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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
—
The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Netanyahu returns to Washington — this time to shape a deal with Iran, not fight one
When President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet at the White House today – their 6th meeting in the U.S. in the last year – their discussion will focus on a shared commitment to confronting the Iranian nuclear threat, but the stakes are different for each of them.
For Trump, a nuclear agreement could cement his legacy as a peacemaker, perhaps even earn him a long-coveted Nobel Peace Prize. For Netanyahu, a deal could bolster his political standing back home in a difficult election year.
In 2015, when President Obama was on the verge of signing a nuclear deal with Iran, Netanyahu cast himself as the indispensable interpreter of the Iranian threat to Washington, as he has again. But back then, Netanyahu came to publicly oppose what he called “a very bad” Iran deal, pushing back against the U.S. president. Now, he is visiting the White House with the hope of shaping U.S. policy on Iran, not challenging the president.
Trump has described the first round of discussions with Iran as “very good,” even as U.S. aircraft carriers and other military assets build up in the region. He has insisted that Tehran is “wanting to make a deal very badly.” Israel, for its part, has made clear that any agreement must go beyond limits on uranium enrichment and also address Iran’s ballistic missile program and its network of regional proxies – Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis – that have been attacking Israel.
Netanyahu has said he plans to present the president with Israel’s approach to the nuclear talks led by Trump’s close advisers, son-in-law Jared Kushner and Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff.
Netanyahu is betting that intimacy equals influence. That being the leader who shows up in person — again and again — ensures Israel is not outflanked as decisions are made. Last June, that strategy appeared to pay off. Netanyahu launched a charm offensive aimed at drawing Trump into a more active role in dismantling Iran’s nuclear program. If talks fail, Trump could act again. “Either we will make a deal, or we will have to do something very tough like last time,” Trump told Axios.
But the frequency of these meetings also reflects some vulnerability. It showcases a prime minister who cannot afford distance and disagreement with the White House.
The domestic clock is ticking
The longest-serving Israeli leader is facing a real risk that Israel’s legislature, the Knesset, will dissolve in the coming weeks if his coalition fails to resolve the explosive issue of military conscription for Haredi yeshiva students. The Haredi parties have threatened to vote against the budget ahead of the March 31 deadline — a move that would trigger elections as early as June.
If Netanyahu emerges from the White House visit with rhetorical alignment or symbolic support, he could buy himself time and political oxygen.
These gestures matter for Israel, where the education minister, Yoav Kisch, has formally invited Trump to attend the Israel Prize ceremony on Independence Day in Jerusalem to receive the prestigious award for a “Unique Contribution to the Jewish People.” Israeli officials have also invited him to participate in the annual torch-lighting ceremony, one of the most emotionally charged moments on the Israeli civic calendar.
If Trump accepts the invitation and travels to Israel again, it would be a political gift of the highest order. For Netanyahu’s supporters, that imagery could energize turnout and blunt opposition momentum. For undecided voters, it reinforces a familiar argument: Whatever Netanyahu’s flaws at home, replacing him would risk destabilizing Israel’s most important relationship abroad and its closest ally in any confrontation with Iran.
But Trump’s current position on Iran may still cross Netanyahu’s red lines. And Trump has shown before that he is willing to act unilaterally, even without backing from allies.
Still, he is very popular in Israel, and that benefits Netanyahu. A new survey by the Jewish People Policy Institute showed that 73% of Israelis rate Trump as a better-than-average U.S. president for Israel’s interests and 54% of Jews in Israel view Trump as one of the best presidents in U.S. history.
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5 things to know ahead of the Trump-Netanyahu meeting
President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are set to meet at the White House Wednesday in a highly anticipated discussion. The primary focus of the meeting is expected to be the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran, particularly regarding Tehran’s treatment of protesters and the possibility of a renewed agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.
But it also comes amid intensifying debates over U.S. military assistance to Israel, eroding bipartisan support for that aid, and recent controversial Israeli moves in the West Bank, all of which could shape the conversation.
How US military aid to Israel works
U.S. military aid to Israel has long been governed by a 2016 memorandum of understanding under which Washington pledged $38 billion in assistance over a decade — $33 billion in military grants and $5 billion for joint missile defense programs. Israel receives roughly $3.8 billion annually, including approximately $500 million earmarked for missile defense. The agreement is scheduled to be renegotiated in 2028.
