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Thomas Friedman explains how devastating Israel’s attacks on Iran have been
By BERNIE BELLAN I’m not sure how many readers follow Thomas Friedman’s writing in the New York Times; after all, he’s been highly critical of Netanyahu for years, which probably makes him persona non grata for a lot of you.

But, on Tuesday, November 26, Friedman wrote a piece that was so particularly incisive – and came across as so laudatory of what Israel has been able to achieve in the past 13 months, that even diehard Friedman critics should be able to take some very meaningful lessons away from that column.
Toward the beginning of what he wrote, Friedman makes what, for most readers of his columns, would probably be perceived as a fairly shocking statement when he writes: “In just the last two months, the Israeli military has inflicted a defeat on Iran that approaches its 1967 Six-Day War defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Full stop.”
He goes on to describe what Israel has been able to do to Hezbollah in the past few months as so destructive of that terrorist organization’s abilities that “Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran have decided to delink themselves from Hamas in Gaza and stop the firing from Lebanon for the first time since Oct. 8, 2023, the day after Hamas invaded Israel.”
Friedman then provides some very interesting information about how effective two attacks Israel launched against Iran – one in April and then one in October, were, both in inflicting tremendous damage to Iran’s capability to defend itself against a full scale Israeli attack – should one be launched, and in undermining Iran’s confidence that it can continue to arm Hezbollah without severe repercussions.
Here is what Friedman wrote:
“There is a reason for this (Hezbollah’s agreeing to a cease fire). Hezbollah’s mother ship has suffered a real blow. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s April strike on Iran eliminated one of four Russian-supplied S-300 surface-to-air missile defense batteries around Tehran, and Israel destroyed the remaining three batteries on Oct. 26. Israel also damaged Iran’s ballistic missile production capabilities and its ability to produce the solid fuel used in long-range ballistic missiles. In addition, according to Axios, Israel’s Oct. 26 strike on Iran, which was a response to an earlier Iranian attack on Israel, also destroyed equipment used to create the explosives that surround uranium in a nuclear device, setting back Iran’s efforts in nuclear weapons research.
“A senior Israeli defense official told me that the Oct. 26 attack on Iran ‘was lethal, precise and a surprise.’ And up to now, the Iranians ‘don’t know technologically how we hit them. So they are at the most vulnerable point they have been in this generation: Hamas is not there for them, Hezbollah is not there for them, their air defenses are not there anymore, their ability to retaliate is sharply diminished, and they are worried about Trump.’ “
Friedman’s column goes on to offer advice to President-elect Trump how to deal with other changing realities in the world, including the rapid pace of artificial intelligence development in which, Friedman points out, Israelis are playing a leading role. But one has to wonder whether anyone in Trump’s circle bothers to read anything written by Friedman. After all, he was very close to President Biden – which would certainly put him into Trump’s enemies’ camp, on top of which he writes for that most hated of all media: The New York Times.
Still, if someone who is as critical of Israel’s government as Friedman has been is capable of pointing out the vastly changed dynamic now permeating the entire Middle East as a result of the huge blows Israel has inflicted both on Iran’s number one proxy in the region – Hezbollah, and on Iran itself, once can more readily understand how Israel’s strategy of taking on different enemies all at the same time has paid off.
I, for one, will admit that I was quite surprised to read Friedman’s analysis – and it leads me to question my own thoughts as to what would happen when Israel opened up a new front in Lebanon at the same time as it was still engaged in Gaza. I had thought that it might lead to a repeat of the 2006 debacle, in which a ground invasion by Israel into Lebanon led to heavy Israeli losses and what was, in effect, a victory for Hezbollah – not by being able to defeat Israel, but simply by surviving that invasion.
This time around though – and we’ll have to wait for military analysts to tell us just how effective the heavy Israeli bombardment of Lebanese areas has been in terms of degrading Hezbollah’s military capabilities, Israel has managed to keep its own casualties relatively low by relying upon bombing of Hezbollah infrastructure. As has been the case in Gaza, however, it’s so difficult to tell what those devastating bombings have actually accomplished in specific terms beyond realizing that they have thoroughly degraded both Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capacities. It seems though that the aphorism that “the sum is greater than its parts” is particularly apt in describing what the Israel Air Force has been able to achieve.
While we have been witnessing the wholesale destruction of civilian areas – in both Gaza and Lebanon, it now seems evident that Israeli intelligence has been able to locate terrorist locations with tremendous accuracy. The fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah have been so thoroughly embedded within civilian population areas made it inevitable that, once the IAF embarked upon a relentless campaign to destroy terrorist infrastructure and locations where terrorists were embedded within the civilian population, there would be huge civilian casualties – but ultimately Israel would be able to degrade both Hamas and Hezbollah’s fighting abilities to the point where they have both been neutralized in large part.
The question, of course, is what will now happen as a result of Friedman himself describing Israel’s having forced Hezbollah and Iran to “delink” themselves from Hamas. Hamas is, in effect, nothing more than a mafia type organization, now terrorizing the Palestinian population in Gaza, with its own survival now being its purpose. The Israel Defence Forces seem content to let Hamas carry on its campaign of looting aid trucks and terrorizing the population for its own benefit.
