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What India’s New Security Paradigm Means for Israel
An Air India Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner plane lands at the Ben Gurion International airport in Lod, near Tel Aviv, Israel, March 22, 2018. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Indian strategic restraint was designed to prevent escalation with Pakistan. In practice, it did the opposite. Terror groups backed by Pakistan’s security agencies exploited the firebreak between terrorism and state aggression, on the assumption that India would avoid decisive retaliation or cross-border action. Limited responses produced predictable patterns, and predictability invited more violence.
India has replaced this framework with a doctrine of compellence. Major attacks are now treated as acts of war. This principle was made explicit during Operation Sindoor, when the Prime Minister announced that major terrorist attacks would be answered as acts of war rather than treated as matters for law enforcement. The government no longer waits for lengthy attribution cycles or international pressure before acting. Pre-emption is considered a sovereign right. During Operation Sindoor, India struck early and deep, using long-range fire, drone swarms, loitering munitions, and real-time fused intelligence. The operation broke the old template and signaled a permanent doctrinal change.
The end of strategic restraint
This evolution is institutional, not episodic. Indian deterrence is now pattern-based rather than event-based, signaling that retaliation is now to be expected rather than debated. Public expectations help shape policy, and citizens expect retaliation rather than investigation. The political reality, in which national strategy is tied to public sentiment, narrows the space for restraint.
The shift extends beyond military action. During the 2025 ceasefire discussions with Pakistan, Delhi rejected all external mediation. That was not a negotiating tactic. It was the expression of a new doctrine. India now treats crises with Pakistan as regionally internal and prefers direct communication between the Directors General of Military Operations, the top operational military officers on each side. Outside involvement is kept at a minimum to preserve freedom of maneuver and crisis ownership.
Treaties under conditional legitimacy
India’s approach to treaties has changed as well, reflecting the same shift toward coercive clarity. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, a 1960 agreement that divided the rivers of the Indus basin and survived multiple wars, marked the first time a resource-sharing treaty was used as coercive leverage in South Asia. The shift echoed earlier remarks by Indian leaders that blood and water cannot flow together, a formulation now reflected in policy rather than rhetoric. For decades, arrangements like this were treated as stabilizing anchors meant to insulate both countries from conflict. India no longer accepts that premise. Water, airspace, and border-management agreements now survive only if they reinforce India’s security narrative.
The same logic applies to the Shimla Agreement of 1972, which committed India and Pakistan to resolve disputes bilaterally. Once a cornerstone of India’s diplomatic posture, it now carries less weight because it places more constraints on India than on Pakistan.
India continues to declare a No First Use nuclear policy, but political leaders have introduced deliberate ambiguity about how that commitment should be interpreted in a rapidly changing threat environment. What was once a doctrine of assured retaliation is evolving toward assured punishment, a formulation that narrows the room for adversary miscalculation while maintaining rhetorical restraint. Precision conventional strikes now operate close to Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure, compressing the conventional–nuclear firebreak. New capabilities such as MIRVs (canisterized missiles kept at higher readiness) and routine SSBN patrols show that India’s deterrent is no longer merely symbolic. It is becoming a readiness-oriented system in which technology and doctrine are evolving together.
India has also redefined its counterterrorism doctrine. Proxy groups are treated as instruments of hostile state policy, not as deniable actors operating in a grey zone. Zero tolerance refers not only to the occurrence of terrorism but to the continued existence of the networks that enable it. India now views the broader ecosystem surrounding terrorist groups as a legitimate set of targets.
A final dimension is often overlooked. China is the silent second audience for India’s choices. Signals meant for Pakistan carry an implied message for Beijing. India’s interception of Chinese-origin PL-15 air-to-air missiles and successful defeat of Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defense systems during Operation Sindoor provided valuable intelligence on Chinese weapons design and vulnerabilities. India’s new deterrence logic is built for a two-front environment in which actions in one direction have consequences in the other.
What emerges is a picture of a state transforming under fire. India is not becoming reckless; it is becoming coherent. It is aligning doctrine, public expectations, defense industrial capacity, and geopolitical messaging around a single principle. Security must be achieved by India, not granted through outside mediation or constrained by outdated assumptions.
Despite these shifts, several structural constraints remain unchanged. India continues to face significant intelligence gaps, limited real-time ISR coverage along key sectors, and persistent bureaucratic friction in inter-service coordination. The political leadership remains sensitive to the costs of prolonged conflict, and the military is deeply cautious about simultaneous commitments on two fronts. These enduring limitations serve as a crucial reminder that doctrinal evolution does not eliminate operational friction.
