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India, Israel, and the Rewiring of the Horn of Africa
India’s prime minister, Shri Narendra Modi, addresses the gathering at the Indian Community Reception Event at the Singapore Expo in Singapore on November 24, 2015.
On December 26, 2025, Israel took the dramatic step of becoming the first state to officially recognize the independence of Somaliland and to establish full diplomatic relations with it.
This was not merely symbolic. It was an extraordinary strategic move that could alter the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s geographic significance became more apparent following the direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025, which underscored Tehran’s efforts to move physically closer to Israel by establishing footholds at regional flashpoints. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was also a strategic response to Ethiopia’s existential need — as the world’s most populous landlocked state — for sovereign access to the sea. The Port of Berbera in Somaliland is the key to freeing Addis Ababa from its near-total dependence on Djibouti’s ports, which are under increasing Chinese influence.
The Israeli move targets the pressure points of other actors as well as Iran. These include Turkey, which is deeply entrenching its political and military influence in Somalia and adjacent maritime routes; and China, which maintains infrastructural and security dominance in Djibouti through economic leverage within the BRI framework. Israel is not planning on a heavy military deployment, but rather on using a combination of monitoring, control, intelligence, and digital capabilities — an approach that aligns with India’s emphasis on capacity-building and functional sovereignty enhancement.
Africa as a central axis in India’s maritime statecraft
Over the past decade, New Delhi has redefined Africa as a key arena in shaping the Global South and as a core component of its strategic interests. India views the continent as a neighborhood in which it can implement its concept of maritime statecraft — a security-economic infrastructure, centered around the Indian Ocean, that is aimed at establishing India as a preferred security and development partner. This approach is anchored in the SAGAR and MAHASAGAR doctrines, which provide a strategic framework for integrating security, growth, and connectivity. Africa is also a critical arena in which India hopes to realize its defense export target of $5 billion by 2025 — a goal unattainable without a deep, institutionalized, and long-term presence on the continent.
The continental anchor: The India-Ethiopia strategic partnership
The historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Addis Ababa on December 16-17, 2025, marked a new phase in the political anchoring of India in the Horn of Africa. The elevation of bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership was intended to inject “new energy and depth” into the countries’ cooperation, with a focus on security, technology, and the economy. Ethiopia — a country with a population of over 126 million that is undergoing a demographic and geo-economic transformation — is a key partner in the realizing of India’s vision of the “Global South.”
Israel’s move in Somaliland provides the protective envelope required to safeguard shared interests in the Indian Ocean “maritime neighborhood.” Israeli capabilities in ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), port security, and MDA (maritime domain awareness) are vital tools in the countering of threats from Iran and maritime terrorism in the Red Sea. The security synergy with Israel directly supports India’s goal of reaching $5 billion in defense exports by 2025, the success of which will be contingent on expansion in Africa.
The combined Indian-Israeli presence in the Horn of Africa offers a clear alternative to China’s BRI model. The Chinese model focuses on massive investment in physical infrastructure that often generates financial dependency and debt. The Indian-Israeli model advances a “resilience and redundancy” approach that is based on sovereign trade corridors and strategic autonomy. India contributes capacity-building and digital infrastructure while Israel adds an advanced technological-operational layer.
Somaliland as a laboratory of informal order
Somaliland stands out as a strategic anomaly: it is a stable and functioning entity despite the absence of formal international recognition. This characteristic makes it an ideal testing ground for the Indian-Israeli model.
A central component of the complementary security package offered by the Indian-Israeli axis is ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), which encompasses advanced technological tools like unmanned platforms, satellite systems, and sensor networks that enable continuous data collection and real-time operational intelligence.
While India focuses on physical infrastructure and human-capital training as part of its capacity-building efforts, Israel contributes digital “eyes.” These capabilities are particularly vital for states with extensive Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) but limited monitoring capacity, as they enable effective maritime control without requiring a heavy military presence.
