(JTA) — An Australian writers’ festival is facing backlash after it announced it had removed an Australian-Palestinian author from its lineup over concerns her inclusion would “not be culturally sensitive” in the wake of the Bondi massacre.

The decision by the organizers of Adelaide Writers’ Week to disinvite Palestinian Australian author, lawyer and activist Randa Abdel-Fattah comes weeks after two gunmen motivated by “Islamic State ideology” opened fire on a Hanukkah celebration in Sydney, killing 15 and injuring dozens more.

“Whilst we do not suggest in any way that Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah’s or her writings have any connection with the tragedy at Bondi, given her past statements we have formed the view that it would not be culturally sensitive to continue to program her at this unprecedented time so soon after Bondi,” the festival’s board’s statement read.

While it was unclear what the festival’s organizers were referring to, in the wake of the Bondi massacre, Abdel-Fattah made a post in the wake of the Bondi massacre decrying those who she said were “quickly surrendering to the agenda of those who are using a horrific act of antisemitism to entrench anti-Palestinian racism.”

“Now is the time to insist on principles not abandon them,” she in a Dec. 17 post on Instagram, three days after the attack. “To see through the shameful and dangerous political exploitation of the murder of 16 people by Zionists, white supremacists, the far right to advance their racist, violent, and oppressive agendas.”

The festival’s organizers wrote that the decision will “likely be disappointing to many in our community,” adding that they expected it would be “labelled and will cause discomfort and pressure to other participants.”

Indeed, since the organizer’s decision was announced on Thursday, nearly 50 writers have announced that they would boycott the festival, which is scheduled to take place from Feb. 28 to March 5, according to The Guardian.

Among the authors who have announced their resignation from the event are British author Zadie Smith, Pulitzer Prize winner Percival Everett, former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis and Russian-Jewish writer M. Gessen, according to The Sydney Morning Herald.

Jewish Community Council of South Australia public and government liaison Norman Schueler told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that he had written a letter to the organizers calling for Abdel-Fattah’s removal. (The progressive Jewish Council of Australia condemned Abdel-Fattah’s removal.)

“The board [has] completely, appropriately disinvited her and personally, I’m very, very surprised it appears a large cohort of people have decided to support her,” Schueler told the outlet.

On Thursday, Abdel-Fattah posted a statement on X where she decried the festival’s decision.

“This is a blatant and shameless act of anti-Palestinian racism and censorship and a despicable attempt to associate me with the Bondi massacre,” she said. “After two years of Isrel’s live-streamed genocide of Palestinians, Australian arts and cultural institutions continue to reveal their utter contempt and inhumanity towards Palestinians. The only Palestinians they will tolerate are silent and invisible ones.”

Abdel-Fattah told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that she hoped that the festival would reconsider its decision.

“I would like an apology, I would like a redemption in terms of the retraction of that statement, the reinstatement of my invitation and steps by the board to actually hold itself accountable to community for what it has done here,” she said.

The post After Australian literary festival drops Palestinian activist, citing Bondi massacre, dozens boycott in solidarity appeared first on The Forward.

Something significant is happening between Israel and Syria, and it deserves more attention than it is getting.

With the backing of the United States, Israeli and Syrian officials have agreed to create what they call a “joint fusion mechanism” — a permanent channel for coordination on intelligence, de-escalation, diplomacy and economic matters — during meetings in Paris. It appears to be the beginning of institutionalized contact between two countries that have formally been at war since 1948.

If this process continues, it will count as a genuine foreign-policy success for President Donald Trump’s administration.

To understand how profound that change would be, it is worth recalling the two countries’ shared history.

Israel and Syria — which the U.S. struck with a set of targeted attacks on the Islamic State on Saturday — have fought openly or by proxy for decades. Before 1967, Syrian artillery positions in the Golan Heights regularly shelled Israeli communities in the Hula Valley and around the Sea of Galilee. After Israel captured that region in 1967, the direct shelling stopped, but the conflict did not.

Syria remained formally committed to a state of war; Israel entrenched itself in the Golan Heights; both sides treated the frontier as a potential flashpoint to be managed carefully. After Egypt and Israel made peace in 1979, Syria became Israel’s most dangerous neighboring state.

A 1974 disengagement agreement created a United Nations-monitored buffer zone, which mostly ensured peace along the border, but did not resolve anything fundamental. In Lebanon, Israel and Syria backed opposing forces for years, and their air forces clashed briefly during the 1982 Lebanon War. Later, Iran’s growing role in Syria and Hezbollah’s military buildup added new threats. The Syrian civil war then destroyed basic state capacity and created precisely the kind of militia-rich environment Israel fears along its borders.

