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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
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America’s Jewish population is shrinking as Israel’s is growing, new Pew research shows
A new Pew Research Center report released Wednesday projects America’s Jewish population will shrink by about 1.2 million between 2020 and 2070. That means the U.S. share of the world’s Jews would fall from 39% to 26%.
American Jews have long planned for the future around children who haven’t been born yet. A congregation raises money for a new wing because it expects the families to keep coming, for example. The Jewish population rose from 6.1 million in 2000 to 6.5 million in 2010, according to The American Jewish Year Book. And between 2013 and 2020, Pew estimated an increase from 6.7 million American Jews to 7.5 million.
This projected demographic downshift could force a reckoning with the slow growth Jews in the U.S. may have taken for granted.
Israel faces the opposite challenge: making room. Its Jewish population is projected to grow from 6.8 million to 11.1 million, bringing its share of global Jewry to 62%. By 2070, more than six in 10 Jews would live in Israel. Decisions made in Jerusalem, like who has to serve in the army, would affect the majority of the world’s Jews.
American Jews have built their lives as a small minority in a diverse country, and Israeli Jews as a majority in a country of their own. The balance between those communities will continue changing.
The next generation: The main force behind the shift is what demographers call “natural increase”: births outnumbering deaths. Israeli Jews are younger and have larger families, with estimated fertility of three children per household, compared with 1.5 among American Jews. Israel’s growth would more than offset declines elsewhere, bringing the worldwide Jewish population from roughly 15 million to 18 million. In the U.S., the implications will arrive long before 2070, like when a congregation downsizes or closes. For the first time in American history, more synagogues are closing each year than opening.
The meaning of home: After Oct. 7 and the rise in antisemitism that followed, these trends carry an emotional weight beyond their numbers. Pew’s migration assumptions cannot tell us if fear will drive more people to Israel, as it draws largely on patterns from 2010-2020.
Growing pains: Israel’s highest Jewish birthrates are among Haredim, or ultra-Orthodox Jews. Our Tel Aviv-based columnist Dan Perry has warned about the consequences of an education system that leaves many boys without preparation in math, English and other subjects needed for modern employment. Most ultra-Orthodox men are exempt from army service, an issue in the recent Israeli election, and only about half hold jobs. The larger their community gets, the harder that is for Israel to ignore.
Islam is projected to overtake Christianity as the world’s largest religion by 2035, driven largely by Muslims’ younger population and higher birthrates, according to the new Pew Research Center report.
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Pro-Palestinian activists protest the arrival of Yoav Gallant in NYC
(JTA) — Several dozen pro-Palestinian activists gathered Wednesday to protest the arrival of former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant, who was scheduled to at an Israel policy organization’s event in midtown Manhattan.
Gallant was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s defense minister at the time of Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attacks and during Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, serving until Netanyahu fired him in November 2024. He and Netanyahu have outstanding arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Protesters urged consequences for Gallant — and for the MirYam Institute, the pro-Israel institute based in Great Neck, New York, that hosted him.
“While far-right Zionist think tanks platform Israeli war criminals, the people of New York are here with a message for our federal government: We demand that you uphold international law and (that) the federal government arrests Yoav Gallant and all genocidaires that step into our city,” one protest leader shouted into a megaphone.
Chants of “Yoav Gallant you can’t hide, we charge you with genocide” and “Zionists not welcome here” rang out to the sound of thumping drums, as well as pots and pans. Demonstrators waved signs as they picketed outside Penn Station, displaying messages such as, “Sanction Israel: Zionist delegation out of NYC” and “War criminals not welcome.” About a dozen members of the anti-Israel, ultra-Orthodox Neturei Karta sect participated.
One passerby wearing tzitzit approached the Neturei Karta protesters, yelling in Hebrew, “Mah zeh,” meaning “What is this?” and “HaShem yishmor!”, a phrase that literally translates to “May God protect” but can convey dismay, similar to “God help us.” A handful of pro-Israel counterprotesters, including Ross Glick, a former director of the far-right Zionist group Betar US, showed up and argued with demonstrators. No arrests were made.
