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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?
(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.
The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.
“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.
“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”
The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.
Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.
“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”
Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)
We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.
This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?
Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.
I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.
Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.
What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.
I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?
I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.
If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.
But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.
So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?
First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.
There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.
It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.
One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.
What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?
I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.
It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.
There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?
Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.
But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.
So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.
The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.
There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.
I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?
Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.
I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.
And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.
But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.
And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.
Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.
The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?
Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.
So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.
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The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
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Dismantling the Iranian Zombie State: Washington’s Strategic Imperative
Smoke rises as protesters gather amid evolving anti-government unrest in Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan province, Iran, released on Jan. 10, 2026, in this screen grab obtained from a social media video. Photo: SOCIAL MEDIA/via REUTERS
The statement delivered by President Donald Trump this week, was more than just another warning to a rogue state. By declaring that the Iranian regime had finally begun to cross “very strong” red lines, and noting that “people are being killed who aren’t supposed to be killed,” the administration signaled the end of a long, failed experiment in managed containment.
We are no longer witnessing a typical cycle of civil unrest in the Middle East. Instead, we are watching the mechanical, violent twitching of what can only be described as a “zombie state” — a clerical establishment that died economically and morally years ago, but continues to walk, fueled only by the survival instincts of its security apparatus and the blood of its own citizens.
To understand why Washington must now move from rhetoric to reality, one must look past the regime’s propaganda and into the overwhelmed wards of Tehran’s hospitals.
On the night of January 8, 2026, as the regime pulled the “kill-switch” on the nation’s Internet, reducing connectivity to a mere one percent, a concentrated slaughter was unleashed in the capital. Reports from medical professionals, risking their lives to smuggle out data, confirm a horrific tally: 217 deaths across just six hospitals in a single night. At Milad and Imam Hossein hospitals, doctors counted 70 bodies each, many arriving with gunshot wounds to the head and eyes — the unmistakable signature of a deliberate shoot-to-kill policy. These victims were not collateral damage in a riot; they were targets of a state that has forgotten how to lead and only knows how to execute.
This “zombie” nature of the Iranian government is not just a metaphor. It is a structural reality. In political analysis, a zombie institution is one that persists long after its social utility has vanished, now driven solely by the primary motivation to survive regardless of the cost to the world. Since the brief but intense “12-Day War” in June 2025, which saw the US and Israel puncture Iran’s aura of deterrence by striking nuclear and military sites, the regime has been in a terminal tailspin. The economy is in a “survival phase,” marked by a currency collapse and a banking system so hollowed by corruption that Bank Melli, the nation’s largest lender, recently faced a massive bank run and suspended cash withdrawals.
Rather than addressing these failures, the clerical elite has retreated into a bunker mentality, labeling every protester a “terrorist” and an “enemy of God” — a charge that carries the mandatory death penalty in their warped legal system. Sensing that the local Law Enforcement Command was “balking” at the order to massacre their own neighbors, the regime has now unleashed the IRGC Ground Forces. Even more telling is the regime’s reliance on foreign muscle; approximately 800 fighters from Iraqi Shiite militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, have been flown in to do the work that even some Iranian soldiers are refusing to do. A regime that must hire foreign mercenaries to kill its own people is a regime that has already lost its soul.
For Washington, the strategic interest is clear: a nuclear-armed zombie is a threat to the world. President Trump’s “very strong options” must address the current “deterrence gap” in the Persian Gulf, where the absence of a US carrier strike group has encouraged Tehran to test American resolve. But the true solution lies in empowering the living movement that is already challenging the dead regime. The Iranian people are no longer asking for reform; they are flying the pre-1979 flag and calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty to restore their national identity.
Washington should immediately move to provide the material tools of resistance. This means bypassing the regime’s digital iron curtain with “direct-to-cell” technologies and thousands of additional Starlink terminals, ensuring the next Internet blackout fails to hide the regime’s crimes. It means facilitating financial channels that allow the global diaspora to fund nationwide strikes, effectively starving the zombie state of the resources it uses to fuel its machines of war. If military force is used, it must be surgical, targeting the specific IRGC units responsible for the hospital massacres, thereby providing the Iranian people the breathing room they need to reclaim their sovereignty.
The 217 martyrs of Tehran’s hospitals — and the many others that have since joined them — have already paid the entry fee for a new Iran. They have proven that the clerical establishment rules only through violence, an observation President Trump echoed on his return from Mar-a-Lago. The time for bargaining with a corpse is over. The “Greatest Peace” the Middle East has ever seen will not come through negotiations with a criminal regime; it will come when the Iranian people are given the support to finally bury the zombie state and build a free, stable, and democratic future.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx
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Israel to Compete in First Semifinal of 2026 Eurovision Song Contest, Organizers Announce
Israel’s representative to the Eurovision Song Contest, Yuval Raphael, a survivor of the deadly Oct. 7 2023, attack by Hamas on the Nova festival in Israel’s south, holds an Israeli flag in this handout photo obtained by Reuters on Jan. 23, 2025. Photo: “The Rising Star,” Channel Keshet 12/Handout via REUTERS
Israel will participate in the first semifinal of the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest in Vienna, Austria, in May and will perform during the second half of the competition, the European Broadcasting Union announced on Monday.
The first semifinal will be held on May 12, followed by the second semifinal on May 14. Based on the results of the audience and jury vote, the top 10 countries from each semifinal will move on to compete in the grand final on May 16. All portions of the 2026 Eurovision will take place at the Wien Stadthalle in Vienna. The lineup for the semifinals was decided by a draw, conducted during a live broadcast by the Austrian broadcaster ORF and on the official Eurovision Song Contest YouTube channel.
