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Trump is poised to reinforce Iran’s regime — despite Netanyahu’s pressure
President Donald Trump’s Wednesday meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took place with an air of urgency around Iran. Yet the men left their three-hour conclave without resolving a fundamental divergence: Israel is deeply suspicious of any agreement with the Islamic Republic, and Trump has a visible preference for keeping diplomacy alive.
So visible, in fact, that Trump announced on Truth Social after the meeting that negotiations with Iran will continue. Where does that leave Israel, which is deeply concerned that Trump, in search of a quick win, will go for a deal that eases sanctions — strengthening the Iranian regime at precisely the time when it seems brittle enough to fall? And what about Iranian critics of the regime, who have good reason to feel betrayed by an American president who encouraged them to protest, and now seems poised to pursue accommodation with the authorities who had protesters killed en masse?
Of course, nothing in the Trump era can be analyzed with absolute certainty. Strategic misdirection is a recognized feature of even normal statecraft, and Trump has elevated unpredictability into something close to doctrine. Yet even allowing for that ambiguity, the meeting made clear that Israel and the United States are not aligned on an absolutely key issue — a potentially perilous state of affairs.
What does Israel want?
Israel does not trust the Iranian regime, for myriad reasons. The Islamic Republic’s missile programs, its sponsorship of proxy militias, and its long record of hostility toward Israel are viewed as elements of a single strategic problem.
Because of that deep and deeply justified mistrust, Israel is wary of any deal that might stabilize or legitimize the regime — a risk raised by Trump’s interest in a new nuclear deal. Israeli leaders are concerned about long-term risk. A renewed agreement focused narrowly on nuclear restrictions would almost inevitably entail sanctions relief or broader economic normalization. Such measures, from Jerusalem’s perspective, would strengthen the very Iranian system that has spent decades spreading havoc across the region.
That doesn’t mean Israel would prefer immediate military confrontation, or that it will speak out against any deal. An agreement that would dismantle Iran’s expanding missile range, including systems capable of reaching Europe, and cut funding from its network of allied armed groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Palestinian factions Hamas and Islamic Jihad — would possibly be of interest. Trump has so far not publicly stressed those demands.
Israel is politically divided, but when it comes to Iran, a broad consensus cuts across political lines. The regime must fall or radically change, for the sake of human rights within Iran’s borders, and that of a healthy regional future outside them.
What does Trump want?
The American position is less straightforward, largely because it is filtered through Trump’s distinctive political style, and his limited regional knowledge. Trump often appears unbothered by expert and public opinion; he seeks drama, through visible wins, deals, and dramatic reversals. He will present any outcome as an amazing achievement that no predecessor could have hoped for — even if he ends up signing an agreement that looks quite a lot like former President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal, which he walked away from in 2018.
Trump’s broader worldview might provide insight. Unlike earlier American administrations that explicitly championed democracy promotion, with mixed results, Trump’s national security posture has consistently downplayed ideological missions. His rhetoric and policy frameworks have reflected skepticism toward efforts to reshape other societies’ political systems, instead emphasizing transactional relationships and the avoidance of prolonged entanglements.
This orientation is reinforced by his political base. A significant segment of MAGA-aligned voters wants a more isolationist foreign policy. Within that framework, negotiations that promise de-escalation and risk reduction are politically attractive. Military confrontation, by contrast, carries unpredictable costs.
Trump’s posture, oscillating between threats of force and enthusiasm for negotiation, reflects the strange truth that American political alignments on Iran defy traditional expectations, with hawkishness losing favor on the right. He has preserved the military option while simultaneously projecting optimism about a deal. Meanwhile, a huge and growing armada is parked in the waters near Iran.
What does Iran want?
Assessing Iranian intentions is notoriously difficult. The regime’s history of opaque decision-making, tactical deception, and disciplined negotiation complicates any definitive reading.