Not all members of India’s strategic community concur with this trajectory. Several scholars argue that a posture centered on rapid retaliation and pre-emption may, in practice, erode crisis stability rather than strengthen it, particularly without sustained reforms in civil-military coordination and decision-making. Moreover, Pakistan’s domestic fragility, decentralized proxy networks, and continued reliance on nuclear signaling introduce significant uncertainty. These structural conditions suggest that India’s increasingly assertive doctrine will not necessarily yield predictable adversary behavior and may interact with Pakistani vulnerabilities in destabilizing ways.
A coherent but high-stakes doctrine
This shift is not without risks. A posture built on pre-emption and rapid retaliation compresses decision time on both sides, increasing the danger of misinterpretation or premature escalation. Pattern-based deterrence assumes intent can be accurately discerned, but intelligence failures or political pressure could easily prompt India to act on incomplete signals. The erosion of stabilizing agreements such as the Indus Waters Treaty and the weakening of the Shimla framework remove guardrails that once shaped crisis behavior. Greater strategic autonomy gives India more room to maneuver, but also narrows the margin for error in a nuclearized environment.
There is also a diplomatic cost. India’s rejection of external mediation strengthens its claim to sovereign crisis management, but reduces the number of actors capable of de-escalating a crisis once it begins. Washington’s traditional stabilizing role will become more constrained, while Beijing may interpret India’s new doctrine through its own rivalry calculus, tightening the two-front dynamic India seeks to manage. Assertiveness delivers clarity, but can also prompt counter-moves that make South Asia more volatile, not less.
Implications for Israel
These shifts matter for Israel. India’s new deterrence posture — explicitly rejecting nuclear blackmail, collapsing the line between proxy terror and state responsibility, and demonstrating a willingness to strike early and with precision — mirrors many of the principles Israel has relied on for decades. Both states face adversaries that use terrorism as a strategic tool under the umbrella of nuclear ambiguity.
India’s performance in Sindoor, especially its defeat of Chinese-origin PL-15 missiles and HQ-9/P air defenses, provides operational insights that are directly relevant to Israel, as Chinese technology expands across the Middle East. The emerging convergence is not rhetorical; it is doctrinal. India’s willingness to impose costs on an ecosystem that enables terrorism, and to do so without waiting for external validation, opens new avenues for Israel-India strategic coordination.
India has written a new playbook, and the world needs to pay attention.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum, a lecturer and a researcher in the Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program at Bar-Ilan University. She specializes in Indian foreign policy.
John Spencer is Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum and Executive Director of the Urban Warfare Institute. He served 25 years as an infantry soldier, including two combat tours in Iraq. He is author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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How YIVO and Max Weinreich Americanized the Yiddish project
װי אַזױ האָט ייִװאָ געפֿונען אַ נײַע הײם אין אַמעריקע נאָכן חורבן? קלמן װײַזער (יאָרק־אוניװערסיטעט אין טאָראָנטאָ) דערצײלט די דאָזיקע דראַמאַטישע געשיכטע אינעם נײַעם בוך „ייִדיש־װיסנשאַפֿט קומט קײן אַמעריקע“.
לכתּחילה איז דער דערפֿאָלג פֿון ייִװאָ ניט געװען קיין זיכערער. װײַזער דערקלערט: „עס איז װײַט ניט געװען קלאָר פֿאַר די שטיצער און מיטאַרבעטער פֿון ייִװאָ אין די 1940ער יאָרן, צי אַן אָרגאַניזאַציע װאָסער ציל איז געװען צו באַדינען די אינטעלעקטועלע און קולטורעלע באַדערפֿענישן פֿונעם אַלװעלטלעכן ייִדיש־רעדנדיקן פֿאָלק קען זיך אײַנװאָרצלען אין די ביז גאָר פֿאַרשײדענע באַדינגונגען פֿון אַמעריקע נאָך דער מלחמה.“
פֿאַר דער מלחמה האָט ייִװאָ געהאַט אַן „אַמעריקאַנער אָפּטײל“ אין ניו־יאָרק. זײַן ציל איז געװען צו זאַמלען געלט פֿאַרן װילנער אינסטיטוט, כאָטש אײניקע זײַנע מיטגלידער האָבן זיך אָפּגעגעבן אױך מיט פֿאָרשונגען פֿון ייִדישער קולטור און געשיכטע — דער עיקר, אין מיזרח-אײראָפּע.
