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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?

(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.

The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.

“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.

“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”

The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.

Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.

“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”

Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)

We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.

This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?

Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.

I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.

Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.

What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.

I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?

I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.

If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.

But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.

So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?

First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.

There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.

It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.

One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.

What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?

I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.

It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.

There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?

Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.

But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.

So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.

The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.

There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.

I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?

Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.

I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.

And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.

But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.

And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.

Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.

The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?

Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.

So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.


The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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How Russian and Austrian politics gave rise to modern Yiddish literature 

פֿון װאַנען האָט זיך גענומען די מאָדערנע ליטעראַטור אױף ייִדיש און העברעיִש? ביז הײַנט האָט מען געהאַלטן, אַז זי איז געװען אַ פּועל־יוצא פֿון דער השׂכּלה־אידעאָלאָגיע, װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו דערציִען די ייִדישע מאַסן אינעם גײַסט פֿון דער אײראָפּעיִשער אױפֿקלערונג־קולטור.

עופֿר דינעס (קאָלאַמביע־אוניװערסיטעט) האַלט, אַז אַ װיכטיקע ראָלע אין דער אַנטוויקלונג פֿון דער מאָדערנער ליטעראַטור בײַ ייִדן האָט געשפּילט די נײַע קאָלאָניאַלע פּאָליטיק פֿון די רוסישע און עסטרײַכישע אימפּעריעס נאָך די צעטײלונגען פֿון פּױלן סוף־18טן יאָרהונדערט.

אונטער דער אַלטער פּױלישער מאַכט האָבן ייִדישע יחידים ניט געהאַט קײן דירעקטן שײכות צו דער מלוכה. די קהילות האָבן זיך געפֿירט לױט זײערע אײגענע תּקנות און מנהגים, און זײער קאָלעקטיװער פֿאָרשטײער פֿאַר דער מלוכה איז געװען דער װעד ארבע ארצות (די פֿאַרװאַלטונג פֿון פֿיר לענדער).

די נײַע אימפּעריאַלע מלוכות האָבן אָפּגעשאַפֿן דעם דאָזיקן רעזשים און גענומען אײַנפֿירן אַלגעמײנע געזעץ־געבונג פֿאַר אַלע אונטערטאַנער זײערע, ייִדן בתוכם. דינעסעס בוך באַשרײַבט ווי אַזוי די משׂכּילים האָבן גענומען אױף זיך די אױפֿגאַבע צו דערקלערן די דאָזיקע פּאָליטיק פֿאַר די ייִדישע מאַסן דורך זײערע ליטעראַרישע װערק.

דאָס קעפּל פֿון דינערס בוך לאָזט זיך ניט גענױ איבערזעצן אױף ייִדיש. דאָס ענגלישע װאָרט fiction האָט צװײ פֿאַרשײדענע באַטײַטן: בעלעטריסטיק און פֿיקציע, און זײ בײדע באַלאַנגען צו דעם מײן פֿונעם קעפּל: “די בעלעטריסטיק/פֿיקציע פֿון דער מלוכה“.

דורך זײערע בעלעטריסטישע װערק, האַלט דינעס, האָבן די משׂכּילישע מחברים געשאַפֿן אַן אידעאַליזירטן אימאַזש, אַ „פֿיקציע“, פֿון דער גוטװיליקער מלוכישער מאַכט, װאָס זאָרגט זיך װעגן דעם װױלזײַן פֿון אַלע אירע אונטערטאַנער.

די דאָזיקע פּאָזיציע האָט פֿאָרמולירט ישׂראל אַקסענפֿעלד (1787־1866) אין „דאָס שטערנטיכל“, דעם ערשטן ייִדישן ראָמאַן: „דאָס פּױלישע ביטערע אָנגעבלאָזענע גדלות, די פּױלישע גאװה איז בײַם רוס ניטאָ. אַ רוס, אַז ער קען זיך מיט אַ ייִדן און האָט מיט אים עטלעכע מאָל צו טאָן, רופֿט ער אים ׳בראַט׳’ [ברודער]. אַפֿילו דער פֿאַקטאָר [קאָמיסיאָנער], אַז ער [דער ייִד] דינט אים געטרײַ, האָט ער אים ליב.“

דינעסעס העלדן זײַנען פֿאַרשײדענע פֿיגורן. אײניקע זײַנען באַרימט, װי דער „זײדע“ פֿון דער ייִדישער ליטעראַטור, שלום־יעקבֿ אַבראַמאָװיטש (מענדעלע מוכר ספֿרים); דער גאַליציאַנער משׂכּיל יוסף פּערל און רבי נחמן פֿון בראַצלעװ.