Many signs in the demonstration were labeled with the name of the Palestinian Youth Movement, which led the protest, and the Party for Socialism and Liberation. Anti-Zionist group Jewish Voice for Peace also promoted the protest on social media.
Demonstrators called for the prosecution of Gallant. One sign called for New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani and New York state Attorney General Letitia James to revoke the MirYam Institute’s federal tax-exempt status, although revoking that status is the responsibility of the IRS.
The MirYam Institute did not respond to a request for comment.
Mamdani vowed during his mayoral campaign to arrest Gallant’s former boss, Netanyahu, should he enter New York City, citing the ICC arrest warrant. Mamdani later acknowledged that he did not have the legal authority to do so, but has criticized Netanyahu and accused him of genocide.
Mamdani did not return a request for comment about Gallant’s visit to New York.
Wednesday’s event was billed as the MirYam Institute’s annual security briefing, where Gallant was slated to speak in addition to former Mossad director David Barnea and Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States, according to MirYam’s website.
On Tuesday, the Hind Rajab Foundation said it filed a request for the U.S. Department of Justice to prosecute Gallant “for authorizing war crimes in Gaza and Lebanon, and for the crime of genocide in Gaza.”
Michigan Rep. Rashida Tlaib reposted the foundation’s post and wrote on Tuesday that we “cannot normalize war criminals walking freely in our cities.”
“He belongs in the Hague, not on a speaking tour. Our government continues to support genocide,” Tlaib wrote.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Sam Bankman-Fried was caught stealing billions — why did Netflix make it a crime of the heart?
Sam Bankman-Fried’s Jewfro preceded him.
Spun up like cotton candy, it made a silhouette that, along with his uniform of a t-shirt and cargo shorts, somehow won the trust of millions of people and the stewardship of billions of their dollars. Whether or not this presentation was affected — a messy, Einsteinian mien cultivated to prove his genius and Casual Monday-Friday dress to out-Zuck Zuckerberg — is much contested. In time this shambolic appearance would seem to give Bankman-Fried plausible deniability for an $8 billion financial scheme. (The jury wasn’t convinced; in 2023, he was quickly found guilty and is now serving 25 years in jail, where Diddy was briefly his cellmate.)
Did the founder of FTX, a major crypto trading platform, mean to defraud investors and customers? Was he simply sloppy? Or did he, for all his lofty promises to donate 99% of his company money to charity, not really care?
The new Netflix series The Altruists believes he began with the best of intentions, and gives him a co-conspirator, presenting a folie à deux between Bankman-Fried and his on-again-off-again girlfriend Caroline Ellison, a fellow math prodigy who he picked to run the first company he founded, Alameda Research.
Showrunners Graham Moore (an Oscar winning screenwriter for The Imitation Game) and Jacqueline Hoyt (The Leftovers), working off reporting from New York magazine, have made Bankman-Fried and Ellison’s love story the crux of their true crime. In these misfits were two souls who could only understand each other. The approach seems to go beyond the credulous, and, in its play for pathos, occasionally tips into the obscene.
As a dramatic device — toggling between Sam and Caroline’s courtship, early days in arbitraging “shitcoin,” the runaway growth of FTX and a mounting crisis when their malfeasance goes public — the romance only makes sense. It was, in the end, an inappropriate, overly-intimate relationship between FTX and Ellison’s crypto trading firm Alameda that led to the implosion of an enterprise valued at its peak at $32 billion.
While they started Alameda with an eye toward affecting change in line with Effective Altruism, a philosophy that believes in making obscene amounts of money and giving as much as possible away, by 2022, FTX, designed to “democratize” crypto, was covering Alameda’s losses with money from its own customers.
This, it goes without saying, is not an ethical business practice, and is all the more ironic given Bankman-Fried’s parents, a beloved tax law professor father (played by Paul Reiser) and an ethicist mother (Robin Weigart), both faculty at Stanford.
This background, and Bankman-Fried’s early penchant for strategic betrayal, developed in a board game called Diplomacy, are largely glossed over to present a more conventionally awkward portrait of our lovers.
Bankman-Fried and Ellison, played by the Irish actor Anthony Boyle (The Plot Against America and Say Nothing, sporting his version of the wunderkind’s unruly mop of curls) and Julia Garner (Ozark, Inventing Anna, here with crooked teeth and frizzed up hair), can be reduced to a litany of eccentricities.