A complementary pillar is port security, which involves a multi-layered physical and digital defense of port infrastructure, piers, and logistical facilities against sabotage, maritime crime, and terrorism. In this context, India invests in physical infrastructure at strategic points while Israeli capabilities ensure that the assets function as protected “sovereign trade corridors.” Port security is not merely a narrow security concern but a prerequisite for developing a sustainable blue economy and reshaping intra-African trade patterns.
The third component is MDA (maritime domain awareness), defined as the ability to generate an integrated situational picture of all maritime activity relevant to security, economic, and environmental interests. MDA relies on the synthesizing of raw data into broad intelligence that can be used for real-time decision-making. India’s aspiration to position itself as a “first responder” to disasters and threats in the Indian Ocean depends heavily on such capabilities. Advanced MDA systems will enable effective responses to piracy, illegal fishing, and non-state threats, strengthening India’s standing as a rule-setting maritime power rather than a reactive one.
The integration of ISR, port security, and MDA creates an operational synergy that deepens African states’ positive dependence on the capabilities offered by the Indian-Israeli axis. While India lays the diplomatic, economic, and physical foundations, Israel provides the critical technological edge that turns the partnership into a game changer vis-à-vis the Chinese model, which relies more on centralized control and less on empowering local capabilities.
Strategic synergy: Redefining the rules of the game
The Indian-Israeli partnership in the Horn of Africa is more than a classical security alliance. It represents an attempt to test whether sustained maritime influence can be built through legitimacy, partnership, and sovereignty enhancement rather than coercion. The division of labor is clear: India shapes the normative framework, legitimacy, and connectivity to the Global South, while Israel supplies the operational-technological layer required to counter physical and technological threats. This synergy strengthens both states: India is perceived as a provider of non-colonial security and development solutions, while Israel establishes a presence along a strategic line stretching from the Indian Ocean through Ethiopia to the Horn of Africa.
The promise inherent in Indian-Israeli synergy in the Horn of Africa is not immune to structural failure or geopolitical shifts. For the proposed model to be sustainable, it must address three risk vectors.
The first is the continent’s structural fragility. Somaliland is positioned as a “laboratory of stability,” yet it operates within an African environment marked by chronic instability. There is a tangible risk that population growth will turn from a “dividend” into a socio-economic burden due to inadequate infrastructure. In the short period from 2020 through 2023, nine military coups occurred in seven African countries, illustrating institutional erosion across the continent. Moreover, debt traps and food insecurity further exacerbate risk. Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio has doubled over the past decade (from 30% to approximately 60%), limiting states’ ability to invest in costly defense technologies. Concurrently, severe food insecurity affects around 20% of the continent’s population, potentially triggering internal unrest that could undermine strategic partnerships.
The second challenge is the Indian legitimacy paradox. India seeks to lead the Global South by promoting sovereignty and transparency. However, recognition of a secessionist entity like Somaliland incurs a dual political risk. It may clash with the African Union (AU), as African states are highly sensitive about preserving post-colonial borders. Supporting Somaliland could be perceived as undermining Somalia’s sovereignty, thereby damaging India’s status as a consensual continental hub. There is also the possibility of a Turkish-Somali backlash. Turkey’s model in Somalia is based on a military presence and deep influence. Recognition of Somaliland places New Delhi and Jerusalem on a collision course with Ankara, which may respond by escalating its military footprint at other maritime chokepoints.
The third challenge is technological competition: Israel’s edge versus the Turkish model. Israel offers superior ISR and MDA but faces competition from proven operational models. Turkish defense equipment (such as Bayraktar UAVs) has demonstrated its battlefield effectiveness in Africa (for example, in Ethiopia and Somalia). The Indian-Israeli model must prove that its security package offers operational and economic value superior to that provided by the cheaper and readily available alternatives supplied by Ankara and Beijing.