But Hamas fighters, however many may remain, don’t have the same option as Hezbollah’s fighters – which is to retreat behind a defined line north of the Litani River in Lebanon. How many are in the tunnels? How many are embedded within the rest of the Gaza population? If the IDF has an idea what the answers to those questions are, I haven’t seen them.
So, the war in Gaza will likely carry on for some time. It appears that the bombing campaign has thoroughly reduced Hamas’s ability to carry on any effective strikes on Israeli targets, but it is not clear at what point the Israeli government might be willing to accept any sort of a ceasefire. The government’s position has been that a ceasefire can only be entered into when at least the majority of the hostages are released, but frankly, Israel is now operating from such a position of strength vis-a-vis Hamas, that the idea of accepting a ceasefire that would allow Hamas fighters to remain in place seems unconscionable to the vast majority of Israelis. It may seem perverse to think that the government has been willing to sacrifice hostages’ lives for the sake of dealing a final, crushing blow to Hamas, but that’s the sad reality.
Still, who would have thought that Israel would be able to wage successful wars on so many fronts? As Thomas Friedman has noted, Israel has upended the situation in the Middle East, albeit at a very heavy price. And even though I’ve been questioning from the outset the Israeli government’s strategy of seeking total victory over Hamas, given how thoroughly Israel has been able to undermine Hezbollah’s and Iran’s positions, perhaps I was wrong to question Netanyahu’s goal of thoroughly crushing Hamas. Credit has to be given though to the IDF and how much they learned from previous wars with Hamas and Hezbollah.
Amidst all this though, one has to feel great sympathy for the people of Gaza. They are being held to ransom by a gang of thugs and there does not appear to be any way out for them. For their sake, let’s hope that Israel can “finish the job” quickly, although how that can be done remains difficult to know. Perhaps Thomas Friedman, who is always so thoughtful and insightful, can shed some answers to that question as well.
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Spanish Authorities Question Steel Workers Over Alleged Israeli Arms Sales, Sparking Outrage
Containers are seen in the Port of Vigo, Spain, March 13, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Nacho Doce
Spanish authorities on Tuesday raided a steel factory near Bilbao, northern Spain, questioning staff over suspected violations of the country’s arms embargo on Israel – a move that has sparked outrage among local Jewish leaders and government officials, who denounced it as blatant intimidation.
According to the Spanish news outlet El Debate, police in Basauri – a town in Spain’s northern Basque Country – questioned staff at Sidenor Group, a steel manufacturer and trader, as part of a criminal investigation into alleged illegal arms sales to Israel.
José Antonio Jainaga, president of Sidenor, is accused of “smuggling and aiding in crimes against humanity or genocide by selling unauthorized batches of steel to Israel Military Industries,” according to the report.
However, Jainaga denied “any irregularity in the sales of steel to Israel” in testimony last year, asserting that the steel produced by Sidenor and exported to Israel was not “among the products subject to special control” by the Spanish government.
The Action and Communication on the Middle East (ACOM) group, a leading pro-Israel organization in Spain, strongly condemned the government’s latest actions as part of a “pattern of political pressure on economic actors for ideological reasons” and an “authoritarian drift and threat to democratic standards.”
“What should have been an administrative compliance process is increasingly perceived as a show of force by a government that has strayed from the standards of transparency, proportionality, and legal certainty promoted by the European Union,” ACOM wrote in a post on X.
“The combination of state intervention with a political climate that tolerates — and sometimes encourages — aggressive activism against Israel and its partners creates a scenario in which civil liberties and the legal security of companies and citizens are steadily eroded,” the statement read.
Spain under Sanchez: authoritarian drift and the threat to democratic standards
Recently, Spain witnessed an event that should alarm any international observer: the National Police conducted a raid on the headquarters of @sidenoraceros in Basauri, in Spain’s Basque Country,… pic.twitter.com/jAmEvcdUGa
— Acción y Comunicación sobre Oriente Medio – ACOM (@ACOM_es) February 10, 2026
ACOM also accused Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of turning the country into one of Europe’s most hostile toward Israel, alleging the move was meant to divert attention from corruption scandals within his Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and from recent electoral setbacks.
Since the start of the war in Gaza, Spain has launched a fierce anti-Israel campaign aimed at undermining and isolating the Jewish state on the international stage.
In September, the Spanish government passed a law to take “urgent measures to stop the genocide in Gaza,” banning trade in defense material and dual-use products from Israel, as well as imports and advertising of products originating from Israeli settlements.
More recently, Spanish officials also announced a ban on imports from hundreds of Israeli communities in the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
Among all European Union members, Spain is the second country to take such action, following Slovenia — one of the bloc’s smallest economies — which became the first EU member to ban Israeli products in August, and potentially to be joined by Ireland, where parliament is currently working on a similar measure.