אַנדערע זײַנען שוין כּמעט פֿאַרגעסן געװאָרן, װי דער העברעיִשער דיכטער משה אלחנן — דער מחבר פֿון צװײ העברעיִשע לױבגעזאַנגען. אײן שיר איז געװען געװידמעט דעם פּױלישן קעניג און דער צװײטער — דעם רוסישן צאַר. אַ צווייטער בײַשפּיל איז דער עסטרײַכישער באַאַמטער יאָהאַן עדואַרד זאַק, דער פֿאַרפֿאַסער פֿון אַ סאַטירישן ראָמאַן, װאָס מאַכט חוזק פֿון די גאַליציאַנער חסידים.

עס איז גוט באַקאַנט, אַז די משׂכּילים, בפֿרט דער טאַרנעפּאָלער סוחר יוסף פּערל, האָבן אין זײערע סאַטירישע חיבורים אױסגעלאַכט די חסידים..

אָבער מיט דער צײַט האָט פּערל דערזען, אַז דאָס איז ניט גענוג פֿאַר באַקעמפֿן די השפּעה פֿון חסידות. ער האָט זיך גענומען מסרן זײ צו די עסטרײַכישע אינסטאַנצן דורך זײַנע ליטעראַרישע װערק. װײַזט אױס, אַז די עסטרײַכישע פּאָליצײ האָט געהאַט מומחים, װאָס האָבן געקענט לײענען ייִדיש און העברעיִש.

להיפּוך צו די משׂכּילים, זײַנען די חסידים ניט געװען אײַנשטימיק אין זײער באַצי צו דער רוסישער אימפּעריע. דער גרעסטער אָנהענגער פֿון רוסלאַנד איז געװען דער גרינדער פֿונעם חב״ד, ר׳ שניאור זלמן פֿון ליאַדי. ער האָט געהאַלטן, אַז די קאָנסערװאַטיװע רוסישע פּאָליטיק העלפֿט באַשיצן ייִדישקײט קעגן די נײַע מערבֿדיקע אידעען.

ר׳ נחמן פֿון בראַצלעװ האָט געהאַט אַן אַנדער דעה. כּסדר האַלט מען זײַנע סיפּורי־מעשׂיות פֿאַר מיסטישע אַלעגאָריעס. אַ סך פֿון זײ דערצײלן װעגן אַ מלך און זײַן מלוכה. אַלעגאָריש טײַטשט מען דאָס אױס װי דער רבונו של עולם און די באַשאַפֿענע װעלט זײַנע.

אָבער דינעס לײענט די דאָזיקע מעשׂיות דורך אַ היסטאָרישן פּאָליטישן שפּאַקטיװ. ער האַלט, אַז צו מאָל איז דער מלך טאַקע פּשוט אַ קעניג און זײַן קעניגרײַך איז אַן עכטע מלוכה.

ר׳ נחמנס קריטיק פֿון דער נײַער אימפּעריאַלער פּאָליטיק איז ספּעציעל בולט אין דער „מעשׂה ממלך שגזר שמד“ („מעשׂה װעגן אַ קעניג װאָס האָט באַפֿוילן שמד“), װאָס מאָלט אױס אַ דעספּאָטישן מאָנאַרך.

דורך זײַנע אַלעגאָריעס האָט ר׳ נחמן געפּרוּװט דערקלערן זײַנע חסידים, אַז די נײַע רוסישע בעלי־בתּים זײַנען אױסן מװתּר צו זײַן די אױטאָנאָמיע, װאָס די ייִדישע קהילות האָבן גענאָסן אונטער דער פּױלישער מאַכט.

ר׳ נחמנס כּװנה, האַלט דינעס, איז געװען צו באַשיצן ייִדן פֿון דער נײַער מאַכט. צוליב דעם האָט ער ספּעציעל אױסגעקליבן די שטאָט בראַצלעװ (בראַסלעװ) אין פּאָדאָליע פֿאַר זײַן רעזידענץ, װײַל דאָס איז געװען אַן אַדמיניסטראַטיװער קרײַז־צענטער.