An alliance of sovereignty and resilience
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not an end in itself but a first step in a broader alliance aimed at reshaping the regional rules of the game. The real contest is not over declarations but over the building of durable networks of influence and alliances capable of controlling trade, information, and intelligence flows. For Israel and India, this constitutes a process of strategic rewiring in which they are positioning themselves as rule-setting powers through partnership, resilience, and functional sovereignty. This represents an alternative model for the regional — and potentially global — order, one that respects the sovereignty of Global South states and strengthens their resilience against external threats.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum and a lecturer and a teaching assistant in the Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program at Bar-Ilan University. She specializes in Indian foreign policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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The Netanyahu-Trump alliance reaches its breaking point
For decades, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s greatest political asset was the United States. Even Israelis who distrusted him, opposed him, or blamed him for deepening the country’s divisions often accepted one proposition: Netanyahu understood the U.S. better than any other politician. He knew how to preserve Israel’s position at the center of American politics and power, without which the country would be in danger.
That belief is no more.
As negotiators meet this week to discuss the future of the Middle East, Israel finds itself in an extraordinary position. Central questions under discussion involve Israel’s security, Israel’s freedom of military action, and the future of Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions.
Yet Israel is not in the room. Iran is.
The result, in Israel, has been something close to wall-to-wall shock and condemnation. And the harshest criticism is aimed not at the agreement but at Netanyahu himself. Switzerland looks like a vindication of the deepest concerns of opponents who have long argued that Netanyahu mortgaged Israel’s bipartisan support in Washington in exchange for a close relationship with President Donald Trump.
“The strategic damage that this government is leaving behind in terms of our relationship with the United States is damage that will take years to repair,” said former Cabinet minister Izhar Shai.
Netanyahu “built Israel’s entire strategic position around President Trump,” Shai added. “But Trump does what is good for himself and for his voters. He does not act on behalf of the state of Israel.”
Someone might want to convey that message to Trump, who has repeatedly suggested that he determines what Israel can and cannot do, and publicly implied that Netanyahu follows his instructions.
Now, as Trump makes promises about Israel’s actions without Israel in the room, he’s solidified the international impression that the hallowed U.S.-Israel relationship has been reduced to that of a superpower dictating terms to an utterly dependent client. No American president from either party has treated an Israeli prime minister this way — at least in public.
An alliance close to fracturing
Many Israelis are confronting the once-unthinkable possibility that their country’s relationship with the U.S. has been materially damaged by the very leader who claimed unique mastery over it. The concern is not merely that Trump disagrees with Netanyahu. It is that influential figures in Washington increasingly appear to believe that Netanyahu helped draw the U.S. into a military confrontation with Iran based on assumptions that were flawed from the outset.
Since Netanyahu spent years narrowing Israel’s political base in the U.S., there’s nowhere for Israel to turn. Netanyahu’s repeated confrontations with Democratic administrations, beginning most dramatically with his 2015 speech objecting to President Barack Obama’s proposed nuclear deal with Iran, steadily weakened bipartisan support. His identification with Trump — whom he openly supported in the 2024 election — meaningfully deepened that trend.
Meanwhile, relations with many European governments deteriorated, especially during the cataclysmic Gaza war. The result is that Israel now finds itself with fewer reserves of international goodwill than at any point in recent memory.
For Israelis, the American relationship has never primarily been about aid. The billions of dollars in annual military assistance are important, but for a half-trillion-dollar economy they are not decisive. The real value of the alliance is strategic.
American backing provides Israel with a level of deterrence that no other country can offer. It shields Israel diplomatically, particularly at the United Nations. It anchors the network of trade, investment, technological cooperation and international legitimacy on which Israeli prosperity depends. Without that support, Israel would face far greater risks of diplomatic isolation, economic pressure and boycotts.
Israelis understand this intuitively, even if their politics do not always reflect it. It is their prosperous economy that finances a sophisticated military. International trade and investment help sustain that prosperity. Strong alliances help make those relationships possible.
Remove enough pieces from that structure, and eventually even Israel’s military power will begin to erode. Remove the U.S., and it could crumble.
A boon for Israel’s military foes
The immediate strategic implications of negotiations are also serious. If Washington agrees to constrain Israeli freedom of action in Lebanon as part of a broader accommodation with Tehran, as appears possible, Israel could find itself pressured by its strongest ally to withdraw from positions it regards as essential to its security. For residents of northern Israel, many of whom only recently returned home after months of displacement, that prospect is deeply unsettling.
