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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
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The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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How YIVO and Max Weinreich Americanized the Yiddish project
װי אַזױ האָט ייִװאָ געפֿונען אַ נײַע הײם אין אַמעריקע נאָכן חורבן? קלמן װײַזער (יאָרק־אוניװערסיטעט אין טאָראָנטאָ) דערצײלט די דאָזיקע דראַמאַטישע געשיכטע אינעם נײַעם בוך „ייִדיש־װיסנשאַפֿט קומט קײן אַמעריקע“.
לכתּחילה איז דער דערפֿאָלג פֿון ייִװאָ ניט געװען קיין זיכערער. װײַזער דערקלערט: „עס איז װײַט ניט געװען קלאָר פֿאַר די שטיצער און מיטאַרבעטער פֿון ייִװאָ אין די 1940ער יאָרן, צי אַן אָרגאַניזאַציע װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו באַדינען די אינטעלעקטועלע און קולטורעלע באַדערפֿענישן פֿונעם אַלװעלטלעכן ייִדיש־רעדנדיקן פֿאָלק קען זיך אײַנװאָרצלען אין די ביז גאָר פֿאַרשײדענע באַדינגונגען פֿון אַמעריקע נאָך דער מלחמה.“
פֿאַר דער מלחמה האָט ייִװאָ געהאַט אַן „אַמעריקאַנער אָפּטײל“ אין ניו־יאָרק. זײַן ציל איז געװען צו זאַמלען געלט פֿאַרן װילנער אינסטיטוט, כאָטש אײניקע זײַנע מיטגלידער האָבן זיך אָפּגעגעבן אױך מיט פֿאָרשונגען פֿון ייִדישער קולטור און געשיכטע — דער עיקר, אין מיזרח-אײראָפּע.
אָבער דאָס רובֿ אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן האָבן געהאַט אַ קנאַפּן אינטערעס צו ייִדיש און בכלל ניט געהאַלטן פֿון ייִדיש־פֿאָרשונג.
נאָכן חורבן איז ייִװאָ געשטאַנען אױפֿן שײדװעג: צו װערן אַ מין אַרכיװ געװידמעט דעם אַמאָליקן חרובֿ־געמאַכטן ייִדישן לעבן אין מזרח־אײראָפּע אָדער װײַטער צו אַנטװיקלען ייִדיש־װיסנשאַפֿט לטובֿת אַ ייִדישן המשך אין אַמעריקע.
װײַזער ברענגט דעם לײענער אַרײַן אין די הײסע װיכּוחים צװישן די מיטאַרבעטער פֿון ייִװאָ װעגן דער ריכטונג פֿון דער אַרבעט. יודל מאַרק האָט געהאַלטן אַז ייִװאָ דאַרף זיך אָפּגעבן דער עיקר מיטן חורבן־פֿאָרשונג, בעת אַמאָליקע בונדיסטן האָבן געטענהט אַז ייִװאָ דאַרף שטודירן דעם מצבֿ פֿון די ייִדישע מאַסן אין אַמעריקע.
מאַקס װײַנרײַך, דער אינטעלעקטועלער מדריך פֿון ייִװאָ, האָט געהאַט אַן אַנדערע װיזיע. ער האָט געגלייבט, אַז דאָס אַמעריקאַנער ייִדנטום איז מסוגל צו שפּילן די פֿירנדיקע ראָלע אין דער ייִדישער װעלט נאָכן חורבן. אָבער לױט זײַן מײנונג זײַנען די אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן ניט געװען גרײט אויף אַזאַ שליחות. און צוגרײטן זײ דערצו האָבן געדאַרפֿט די פּליטים פֿון מזרח־אײראָפּע.
לױט זײַן װיזיע, האָט זיך ייִװאָ געדאַרפֿט אָפּגעבן ניט סתּם מיט װיסנשאַפֿט, נאָר מיט „װיסן װאָס שאַפֿט“, דאָס הײסט, ייִדיש־װיסנשאַפֿט מוז דערמעגלעכן אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן אָפּצוהיטן זײער ייִדישן מהות און פֿאַרזיכערן ייִדישע המשכדיקײט.