ר׳ נחמן האָט געהאָפֿט, אַז בראַצלעװ װעט זײַן „די פֿאַבריק פֿון ייִדישקײט“, און אַזױ אַרום „װעט די גאַנצע װעלט ווערן בראַסלאַװער חסידים“. די דאָזיקע װערטער האָט פֿאַרשריבן זײַן געטרײַער תּלמיד ר׳ נתן שטײנהאַרץ.

דינעס איז אַ געניטער דערצײלער. אױף די זײַטן פֿון זײַן בוך טרעפֿן זיך פּױלישע פּריצים, רוסישע מיליטער־לײַט, עסטרײַכישע פּאָליצײ און כּל־מיני ייִדן: משׂכּילים, חסידים, משומדים. ער אַנטפּלעקט פֿאַרכאַפּנדיקע פּרטים און אומשטאַנדן, װאָס לאָזן אױף ס׳נײַ אױסטײַטשן ליטעראַרישע טעקסטן.

סוף־18טן און אָנהײב־19טן יאָרהונדערט איז געװען אַ שטורעמדיקע תּקופֿה איבער גאַנץ אײראָפּע. די צעטײלונגען פֿון פּױלן און דערנאָך די מלחמות קעגן נאַפּאָלעאָנישן פֿראַנקרײַך האָבן שטאַרק געענדערט די פּאָליטישע מאַפּע פֿון מיטל־ און מזרח־אײראָפּע.

די דאָזיקע דראַמאַטישע געשעענישן האָבן פֿאַרטיפֿט דעם שפּאַלט אינעם פּױלישן ייִדנטום. די העכערע שיכטן, פֿאַרמעגלעכע שטאָטישע בעלי־בתּים, האָבן לרובֿ געשטיצט די נײַע פּאָליטיק און געצױגן נוצן פֿון דער לעגאַלער אָרדענונג אין רוסלאַנד און עסטרײַך.

אָבער די אָרעמע שטעטלדיקע מאַסן, בפֿרט חסידים, האָבן חושד געווען, אַז די נײַע מאַכט מאַכט וועט זיך אַרײַנמישן אין זײער עסקים כּדי אָפּצוציִען ייִדן פֿון ייִדישקײט.

בײדע צדדים האָבן גענומען פֿאַרשפּרײטן זײערע אידעען דורך ליטעראַרישע טעקסטן אין פֿאַרשײדענע זשאַנערס, אַזעלכע װי מעשׂיות, לידער, ראָמאַנען און סאַטירישע פּאַמפֿלעטן. און פֿון אָט די דאָזיקע װיכּוחים איז אױסגעװאַקסן די מאָדערנע צװײ־שפּראַכיקע ייִדישע ליטעראַטור.

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2 top Iranian officials to face trial in absentia over deadly 1994 attack on Argentinian Jewish center

(JTA) — Two senior officials at the heart of Iran’s military and national security establishment are among the eight people set to face trial in absentia over their alleged roles in the 1994 terrorist bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.

Argentine Federal Judge Daniel Rafecas issued the 648-page ruling Monday, formally processing the suspects and ordering an asset freeze of up to $500 million for each of them. The ruling attributes different roles to the suspects, ranging from senior Iranian officials who allegedly made and facilitated the decision to carry out the attack to individuals accused of providing diplomatic and operational support.

Ahmad Vahidi, the current commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, are among seven Iranian citizens and one Lebanese national formally charged in the case.

The other defendants are former Iranian intelligence minister Ali Fallahian; former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati; former Iranian diplomat Hadi Soleimanpour; former cultural attaché in Buenos Aires Mohsen Rabbani; former embassy official Ahmad Reza Asghari; and alleged Hezbollah operative Salman Raouf Salman, also known as Samuel Salman El Reda.

 

 

The judge charged the defendants with aggravated homicide and injuries motivated by racial or religious hatred. He classified the bombing as both a crime against humanity and an act of genocide.

The July 18, 1994 bombing of the AMIA building killed 85 people and injured over 300, remaining the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history.

The ruling was handed down after almost seven months of Iran’s war with the U.S. and Israel, with the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program at the center of international debate.

Argentine President Javier Milei, known for his pro-Israel views, noted the prosecution in his remarks Wednesday at the annual U.N. General Assembly, and placed it in the context of the threat he said Iran poses to the West.

