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Why IDF Intelligence Needs to Be Better — And How to Improve It
Troops from the IDF’s 98th Division operating in Jabalia, the northern Gaza Strip, May 2024. Photo: Israel Defense Forces.
The IDF’s current mechanism for determining and providing intelligence assessments rigidifies the thinking of intelligence analysts, and increases the risk that they will not recognize changes in the behavioral patterns of the adversary that affect the predictive ability and relevance of the forecast. Providing assessments should be the beginning of the process, not the end. A structured, open, and ongoing discussion of an assessment can make both the process and the product more dynamic in the face of changing conditions.
The current intelligence assessment process increases the risk of forecast error
At the core of intelligence assessment stands the forecast. If the adversary’s behavioral dynamics form a linear regression — that is, they adhere to familiar patterns — then it is possible to draw a straight line from the present to the future and score high prediction levels (90% or better). This applies to most current and tactical engagements of intelligence. Assessment based on familiar patterns, combined with reasonable risk analysis, makes intelligence an effective support tool for political and operational decision-making.
Difficulties arise when the adversary’s behavior diverges from the expected. In this situation, the ability to predict decreases significantly; and the risk grows that the intelligence forecast will lead to decisions that do not correspond to reality. In such a situation, decision-makers must rely to a greater degree on risk management.
It is a serious problem when familiar patterns are disrupted and can no longer serve as a basis for assessment. To make matters worse, limitations on human thinking make it difficult for analysts to identify this problem when it arises. This increases the risk that intelligence predictions will actually serve the enemy, because our side will make decisions based on those predictions that the enemy is prepared to disrupt, circumvent, or even exploit.
Once an intelligence assessment has been formulated, it becomes an inflexible entity. Predictions about the future become a fixed reality (a “concept”) about the present. After the assessment is given to the client (the decision-maker, the commander), it becomes even more fixed among intelligence analysts. This is in order to prevent situations that are perceived as unprofessional, including changing the assessment as a result of dynamics with the client or frequently updating the assessment in a way that makes it difficult for the decision-maker to form policy decisions.
Because intelligence assessments tend to set like concrete after they have been turned over to the client, intelligence analysts generally shift their focus to the implications of the assessment for intelligence gathering, assimilating the assessment among the clients, and providing recommendations for policy and action stemming from it. All this activity diverts focus away from the implications of the assessment for the intelligence assessment process itself.
The problem can be summarized as follows: The mechanism for determining and providing intelligence assessments rigidifies the thinking of intelligence analysts, and increases the risk that they will not recognize changes in the behavioral patterns of the adversary that affect the predictive ability and relevance of the forecast.
A solution: Assessment as an ongoing process
To overcome this problem, the providing of an assessment should be viewed as the beginning of the process, not the end. To paraphrase Eisenhower on military planning, “Assessment is everything and nothing”. Intelligence analysts should remain within the assessment process even after providing it to the client.
What would this mean in practice? It would mean examining the assessment against many parameters and continuing to do so systematically, even after the assessment has been submitted. Discussions about the assessment should be open, transparent, and structured for the participation of both the intelligence analysts and the clients so that gaps in the forecast can be identified early.
Parameters for the ongoing review of an assessment can include:
- Verification and validity: These are recognized existing parameters within which the analyst examines whether developments with the subject strengthen or weaken the assessment. As we have seen many times, these criteria are the first victims of cognitive biases that make it difficult for the analyst to detach himself from the assessment.
- Evaluation context: What circumstances underlying the prediction are connected not to the adversary but to other circles, like the adversary’s partners, regional factors, international factors, and the internal context? Variations in the broader circumstances can affect the validity of the evaluation, even if no apparent change is identified in the subject.
- Assessment levels: If a strategic early warning has been issued, what are its implications for operational and tactical early warnings, and how does the sequence of forecasting change between levels? Does a sequence of tactical early warnings indicate a strategic early warning? Are the actions of the adversary consistent with its policy? What is the meaning of continuity or lack of continuity in the approach between different levels?
- Projection: This refers to the projection of an assessment of a particular issue onto assessments of other issues and topics. For example, is the predicted behavior of an adversary likely to affect the behavior of one of his allies? Is the predicted weakening of an adversary likely to lead to a deeper and broader change in other circles?
- Impact of responding to opportunities and risks: If the assessment indicates an opportunity, what are the implications of acting or not acting in response to it? Does inaction in response to the opportunity influence the forecast? And conversely, with regard to risks: If the assessment indicates a risk, is it a self-fulfilling prophecy? In other words, would caution in the face of the risk lead to its realization?
- Meaning of continuity or change: If the forecast indicates continuity, what are the indications if change in fact occurs? If the forecast indicates change, what needs to happen so that change does not materialize?
