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American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews?

(JTA) — Among Sandra Fox’s most memorable finds during her years mining American archives for materials about Jewish summer camps was a series of letters about the hours before lights-out.

The letters were by counselors who were documenting an unusual window in the day when they stopped supervising campers, leaving the teens instead to their own devices, which sometimes included romance and sexual exploration.

“It was each division talking about how they dealt with that free time before bed in ‘age-appropriate ways,’” Fox recalled about the letters written by counselors at Camp Ramah in Wisconsin, the original iteration of the Conservative movement’s network of summer camps.

“I’ve spoken to Christian people who work at Christian camps and have researched Christian camps. There is no free time before bed,” Fox told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “That’s not a thing if you don’t want kids to hook up. So it was just amazing to find these documents of Camp Ramah leaders really having the conversation explicitly. Most of the romance and sexuality stuff is implicit in the archives.”

The letters are quoted extensively in Fox’s new book, “The Jews of Summer: Summer Camp and Jewish Culture in Postwar America.” Fox, who earned a PhD in history from New York University in 2018 and now teaches and directs the Archive of the American Jewish Left there, tells the story of American Judaism’s most immersive laboratory for constructing identity and contesting values.

Next week, Fox is launching the book with an event at Congregation Beth Elohim in Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Tickets for the Feb. 23 event are available here.) Attendees will be able to tour adult versions of some of the most durable elements of Jewish summer camps, from Israeli dance to Yiddish and Hebrew instruction to Color Wars to Tisha B’Av, the mournful holiday that always falls over the summer.

“I never considered doing a normal book party,” Fox said. “It was always really obvious to me that a book about experiential Jewish education and role play should be celebrated and launched out into the world through experiential education and role play.”

Sandra Fox’s 2023 book “The Jews of Summer,” looks at the history of American Jewish summer camps. (Courtesy of Fox)

We spoke to Fox about her party plans, how Jewish summer camps have changed over time and how they’ve stayed the same, and the cultural history of that before-bed free time.

This interview has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. We’ll be continuing the conversation in a virtual chat through the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Feb. 27 at 1 p.m.; register here.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency: Given how much Jews like to talk about camp, were you surprised that this book hadn’t already been written?

Sandra Fox: There’s been a lot of fruitful research on the history of various camps, but it’s usually been focused on one camping movement or one camp type. So there are articles about Zionist camps. There are certainly articles out there about the Ramah camps. A lot of camps have produced books — either their alumni associations or a scholar who went to let’s say, Reform movement camps have created essay collections about those camps. And there are also books about Habonim and other Zionist youth movements.

I don’t really know why this is the first stab at this kind of cross-comparison. It might be that people didn’t think there would be so much to compare. I think the overwhelming feeling I get from readers so far, people who preordered and gotten their books early, is that they’re very surprised to hear how similar these camps are. So perhaps it’s that scholars weren’t thinking about Jewish summer camps that came from such diverse standpoints as having something enough in common to write about them all at once.

Also distance from the time period really helps. You can write a book about — and people do write a book about — the ’60s and ’70s and have been for decades, but there’s a certain amount of distance from the period that has allowed me to do this, I think, and maybe it also helps that I’m generationally removed. A lot of the scholars who’ve worked on camps in the postwar period went to camps in the postwar period. It makes a lot of sense that it would be harder to write this sort of sweeping thing perhaps. The fact that I’m a millennial meant that I could write about the postwar period — and also write kind of an epilogue-style chapter that catches us up to the present.

What’s clear is that there’s something amazing about studying summer camp, a completely immersive 24/7 experience that parents send children away for. There’s no better setting for thinking about how adults project their anxieties and desires about the future onto children. There’s also no place better to think about power dynamics and age and generational tension.

I was definitely struck by the “sameyness” of Jewish camps in your accounting. What do you think we can learn from that, either about camps or about us as Jews?

I do want to say that while there’s a lot of sameyness, whenever you do a comparative study, there’s a risk of kind of collapsing all these things and making them seem too similar. What I’m trying to convey is that the camp leaders from a variety of movements took the basic structure of the summer camp as we know it — its daily schedule, its environment, its activities — and it did look similar from camp to camp, at least on that surface level.