דער שליסל צום דערפֿאָלג פֿונעם ריזיקן פּראָיעקט איז געװען די ייִדישע שפּראַך. ייִדיש האָט געדאַרפֿט דינען װי אַ בריק צװישן דורות ייִדן, אַ גײַסטיקע פֿאַרבינדונג צװישן דער אַלטער און דער נײַער הײם.
צוליב דעם, האָט װײַנרײַך געהאַלטן, דאַרף מען „אױסגױיִשן“ די אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישע אינטעליגענציע און העכערן דעם פּרעסטיזש פֿון ייִדיש אין דער אַמעריקאַנער אַקאַדעמישער װעלט.
אָבער ניט געקוקט אױף װײַנרײַכס באַמיִונגען איז ייִװאָ לכתּחילה פֿאַרבליבן אױף די ראַנדן פֿונעם אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישן הױפּטשטראָם און האָט באַקומען אַ קנאַפּע שטיצע מצד די גרױסע ייִדישע פֿילאַנטראָפּישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס. די באַציִונגען צװישן ייִװאָ און דער אַמעריקאַנער ייִדיש־סבֿיבֿה זײַנען אױך ניט געװען קײן גלאַטיקע.
די נאָרמאַטיװע ייִדישע כּלל־שפּראַך, װאָס ייִװאָ האָט געװאָלט פֿאַרשפּרײטן, האָט אַרױסגערופֿן קריטיק מצד אײניקע ייִדישיסטן. זײ האָבן געטענהט, אַז דער „ייִװאָ־ייִדיש“ איז װײַט פֿונעם עכטן נאַטירלעכן מאַמע־לשון.
אין זײַנע אַרטיקלען אין פֿאָרװערטס האָט יצחק באַשעװיס אױסגעלאַכט אַזעלכע נעאָלאָגיזמען װי „קדמן־ייִדיש“ און „בראשית־ייִדיש“, װאָס װײַנרײַך האָט צוגעטראַכט װי לינגװיסטישע באַגריפֿן פֿאַר פֿאַרשײדענע היסטאָרישע תּקופֿות אין דער אַנטװיקלונג פֿון דער ייִדישער שפּראַך.
אין תּוך איז דער קאָנפֿליקט צװישן ייִװאָ און די ייִדישע ליטעראַטן געװען אַרום דער פֿראַגע, „צו װעמען געהערט ייִדיש?“, דערקלערט װײַזער. דער ציל פֿון ייִװאָ איז געװען צו שאַפֿן אַ נאָרמאַטיװע שפּראַך, װאָס מען קען אױסלערנען װי מען לערנט אַנדערע פֿרעמדע שפּראַכן. אַזױ קען מען פֿאַרזיכערן דעם המשך פֿון ייִדיש אַפֿילו װען קײן לעבעדיקע ייִדיש־רעדנדיקער סבֿיבֿה איז מער ניטאָ.
די סאַמע געשפּאַנטע קאַפּיטלען אין דער געשיכטע פֿון ייִװאָ אין אַמעריקע דערצײלן װעגן דעם קאַמף פֿאַר צוריקבאַקומען די מאַטעריאַלן, װאָס האָבן אַ מאָל געהערט צום װילנער ייִװאָ.
טײלװײַז האָבן די נאַציסטן זײ געבראַכט קײן דײַטשלאַנד פֿאַרן אַרכיװ פֿונעם אַנטיסעמיטישן „אינסטיטוט פֿאַר פֿאָרשונגען פֿון דער ייִדן־פֿראַגע“”. נאָך דער מלחמה זײַנען די דאָזיקע מאַטעריאַלן אַרײַנגעפֿאַלן אינעם רשות פֿון דער אַמעריקאַנער מיליטערישער אַדמיניסטראַציע אין דײַטשלאַנד.