אָבער דאָס רובֿ אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן האָבן געהאַט אַ קנאַפּן אינטערעס צו ייִדיש און בכלל ניט געהאַלטן פֿון ייִדיש־פֿאָרשונג.
נאָכן חורבן איז ייִװאָ געשטאַנען אױפֿן שײדװעג: צו װערן אַ מין אַרכיװ געװידמעט דעם אַמאָליקן חרובֿ־געמאַכטן ייִדישן לעבן אין מזרח־אײראָפּע אָדער װײַטער צו אַנטװיקלען ייִדיש־װיסנשאַפֿט לטובֿת אַ ייִדישן המשך אין אַמעריקע.
װײַזער ברענגט דעם לײענער אַרײַן אין די הײסע װיכּוחים צװישן די מיטאַרבעטער פֿון ייִװאָ װעגן דער ריכטונג פֿון דער אַרבעט. יודל מאַרק האָט געהאַלטן אַז ייִװאָ דאַרף זיך אָפּגעבן דער עיקר מיטן חורבן־פֿאָרשונג, בעת אַמאָליקע בונדיסטן האָבן געטענהט אַז ייִװאָ דאַרף שטודירן דעם מצבֿ פֿון די ייִדישע מאַסן אין אַמעריקע.
מאַקס װײַנרײַך, דער אינטעלעקטועלער מדריך פֿון ייִװאָ, האָט געהאַט אַן אַנדערע װיזיע. ער האָט געגלייבט, אַז דאָס אַמעריקאַנער ייִדנטום איז מסוגל צו שפּילן די פֿירנדיקע ראָלע אין דער ייִדישער װעלט נאָכן חורבן. אָבער לױט זײַן מײנונג זײַנען די אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן ניט געװען גרײט אויף אַזאַ שליחות. און צוגרײטן זײ דערצו האָבן געדאַרפֿט די פּליטים פֿון מזרח־אײראָפּע.
לױט זײַן װיזיע, האָט זיך ייִװאָ געדאַרפֿט אָפּגעבן ניט סתּם מיט װיסנשאַפֿט, נאָר מיט „װיסן װאָס שאַפֿט“, דאָס הײסט, ייִדיש־װיסנשאַפֿט מוז דערמעגלעכן אַמעריקאַנער ייִדן אָפּצוהיטן זײער ייִדישן מהות און פֿאַרזיכערן ייִדישע המשכדיקײט.
דער שליסל צום דערפֿאָלג פֿונעם ריזיקן פּראָיעקט איז געװען די ייִדישע שפּראַך. ייִדיש האָט געדאַרפֿט דינען װי אַ בריק צװישן דורות ייִדן, אַ גײַסטיקע פֿאַרבינדונג צװישן דער אַלטער און דער נײַער הײם.
צוליב דעם, האָט װײַנרײַך געהאַלטן, דאַרף מען „אױסגױיִשן“ די אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישע אינטעליגענציע און העכערן דעם פּרעסטיזש פֿון ייִדיש אין דער אַמעריקאַנער אַקאַדעמישער װעלט.
אָבער ניט געקוקט אױף װײַנרײַכס באַמיִונגען איז ייִװאָ לכתּחילה פֿאַרבליבן אױף די ראַנדן פֿונעם אַמעריקאַנער ייִדישן הױפּטשטראָם און האָט באַקומען אַ קנאַפּע שטיצע מצד די גרױסע ייִדישע פֿילאַנטראָפּישע אָרגאַניזאַציעס. די באַציִונגען צװישן ייִװאָ און דער אַמעריקאַנער ייִדיש־סבֿיבֿה זײַנען אױך ניט געװען קײן גלאַטיקע.
די נאָרמאַטיװע ייִדישע כּלל־שפּראַך, װאָס ייִװאָ האָט געװאָלט פֿאַרשפּרײטן, האָט אַרױסגערופֿן קריטיק מצד אײניקע ייִדישיסטן. זײ האָבן געטענהט, אַז דער „ייִװאָ־ייִדיש“ איז װײַט פֿונעם עכטן נאַטירלעכן מאַמע־לשון.
אין זײַנע אַרטיקלען אין פֿאָרװערטס האָט יצחק באַשעװיס אױסגעלאַכט אַזעלכע נעאָלאָגיזמען װי „קדמן־ייִדיש“ און „בראשית־ייִדיש“, װאָס װײַנרײַך האָט צוגעטראַכט װי לינגװיסטישע באַגריפֿן פֿאַר פֿאַרשײדענע היסטאָרישע תּקופֿות אין דער אַנטװיקלונג פֿון דער ייִדישער שפּראַך.