If you look at the daily schedules in comparison, they might have a lot of the same features but they’ll be called slightly different things depending on if the camp leans more heavily towards Hebrew, or Yiddish, or English. But the content within those schedules would be rather different. It’s more that the skeletal structure of camp life has a lot of similarities across the board and then the details within each section of the day or the month had a lot of differences.

But I think what it says is that in the postwar period, the anxieties that Jewish leaders had about the future of Judaism are really, really similar and the solution that they found within the summer camp, they were pretty unanimous about. They just then took the model and inserted within it their particular nationalistic, linguistic or religious perspectives. So I think more so than saying anything about American Jewry, it shows kind of how flexible camping is. And that’s not just the Jewish story. Lots of different Americans have embraced summer camping in different ways.

So many people who have gone to camp have a fixed memory of what camp is like, where it’s caught in time, but you argue that camps have actually undergone lots of change. What are the most striking changes you documented, perhaps ones that might have been hard for even insiders to discern as they happened?

First of all, the Israel-centeredness of American Jewish education as we know it today didn’t happen overnight in 1948, for instance. It was a slower process, beyond the Zionist movements where that was already going on, for decades before 1948. Ramah and the Reform camps for instance took their time towards getting to the heavily Zionist-imbued curricula that we know.

There was considerable confusion and ambivalence at first about what to do with Israel: whether to raise an Israeli flag, not because they were anti-Zionist, but because American Jews had been thinking about proving their loyalty to America for many generations. There were some sources that would talk about — what kind of right do American Jews have to raise the Israeli flag when they’re not Israeli? So that kind of Israel-centeredness that is really a feature of camp life today was a slower process than we might think.

It fit camp life really well because broader American camps used Native American symbols, in some ways that are problematic today, to create what we know of as an iconography of camp life. So for Jews, Israel and its iconography, or Palestine and iconography before ’48, provided an alternative set of options that were read as Jewish, but it still took some time to get to where we are now in terms of the Israel focus.

One of the reasons I place emphasis on the Yiddish summer camps is to show that in the early 20th century and the mid-20th century there was more ideological diversity in the Jewish camping sphere, including various forms of Yiddishist groups and socialist groups and communist groups that operated summer camps. Most of them have closed, and their decline is obviously a change that tells a story of how American Jewry changed over the course of the postwar period. Their legacy is important, too: I have made the argument that these camps in a lot of ways modeled the idea of Yiddish as having a future in America.

What about hookup culture? Contemporary discourse about Jewish camps have focused on sex and sexuality there. What did you observe about this in the archives?

I think people think of the hookup culture of Jewish camps today and certainly in my time in the ’90s and 2000s as a permanent feature, and in some ways I found through my research and oral history interviews that that was the case, but it was really interesting to zoom out a little bit and think about how Jewish summer camps changed in terms of sexual romantic culture, in relationship to how America changed with the sexual revolution and the youth culture.

It’s not it’s not useful to think about Jewish hookup culture in a vacuum. It’s happening within America more broadly. And so of course, it’s changed dramatically over time. And one of the things I learned that was so fascinating is that Jewish summer camps were actually their leaders were less concerned in a lot of ways about sexuality at camp in the ’40s and ’50s, than they were in the late ’60s and ’70s. Because earlier premarital sex was pretty rare, at least in the teenage years, so they were not that concerned about what happened after lights out because they kind of assumed whatever was going on was fairly innocent.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, that’s when camps have to actually think about how to balance allowance and control. They want to allow campers to have these relationships, to have their first sexual experiences, and part of that is related to rising rates of intermarriage and wanting to encourage love between Jews, but they also want to control it because there’s a broader societal moment in which the sexuality of teenagers is problematized and their and their sexual culture is more public.

There’s been a real wave of sustained criticism by former campers about the cultures that they experienced, arguing that the camps created an inappropriately sexualized and unsafe space. There’s been a lot of reaction to that and the broader #MeToo moment. I’m curious about what you can speculate about a future where that space is cleaned up, based on your historical research — what is gained and what, potentially, could be lost?