Since the outbreak of the Gaza war on Oct. 7, 2023, Congress has authorized at least $16.3 billion in additional aid. The flow of funds is subject to congressional review and measures such as the Leahy Law, which bars assistance to foreign security forces implicated in gross human rights violations.
US aid to Israel no longer enjoys the bipartisan support it once did
Amid the Gaza war and the rise of a U.S. anti-war, pro-Palestinian movement, American public support for Israel has declined significantly across both major parties.
A 2025 Pew Research Center study found that only 24% of Americans under 30 view the Israeli government favorably, compared with roughly half of those over 60. Among Republicans, negative views of Israel increased from 27% in 2022 to 37%, while among Democrats the rise was steeper — from 53% to 69%. Nearly 4 in 10 adults under 30 believe the U.S. provides “too much” aid to Israel, compared with one-third of adults overall.
The debate over U.S. aid to Israel played a significant role in last week’s Democratic congressional primary in New Jersey. A super PAC associated with the pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC spent more than $2 million on negative ads that helped fuel the defeat of former Rep. Tom Malinowski, who describes himself as pro-Israel but who drew AIPAC’s fire because he is opposed to unconditional aid.
Why Netanyahu wants to reduce U.S. military aid
In recent weeks, Netanyahu and other Israeli officials have publicly expressed a desire to reduce Israel’s dependence on U.S. military assistance. Netanyahu has said he hopes to “taper off” U.S. aid over the next decade and has indicated that he does not intend to seek a full renewal of the 2016 agreement.
This push is rooted in frustrations during the Gaza war, when several allies, including the Biden administration, temporarily halted or delayed certain arms transfers over concerns that specific munitions could be used in ways that might cause excessive harm to Palestinian civilians. Israeli officials argue that these restrictions constrained Israel’s ability to fight at critical moments.
Israeli leaders also see strategic and economic value in redirecting the billions of dollars currently spent on U.S. weapons toward Israel’s own defense industry. At the same time, declining support for U.S. aid to Israel among both “America First” Republicans and Democrats concerned about Gaza casualties has made the Israeli government increasingly wary of relying on Washington for its long-term defense needs.
On Jan. 28, Netanyahu claimed that what he called an arms “embargo” under former President Joe Biden cost Israeli soldiers their lives — a statement former U.S. officials quickly condemned.
“Netanyahu is both not telling the truth and ungrateful to a president that literally saved Israel at its most vulnerable moment,” said Amos Hochstein, a former U.S. diplomat under Biden. Brett McGurk, who served in senior national security roles under presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Trump, as well as Biden, said the claim was “categorically false.” Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Tom Nides added: “He is wrong. Biden’s support for Israel has been rock solid, and he provided it at enormous political cost.”
For its part, the Trump administration published its 2026 National Defense Strategy at the end of January, which states, “Israel is a model ally, and we have an opportunity now to further empower it to defend itself and promote our shared interests.”
The meeting’s focus: Iran
Discussions regarding Iran are expected to dominate the meeting. Iran and Israel have long been adversaries, with Tehran openly committed to Israel’s destruction. The meeting comes ahead of months of increased tension between the two nations. During the 12-Day War in June 2025, Israel struck key Iranian military assets, and the U.S., buoyed by prior Israeli military successes, attacked major Iranian nuclear facilities. The present condition of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs after the strikes is unclear, and Israel remains determined to eliminate the security threat posed by Iran.
Following the outbreak of anti-regime protests in Iran in mid-January, Trump encouraged demonstrators in a Jan. 13 Truth Social post, writing: “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING—TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! … HELP IS ON ITS WAY.”
Shortly after the post, Netanyahu reportedly urged Trump not to strike Iran, citing fears of a major Iranian retaliation against Israel — an outcome Iranian officials have explicitly threatened. While Trump has repeatedly warned Iran of potential military action over Iran’s treatment of protesters, and moved a fleet of aircraft carrier strike groups to the Middle East, he has emphasized his preference for reaching a diplomatic solution with Iran, particularly focused on the country’s nuclear program.