Bankman-Fried would munch on frozen vegan meals, go shoeless and play video games during interviews and pitch meetings. Ellison maintained a confessional blog and likened her ideal of polyamory to a Chinese imperial harem. (Sam developed mathematical formulas on how to proceed with his romantic relationships, a quality that is transferred to Caroline in the series.)
But in a defiant commitment to, in the words of Moore, “show you things that by definition couldn’t have been filmed before,” the show’s creators have replaced these idiosyncrasies with cliches.
Sam rehearses small talk in a mirror; Ellison was a pity-invite to a friend’s bachelorette party, where she has a fateful encounter with Bloomberg reporter Hannah Miller (the fact Ellison was actually a bridesmaid, and had previously hosted the bride’s engagement party, is evidently inconvenient for the nerd tropes they’re aiming to deploy.).
In the early offing, the show suffers from what I’ll call a Big Bang Theorification of the startup-blowup genre that proliferates on streaming services. The word “noob” is used with abandon. Bankman-Fried is defined largely by his sexual inexperience — Caroline is his first, and his efforts to keep her in his life spell his doom.
“Both of us are clearly not normal people,” he tells her at one point, “so maybe we don’t have to do normal things that normal people do.”
Later he muses, “I’m not normal, so I can be special,” but laments that if he falls short, others may “see me for who I really am.” You see we have a flair for subtext.
The series finally hits its stride in episode six, which Moore wrote and directed. Anchored by a dynamic performance by Alex Lawther, playing erstwhile Alameda CEO Sam Trabucco, it gives us the first credible insight into what made Bankman-Fried crypto’s major player: a blind spot for consequences, dramatized in his sneaking liquid nitrogen into his frat house to make instant ice cream.

Previous accounts of Bankman-Fried’s rise and fall point to a bigger blind spot that challenges the core of the miniseries.
Bankman-Fried appears to have been an emotionally distant, at times indifferent partner to Ellison, who, despite her interest in polyamory, ultimately wanted a more conventional arrangement. In the show, the roles are often reversed, making Bankman-Fried more sympathetic and their eventual he-said-she-said in the court of the Southern District of New York all the more poignant. It would be less sad and romantic if it, even for a moment, considered the professional power imbalance between them or the list of pros and cons SBF drew up about the prospect of them dating. Moore and Hoyt claim their own sources on the duo’s dynamic, so perhaps there’s more to what’s been reported elsewhere.
Chroniclers of FTX’s demise are divided on whether Bankman-Fried was an arrogant upstart who was out-of-his-depth, or a maximalist utilitarian, who used EA philosophy as a permission structure to flout the rules and advance his own ambition.
The Altruists suggest something else entirely: He was a good person, who meant to do the most good possible, but out of a commitment to his lover, took his eye off the ball. This may ring familiar to those who may have come off a screening of the Elizabeth Holmes doc You Can See Everything, and for me the apologia is just as hollow.
That the showrunners still buy the hype about earn to give, when Bankman-Fried entered into a $135 million deal for stadium-naming rights (not shown — it was filmed before, after all), put up $210 million for an esports partnership and blew $30 million for a Super Bowl spot with Larry David months before declaring bankruptcy, is gobsmacking.
The doomed romance intermittently makes for good drama — despite ostentatious camerawork, including an extended sequence shot through vertical bars at a Margaritaville, because foreshadowing — but it feels fundamentally dishonest given so much of what emerged about the couple after the company went bust.
That Bankman-Fried, who has a documentary series coming out later this month, composed mostly of Zoom interviews from prison, is continuing to be reevaluated shows there’s room for ambiguity. Michael Lewis gives him some grace, and gets flack for it. But while buying the EA impetus, The Altruists falls victim to the very same solipsism of its main characters.
In the end, the tragedy it presents isn’t about the people who lost everything to Sam and Caroline’s hubris, it’s that the vagaries of business — and the law — got between their love.
That this is the focus makes it a new twist on a familiar story; whether The Altruists is effective, or ethical, is another matter.
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