Without being involved in camping today — and I want to really make that disclaimer because I know a lot of change is happening and lot of organizations are involved to talk about this issue better, to train camps and camp leaders and their counselors to not create a pressured environment for camper — I think what the history shows is that this hookup culture did not come about out of nowhere. It was partly related to the broader changes in America and the sexual revolution.

But it was also partly created because camps really needed to have campers’ buy-in, in order to be “successful.” A huge argument of my book is that we think about the power of camps as if camp directors have campers as, like, puppets on strings, and that what they do is what happens in camp life. But actually, campers have changed the everyday texture of life at camp over the course of the decades in so many different ways by resisting various ideas or just not being interested.

So hookup culture is also part of making campers feel like they have freedom at camp and that’s essential. That’s not a side project — that is essential to their ability to get campers to come back. It’s a financial need, and it’s an ideological need. If you make campers feel like they have freedom, then they will feel like they freely took on the ideologies your camp is promoting in a really natural way.

The last part of it is rising rates of intermarriage. As rates of intermarriage rose in the second half of the 20th century, there’s no doubt in my mind from doing the research that the preexisting culture around sexuality at camp and romance at camp got turbo-boosted [to facilitate relationships that could potentially lead to marriage between two Jews]. At that point, the allowance and control that camp leaders were trying to create for many decades leans maybe more heavily towards allowance.

There are positives to camp environments being a place where campers can explore their sexualities. There’s definitely a lot of conversation about the negative effects and those are all very, very real. I know people who went through horrible things at a camp and I also know people who experienced it as a very sex-positive atmosphere. I know people in my age range who were able to discover that they were gay or lesbian at camp in safety in comparison to home, so it’s not black and white at all. I hope that my chapter on romance and sexuality can maybe add some historical nuance to the conversation and give people a sense of how this actually happened. Because it happened for a whole bunch of reasons.

I think there’s a consensus view that camp is one of the most “successful” things the Jews do. But it’s hard to see where lessons from camp or camp culture are being imported to the rest of Jewish life. I’m curious what you see as kind of the lessons that Jewish institutions or Jewish communities have taken from camp — or have they not done that?

Every single public engagement I do about my work has boiled down to the question of, well, does it work? Does camp work? Is it successful? And that’s been a question that a lot of social scientists have been interested in. I don’t want to oversimplify that research, but a lot of the ways that they’ve measured success have been things that are not necessarily a given to all Jews as obviously the right way to be a Jew. So, for instance, in the ’90s and early 2000s, at the very least, a lot of research was about how, you know, “XYZ” camp and youth movement were successfully curbing intermarriage. A lot of them also asked campers and former campers how they feel about Israel, and it’s always if they are supportive of Israel in very normative ways, right, giving money visiting, supporting Israel or lobbying for its behalf — then camps have been successful.

I’m not interested in whether camps were successful by those metrics. I’m interested in how we got to the idea that camp should be successful in those ways in the first place. How did we get to those kinds of normative assumptions of like, this is a good Jew; a good Jew marries a Jew; a good Jew supports Israel, no matter what. So what I wanted to do is zoom out from that question of success and show how camp actually functions.

And then the question of “does it work” is really up to the reader. To people who believe that curbing intermarriage is the most important thing, then camps have been somewhat successful in the sense that people who go to these heavily educational camps are less likely to marry out of the faith.

But I am more interested in what actually happened at camp. And in terms of their legacies, I wanted to show how they changed various aspects of American Jewish life, and religion and politics. So I was really able to find how camping was essential in making kind of an Israel-centered Jewish education the norm. I was also able to draw a line between these Yiddish camps over the ’60s and ’70s that closed in the ’80s and contemporary Yiddish. The question of success is a real tricky and political one in a way that a lot of people have not talked about.

And is camp also fun? Because you’re creating a camp experience for your book launch next week.

Camp is fun — for a lot of people. Camp was not fun for everyone. And so I do want to play with that ambivalence at the party, and acknowledge that and also acknowledge that some people loved camp when they were younger and have mixed feelings about it now.