Yet certain baseline assumptions are reasonable. First, the regime seeks survival. Whatever ideological ambitions authorities may harbor, self-preservation remains paramount. Sanctions relief, economic stabilization, and reduced risk of direct confrontation with the U.S. all serve that objective.
Second, Iran is unlikely to accept a permanent prohibition on uranium enrichment, particularly at civilian levels. Tehran has consistently framed demands for “zero enrichment” as infringements on sovereignty — a defensible position under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Third, the regime has strong incentives to resist constraints on its missiles and militias, even though the militias are completely indefensible. But the regime exists, essentially, to export jihad, and those groups have been a central pillar of Iran’s project for decades.
Could the Iranian regime be brought down?
This question lurks behind every discussion of Iran, though policymakers rarely address it directly. Regime change, while rhetorically invoked at times, presents immense practical challenges. Many observers doubt that aerial strikes alone could produce political collapse. Modern regimes, particularly those with entrenched security apparatuses, rarely disintegrate solely under external bombardment. Iran’s leadership has demonstrated resilience under severe economic and military pressure, maintaining internal control despite periodic unrest.
That means meaningful regime destabilization would almost certainly require fractures within the state’s military, intelligence, and security forces, or coordinated ground dynamics that external actors can neither easily predict nor control. Such scenarios introduce enormous risks, including civil conflict, regional spillover and severe disruptions to global energy markets.
The regime’s brutality may reinforce its durability. A leadership willing to impose extreme domestic repression is less vulnerable to popular pressure than one constrained by public accountability. Last month Trump suggested the U.S. would support the protesters; that pledge appears to no longer be on his radar. The protesters were not seeking a better nuclear deal — which is now his apparent sole focus — but better lives.
So what happens now?
All of this suggests that Israel will be unhappy with any outcome to this period of tensions. It is much less likely that pressure from Trump will bring real reform to the Iranian regime is than that Trump will sign off on a deal that seems counter to Israel’s long-term interests.
In the coming days, it may become clearer whether Netanyahu persuaded Trump to expand the scope of negotiations to include Iran’s missile program and its network of proxy militias. It is also possible that talks will collapse, and that military action will follow.
But this much is clear: If the regime survives intact and is strengthened in the process, that would be a profound tragedy. For 47 years, the Islamic Republic has oppressed its own people while exporting instability across the Middle East. That is roughly the same span of time that communism endured in Eastern Europe before popular unrest finally brought it down.
Only a month ago, there was a palpable sense that the Iranian people were courageously pressing for a similar reckoning. To reward a weakened and discredited regime at such a moment by helping it stabilize itself — in exchange for promises about uranium enrichment alone — would be a historic missed opportunity.
The post Trump is poised to reinforce Iran’s regime — despite Netanyahu’s pressure appeared first on The Forward.
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How Russian and Austrian politics gave rise to modern Yiddish literature
פֿון װאַנען האָט זיך גענומען די מאָדערנע ליטעראַטור אױף ייִדיש און העברעיִש? ביז הײַנט האָט מען געהאַלטן, אַז זי איז געװען אַ פּועל־יוצא פֿון דער השׂכּלה־אידעאָלאָגיע, װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו דערציִען די ייִדישע מאַסן אינעם גײַסט פֿון דער אײראָפּעיִשער אױפֿקלערונג־קולטור.
עופֿר דינעס (קאָלאַמביע־אוניװערסיטעט) האַלט, אַז אַ װיכטיקע ראָלע אין דער אַנטוויקלונג פֿון דער מאָדערנער ליטעראַטור בײַ ייִדן האָט געשפּילט די נײַע קאָלאָניאַלע פּאָליטיק פֿון די רוסישע און עסטרײַכישע אימפּעריעס נאָך די צעטײלונגען פֿון פּױלן סוף־18טן יאָרהונדערט.