Now, with the dictator Bashar al-Assad gone and the former rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in power, Syria is a broken country trying to stabilize. Sharaa’s past associations, disturbingly, include leadership of jihadist groups that were part of the wartime landscape in Syria. But today he governs a state facing economic collapse, infrastructure ruin and a population that needs jobs and basic services. His incentives are simple and powerful: ensure the survival of his regime, invite foreign investment, and secure relief from isolation and sanctions. Those goals point toward the U.S. and its partners, including Israel.

The Trump administration has made it clear that it wants to see new Syrian cooperation with Israel, with the suggestion that progress with Israel will become a gateway to international investment, and to a degree of political acceptance that Syria has lacked for years. Al-Sharaa’s willingness to engage is therefore not a mystery.

Israel’s motivations are also straightforward. After the Gaza war, Israel is facing a severe reputational problem. It is widely viewed abroad as reckless and excessively militarized. The government is under pressure over not only the conduct of the war but also the perception that it has no political strategy and relies almost exclusively on force. A diplomatic track with Syria allows Israel to present a very different picture: that of a country capable of negotiations with ideologically opposed neighbors, de-escalation, and regional cooperation.

There are significant security incentives, too.

Israel wants to limit Iran and Hezbollah’s influence in Syria. It wants a predictable northern border. It wants assurances regarding the Druze population in southern Syria — brethren to the Israeli Druze who are extremely loyal to the state, and who were outraged after a massacre of Syrian Druze followed the installation of al-Sharaa’s regime. It wants to ensure that no armed Syrian groups will tread near the Golan. A coordinated mechanism supervised by the U.S. offers a strong diplomatic way to address these issues.

The U.S. will benefit as well. The Trump team is eager to show that it can deliver lasting diplomatic achievements in the Middle East after the success of the Abraham Accords in Trump’s first term. A meaningful shift in Israel–Syria relations would be a very welcome addition, especially as the U.S.-brokered ceasefire in the Gaza war faces an uncertain future.

The main questions now are practical. Can the “joint fusion mechanism” function under pressure? What will happen when there is, almost inevitably, an incident — a drone downed, a militia clash, a cross-border strike? Will the new system effectively lower the temperature, or will it collapse at the first crisis?

Will Iran — facing its own profound internal political crisis — accept a Syria that coordinates with Israel under U.S. supervision, or will it work to undermine al-Sharaa? How will Hezbollah react if Damascus appears to move away from the axis of “resistance” and toward a security understanding with Israel?

How would an Israel-Syria deal impact Lebanon’s moribund efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capacity? Al-Sharaa has already helped significantly by ending the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah from Iran through his territory. Might he also actively help with the disarming of the group?

No one should expect a full peace treaty soon. The question of possession of the Golan Heights probably remains a deal-breaker. Public opinion in Syria has been shaped by decades of official hostility to Israel, and Israeli politics is fragmented and volatile.

But diplomatic breakthroughs can confound expectations. They usually begin with mechanisms like this one, involving limited cooperation, routine contact and crisis management.

If this effort helps move the border from a zone of permanent tension to one of managed stability, that alone would be a major shift. It would also send a signal beyond the region: U.S. engagement still matters, and American pressure and incentives can still change behavior.

The post A quiet diplomatic shift in the Middle East, with monumental consequences for Israel appeared first on The Forward.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks to the press on Capitol Hill, Washington, DC, July 8, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in an interview published on Friday that he hopes to “taper off” Israeli dependence on US military aid in the next decade.

Netanyahu has said Israel should not be reliant on foreign military aid but has stopped short of declaring a firm timeline for when Israel would be fully independent from Washington.

“I want to taper off the military within the next 10 years,” Netanyahu told The Economist. Asked if that meant a tapering “down to zero,” he said: “Yes.”

Netanyahu said he told President Donald Trump during a recent visit that Israel “very deeply” appreciates “the military aid that America has given us over the years, but here too we’ve come of age and we’ve developed incredible capacities.”

In December, Netanyahu said Israel would spend 350 billion shekels ($110 billion) on developing an independent arms industry to reduce dependency on other countries.

In 2016, the US and Israeli governments signed a memorandum of understanding for the 10 years through September 2028 that provides $38 billion in military aid, $33 billion in grants to buy military equipment and $5 billion for missile defense systems.

Israeli defense exports rose 13 percent last year, with major contracts signed for Israeli defense technology including its advanced multi-layered aerial defense systems.

US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a staunch Israel supporter and close ally of Trump, said on X that “we need not wait ten years” to begin scaling back military aid to Israel.

“The billions in taxpayer dollars that would be saved by expediting the termination of military aid to Israel will and should be plowed back into the US military,” Graham said. “I will be presenting a proposal to Israel and the Trump administration to dramatically expedite the timetable.”