The party is not really a celebration of Jewish summer camp. People will be drinking and having fun and dancing — but I want them to be thinking while also about what is going on and why. How is Tisha B’Av [the fast day that commemorates the destruction of the ancient Jewish temple in Jerusalem that falls at the height of summer] commemorated at camp, for example?

Or what songs are we singing and what do they mean? I think a lot of people when they’re little kids, they learn songs in these Jewish summer camps that they can’t understand and later they maybe learn Hebrew and go, whoa, we were singing what?! My example from Zionist summer camp is singing “Ein Li Eretz Acheret,” or “I Have No Other Country.” We were in America and we obviously have another country! I don’t think anyone in my youth movement actually believes the words “Ein Li Eretz Acheret” because we live in America and people tend to kind of like living in America and most of them do not move to Israel.

So at the party we’ll be working through the fun of it, and at the same time the confusion of it and the ambivalence of it. I want it to be fun, and I also want it to be something that causes people to think.


The post American Jews created historic summer camps. Or did summer camps create American Jews? appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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Cornell University Clears President of Wrongdoing After Incident With Anti-Israel Protesters

Cornell University students walk on campus, November 2023. Photo: USA TODAY NETWORK via Reuters Connect

Cornell University absolved its president, Michael Kotlikoff, of wrongdoing following an incident in which anti-Israel protesters accused him of lightly impacting a student and an alumnus with his car as they participated in a mob which had surrounded the vehicle to prevent his leaving a parking space.

As seen in viral footage shared on social media and reported in local outlets, Kotlikoff was walking to his car on April 30 when an anti-Zionist group converged on him, demanding a chance to interrogate him about free speech and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Kotlikoff resolved to go home, however, telling the group that he would not answer any more questions and asked them to stop recording.

After the protesters refused to comply, Kotlikoff denied the protesters their move to form a blockade around his parking spot, reversing out of it even as the student and alumnus held their positions to hold him still.

All the while, the mob banged on the vehicle, creating what the school described as a sense of imminent danger.

“The actions taken by these individuals on April 30th, which included following President Kotlikoff from an evening event into a parking lot and impeding his ability to leave, are inconsistent with university policies governing expressive activity and our standards for respectful conduct, safety, and the prohibition of intimidation,” the university’s Ad Hoc Special Committee of the Board of Trustees said in a statement on Friday announcing its decision after reviewing the incident. “President Kotlikoff has declined to pursue a complaint against the students involved.”

Noting it considered evidence gathered by the Cornell University Police Department (CUPD), including video footage and a sworn statement from Kotlikoff, the committee said the person at the scene who reported that Kotlikoff’s vehicle had made contact refused treatment from the EMS team and would not provide a sworn statement to CUPD. None of the individuals at the scene gave sworn statements about the incident.

The committee added that “appropriate action” was taken against at least one of Kotlikoff’s “non-student” harassers and called on students to appreciate the importance of “robust debate” and “peaceful protest,” values it extolled Kotlikoff for upholding “over the course of his decades long tenure at Cornell.”

Cornell University is no stranger to radical anti-Zionist activity. In 2023, a history professor there cheered Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel — a cornucopia of evils which included torture and gang rape. That same semester, an ex-student, Patrick Dai, threatened to perpetrate mass murder and sex crimes against Jewish students.

Anti-Zionists activists at Cornell have also heavily featured blood in their political messaging. Last year, they doused a statue in red paint and left behind a graffitied message which said “occupation=death.”

Kotlikoff, whom trustees appointed to the university’s top position in 2024 at the peak of student protests over the Israel-Hamas war, is a veteran of several clashes with the school’s anti-Israel faction.

Having enacted a zero-tolerance disciplinary policy, Kotlikoff has pursued criminal investigations against protesters who break the law, as happened in September 2024 when a mass of them disrupted a career fair because it was attended by defense contractors Boeing and L3Harris. The incident resulted in at least three arrests, and, later, severe sanctions, including classifying five students as “persona non grata,” which, Cornell says, bans from campus “a person who has exhibited behavior which has been deemed detrimental to the university community.”

Anti-Zionist student groups have tried and failed several times to initiate mass demonstrations or make other big moves during these final weeks of the academic year.