כּדי צוריקצוקריגן די דאָזיקע מאַטעריאַלן איז געװען אַ גװאַלדיקער אױפֿטו פֿון װײַנרײַך און זײַנע מיטאַרבעטער, צװישן זיי — לוסי שילדקרעט (דאַװידאָװיטש), װאָס האָט שפּעטער זיך קונה־שם געװען װי אַ חורבן־פֿאָרשערין. לױטן געזעץ האָט די אַמעריקאַנער מיליטערישע אַדמינסטראַציע געדאַרפֿט צוריקגעבן די געראַבעװעטע מאַטעריאַלן צו פּױלן אָדער סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד. אַן אַנדער פּרעטענדענט איז געװען דער העברעיִשער אוניװערסיטעט אין ירושלים.
װײַנרײַך האָט אױסגענוצט זײַנע קאָנטאַקטן אין די אַמעריקאַנער הױכע פֿענצטער און אין 1947 האָט ייִװאָ צוריקבאַקומען זײַנע מאַטעריאַלן. עס האָט זיך אים אױך אײַנגעגעבן פֿאָרצושטעלן ייִװאָ װי אַ יורש פֿון אַנדערע קולטורעלע אַנשטאַלטן אין װילנע, און ייִװאָ האָט אױך באַקומען די אוצרות פֿון דער סטראַשון־ביבליאָטעק און דער „ווילנער יידישער היסטאריש-עטנאגראפישער געזעלשאפט אויף דעם נאמען פון ש. אַנ־סקי.
דאָס צװײטע קאַפּיטל פֿון דער דאָזיקער געשיכטע איז פֿאָרגעקומען נאָכן פֿאַנאַנדערפֿאַל פֿונעם סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד אין די 1990ער יאָרן. דעמאָלט האָט מען אַנטדעקט אַ היפּשע זאַמלונג פֿון פֿאָנדן פֿון ייִװאָ אין ליטע, װאָס אַ ליטװישער ביבליאָגראַף האָט פֿאַרבאַהאַלטן אין אַ מאַגאַזין פֿון דער מלוכישער ביכער־קאַמער.
דאָס מאָל האָט ייִװאָ געדאַרפֿט פֿאַרהאַנדלען מיט דער רעגירונג פֿון דער ליטװישער רעפּובליק, װאָס איז אָקערשט געװאָרן אומאָפּהענגיק. סוף־כּל־סוף איז מען געקומען צו אַ פּשרה, און איצט קען מען נוצן די דאָזיקע מאַטעריאַלן אינעם דיגיטאַלישן פֿאָרמאַט.
װײַזערס געשיכטע פֿון ייִװאָ איז אַ געשפּאַנטע און באַלערעװדיקע לעקטור. מאַקס װײַנרײַך איז ניט געװען דער אײנציקער צװישן די אײראָפּעיִשע ייִדישע פּליטים װאָס האָט געפֿונען אַ נײַע הײם אין אַמעריקע און אױפֿגעבױט דאָ אַ הצלחהדיקעע קאַריערע. אָבער ער איז אפֿשר געװען דער אײנציקער, װעמען עס האָט זיך אײַנגעגעבן ניט נאָר ממשיך צו זײַן זײַנע אײגענע פֿאָרשונגען, נאָר אױך װידער אױפֿצובױען אַ גאַנצע װיסנשאַפֿטלעכע אינסטיטוציע אױפֿן נײַעם אַמעריקאַנער באָדן, װאָס פֿאַרבלײַבט אַקטיװ ביזן הײַנטיקן טאָג.
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Hasan Piker causes new trouble for Democrats — especially in key Senate race
Hasan Piker, the popular pundit who most recently suggested American Jews are making themselves targets of violence by supporting Israel, may speak for far-left progressives, but he doesn’t speak for one of the movement’s highest-profile candidates in a closely watched swing-state race, the candidate said.