אונטער דער אַלטער פּױלישער מאַכט האָבן ייִדישע יחידים ניט געהאַט קײן דירעקטן שײכות צו דער מלוכה. די קהילות האָבן זיך געפֿירט לױט זײערע אײגענע תּקנות און מנהגים, און זײער קאָלעקטיװער פֿאָרשטײער פֿאַר דער מלוכה איז געװען דער װעד ארבע ארצות (די פֿאַרװאַלטונג פֿון פֿיר לענדער).
די נײַע אימפּעריאַלע מלוכות האָבן אָפּגעשאַפֿן דעם דאָזיקן רעזשים און גענומען אײַנפֿירן אַלגעמײנע געזעץ־געבונג פֿאַר אַלע אונטערטאַנער זײערע, ייִדן בתוכם. דינעסעס בוך באַשרײַבט ווי אַזוי די משׂכּילים האָבן גענומען אױף זיך די אױפֿגאַבע צו דערקלערן די דאָזיקע פּאָליטיק פֿאַר די ייִדישע מאַסן דורך זײערע ליטעראַרישע װערק.
דאָס קעפּל פֿון דינערס בוך לאָזט זיך ניט גענױ איבערזעצן אױף ייִדיש. דאָס ענגלישע װאָרט fiction האָט צװײ פֿאַרשײדענע באַטײַטן: בעלעטריסטיק און פֿיקציע, און זײ בײדע באַלאַנגען צו דעם מײן פֿונעם קעפּל: “די בעלעטריסטיק/פֿיקציע פֿון דער מלוכה“.
דורך זײערע בעלעטריסטישע װערק, האַלט דינעס, האָבן די משׂכּילישע מחברים געשאַפֿן אַן אידעאַליזירטן אימאַזש, אַ „פֿיקציע“, פֿון דער גוטװיליקער מלוכישער מאַכט, װאָס זאָרגט זיך װעגן דעם װױלזײַן פֿון אַלע אירע אונטערטאַנער.
די דאָזיקע פּאָזיציע האָט פֿאָרמולירט ישׂראל אַקסענפֿעלד (1787־1866) אין „דאָס שטערנטיכל“, דעם ערשטן ייִדישן ראָמאַן: „דאָס פּױלישע ביטערע אָנגעבלאָזענע גדלות, די פּױלישע גאװה איז בײַם רוס ניטאָ. אַ רוס, אַז ער קען זיך מיט אַ ייִדן און האָט מיט אים עטלעכע מאָל צו טאָן, רופֿט ער אים ׳בראַט׳’ [ברודער]. אַפֿילו דער פֿאַקטאָר [קאָמיסיאָנער], אַז ער [דער ייִד] דינט אים געטרײַ, האָט ער אים ליב.“
דינעסעס העלדן זײַנען פֿאַרשײדענע פֿיגורן. אײניקע זײַנען באַרימט, װי דער „זײדע“ פֿון דער ייִדישער ליטעראַטור, שלום־יעקבֿ אַבראַמאָװיטש (מענדעלע מוכר ספֿרים); דער גאַליציאַנער משׂכּיל יוסף פּערל און רבי נחמן פֿון בראַצלעװ.
אַנדערע זײַנען שוין כּמעט פֿאַרגעסן געװאָרן, װי דער העברעיִשער דיכטער משה אלחנן — דער מחבר פֿון צװײ העברעיִשע לױבגעזאַנגען. אײן שיר איז געװען געװידמעט דעם פּױלישן קעניג און דער צװײטער — דעם רוסישן צאַר. אַ צווייטער בײַשפּיל איז דער עסטרײַכישער באַאַמטער יאָהאַן עדואַרד זאַק, דער פֿאַרפֿאַסער פֿון אַ סאַטירישן ראָמאַן, װאָס מאַכט חוזק פֿון די גאַליציאַנער חסידים.
עס איז גוט באַקאַנט, אַז די משׂכּילים, בפֿרט דער טאַרנעפּאָלער סוחר יוסף פּערל, האָבן אין זײערע סאַטירישע חיבורים אױסגעלאַכט די חסידים..
