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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
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The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Iran Leaders Join Crowds on Tehran’s Streets to Project Control in Wartime
Iranians gather at a park on Nature Day, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, April 2, 2026. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
After more than a month of being stalked by targeted assassinations, Iran’s leadership has adopted a new tactic to show it is still in control – with senior officials walking openly in the streets among small crowds who have gathered in support of the Islamic Republic.
In recent days, Iran’s president and foreign minister have separately mixed with groups of several hundred people in central Tehran. On Tuesday, state television aired footage of the two posing for selfies, talking to members of the public and shaking hands with supporters who had gathered in public areas.
According to insiders and analysts, the appearances are part of a calculated effort by Iran’s theocratic leadership to project resilience and authority — not only over the vital Strait of Hormuz but also over the population — despite a sustained US-Israeli campaign aimed at “obliterating” it.
One insider close to the hardline establishment said such public outings are intended to show that the Islamic Republic is “unshaken by strikes and that it remains in control and vigilant” as the war grinds on.
The US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28 with the killing of veteran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior military commanders in waves of strikes that have since continued to target top officials.
Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not been seen in public since taking over on March 8 from his father. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, meanwhile, was removed from Israel’s hit list amid mediation efforts last month, including by Pakistan, to bring Tehran and Washington together for talks to end the war.
Talks aimed at ending the war have since appeared to have petered out, as Tehran brands US peace proposals “unrealistic.” Against that backdrop, recent public appearances by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Araqchi appear designed to project defiance, if not a convincing display of public support.
A senior Iranian source said officials’ public presence demonstrates that “the establishment is not intimidated by Israel’s targeted killing of top Iranian figures.”
Asked whether Iran’s foreign minister or president were on any sort of kill list, an Israeli military spokesperson, Nadav Shoshani, said on Friday he would not “speak about specific personnel.”
NIGHTLY RALLIES TO SHOW RESILIENCE
Despite widespread destruction, Tehran appears emboldened by surviving weeks of intense US-Israeli attacks, firing on Gulf countries hosting US troops and demonstrating its ability to effectively block the Strait of Hormuz.
On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump vowed more aggressive strikes on Iran, without offering a timeline for ending hostilities. Tehran responded by warning the United States and Israel that “more crushing, broader and more destructive” attacks were in store.
Encouraged by clerical rulers, supporters of the Islamic Republic take to the streets each night, filling public squares to show loyalty even as bombs rain down across the country.
Analysts say the establishment is also seeking to raise the “political and reputational” cost of the strikes at a time when civilian casualties are deeply disturbing for Iranians.
Omid Memarian, a senior Iran analyst at DAWN, a Washington-based think tank, said the decision to send officials into gatherings reflects a layered strategy, including an effort to sustain the morale of core supporters at a moment of acute pressure.
“The system relies heavily on this base; if its supporters withdraw from public space, its ability to project control and authority weakens significantly,” Memarian said.
Speaking to state television, some in the crowds voice unwavering loyalty to Iran’s leadership; others oppose the bombing of their country regardless of politics; and some have a stake in the system, including government employees, students and others whose livelihoods are tied to it.
Hadi Ghaemi, head of the New York-based Center for Human Rights in Iran, said the establishment is using such loyal crowds as human shields to raise the cost of any assassination attempts.
“By being in the middle of large crowds they have protections that would make Israeli-American attacks against them very bloody and generate sympathy worldwide,” he said.
POTENTIAL PROTESTERS STAY OFF STREETS AT NIGHT
The Islamic Republic emerged from a 1979 revolution backed by millions of Iranians. But decades of rule marked by corruption, repression and mismanagement have thinned that support, alienating many ordinary people.
While there has been little sign so far of anti-government protests that erupted in January and abated after a deadly crackdown, the establishment has adopted harsh measures – such as arrests, executions and large-scale deployment of security forces – to prevent any sparks of dissent.
Rights groups have warned about “rushed executions” during wartime after Iran hanged at least seven political prisoners during the war.
“Many potential protesters are frightened by the continuing presence of armed men and violent crowds in the streets and largely stay at home once darkness falls,” Ghaemi said.
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US Fighter Jet Shot Down Over Iran, Search Underway for Crew, US Officials Say
FILE PHOTO: A U.S. Air Force F-16 jet fighter takes off from an airbase during CRUZEX, a multinational air exercise hosted by the Brazilian Air Force, in Natal, Brazil November 21, 2018. REUTERS/Paulo Whitaker/File Photo
A US fighter jet has been shot down over Iran and a search-and-rescue operation is underway for any survivors, two US officials told Reuters on Friday, in the first such known incident since the war began nearly five weeks ago.
The Pentagon and US Central Command did not respond to requests for comment.
The prospect of US pilots being alive and on the run inside Iran raises the stakes for the United States in a conflict that has struggled to win popular support among Americans, according to opinion polls.
It also presents a challenge to the US military, which faces the twin goals of trying to save the lives of any surviving U.S. crew and safeguard whoever is involved in perilous rescue missions.
Iranian officials called on civilians to be on the lookout for survivors and have flooded social media with images that purport to show wreckage from the aircraft.
The governor of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province said anyone who captured or killed the crew “would be specially commended,” Iran’s semi-official news agency ISNA reported.
The incident follows threats by US President Donald Trump to bomb the country back to the “Stone Age,” including to attack Iran’s energy infrastructure and desalination plants, as he presses Tehran to end the war on US terms.
So far, 13 US military service members have been killed in the conflict and more than 300 have been wounded, according to the US Central Command. No US troops have been taken prisoner by Iran.
While Trump has repeatedly sought to portray the Iranian military as defeated, Reuters has reported on US intelligence showing Iran retains large amounts of missile and drone capability.
As of last week, the United States could only determine with certainty that it has destroyed about a third of Iran’s missile arsenal. The status of around another third was less clear but bombings likely damaged, destroyed or buried those missiles in underground tunnels and bunkers, Reuters’ sources said.
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Trump: US ‘Hasn’t Even Started Destroying What’s Left in Iran’
US President Donald Trump speaks on the day he honors reigning Major League Soccer (MLS) champion Inter Miami CF players and team officials with an event in the East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, US, March 5, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
i24 News – US President Donald Trump said Israel will halt its military campaign against Iran when he decides to end the war, while also signaling in recent conflicting statements that US strikes on Iranian targets could intensify.
Trump emphasized coordination with Israel, stating, “They’ll do what I tell them… They’ve been a good team player. They’ll stop when I stop. They’ll stop unless they’re provoked.”
At the same time, Trump indicated that the US has not yet fully escalated its military campaign. In a statement on Truth Social on Friday, he said, “Our military… hasn’t even started destroying what’s left in Iran. Bridges next, then electric power plants!” He added that Iran’s new leadership “knows what has to be done and has to be done FAST.”
According to a TIME report, Trump is weighing how to balance further military action with growing domestic pressure. Advisers warned him that public support for the war is declining as fuel prices rise and economic concerns mount in the United States.
The conflict has had global implications, particularly through disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for oil shipments. The report notes that prolonged instability in the waterway could deepen economic strain and impact global markets.
At the same time, the administration has highlighted military achievements while acknowledging uncertainty over how to achieve broader goals such as limiting Iran’s long-term capabilities. Trump has expressed interest in ending the war but also in ensuring what he views as a decisive outcome.
The report indicates that the US is pursuing multiple options, with Trump seeking a way to conclude the conflict while maintaining pressure on Iran through continued or expanded strikes.