The Trump administration met with Iranian officials in Oman over the weekend in the hopes that a deal might be struck. With talks expected to continue next week, Netanyahu is now seeking to broaden the scope of any potential agreement between the U.S. and Iran. According to a statement from his office, Netanyahu hopes the Trump administration will push for provisions addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program and Iran’s support for regional militant groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, as well as ensuring Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.
On the sidelines, Israel makes controversial moves in the West Bank
Recent Israeli decisions regarding the West Bank may also surface during the meeting, following announcements on Sunday by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Defense Minister Israel Katz of new measures expanding Israeli control over territory in the West Bank presently controlled by the Palestinian Authority. The steps will make it easier for Jewish Israelis to purchase land in the West Bank and could allow Israeli police to demolish homes in areas under PA jurisdiction — moves that would violate the Oslo Accords.
The recent Israeli decisions run counter to explicit Trump administration requests that Israel avoid controversial actions in the West Bank, particularly as Arab states have warned that steps toward annexation could jeopardize their willingness to help manage postwar Gaza or normalize relations with Israel.
Trump told Axios on Tuesday, “We have enough things to think about now. We don’t need to be dealing with the West Bank.” U.S. officials also reiterated Trump’s opposition to Israeli annexation of the territory, stating, “A stable West Bank keeps Israel secure and is in line with this administration’s goal to achieve peace in the region.”
With a potential deal with Iran on the table, U.S. military aid to Israel under growing scrutiny, and Israeli actions in the West Bank complicating regional diplomacy, Wednesday’s meeting comes at a unique moment for the U.S.-Israel relationship. But as past meetings between Trump and Netanyahu have shown, there is a very real chance the meeting could veer off script.
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Florida’s anti-Israel GOP candidate James Fishback is railing against ‘goyslop.’ What is he talking about?
(JTA) — At a campus campaign stop last week, Florida GOP gubernatorial candidate James Fishback dropped some unusual verbiage while inveighing against junk food in school cafeterias.
“I’m not saying that the test scores are the result of the Pop-Tarts,” Fishback told a crowd at the University of Central Florida, in remarks boosting locally grown produce over convenience foods. “But if you wanted kids to fail, if you wanted to set our kids up for failure, you would feed them the absolute goyslop in our cafeterias.”
Goyslop?! What was Fishback talking about?
The term has skyrocketed in use in recent months among the very online far right, the ecosystem that gave rise to the candidacy of the 31-year-old investment banker and political outsider. It’s a portmanteau of “goy,” the Yiddish word meaning non-Jew that white nationalist groups have increasingly repurposed into an antisemitic badge of honor, and “slop” — a popular way to refer to low-quality content, especially digital content.
The term is making the rounds among the largest white nationalist and antisemitic influencers. Clavicular, a popular manosphere influencer recently seen dancing and singing to Ye’s “Heil Hitler” at a Miami nightclub, appeared on a recent livestream with white nationalist Nick Fuentes to lament how “the entire grocery store is filled with goyslop.”
One popular X account known for spewing antisemitism recently defined the term “goyslop” as “fast food”; it has also been used by accounts to describe everything from the Super Bowl to the Epstein files.
It’s the sort of trolling language that Fishback has used frequently since entering the race last year. He has repeatedly praised followers of Fuentes and indicated familiarity with the antisemitic podcaster Myron Gaines. He has called U.S. Rep. Byron Donalds, his opponent and the leading candidate in the GOP primary, a “slave to donors.” (Donalds is Black.)
Fishback has also embraced anti-Israel talking points. He opposed Florida’s adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of antisemitism because — as he recently claimed to Tucker Carlson — it would make it “against the law to criticize Israel.” He has said he would “divest every penny from Israel on day one,” setting up an ideological battle in a state with a substantial Jewish population where lawmakers are on the verge of forcing the term “West Bank” to be replaced in educational materials with “Judea and Samaria.”
During the same UCF campaign event in which he uttered “goyslop,” Fishback also inveighed against politicians who “visit another country” and wind up “kissing a stupid wall,” a clear reference to Israel’s Western Wall.