אָבער מיט דער צײַט האָט פּערל דערזען, אַז דאָס איז ניט גענוג פֿאַר באַקעמפֿן די השפּעה פֿון חסידות. ער האָט זיך גענומען מסרן זײ צו די עסטרײַכישע אינסטאַנצן דורך זײַנע ליטעראַרישע װערק. װײַזט אױס, אַז די עסטרײַכישע פּאָליצײ האָט געהאַט מומחים, װאָס האָבן געקענט לײענען ייִדיש און העברעיִש.
להיפּוך צו די משׂכּילים, זײַנען די חסידים ניט געװען אײַנשטימיק אין זײער באַצי צו דער רוסישער אימפּעריע. דער גרעסטער אָנהענגער פֿון רוסלאַנד איז געװען דער גרינדער פֿונעם חב״ד, ר׳ שניאור זלמן פֿון ליאַדי. ער האָט געהאַלטן, אַז די קאָנסערװאַטיװע רוסישע פּאָליטיק העלפֿט באַשיצן ייִדישקײט קעגן די נײַע מערבֿדיקע אידעען.
ר׳ נחמן פֿון בראַצלעװ האָט געהאַט אַן אַנדער דעה. כּסדר האַלט מען זײַנע סיפּורי־מעשׂיות פֿאַר מיסטישע אַלעגאָריעס. אַ סך פֿון זײ דערצײלן װעגן אַ מלך און זײַן מלוכה. אַלעגאָריש טײַטשט מען דאָס אױס װי דער רבונו של עולם און די באַשאַפֿענע װעלט זײַנע.
אָבער דינעס לײענט די דאָזיקע מעשׂיות דורך אַ היסטאָרישן פּאָליטישן שפּאַקטיװ. ער האַלט, אַז צו מאָל איז דער מלך טאַקע פּשוט אַ קעניג און זײַן קעניגרײַך איז אַן עכטע מלוכה.
ר׳ נחמנס קריטיק פֿון דער נײַער אימפּעריאַלער פּאָליטיק איז ספּעציעל בולט אין דער „מעשׂה ממלך שגזר שמד“ („מעשׂה װעגן אַ קעניג װאָס האָט באַפֿוילן שמד“), װאָס מאָלט אױס אַ דעספּאָטישן מאָנאַרך.
דורך זײַנע אַלעגאָריעס האָט ר׳ נחמן געפּרוּװט דערקלערן זײַנע חסידים, אַז די נײַע רוסישע בעלי־בתּים זײַנען אױסן מװתּר צו זײַן די אױטאָנאָמיע, װאָס די ייִדישע קהילות האָבן גענאָסן אונטער דער פּױלישער מאַכט.
ר׳ נחמנס כּװנה, האַלט דינעס, איז געװען צו באַשיצן ייִדן פֿון דער נײַער מאַכט. צוליב דעם האָט ער ספּעציעל אױסגעקליבן די שטאָט בראַצלעװ (בראַסלעװ) אין פּאָדאָליע פֿאַר זײַן רעזידענץ, װײַל דאָס איז געװען אַן אַדמיניסטראַטיװער קרײַז־צענטער.
ר׳ נחמן האָט געהאָפֿט, אַז בראַצלעװ װעט זײַן „די פֿאַבריק פֿון ייִדישקײט“, און אַזױ אַרום „װעט די גאַנצע װעלט ווערן בראַסלאַװער חסידים“. די דאָזיקע װערטער האָט פֿאַרשריבן זײַן געטרײַער תּלמיד ר׳ נתן שטײנהאַרץ.
דינעס איז אַ געניטער דערצײלער. אױף די זײַטן פֿון זײַן בוך טרעפֿן זיך פּױלישע פּריצים, רוסישע מיליטער־לײַט, עסטרײַכישע פּאָליצײ און כּל־מיני ייִדן: משׂכּילים, חסידים, משומדים. ער אַנטפּלעקט פֿאַרכאַפּנדיקע פּרטים און אומשטאַנדן, װאָס לאָזן אױף ס׳נײַ אױסטײַטשן ליטעראַרישע טעקסטן.