אין תּוך איז דער קאָנפֿליקט צװישן ייִװאָ און די ייִדישע ליטעראַטן געװען אַרום דער פֿראַגע, „צו װעמען געהערט ייִדיש?“, דערקלערט װײַזער. דער ציל פֿון ייִװאָ איז געװען צו שאַפֿן אַ נאָרמאַטיװע שפּראַך, װאָס מען קען אױסלערנען װי מען לערנט אַנדערע פֿרעמדע שפּראַכן. אַזױ קען מען פֿאַרזיכערן דעם המשך פֿון ייִדיש אַפֿילו װען קײן לעבעדיקע ייִדיש־רעדנדיקער סבֿיבֿה איז מער ניטאָ.
די סאַמע געשפּאַנטע קאַפּיטלען אין דער געשיכטע פֿון ייִװאָ אין אַמעריקע דערצײלן װעגן דעם קאַמף פֿאַר צוריקבאַקומען די מאַטעריאַלן, װאָס האָבן אַ מאָל געהערט צום װילנער ייִװאָ.
טײלװײַז האָבן די נאַציסטן זײ געבראַכט קײן דײַטשלאַנד פֿאַרן אַרכיװ פֿונעם אַנטיסעמיטישן „אינסטיטוט פֿאַר פֿאָרשונגען פֿון דער ייִדן־פֿראַגע“”. נאָך דער מלחמה זײַנען די דאָזיקע מאַטעריאַלן אַרײַנגעפֿאַלן אינעם רשות פֿון דער אַמעריקאַנער מיליטערישער אַדמיניסטראַציע אין דײַטשלאַנד.
כּדי צוריקצוקריגן די דאָזיקע מאַטעריאַלן איז געװען אַ גװאַלדיקער אױפֿטו פֿון װײַנרײַך און זײַנע מיטאַרבעטער, צװישן זיי — לוסי שילדקרעט (דאַװידאָװיטש), װאָס האָט שפּעטער זיך קונה־שם געװען װי אַ חורבן־פֿאָרשערין. לױטן געזעץ האָט די אַמעריקאַנער מיליטערישע אַדמינסטראַציע געדאַרפֿט צוריקגעבן די געראַבעװעטע מאַטעריאַלן צו פּױלן אָדער סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד. אַן אַנדער פּרעטענדענט איז געװען דער העברעיִשער אוניװערסיטעט אין ירושלים.
װײַנרײַך האָט אױסגענוצט זײַנע קאָנטאַקטן אין די אַמעריקאַנער הױכע פֿענצטער און אין 1947 האָט ייִװאָ צוריקבאַקומען זײַנע מאַטעריאַלן. עס האָט זיך אים אױך אײַנגעגעבן פֿאָרצושטעלן ייִװאָ װי אַ יורש פֿון אַנדערע קולטורעלע אַנשטאַלטן אין װילנע, און ייִװאָ האָט אױך באַקומען די אוצרות פֿון דער סטראַשון־ביבליאָטעק און דער „ווילנער יידישער היסטאריש-עטנאגראפישער געזעלשאפט אויף דעם נאמען פון ש. אַנ־סקי.
דאָס צװײטע קאַפּיטל פֿון דער דאָזיקער געשיכטע איז פֿאָרגעקומען נאָכן פֿאַנאַנדערפֿאַל פֿונעם סאָװעטן־פֿאַרבאַנד אין די 1990ער יאָרן. דעמאָלט האָט מען אַנטדעקט אַ היפּשע זאַמלונג פֿון פֿאָנדן פֿון ייִװאָ אין ליטע, װאָס אַ ליטװישער ביבליאָגראַף האָט פֿאַרבאַהאַלטן אין אַ מאַגאַזין פֿון דער מלוכישער ביכער־קאַמער.
דאָס מאָל האָט ייִװאָ געדאַרפֿט פֿאַרהאַנדלען מיט דער רעגירונג פֿון דער ליטװישער רעפּובליק, װאָס איז אָקערשט געװאָרן אומאָפּהענגיק. סוף־כּל־סוף איז מען געקומען צו אַ פּשרה, און איצט קען מען נוצן די דאָזיקע מאַטעריאַלן אינעם דיגיטאַלישן פֿאָרמאַט.