Dr. Abdul El-Sayed, the Michigan Democratic nominee for Senate, released a statement Monday saying he disagreed with Piker’s latest remarks and that he is opposed to “any rhetoric that puts the community at risk.”
“If Jews in America keep putting this idea out there that they are singularly invested in Israel, eventually someone is going to come around and take action,” Piker said during a Twitch stream on Thursday, “not against the state of Israel, mind you, but against American Jews.” He claimed American Jews who support Israel are bringing violence on themselves by tying their identity to what he called “Jewish ISIS.”
Piker added in an interview published Monday in Haaretz that, “I don’t think that me calling Zionism a Nazi ideology is fomenting violence towards Jews broadly. I genuinely don’t believe that.”
In Monday’s statement, El-Sayed sought to move past the controversy, shifting the conversation back to his campaign’s economic message as he remains in a close race with GOP nominee Mike Rogers. “While politicians and pundits try to make this race about a Twitch streamer, we’re going to be talking about gas, groceries, good schools and healthcare,” Sayed said. “Nobody speaks for this campaign besides me and my campaign spokespeople.”
Piker’s influence
The episode comes as Piker appears to be expanding rather than retreating from Democratic electoral politics.
He campaigned with El-Sayed and other insurgent progressives, including Adam Hamawy, a fierce Israel critic who served as a trauma surgeon in Gaza and won the Democratic primary in New Jersey’s 12th District. In Florida, Rep. Jared Moskowitz made Piker himself part of the closing argument against his socialist primary challenger, Oliver Larkin, whom Piker supported. After Moskowitz easily defeated Larkin, the Jewish congressman offered Piker his “condolences.”
On Monday, even as the controversy over his remarks about American Jews was unfolding, Piker used his Twitch platform to offer an exclusive look at new polling commissioned by the IMEU Policy Project, a pro-Palestinian advocacy organization, and conducted by YouGov among more than 4,000 likely Democratic primary voters in the six states picked as early contests in the 2028 Democratic presidential primary: South Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Michigan and Virginia.
The results showed broad support among those Democratic voters for presidential candidates who commit to reducing U.S. aid for Israel. Piker commands an enormous platform among precisely the younger voters progressive candidates are looking to court. “These numbers are making it undeniable,” Piker said on the stream. “This is an issue that is untenable.”
Earlier in the stream, Piker said the backlash over the weekend has “been a lot” to endure. “I’m going to continue doing what I’m doing,” he added. “I’m not going to feel discouraged. I’m not going to stop saying the truth… someone has to do it.”
The risk for El-Sayed
For El-Sayed, separating himself from some of Piker’s comments but still embracing him reflects the difficult political balance he has been trying to maintain since narrowly winning the primary.
El-Sayed has struggled to build support among Jewish Democrats while holding on to the progressive and pro-Palestinian coalition that helped carry him through the primary. He has assured Jewish voters that his fierce criticism of Israel — and his political relationships with figures such as Piker — should not be seen as hostility toward Jews. “I love and revere Judaism and the Jewish people,” he said in a recent TV appearance. “My commitment to the well-being of the Jewish community, their safety, their children, their future in Michigan is the same commitment that I’ve got to the well-being of my own daughters and all of our kids,” he said in another interview on Sunday.
At the same time, he resisted calls to distance himself from Piker, who has been embraced by Democratic Party progressive candidates. He appeared with El-Sayed on the campaign trail even as Piker has championed terrorist groups as righteous fighters against Israel — leading to accusations he traffics in antisemitism. In a recent speech to college students, Piker blasted Democrats who “fund ICE” and “fund Israel.”
El-Sayed’s Republican rival has already begun courting those voters, launching a “Democrats for Rogers” effort and highlighting El-Sayed’s relationship with Piker.
Speaking to Fox News’ Jesse Watters on Monday night, El-Sayed said that Rogers “thinks he’s running against Hasan Piker.”