סוף־18טן און אָנהײב־19טן יאָרהונדערט איז געװען אַ שטורעמדיקע תּקופֿה איבער גאַנץ אײראָפּע. די צעטײלונגען פֿון פּױלן און דערנאָך די מלחמות קעגן נאַפּאָלעאָנישן פֿראַנקרײַך האָבן שטאַרק געענדערט די פּאָליטישע מאַפּע פֿון מיטל־ און מזרח־אײראָפּע.
די דאָזיקע דראַמאַטישע געשעענישן האָבן פֿאַרטיפֿט דעם שפּאַלט אינעם פּױלישן ייִדנטום. די העכערע שיכטן, פֿאַרמעגלעכע שטאָטישע בעלי־בתּים, האָבן לרובֿ געשטיצט די נײַע פּאָליטיק און געצױגן נוצן פֿון דער לעגאַלער אָרדענונג אין רוסלאַנד און עסטרײַך.
אָבער די אָרעמע שטעטלדיקע מאַסן, בפֿרט חסידים, האָבן חושד געווען, אַז די נײַע מאַכט מאַכט וועט זיך אַרײַנמישן אין זײער עסקים כּדי אָפּצוציִען ייִדן פֿון ייִדישקײט.
בײדע צדדים האָבן גענומען פֿאַרשפּרײטן זײערע אידעען דורך ליטעראַרישע טעקסטן אין פֿאַרשײדענע זשאַנערס, אַזעלכע װי מעשׂיות, לידער, ראָמאַנען און סאַטירישע פּאַמפֿלעטן. און פֿון אָט די דאָזיקע װיכּוחים איז אױסגעװאַקסן די מאָדערנע צװײ־שפּראַכיקע ייִדישע ליטעראַטור.
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2 top Iranian officials to face trial in absentia over deadly 1994 attack on Argentinian Jewish center
(JTA) — Two senior officials at the heart of Iran’s military and national security establishment are among the eight people set to face trial in absentia over their alleged roles in the 1994 terrorist bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.
Argentine Federal Judge Daniel Rafecas issued the 648-page ruling Monday, formally processing the suspects and ordering an asset freeze of up to $500 million for each of them. The ruling attributes different roles to the suspects, ranging from senior Iranian officials who allegedly made and facilitated the decision to carry out the attack to individuals accused of providing diplomatic and operational support.
Ahmad Vahidi, the current commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, are among seven Iranian citizens and one Lebanese national formally charged in the case.
The other defendants are former Iranian intelligence minister Ali Fallahian; former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati; former Iranian diplomat Hadi Soleimanpour; former cultural attaché in Buenos Aires Mohsen Rabbani; former embassy official Ahmad Reza Asghari; and alleged Hezbollah operative Salman Raouf Salman, also known as Samuel Salman El Reda.
The judge charged the defendants with aggravated homicide and injuries motivated by racial or religious hatred. He classified the bombing as both a crime against humanity and an act of genocide.
The July 18, 1994 bombing of the AMIA building killed 85 people and injured over 300, remaining the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history.
The ruling was handed down after almost seven months of Iran’s war with the U.S. and Israel, with the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program at the center of international debate.
Argentine President Javier Milei, known for his pro-Israel views, noted the prosecution in his remarks Wednesday at the annual U.N. General Assembly, and placed it in the context of the threat he said Iran poses to the West.
“We have also made a geopolitical choice: We have aligned ourselves unequivocally with the West, with the United States and with Israel — countries with which we share a deep affinity of values and strategic complementarity,” he said. “That is why we condemn the Iranian regime’s attacks on the State of Israel, we have designated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization, and continue to seek justice for the two attacks carried out on Argentine soil in 1992 and 1994.”