װײַזערס געשיכטע פֿון ייִװאָ איז אַ געשפּאַנטע און באַלערעװדיקע לעקטור. מאַקס װײַנרײַך איז ניט געװען דער אײנציקער צװישן די אײראָפּעיִשע ייִדישע פּליטים װאָס האָט געפֿונען אַ נײַע הײם אין אַמעריקע און אױפֿגעבױט דאָ אַ הצלחהדיקעע קאַריערע. אָבער ער איז אפֿשר געװען דער אײנציקער, װעמען עס האָט זיך אײַנגעגעבן ניט נאָר ממשיך צו זײַן זײַנע אײגענע פֿאָרשונגען, נאָר אױך װידער אױפֿצובױען אַ גאַנצע װיסנשאַפֿטלעכע אינסטיטוציע אױפֿן נײַעם אַמעריקאַנער באָדן, װאָס פֿאַרבלײַבט אַקטיװ ביזן הײַנטיקן טאָג.
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Hasan Piker causes new trouble for Democrats — especially in key Senate race
Hasan Piker, the popular pundit who most recently suggested American Jews are making themselves targets of violence by supporting Israel, may speak for far-left progressives, but he doesn’t speak for one of the movement’s highest-profile candidates in a closely watched swing-state race, the candidate said.
Dr. Abdul El-Sayed, the Michigan Democratic nominee for Senate, released a statement Monday saying he disagreed with Piker’s latest remarks and that he is opposed to “any rhetoric that puts the community at risk.”
“If Jews in America keep putting this idea out there that they are singularly invested in Israel, eventually someone is going to come around and take action,” Piker said during a Twitch stream on Thursday, “not against the state of Israel, mind you, but against American Jews.” He claimed American Jews who support Israel are bringing violence on themselves by tying their identity to what he called “Jewish ISIS.”
Piker added in an interview published Monday in Haaretz that, “I don’t think that me calling Zionism a Nazi ideology is fomenting violence towards Jews broadly. I genuinely don’t believe that.”
In Monday’s statement, El-Sayed sought to move past the controversy, shifting the conversation back to his campaign’s economic message as he remains in a close race with GOP nominee Mike Rogers. “While politicians and pundits try to make this race about a Twitch streamer, we’re going to be talking about gas, groceries, good schools and healthcare,” Sayed said. “Nobody speaks for this campaign besides me and my campaign spokespeople.”
Piker’s influence
The episode comes as Piker appears to be expanding rather than retreating from Democratic electoral politics.
He campaigned with El-Sayed and other insurgent progressives, including Adam Hamawy, a fierce Israel critic who served as a trauma surgeon in Gaza and won the Democratic primary in New Jersey’s 12th District. In Florida, Rep. Jared Moskowitz made Piker himself part of the closing argument against his socialist primary challenger, Oliver Larkin, whom Piker supported. After Moskowitz easily defeated Larkin, the Jewish congressman offered Piker his “condolences.”
On Monday, even as the controversy over his remarks about American Jews was unfolding, Piker used his Twitch platform to offer an exclusive look at new polling commissioned by the IMEU Policy Project, a pro-Palestinian advocacy organization, and conducted by YouGov among more than 4,000 likely Democratic primary voters in the six states picked as early contests in the 2028 Democratic presidential primary: South Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Michigan and Virginia.
The results showed broad support among those Democratic voters for presidential candidates who commit to reducing U.S. aid for Israel. Piker commands an enormous platform among precisely the younger voters progressive candidates are looking to court. “These numbers are making it undeniable,” Piker said on the stream. “This is an issue that is untenable.”
Earlier in the stream, Piker said the backlash over the weekend has “been a lot” to endure. “I’m going to continue doing what I’m doing,” he added. “I’m not going to feel discouraged. I’m not going to stop saying the truth… someone has to do it.”
The risk for El-Sayed
For El-Sayed, separating himself from some of Piker’s comments but still embracing him reflects the difficult political balance he has been trying to maintain since narrowly winning the primary.
El-Sayed has struggled to build support among Jewish Democrats while holding on to the progressive and pro-Palestinian coalition that helped carry him through the primary. He has assured Jewish voters that his fierce criticism of Israel — and his political relationships with figures such as Piker — should not be seen as hostility toward Jews. “I love and revere Judaism and the Jewish people,” he said in a recent TV appearance. “My commitment to the well-being of the Jewish community, their safety, their children, their future in Michigan is the same commitment that I’ve got to the well-being of my own daughters and all of our kids,” he said in another interview on Sunday.