“We have also made a geopolitical choice: We have aligned ourselves unequivocally with the West, with the United States and with Israel — countries with which we share a deep affinity of values and strategic complementarity,” he said.  “That is why we condemn the Iranian regime’s attacks on the State of Israel, we have designated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization, and continue to seek justice for the two attacks carried out on Argentine soil in 1992 and 1994.”

The indictments followed a unanimous ruling also on Monday by the federal appeals court upholding the constitutionality of applying Argentina’s trial-in-absentia law⁠ to the AMIA case. The legislation, enacted in 2025, allows proceedings involving terrorism and crimes against humanity to continue when defendants deliberately evade Argentine justice.

The Jewish umbrella organization DAIA welcomed the decision. “Thirty-two years after the bombing of the AMIA-DAIA building, Argentina’s courts have taken a major step in the pursuit of truth and justice,” it said in a post on X. The post featured photos of the suspects formally charged by an Argentine judge under the headline “Historic Event.”

AMIA in a statement posted Tuesday said the decision marks “a decisive milestone in establishing the truth about the worst terrorist attack suffered by our country.” The trial date has not yet been set, but experts quoted by Argentine media estimate that it will take place next year. It would be the first trial in absentia in Argentina’s history.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post 2 top Iranian officials to face trial in absentia over deadly 1994 attack on Argentinian Jewish center appeared first on The Forward.

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Jewish Dems in Congress oppose plans to merge Holocaust and antisemitism envoys

(JTA) — Nearly two dozen Jewish Democrats in Congress signed a letter opposing plans to fold the State Department’s standalone Holocaust envoy office into the office of Rabbi Yehuda Kaploun, the Trump administration’s special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism.

Kaploun has been pushing for the merger for months, and his efforts have divided Jewish leaders over the future of Holocaust diplomacy. Supporters of the move claimed that it would improve efficiency, while critics said it would flatten the attention given to Holocaust-specific issues, and criticized it as a power grab by Kaploun.

Opposition to the plan escalated Wednesday when 19 members of Congress, in a letter shared exclusively with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, called for Secretary of State Marco Rubio to preserve the Holocaust envoy as “a distinct, permanent office led by a dedicated career State Department official.”

The officials, who are all members of the Congressional Jewish Caucus, wrote that the two offices “are complementary, but they are not interchangeable.” Kaploun’s office is “responsible for confronting contemporary antisemitism around the world,” the letter reads, while the Holocaust envoy’s office “focuses on Holocaust-era restitution, historical justice, remembrance, and accountability.”

Signatories on the letter include moderate Democrats such as Reps. Jared Moskowitz and Josh Gottheimer, and progressives including Reps. Jamie Raskin and Jan Schakowsky.

New York Rep. Jerry Nadler, who co-led the letter with Illinois Rep. Brad Schneider, said back in June that the potential move was “abominable” and a “vain attempt to consolidate power by Yehuda Kaploun.”

“If supporting Holocaust victims and their families was a priority to this Administration, they would seek further opportunities to support SEHI, not to eliminate it,” said Nadler, the House’s longest-serving Jewish member, using the acronym for the Holocaust envoy office.

Wednesday’s letter called for Rubio to not only preserve the role, which is currently vacant, but also to “immediately appoint a new Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.” Rubio has not named a successor to Ellen Germain, whose term ended on July 31 after she took over in August 2021.

Germain notably emphasized the need for European nations to sustain remembrance of the Holocaust and their roles in its perpetration; top Trump administration figures, including Vice President JD Vance, have said that the current intensity of Holocaust commemoration in Europe is counterproductive.

A group of Jewish organizations, including the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee and B’nai Brith International, had called on Rubio to fill the impending vacancy back in April. Doing so, the groups wrote, would “demonstrate the prioritization that the United States ascribes to preserving the uniqueness of the Holocaust through this special office,” and “ensure that its critical work continues.”

A separate host of Jewish groups, including the Combat Antisemitism Movement, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, the World Jewish Congress and Chabad-Lubavitch World Headquarters, had called for Rubio to go ahead with the merger in June to increase efficiency and avoid “duplicative efforts” by the two offices.

The Jewish Democrats’ letter this week refuted that argument.

“Combining them would not streamline efficiency or eliminate any meaningful duplication; it would risk diminishing the focus, experience, and institutional capacity necessary for each,” the letter reads.

The post Jewish Dems in Congress oppose plans to merge Holocaust and antisemitism envoys appeared first on The Forward.

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