The indictments followed a unanimous ruling also on Monday by the federal appeals court upholding the constitutionality of applying Argentina’s trial-in-absentia law to the AMIA case. The legislation, enacted in 2025, allows proceedings involving terrorism and crimes against humanity to continue when defendants deliberately evade Argentine justice.
The Jewish umbrella organization DAIA welcomed the decision. “Thirty-two years after the bombing of the AMIA-DAIA building, Argentina’s courts have taken a major step in the pursuit of truth and justice,” it said in a post on X. The post featured photos of the suspects formally charged by an Argentine judge under the headline “Historic Event.”
AMIA in a statement posted Tuesday said the decision marks “a decisive milestone in establishing the truth about the worst terrorist attack suffered by our country.” The trial date has not yet been set, but experts quoted by Argentine media estimate that it will take place next year. It would be the first trial in absentia in Argentina’s history.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Jewish Dems in Congress oppose plans to merge Holocaust and antisemitism envoys
(JTA) — Nearly two dozen Jewish Democrats in Congress signed a letter opposing plans to fold the State Department’s standalone Holocaust envoy office into the office of Rabbi Yehuda Kaploun, the Trump administration’s special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism.
Kaploun has been pushing for the merger for months, and his efforts have divided Jewish leaders over the future of Holocaust diplomacy. Supporters of the move claimed that it would improve efficiency, while critics said it would flatten the attention given to Holocaust-specific issues, and criticized it as a power grab by Kaploun.
Opposition to the plan escalated Wednesday when 19 members of Congress, in a letter shared exclusively with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, called for Secretary of State Marco Rubio to preserve the Holocaust envoy as “a distinct, permanent office led by a dedicated career State Department official.”
The officials, who are all members of the Congressional Jewish Caucus, wrote that the two offices “are complementary, but they are not interchangeable.” Kaploun’s office is “responsible for confronting contemporary antisemitism around the world,” the letter reads, while the Holocaust envoy’s office “focuses on Holocaust-era restitution, historical justice, remembrance, and accountability.”
Signatories on the letter include moderate Democrats such as Reps. Jared Moskowitz and Josh Gottheimer, and progressives including Reps. Jamie Raskin and Jan Schakowsky.
New York Rep. Jerry Nadler, who co-led the letter with Illinois Rep. Brad Schneider, said back in June that the potential move was “abominable” and a “vain attempt to consolidate power by Yehuda Kaploun.”
“If supporting Holocaust victims and their families was a priority to this Administration, they would seek further opportunities to support SEHI, not to eliminate it,” said Nadler, the House’s longest-serving Jewish member, using the acronym for the Holocaust envoy office.
Wednesday’s letter called for Rubio to not only preserve the role, which is currently vacant, but also to “immediately appoint a new Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.” Rubio has not named a successor to Ellen Germain, whose term ended on July 31 after she took over in August 2021.
Germain notably emphasized the need for European nations to sustain remembrance of the Holocaust and their roles in its perpetration; top Trump administration figures, including Vice President JD Vance, have said that the current intensity of Holocaust commemoration in Europe is counterproductive.
A group of Jewish organizations, including the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee and B’nai Brith International, had called on Rubio to fill the impending vacancy back in April. Doing so, the groups wrote, would “demonstrate the prioritization that the United States ascribes to preserving the uniqueness of the Holocaust through this special office,” and “ensure that its critical work continues.”
A separate host of Jewish groups, including the Combat Antisemitism Movement, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, the World Jewish Congress and Chabad-Lubavitch World Headquarters, had called for Rubio to go ahead with the merger in June to increase efficiency and avoid “duplicative efforts” by the two offices.
The Jewish Democrats’ letter this week refuted that argument.
“Combining them would not streamline efficiency or eliminate any meaningful duplication; it would risk diminishing the focus, experience, and institutional capacity necessary for each,” the letter reads.
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