At the same time, he resisted calls to distance himself from Piker, who has been embraced by Democratic Party progressive candidates. He appeared with El-Sayed on the campaign trail even as Piker has championed terrorist groups as righteous fighters against Israel — leading to accusations he traffics in antisemitism. In a recent speech to college students, Piker blasted Democrats who “fund ICE” and “fund Israel.”
El-Sayed’s Republican rival has already begun courting those voters, launching a “Democrats for Rogers” effort and highlighting El-Sayed’s relationship with Piker.
Speaking to Fox News’ Jesse Watters on Monday night, El-Sayed said that Rogers “thinks he’s running against Hasan Piker.”
An AARP poll released this month had El-Sayed at 48% and Rogers at 47%. Jewish voters account for only about 1.4% of the state electorate, but the defections among Jewish Democrats could matter in a race that close.
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‘Have a problem, call the PM,’ says Netanyahu as he gives out his number in campaign video
(JTA) — TEL AVIV – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday posted what he described as his personal phone number and invited Israelis to contact him with their questions and problems.
It was an election-season stunt that drew such a flood of responses that the number’s WhatsApp account was blocked within minutes and those calling received a busy signal.
It also drew suspicions that it was a ploy to collect voter data.
In a video posted to social media, Netanyahu is seen with longtime adviser Topaz Luk, who asks the prime minister whether he can publish his phone number. Netanyahu initially reacts with disbelief, saying, “Topaz, have you gone crazy?” before agreeing.
“I want to hear from you. Your suggestions, your questions, your problems. I want to hear, so leave me a message,” Netanyahu said. He added that he could not promise to answer everyone but would respond to as many people as possible.
Hundreds of messages and calls arrived within minutes and the WhatsApp account associated with the number was blocked. Luk later posted on X that the account had been disabled because of the volume of calls and said Netanyahu’s team was working to restore it, directing people to Telegram in the meantime.
Kan political correspondent Michael Shemesh questioned whether the number belonged to Netanyahu at all and suggested on X that the exercise was “probably designed to harvest the phone numbers of potential voters.”
Other users pointed to another clue that the handset seen in the video was unlikely to be Netanyahu’s personal phone. One of the WhatsApp groups visible in Luk’s video was a synagogue updates group whose latest message appeared to back political rival Naftali Bennett, the former prime minister who now heads the Beyachad party.
“Something tells me that Bibi isn’t signed up to the ‘Menachem’s House Main Shul Updates’ group,” one X user wrote, “especially not when the latest message there is ‘yalla, it’s time for Bennett.’”
The Likud spokesperson had not responded to a request for comment on the accusations by the time of publication.
It was not the first time Netanyahu handed out what he presented as his personal number during an election campaign. In August 2022, little more than two months before the vote that returned him to power, the then-opposition leader published another number and invited Israelis to video call him.
“Why should only some people have my phone number? Everyone should have it,” Netanyahu said at the time, joking that the move was a “dramatic, world-changing decision.” He told supporters who sent proof they had joined his Telegram channel that they would have a better chance of receiving a video call from him.
The response was similarly intense. Likud said Netanyahu received 9,420 calls within the first 30 minutes, while follow-up videos showed calls and messages flooding the phone.
Netanyahu’s rivals mocked the stunt. Then-Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman released a parody video saying Netanyahu “has not picked up the phone in 12 years,” while Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid dismissed it as a “fictional phone operated by Netanyahu’s aides.”
The episode comes as Netanyahu faces a difficult reelection campaign, with roughly 20% of voters remaining undecided, many of whom are disillusioned Likud voters, according to pollsters and researchers cited by Reuters.
A Channel 13 poll released earlier this month put Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party at 23 seats, ahead of Likud with 21, and Netanyahu’s current coalition projected to win just 49 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Eisenkot also led Netanyahu 47% to 34% when respondents were asked who was better suited to serve as prime minister.
The phone-number appeal is the latest in a series of efforts to put Netanyahu directly in front of voters, including a blitz of highly publicized appearances. Last week, the prime minister visited a restaurant in Hadera, a Likud stronghold, where owner Simo Shtivi said his arrival was “like hoisting the World Cup,” as diners lined up for photos and a chance to speak with him.
Netanyahu also made a surprise appearance with his wife Sara at a concert by Israeli pop star Eden Ben Zaken. A few days earlier, he filmed a campaign video at Jerusalem’s Malha Mall meeting shoppers, including children. The Central Elections Committee later ordered the video removed because election law bars the use of children in campaign propaganda.
Likud also rolled out billboards showing New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani alongside the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Hezbollah under the slogan, “They want Netanyahu to lose. Don’t let them win.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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