran’s air defense systems.
Mohammad Sadr, a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council and close adviser to former President Mohammad Khatami, claimed Israel’s precise strikes on Iranian air defense systems were suspicious.
He noted Russia’s refusal to support Iran during the war, saying that Moscow had shown a “bias in favor of Israel” and that the recent conflict demonstrated the “strategic agreement with Russia is nonsense.”
“This war proved that the strategic alliance with Moscow is worthless,” Sadr said during an interview with BBC Persian, referring to the 12-day war between Iran and Israel.
“We must not think that Russia will come to Iran’s aid when the time comes,” he continued.
At the SCO summit in Tianjin earlier this week, Tehran also described its ties with China as “flourishing,” pointing to a strategic pact similar to the one it signed with Russia.
According to some reports, China may be helping Iran rebuild its decimated air defenses following the 12-day war with Israel.
China is the largest importer of Iranian oil, with nearly 90 percent of Iran’s crude and condensate exports going to Beijing. The two sides also recently signed a 25-year cooperation agreement, held joint naval drills, and continued to trade Iranian oil despite US sanctions.
“It should be noted that despite the 25-year cooperation agreement signed between Tehran and Beijing in March 2021, the partnership between the two countries remains very limited, and China does not provide solutions to most of Iran’s economic difficulties, including the need for infrastructure investment,” the INSS study explains.
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US Lawmakers Urge Trump to Restrict Visas for Iran’s President, Other Regime Officials Ahead of UN General Assembly
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during a meeting in Ilam, Iran, June 12, 2025. Photo: Iran’s Presidential website/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
A bipartisan group of US lawmakers is urging President Donald Trump to block or sharply restrict visas for Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and other top Iranian officials traveling to New York this month for the United Nations General Assembly, warning that Tehran will use the global platform to disguise its escalating repression at home.
In a letter sent to Trump on Thursday, 40 members of Congress pointed to Iran’s recent human rights record, which includes nearly 1,500 executions in the past year, and accused Pezeshkian’s government of openly threatening to repeat the mass killings of dissidents that scarred the country in 1988.
“Immediately following the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran, the Iranian regime escalated its widespread internal crackdown, arbitrarily arresting hundreds of ethnic minorities, civil society leaders, women’s rights activists, and others,” the lawmakers wrote. They described Iran’s leaders as “criminals” who “support terrorism” and “sow hatred and instability across the Middle East.”
The letter was signed by an unusually broad coalition of Republicans and Democrats, including House GOP Conference Chair Elise Stefanik (NY), as well as Reps. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX), Deborah Ross (R-NC), and Val Hoyle (D-OR), underscoring how concern about Iran’s hostility toward the US and its allies continues to cut across party lines.
Drawing a distinction between the regime and the Iranian people who support democracy, the lawmakers asked Trump to make a strong statement against a country that US intelligence agencies have long labeled the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
“We respectfully urge you to restrict the Iranian delegation’s freedom of movement, and, to the extent possible, refrain from issuing visas to key delegation members, including for its President, Masoud Pezeshkian,” the letter stated.
It continued, “We urge you to take a strong stand against the Iranian regime’s ongoing support for terrorism and human rights abuses, in line with your dedication toward ‘Peace through Strength’ and the maximum pressure campaign against the regime. We look forward to working you to further
oppose the destructive and destabilizing influence of the government of Iran and support the
Iranian people on the world stage.”
The lawmakers’ request comes as the Trump administration weighs new restrictions on several UN delegations ahead of the annual gathering. According to a State Department memo obtained by the Associated Press, the US is considering limiting the movements of officials not just from Iran, but also from Sudan and Zimbabwe. The department is also considering limiting the movements of officials from Brazil, whose president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, traditionally opens the General Assembly.
The proposals also suggest that Iranian diplomats be barred from shopping at Costco or Sam’s Club without explicit permission from the State Department, according to the AP report. Diplomats from Iran have historically relied on those stores to buy affordable goods unavailable in their home country. By contrast, the memo indicates that delegates from Syria may be granted a waiver, reflecting shifting US priorities in the region.
Under the UN Headquarters Agreement, the US is obligated to grant visas to foreign officials attending UN functions. But successive administrations have imposed restrictions on the travel of adversarial delegations, typically confining them to Manhattan and surrounding boroughs. The latest proposals would go further, potentially requiring advance State Department approval for movements and limiting access to certain businesses.