At Occidental College in Los Angeles, Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) “peacefully” took down an encampment it established in April to protest the institution’s financial ties to Israel after school officials rushed to the scene to take names and issue disciplinary referrals, deterring others joining in.

At Smith College in Massachusetts, SJP activists last month were granted a meeting with high-level officials at a later date in exchange for the group’s ending an unauthorized encampment established on campus to protest the board of trustees’ decision to reject a proposal inspired by the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.

Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.

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Jewish Man Brutally Attacked in London After Speaking Hebrew

Jewish man beaten in London on May 17, 2026, after speaking Hebrew. Images circulating on social media show the victim’s face heavily bloodied and bruised, with multiple visible cuts and swelling in the aftermath of the assault. Photo: Screenshot

British police are searching for a group of attackers after a young Jewish man was brutally assaulted in the north London area of Golders Green following an incident in which he was overheard speaking Hebrew, the latest outrage in a surge of antisemitic violence and harassment shaking the city’s Jewish community.

On Sunday night, a 22-year-old Jewish man was violently attacked by a group of four to five unidentified individuals outside his home in Golders Green, one of the most visible centers of Jewish life in London, around 2 am, after they allegedly overheard him speaking Hebrew during a phone call.

According to multiple media reports, masked men walking nearby heard the man speaking Hebrew on his phone and began chasing him while shouting antisemitic insults.

Once they caught up with him, the group allegedly demanded to know if he was Jewish, before dragging him across the road, ripping his clothes, and stealing one of his shoes.

The attackers brutally beat him, according to reports, repeatedly kicking him until he was left close to losing consciousness, with images later circulating on social media showing his face covered in cuts and bruises.

Local law enforcement arrived at the scene shortly afterward, but the suspects had already fled. The victim was later taken to hospital for treatment of his injuries and has since been receiving medical care.

As authorities continue their investigation, the assault is being treated as an antisemitic hate crime, with no arrests made so far.

The Campaign Against Antisemitism, a British charity, strongly condemned the incident, warning of a sharp escalation in threats facing Jewish communities and calling for urgent action to confront the rising tide of violence.

“It is plain for all to see that Jewish lives are under threat in their own communities. We cannot wait any longer for real intervention against this horrific wave of violence against Britain’s Jews,” the statement read. “We are in dire need of urgent action.”

In the United Kingdom, the Jewish community has faced a mounting wave of antisemitic violence, intimidation, and street-level harassment over the past two years following the Hamas-led invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, with the escalation deepening concerns over public safety.

Over the past couple months, however, the rate and intensity of incidents have spiked, with arson attacks, stabbings, and other forms of violence.

Recently, an increasingly popular antisemitic TikTok trend in London has led to arrests and convictions after young men filmed themselves using cash to mock and harass members of Orthodox Jewish communities.

Videos circulating on social media show young men walking through heavily Jewish areas of London carrying fishing rods with money attached to the line in an apparent attempt to “fish for Jews.”

In a separate incident last weekend in Stamford Hill, a man allegedly whipped several Haredi Jewish women with a belt before spitting at volunteer responders who arrived at the scene. Witnesses said he also shouted racist insults, antisemitic slurs, and threats at both the victims and the volunteers.

Hours later, in nearby Amhurst Park in north London, a Jewish child was allegedly assaulted outside a school after a woman screamed antisemitic insults and punched the minor.

Three weeks ago, an assailant stabbed two Jewish men in Golders Green — an attack that prompted the British government to raise the national terrorism threat level from “substantial” to “severe” for the first time in over four years.

In March, arsonists set fire to four ambulances belonging to the Jewish Hatzola organization in the area. Weeks later, a synagogue and the former premises of a Jewish charity in north London were also targeted.

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Iran’s Executions More Than Double in 2025, Making Up 80% of Global Total, New Data Shows

A February 2023 protest in Washington, DC calling for an end to executions and human rights violations in Iran. Photo: Reuters/ Bryan Olin Dozier.

The Islamic regime in Iran led the world in documented executions last year, with 2,159 people killed out of a total of 2,707 across 17 nations, according to a report released on Monday by Amnesty International.