And a weakened Israeli deterrent could strengthen Hezbollah politically as well as militarily. The organization is battered. But if Israel is forced to accept restrictions on its freedom of action while Hezbollah remains intact, the Lebanese government — which recently took risks by signaling a willingness to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance — may conclude that confrontation is no longer worth the danger.
In the worst case scenario, Hezbollah could emerge from the crisis with greater influence than before, emboldened to test Israel through provocations, targeted attacks or efforts to intimidate opponents inside Lebanon.
Israel’s military future as regards Iran also looks grim. The Islamic Republic has emerged strategically strengthened from this conflict. It’s all but certain that Tehran has no real plans to abandon its long-term nuclear ambitions, even if it accepts temporary restrictions. Israelis’ expectation now is that Iran will eventually resume enrichment activities — while Israel’s ability to respond militarily has been narrowed by understandings reached over its head.
That is why the current moment feels so dangerous. Israelis are considering, for the first time for real, that by relying on Trump, Netanyahu has wrecked the strategic framework that has underwritten Israel’s security and prosperity for generations. The October election may therefore become more than a referendum on the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, Gaza or Iran. It may become a referendum on the central promise that sustained Netanyahu’s political career for decades: that whatever his faults, he knew how to manage America.
The post The Netanyahu-Trump alliance reaches its breaking point appeared first on The Forward.
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The White House cabinet is eating like your zayde
Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is hawking a new diet: sauerkraut. Yes, lacto-fermented cabbage. And it’s catching on with Trump’s cabinet, according to The Wall Street Journal, which reported that Vice President JD Vance, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick are all heaping their plates with cabbage — apparently “drawn by the promise of slimmer waistlines and glowing skin.”
This claim may sound like it belongs in the marketing material for some sort of beauty product, or a scammy gas station supplement, rather than a jar of preserved vegetables. But RFK Jr. boasted that he lost 20 lbs in 30 days from eating mass amounts of the stuff. One might assume something like a tapeworm is responsible for such extreme weight loss — especially given Kennedy’s previous worm-related medical issues — but he asserts it’s all thanks to cabbage.
The diet, drawn up by one Dr. Sean O’Mara, an MD who advertises himself as an “executive biological consultant to high-performance leaders,” is apparently not just about sauerkraut; it includes other fermented vegetables, urges followers to also eat steak, snack on “old world cheese” and cut out alcohol and sugar.
Admittedly, this sounds like a fairly normal, low-carb diet. But sauerkraut is so core to the meal plan that members of the cabinet have taken to making their own, and carrying it around just to make sure they’re never without. Kennedy’s wife, Cheryl Hines, said on a podcast with Steven Miller’s wife, Katie, that she has had to refuse to stow a container of sauerkraut in her clutch when she and her husband go out for a nice evening. But, she said, he brings it anyway, presumably in his own bag. Or maybe tucked under his arm.
It’s hard to imagine anything more bubbie-coded than whipping out a jar of sauerkraut from a handbag while out at a nice dinner.
It’s not that Jews have some kind of patent on fermented vegetables; they exist in many cultures, like kimchi in Korea and miso in Japan. Sauerkraut specifically is common throughout European countries like Germany, Czechia and Russia.
But in the U.S., there’s a pretty strong association between Jews and pickles, whether they be sauerkraut or cucumbers, thanks to the deli culture imported with Jewish immigrants into the U.S. Jews created a pickle district on the Lower East Side, selling the preserved vegetables from pushcarts and spreading the food through the city. We’ve long been aware of the healthy gut biome effects of a lacto-fermented vegetable.
Ashkenazi food has long been made fun of for being gross — largely thanks to innovations like jarred gefilte fish, its beige-heavy color palette and, as the Wall Street Journal piece hinted at, the diet’s resulting gastrointestinal effects. Much of shtetl food culture was the result of hardship, and the need to preserve food through long winters, not an attempt for glowing skin and slim waistlines. The hardier the vegetable, the longer it lasted. Enter the cabbage. There are few foods less sexy than cabbage. (And I love cabbage.)