An AARP poll released this month had El-Sayed at 48% and Rogers at 47%. Jewish voters account for only about 1.4% of the state electorate, but the defections among Jewish Democrats could matter in a race that close.
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‘Have a problem, call the PM,’ says Netanyahu as he gives out his number in campaign video
(JTA) — TEL AVIV – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday posted what he described as his personal phone number and invited Israelis to contact him with their questions and problems.
It was an election-season stunt that drew such a flood of responses that the number’s WhatsApp account was blocked within minutes and those calling received a busy signal.
It also drew suspicions that it was a ploy to collect voter data.
In a video posted to social media, Netanyahu is seen with longtime adviser Topaz Luk, who asks the prime minister whether he can publish his phone number. Netanyahu initially reacts with disbelief, saying, “Topaz, have you gone crazy?” before agreeing.
“I want to hear from you. Your suggestions, your questions, your problems. I want to hear, so leave me a message,” Netanyahu said. He added that he could not promise to answer everyone but would respond to as many people as possible.
Hundreds of messages and calls arrived within minutes and the WhatsApp account associated with the number was blocked. Luk later posted on X that the account had been disabled because of the volume of calls and said Netanyahu’s team was working to restore it, directing people to Telegram in the meantime.
Kan political correspondent Michael Shemesh questioned whether the number belonged to Netanyahu at all and suggested on X that the exercise was “probably designed to harvest the phone numbers of potential voters.”
Other users pointed to another clue that the handset seen in the video was unlikely to be Netanyahu’s personal phone. One of the WhatsApp groups visible in Luk’s video was a synagogue updates group whose latest message appeared to back political rival Naftali Bennett, the former prime minister who now heads the Beyachad party.
“Something tells me that Bibi isn’t signed up to the ‘Menachem’s House Main Shul Updates’ group,” one X user wrote, “especially not when the latest message there is ‘yalla, it’s time for Bennett.’”
The Likud spokesperson had not responded to a request for comment on the accusations by the time of publication.
It was not the first time Netanyahu handed out what he presented as his personal number during an election campaign. In August 2022, little more than two months before the vote that returned him to power, the then-opposition leader published another number and invited Israelis to video call him.
“Why should only some people have my phone number? Everyone should have it,” Netanyahu said at the time, joking that the move was a “dramatic, world-changing decision.” He told supporters who sent proof they had joined his Telegram channel that they would have a better chance of receiving a video call from him.
The response was similarly intense. Likud said Netanyahu received 9,420 calls within the first 30 minutes, while follow-up videos showed calls and messages flooding the phone.
Netanyahu’s rivals mocked the stunt. Then-Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman released a parody video saying Netanyahu “has not picked up the phone in 12 years,” while Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid dismissed it as a “fictional phone operated by Netanyahu’s aides.”
The episode comes as Netanyahu faces a difficult reelection campaign, with roughly 20% of voters remaining undecided, many of whom are disillusioned Likud voters, according to pollsters and researchers cited by Reuters.
A Channel 13 poll released earlier this month put Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party at 23 seats, ahead of Likud with 21, and Netanyahu’s current coalition projected to win just 49 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Eisenkot also led Netanyahu 47% to 34% when respondents were asked who was better suited to serve as prime minister.
The phone-number appeal is the latest in a series of efforts to put Netanyahu directly in front of voters, including a blitz of highly publicized appearances. Last week, the prime minister visited a restaurant in Hadera, a Likud stronghold, where owner Simo Shtivi said his arrival was “like hoisting the World Cup,” as diners lined up for photos and a chance to speak with him.
Netanyahu also made a surprise appearance with his wife Sara at a concert by Israeli pop star Eden Ben Zaken. A few days earlier, he filmed a campaign video at Jerusalem’s Malha Mall meeting shoppers, including children. The Central Elections Committee later ordered the video removed because election law bars the use of children in campaign propaganda.
Likud also rolled out billboards showing New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani alongside the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Hezbollah under the slogan, “They want Netanyahu to lose. Don’t let them win.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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