- The price of error: How does the cost of a prediction error affect the validity of the assessment? Isn’t the validity of a prediction that excludes extreme scenarios (military attack, nuclear weapons proliferation, regime collapse) weakened by the heavy cost of an error?
- Use of the assessment: What is the intelligence assessment being used for? If it is not used, or if, in the intelligence analysts’ view, its use is contrary to its content, what does that say about the assessment itself and its logic and clarity?
- Realization: If the prediction comes to pass, why did it do so? Did this show that the estimate was correct, or was it merely a coincidence? Conversely, does the failure of a prediction necessarily indicate that the estimate was incorrect?
Continuous engagement in the assessment process will improve its quality
A structured, open, and ongoing discussion of an assessment during and after its construction can free intelligence analysts from fixations, create more dynamism in the process and product, and improve and refine the product over time and in the face of changing conditions. This takes broader contexts than the adversary himself into account. It is not about changing estimates due to external influences. Rather, it is about developing a more comprehensive, broad, and rich view of the act of intelligence assessment.
The products of such an improvement could be more accurate and nuanced assessments, constant examination of the validity of assessments, continuous engagement with lower probability scenarios and not neglecting them after an assessment has been submitted, and expanding the potential for identifying problems in assessments as a result of more time spent on them.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Why IDF Intelligence Needs to Be Better — And How to Improve It first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Hamas Says No Interim Hostage Deal Possible Without Work Toward Permanent Ceasefire
Explosions send smoke into the air in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, July 17, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
The spokesperson for Hamas’s armed wing said on Friday that while the Palestinian terrorist group favors reaching an interim truce in the Gaza war, if such an agreement is not reached in current negotiations it could revert to insisting on a full package deal to end the conflict.
Hamas has previously offered to release all the hostages held in Gaza and conclude a permanent ceasefire agreement, and Israel has refused, Abu Ubaida added in a televised speech.
Arab mediators Qatar and Egypt, backed by the United States, have hosted more than 10 days of talks on a US-backed proposal for a 60-day truce in the war.
Israeli officials were not immediately available for comment on the eve of the Jewish Sabbath.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said in a statement on a call he had with Pope Leo on Friday that Israel‘s efforts to secure a hostage release deal and 60-day ceasefire “have so far not been reciprocated by Hamas.”
As part of the potential deal, 10 hostages held in Gaza would be returned along with the bodies of 18 others, spread out over 60 days. In exchange, Israel would release a number of detained Palestinians.
“If the enemy remains obstinate and evades this round as it has done every time before, we cannot guarantee a return to partial deals or the proposal of the 10 captives,” said Abu Ubaida.
Disputes remain over maps of Israeli army withdrawals, aid delivery mechanisms into Gaza, and guarantees that any eventual truce would lead to ending the war, said two Hamas officials who spoke to Reuters on Friday.
The officials said the talks have not reached a breakthrough on the issues under discussion.
Hamas says any agreement must lead to ending the war, while Netanyahu says the war will only end once Hamas is disarmed and its leaders expelled from Gaza.
Almost 1,650 Israelis and foreign nationals have been killed as a result of the conflict, including 1,200 killed in the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on southern Israel, according to Israeli tallies. Over 250 hostages were kidnapped during Hamas’s Oct. 7 onslaught.
Israel responded with an ongoing military campaign aimed at freeing the hostages and dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities in neighboring Gaza.
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Iran Marks 31st Anniversary of AMIA Bombing by Slamming Argentina’s ‘Baseless’ Accusations, Blaming Israel
People hold images of the victims of the 1994 bombing attack on the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) community center, marking the 30th anniversary of the attack, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Irina Dambrauskas
Iran on Friday marked the 31st anniversary of the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish community center in Buenos Aires by slamming Argentina for what it called “baseless” accusations over Tehran’s alleged role in the terrorist attack and accusing Israel of politicizing the atrocity to influence the investigation and judicial process.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the anniversary of Argentina’s deadliest terrorist attack, which killed 85 people and wounded more than 300.
“While completely rejecting the accusations against Iranian citizens, the Islamic Republic of Iran condemns attempts by certain Argentine factions to pressure the judiciary into issuing baseless charges and politically motivated rulings,” the statement read.
“Reaffirming that the charges against its citizens are unfounded, the Islamic Republic of Iran insists on restoring their reputation and calls for an end to this staged legal proceeding,” it continued.
Last month, a federal judge in Argentina ordered the trial in absentia of 10 Iranian and Lebanese nationals suspected of orchestrating the attack in Buenos Aires.
The ten suspects set to stand trial include former Iranian and Lebanese ministers and diplomats, all of whom are subject to international arrest warrants issued by Argentina for their alleged roles in the terrorist attack.