Which is why it’s so funny to see some of the most powerful men in the U.S. adopting the diet of a poor shtetl Jew — and doing so for aesthetic reasons.
There are a lot of weird diets and quasi-scientific buzzwords like “seed oils” and “clean protein” floating through the MAHA world that these American leaders often play to. But most of those, at least the ones promoted by men like Vance, have some cross-over focus on manliness and discipline — they’re about building muscle in some sort of primitive way. Think the carnivore diet or Kennedy’s obsession with beef tallow. Seeing these men turn to a diet I associate with my grandmother because they want to lose weight feels absurd, especially in the days of Ozempic for those with the funds to pay for it. Perhaps that does not have the right optics.
Of course, sauerkraut is nothing to be ashamed of. In recent years, Jews have been reclaiming pride in their food cultures; bespoke pickling classes have boomed. So the White House cabinet’s sauerkraut kick is really just them being really late to the shtetl chic trend. But you still should probably be ashamed of smuggling your own food into a nice restaurant, even if it’s sauerkraut.
The post The White House cabinet is eating like your zayde appeared first on The Forward.
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Chair of Britain’s largest arts center to step down amid antisemitism scrutiny
(JTA) — The chair of the United Kingdom’s largest arts institution will step down this fall following months of controversy over allegations of antisemitism and his social media activity related to Israel.
Misan Harriman, 48, the chair of the publicly funded Southbank Centre in central London that hosts millions of visitors per year, publicly stated earlier this week that he would not seek another term.
In a since-deleted social media post, Harriman stated on Monday that his departure had long been planned. “It’s semi-public knowledge that my term is coming to an end anyway,” he said, according to The Guardian. “I had decided way before this madness that I was going to do two terms.” He added, “I came on just after Covid, two terms, then handing the baton to whoever the next chairman will be. We will find out in due course, and of course, I am going to support that.”
The Southbank Centre said that it had been informed earlier in the year of Harriman’s decision.
In May, more than 64 MPs and peers wrote to Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy asking the government to open an investigation into Harriman’s behavior, expressing concern that his public comments “have not been treated with sufficient scrutiny, particularly given their implications for public trust and community confidence,” in a publicly funded institution.
Nandy later confirmed that the Charity Commission and Arts Council England were examining complaints, alongside an internal review by the Southbank Centre.
Harriman, a photographer and self-described social activist, came to prominence in 2020, photographing a Black Lives Matter protest in London. He has overseen the Southbank Centre since 2021, but it’s only in recent months that he has faced increasing scrutiny over his public and social media comments, including referring to Israel as an “occupying power” and accusing the country of genocide.
In April, when two Jewish men were stabbed in the heavily Orthodox Jewish neighborhood of Golders Green in London, Harriman posted on social media about an alleged third victim who was Muslim. He wrote, “Wait, so there was a 3rd victim on the SAME DAY who was Muslim?! And our press isn’t reporting it? Even the Met Police didn’t mention the Muslim victim in its X post?! What is going on @metpolice_uk ?”
The Muslim victim did in fact receive coverage, and the focus on the Jewish victims stemmed from the alleged attacker’s anti-Jewish animus.
Then, following Reform UK’s gains in the May 7 local elections, Harriman shared a post that critics said compared the party’s success to the events that led to the Holocaust.
The post prompted Reform MP Robert Jenrick to respond on X, “Comparing the millions who voted Reform on Thursday to the Nazis is disgusting.”
Harriman received support from many prominent activists and artists who signed a petition in May organized by The Good Law Project. The petition accused right-wing media of running a smear campaign against Harriman.
Those who signed included activist Greta Thunberg, actors Aimee Lou Wood, Mark Ruffalo, and Susan Sarandon, director Yorgos Lanthimos and journalist Mehdi Hassan.
Following Harriman’s announcement, the Campaign Against Antisemitism praised the decision, posting on X, “Mr Harriman’s decision to step down – supposedly always his intention – is welcome. This saga has exposed a rot in the arts world. We hope that his successor will be more worthy of the post.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post Chair of Britain’s largest arts center to step down amid antisemitism scrutiny appeared first on The Forward.