Fishback’s goyslop comments came as he was responding to a question about whether he planned to remove fluoride from the state’s tap water system and replace it with creatine — the amino-acid compound beloved among health influencers for purportedly boosting athletic performance.
Fishback later winkingly professed ignorance about the word.
“I used a term recently this week that I got a lot of flak for, about referring to the food in our public cafeterias,” he told a crowd while eating a fried Oreo at the Florida State Fair. “I don’t know what that term was.”
But Jews in Florida knew. “Just last night, at a local event, he mocked efforts to bring quality education to Florida schools, using the slang ‘GOYSLOP’ in a context clearly meant to belittle,” Joseph Feldman, an Orthodox Jewish Miami resident, wrote about Fishback in the Hasidic publication VINNews. “These remarks are not accidental gaffes; they are calculated, designed to play on prejudice for political gain.”
Searches for “goyslop” have spiked over the last three months after being essentially dormant prior to that, according to Google Trends.
“Consume less goyslop, piggy,” the right-wing influencer Ian Miles Cheong posted on X last month, mocking heavy-set anti-ICE protester in Minneapolis. Cheong frequently engages on the platform with the site’s owner and multi-billionaire Elon Musk, and his account commands a following of 1.2 million on its own.
The term and a variant, “zogchow,” originated on message boards like 4Chan as early as 2019, and user-submitted definitions of the term appear on Urban Dictionary date back to 2021. In its original usage, “goyslop” refers to corporate fast food or other low-quality food, including school lunches, which antisemites believe is promoted by Jews to keep “goyim” unhealthy and dissatisfied. (“ZOG,” short for “Zionist-occupied government,” is an acronym that emerged in white supremacist circles in the 1970s and is now widely used in antisemitic rhetoric.)
Some who have employed the term “goyslop,” including leftists who have absorbed and adapted far-right talking points on Israel and Zionism, may not understand its origins. “Ever since I saw someone say they thought the goy part of goyslop was a combo of gay and soy, I’ve been wondering how many other people have no idea what the f–k they’re saying half the time,” the progressive author Ashley Reese tweeted last week.
But others are fully aware. The Anti-Defamation League’s online glossary of hate terms notes that antisemites have increasingly used “goy” in reference to antisemitic conspiracy theories.
For example, the phrase “The goyim know” — as in “shut it down, the goyim know!” — has circulated on antisemitic forums for years. It imagines the speaker as a Jew whose villainy has been exposed, and depicts Jews as “malevolent puppet-masters, manipulating the media, banks, and even entire governments to the benefit of themselves but to the detriment of other peoples,” according to the ADL.
“Slop,” meanwhile, is online slang that has caught on with the mainstream in a big way, most notably as a reference to junky or untrustworthy content generated by artificial intelligence. The dictionary publisher Miriam-Webster declared “slop” its 2025 Word of the Year, defining it as “digital content of low quality that is produced usually in quantity by means of artificial intelligence.”
From AI, “slop” has spread to the real world as a catchall term for degrading quality control in all manner of institutions. The New York Times this week, in a trend piece about one-bowl, no-fuss meals called “boy kibble,” referred to the meal as “slop.” A conspiratorial fixation on “slop” foods also dovetails with the popularity of Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s Make America Healthy Again movement and various influencer podcasts.
Fishback’s inversion of Jewish terminology didn’t end with “goyslop.” At the UCF event, following a round of laughter and applause from the gathered crowd after he employed the word, the candidate added, “And that is on gentile, OK?”
That term — a seeming riff on “on fleek” — is even harder to parse. Most X users who noted the phrase seemed to be encountering it for the first time, and there is no online record of it being circulated by other figures or on other platforms.
Fishback is polling in the low single digits in the GOP primary, according to most current pollsters. The heavily favored, and Trump-endorsed, candidate is Donalds (whom Fishback, borrowing an insult once leveled by the left at Hakeem Jeffries, has also dubbed “AIPAC Shakur”). The state’s lieutenant governor and former House speaker are also in the race, with Casey DeSantis, Florida’s current First Lady, also reportedly mulling a run.
If Fishback’s meme-heavy campaign gains traction outside of the antisemitic fringe, he may prove a new political axiom: Slop sells.
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