The countries competing in the first half of the semifinal on May 12 are Georgia, Portugal, Croatia, Sweden, Finland, Moldova, and Greece. Israel is competing in the second half along with Montenegro, Estonia, San Marino, Poland, Belgium, Lithuania, and Serbia. The order of performances for the two semifinals will be announced by the end of March, according to the EBU.
A total of 35 countries will participate in the 70th Eurovision Song Contest, but only 30 will compete in the semifinals because five countries are pre-qualified for the grand final on May 16. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and last year’s winner Austria automatically qualify for the grand final, but are still required to broadcast and vote in one of the semifinals. Germany and Italy will perform and vote in the first semifinal.
“The Eurovision Village at Rathausplatz – in the heart of our city – will send a visible message of unity to the world – something very important in these turbulent times,” said Vienna Mayor Michael Ludwig in a released statement. “Vienna will become the world stage of entertainment once more and do everything possible to ensure that all visitors can celebrate a wonderful and safe festival together. Vienna will once again show that it is a great host for people from all over the world, where everyone can feel welcome and safe.”
“Together with ORF, Vienna is ready to welcome Europe and the world for the 70th Contest to celebrate music, creativity and connection,” said Martin Green CBE, director of the Eurovision Song Contest. “With broadcasters from across Europe and beyond taking part, and a global audience that continues to grow, the Eurovision Song Contest remains a truly unique live event. We can’t wait to see the stage come alive in May and to share an extraordinary celebration of 70 years of international music and creativity with hundreds of millions of viewers worldwide.”
Spain, Ireland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Slovenia announced they will not compete in the 2026 Eurovision after it was ruled in early December that Israel is allowed to participate. The countries are protesting Israel’s military actions in the Gaza Strip during the Israel-Hamas war. Other countries, like Belgium and Italy, have been facing pressure to withdraw from the song contest because of Israel’s involvement. Two previous Eurovision winners also returned their trophies to the EBU in protest of Israel’s participation in the 2026 Eurovision: 2024 Swiss winner Nemo and Charlie McGettigan, who won the 1994 Eurovision with fellow Irish singer Paul Harrington.
Austria’s broadcaster ORF said last month it will not ban Palestinian flags from the audience or drown out booing during Israel’s performance in the Eurovision this year.
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Trump’s Iran Tariff Threat Risks Reopening China Rift
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping react as they hold a bilateral meeting at Gimhae International Airport, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, in Busan, South Korea, Oct. 30, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein
US President Donald Trump’s threat to slap a 25% tariff on countries that trade with Iran risks reopening old wounds with Beijing, Tehran’s biggest trading partner.
Iran became a flashpoint in US-China ties during Trump’s 2017-21 first term as president as Washington tightened sanctions on Tehran and put China‘s Huawei, accused of selling technology to the Islamic Republic, in its crosshairs.
The arrest of Meng Wenzhou, the daughter of Huawei’s founder, in Canada at Washington’s request sparked retaliation and a hostage crisis, with bitter recriminations lingering for the remainder of Trump’s first administration.
With Iran in his sights once again, the duty would see Chinese shipments to the US incurring levies exceeding 70%, higher than the effective 57.5% tariffs in place before Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping struck a deal in October to de-escalate their trade war.
It remains unclear which countries with Iranian business links Trump might target, and he has not named China. The US president has also made offhand remarks that threatened to upend US foreign policy without acting on them before.
“China will call [Trump’s] bluff. I can assure you that Trump has no guts to impose the extra 25% tariffs on China, and if he does, China will retaliate and he will be punished,” said Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, “just like in Meng Wenzhou’s case.”
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Some Chinese experts questioned why Trump seemed intent on revisiting one of the most contentious foreign policy issues from his first term, despite having already made Beijing think twice about providing economic support to Tehran.
“China and Iran are not as close as in the public imagination,” said a Beijing-based Chinese academic who advises the foreign ministry on Iran policy, and requested anonymity as they were not authorized to speak to media.
China has sharply reduced Iranian imports in recent years, according to Chinese customs data, with Chinese companies wary of being sanctioned by the US government. China bought just $2.9 billion of Iranian goods in the first 11 months of last year, the latest customs figures show, compared with a peak of $21 billion in 2018 during Trump’s first presidency.
That said, Beijing moves around 80% of Iran‘s shipped oil through small independent refiners trading off the books to skirt US sanctions over the country’s nuclear ambitions.
China‘s state-backed oil majors have not done any business with Iran since 2022. Some analysts say the independents’ shipments means the total value of China‘s purchases remains in the tens of billions of dollars.
“China is just an excuse, a kind of disguise for the Trump administration, to impose new pressure [on] Iran,” said Wang Jin at the Beijing Club for International Dialogue think tank.
When asked at Tuesday’s regular press conference on Trump’s tariff threat, China‘s foreign ministry said that Beijing would “resolutely safeguard its legitimate rights and interests.”
HIGH STAKES
Still, Iran remains substantially bigger business for China than Venezuela, where Trump acted to curb Beijing’s stake with a commando raid to capture President Nicolas Maduro to face drug charges in the United States.
Analysts said Trump’s renewed push to cut off Iran from global trade flows is likely to deepen scrutiny of Xi’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, where Iran is a strategic hub for the passage of Chinese goods to the Middle East.
It also raises uncertainty over whether Trump will visit Beijing in April as expected, with analysts anticipating the announcement of a sweeping trade agreement with Xi.
“Whether Trump’s tariffs are enforceable remains a question,” said Xu Tianchen, a Beijing-based analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit.
“Last year he announced tariffs related to ‘illicit’ Russian oil trade, but their implementation was patchy.”
“Trump is also the kind of person who likes bullying the weak,” Xu said. “He should manage his actions to avoid these tariffs escalating into direct confrontation with China.”