In its statement on Friday, Iran also accused Israel of influencing the investigation to advance a political campaign against the Islamist regime in Tehran, claiming the case has been used to serve Israeli interests and hinder efforts to uncover the truth.
“From the outset, elements and entities linked to the Zionist regime [Israel] exploited this suspicious explosion, pushing the investigation down a false and misleading path, among whose consequences was to disrupt the long‑standing relations between the people of Iran and Argentina,” the Iranian Foreign Ministry said.
“Clear, undeniable evidence now shows the Zionist regime and its affiliates exerting influence on the Argentine judiciary to frame Iranian nationals,” the statement continued.
In April, lead prosecutor Sebastián Basso — who took over the case after the 2015 murder of his predecessor, Alberto Nisman — requested that federal Judge Daniel Rafecas issue national and international arrest warrants for Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei over his alleged involvement in the attack.
Since 2006, Argentine authorities have sought the arrest of eight Iranians — including former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who died in 2017 — yet more than three decades after the deadly bombing, all suspects remain still at large.
In a post on X, the Delegation of Argentine Israelite Associations (DAIA), the country’s Jewish umbrella organization, released a statement commemorating the 31st anniversary of the bombing.
“It was a brutal attack on Argentina, its democracy, and its rule of law,” the group said. “At DAIA, we continue to demand truth and justice — because impunity is painful, and memory is a commitment to both the present and the future.”
31 años del atentado a la AMIA – DAIA. 31 años sin justicia.
El 18 de julio de 1994, un atentado terrorista dejó 85 personas muertas y más de 300 heridas. Fue un ataque brutal contra la Argentina, su democracia y su Estado de derecho.
Desde la DAIA, seguimos exigiendo verdad y… pic.twitter.com/kV2ReGNTIk
— DAIA (@DAIAArgentina) July 18, 2025
Despite Argentina’s longstanding belief that Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah terrorist group carried out the devastating attack at Iran’s request, the 1994 bombing has never been claimed or officially solved.
Meanwhile, Tehran has consistently denied any involvement and refused to arrest or extradite any suspects.
To this day, the decades-long investigation into the terrorist attack has been plagued by allegations of witness tampering, evidence manipulation, cover-ups, and annulled trials.
In 2006, former prosecutor Nisman formally charged Iran for orchestrating the attack and Hezbollah for carrying it out.
Nine years later, he accused former Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner — currently under house arrest on corruption charges — of attempting to cover up the crime and block efforts to extradite the suspects behind the AMIA atrocity in return for Iranian oil.
Nisman was killed later that year, and to this day, both his case and murder remain unresolved and under ongoing investigation.
The alleged cover-up was reportedly formalized through the memorandum of understanding signed in 2013 between Kirchner’s government and Iranian authorities, with the stated goal of cooperating to investigate the AMIA bombing.
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Jordan Reveals Muslim Brotherhood Operating Vast Illegal Funding Network Tied to Gaza Donations, Political Campaigns
Murad Adailah, the head of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, attends an interview with Reuters in Amman, Jordan, Sept. 7, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Jehad Shelbak
The Muslim Brotherhood, one of the Arab world’s oldest and most influential Islamist movements, has been implicated in a wide-ranging network of illegal financial activities in Jordan and abroad, according to a new investigative report.
Investigations conducted by Jordanian authorities — along with evidence gathered from seized materials — revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood raised tens of millions of Jordanian dinars through various illegal activities, the Jordan news agency (Petra) reported this week.
With operations intensifying over the past eight years, the report showed that the group’s complex financial network was funded through various sources, including illegal donations, profits from investments in Jordan and abroad, and monthly fees paid by members inside and outside the country.
The report also indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood has taken advantage of the war in Gaza to raise donations illegally.
Out of all donations meant for Gaza, the group provided no information on where the funds came from, how much was collected, or how they were distributed, and failed to work with any international or relief organizations to manage the transfers properly.
Rather, the investigations revealed that the Islamist network used illicit financial mechanisms to transfer funds abroad.
According to Jordanian authorities, the group gathered more than JD 30 million (around $42 million) over recent years.
With funds transferred to several Arab, regional, and foreign countries, part of the money was allegedly used to finance domestic political campaigns in 2024, as well as illegal activities and cells.
In April, Jordan outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, the country’s most vocal opposition group, and confiscated its assets after members of the Islamist movement were found to be linked to a sabotage plot.
The movement’s political arm in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front, became the largest political grouping in parliament after elections last September, although most seats are still held by supporters of the government.
Opponents of the group, which is banned in most Arab countries, label it a terrorist organization. However, the movement claims it renounced violence decades ago and now promotes its Islamist agenda through peaceful means.
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