Iran’s executions surged since 2024, when the regime carried out at least 972. All executions were conducted through hanging.

Following Iran, the next countries with the highest totals included Saudi Arabia, 356 or more; Yemen, 51; the United States, 47; Egypt, 23; Somalia, 17; Kuwait, 17; Singapore, 17; Afghanistan, six; and the United Arab Emirates, three.

Three countries executed one person: Japan, South Sudan, and Taiwan. In the US, nearly half of all executions took place in Florida. In total, Iran and Saudi Arabia accounted for 93 percent of documented global executions.

Notably, the 2025 total did not include “the thousands of executions that Amnesty International believes continued to be carried out in China, which remained the world’s lead executioner.”

China “continued to execute and sentence to death thousands of people but kept figures secret,” stated the report, which explained other countries did not disclose their death penalty numbers including North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Belarus.

“In the face of the state secrecy that continued to surround data on the death penalty, disclosures and commentary by the Chinese authorities once again pointed to an intentional use of the death penalty to send a message that the state would not tolerate threats to public security or stability; and would impose severe punishment to maintain order,” the report said.

According to Amnesty International, 2025 saw the highest number of executions globally since 1981, with Iran leading the surge.

“This alarming spike in the use of the death penalty is due to a small, isolated group of states willing to carry out executions at all costs, despite the continued global trend towards abolition,” said Agnès Callamard, secretary general of Amnesty International. “From China, Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia to Yemen, Kuwait, Singapore, and the USA, this shameless minority are weaponizing the death penalty.”

Callamard warned that the use of the death penalty sought to “instill fear, crush dissent, and show the strength state institutions have over disadvantaged people and marginalized communities”

The report showed a disturbing trend among the executions: that 46 percent of offenders (1,257) received the sentence for drug convictions, with 998 in Iran, 250 in Saudi Arabia, 15 in Singapore, and two in Kuwait. Amnesty documented 11 public hangings in Iran and six in Afghanistan — spectacles meant to terrorize communities as much as punish individuals.

Amnesty published its findings weeks after a joint-annual report released by the European groups Iran Human Rights (IHR) in Norway and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM) in France found Iran executed at least 1,639 people in 2025, a 68 percent leap from the 975 killed in 2024 and the highest seen since tracking began in 2008.

In March, the Human Rights Activists News Agency released a report on broader crackdowns in Iran last year, identifying that 78,907 people were arrested on ideological or political grounds from March 2025 to March 2026. In addition, the group found at least 6,724 protesters, including 236 children, were killed, with an additional 11,744 cases still under verification. Researchers also discovered 105 women were murdered with seven classified as “honor killings,” and that 68 were victims of sexual violence.

While men dominated the list of executions in the annual report, Iran executed 61 women and Saudi Arabia executed five.

Regarding methods of execution deployed, hanging was the preference of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Singapore, and South Sudan. Countries using firing squads included Afghanistan, China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Taiwan, the UAE, and Yemen. China, the US, and Vietnam rely on lethal injections while some US states use nitrogen gas asphyxiation.

Saudi Arabia is the world’s only state to continue beheading as a method of execution. The kingdom maintains the practice in accordance with Islamic law which mandates death for a wide range of offenses including adultery, sorcery, and apostasy.

The report noted that last year in Yemen, 18 people were convicted and sentenced to death “for sexual acts that do not constitute internationally recognized offenses – including sexual relations among consenting adults of the same-sex, and drug-related offenses.”

Saudi Arabia has also executed people convicted of offenses as children. Researchers described how on Aug. 21, 2025, the government executed Jalal Labbad (who was born on April 3, 1995) for his alleged “participation in protests in 2011 and 2012 against the treatment of Saudi Arabia’s Shia minority in Al-Qatif, as well as his attendance at funerals of individuals killed by security forces. On Aug. 1, 2022, the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) convicted and sentenced him to death for alleged offences committed when he was 16 and 17 years old.”

Amnesty claimed success in its campaign to end capital punishment which started in 1977, noting that at the time 16 countries had banned the practice and today the number has reached 113.

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