As a major trading partner, Israel exports roughly $850 million in goods to Spain each year — about half the value of Spanish exports to Israel — with products from the West Bank and the Golan making up only a small fraction of those shipments, according to the Israel Export Institute.
Last year, the Spanish government also announced it would bar entry to individuals involved in what it called a “genocide against Palestinians” and block Israel-bound ships and aircraft carrying weapons from Spanish ports and airspace.
Spain has also canceled a €700 million ($825 million) deal for Israeli-designed rocket launchers, as the government conducts a broader review to systematically phase out Israeli weapons and technology from its armed forces.
Amid this increasingly hostile stance toward the Jewish state, the Sánchez administration is facing mounting pressure from the country’s political leaders and the Jewish community, who accuse the government of stoking antisemitic hostility.
In December, Spanish authorities granted Airbus, the European aerospace and defense company, exceptional permission to produce aircraft and drones using Israeli technology at its Spanish plants – a move that reflects growing pressure from companies and domestic interests against the government’s push for trade sanctions on Israel over the war in Gaza.
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Antisemitic Incidents in UK Surged After Lethal Attack at Manchester Synagogue on Yom Kippur
Police officers stand outside the Manchester synagogue, where multiple people were killed on Yom Kippur, in what police have declared a terrorist incident, in north Manchester, Britain, Oct. 6, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Hannah McKay
Antisemitic incidents in the United Kingdom spiked to their highest levels last year following the deadly attack at Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, according to newly released data.
The Community Security Trust (CST), a nonprofit charity that advises Britain’s Jewish community on security matters, revealed in an annual report published on Tuesday that Oct. 2, the day of the car-ramming and stabbing attack that left two Jewish worshippers dead and three seriously wounded, saw 40 recorded antisemitic incidents. Another 40 such outrages occurred the next day.
These were the two highest daily totals for antisemitic incidents in 2025. More than half of the incidents included direct responses to the Manchester violence, with some celebrating what transpired.
Melvin Cravitz and Adrian Daulby, the Jews killed in the attack by Jihad Al-Shamie on Oct. 2, are the first victims of a lethal antisemitic terrorist attack in the UK since CST began tracking incidents in 1984.
In its latest report, the CST identified the surge in incidents as a perennial pattern following terrorist attacks targeting Jews.
Overall, CST recorded 3,700 antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2025, the second-highest total ever in a single calendar year and an increase of 4 percent from the 3,556 in 2024.
This is the first report in which more than 200 incidents occurred in every month. The year averaged 308 antisemitic incidents each month — an exact doubling of the 154 monthly average in the year before the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, massacre across southern Israel.
“The tensions that exist in our society have not abated and are both deeper and more long-standing than anything we have experienced in modern times,” said Chief Constable Mark Hobrough, the UK’s national head for policing hate crimes, who called the figures “unacceptably high.”
Antisemitic incidents had fallen from the record high of 4,298 in 2023, which analysts say was fueled by Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack — the biggest single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust — when Palestinian terrorists slaughtered 1,200 people, kidnapped 251 hostages, and engaged in sadistic acts of brutal barbarism that one Israeli NGO described in a 2025 report as the “tactical use of sexual violence.”
According to CST’s report, “the enduringly high incident levels and type of content reported since the initial Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, partly reflect the unprecedented length of the subsequent war, its geographical reach from Gaza to Lebanon and Iran, and its consequent continued foregrounding in media, politics and public debate. Anti-Israel protests have persisted, as did vigils for the hostages held in Hamas captivity and marches against antisemitism.”
Similar to the data observed in its latest report of increased antisemitic incidents following the Manchester synagogue attack on Yom Kippur, CST’s prior research also affirmed the trend in noting that 416 of 2023’s incidents took place in the week after the Oct. 7 massacre.
A surge of UK incidents also occurred on the day of and in the two days following the antisemitic terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia which left 15 dead. The alleged perpetrators are a father and son team. The father, Sajid Akram, has reportedly praised Islamic State and a top Al Qaeda propagandist.
“Two years of intense anti-Jewish hatred culminated in a jihadi terror attack at a synagogue on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar,” CST chief executive Mark Gardner said in a statement. “The terror attack then triggered even more antisemitism, showing the depths of extremism faced by Jews and all our British society.”
Gardner said the increase in violence and terrorism “makes CST even more determined to keep protecting our community, giving it strength and dignity so it can lead the life of its choice.”
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood said in response to the report that the government was “providing record funding for security at synagogues, Jewish schools, and community centers.” She vowed, “I will go further to strengthen police powers so they can crack down on intimidating protests.”
Anti-Israel sentiment fueled antisemitism, according to the CST’s data, which showed that 1,977 incidents involved references to Israel, Palestine, the Hamas attack, or the ensuing war in Gaza. “This was true of 52 percent of the incidents reported in 2024, 43 percent of those in 2023, and 15 percent of those in 2022: a year unaffected by a significant trigger event in the region,” CST noted.
According to the report, 170 incidents in 2025 involved an assault, which represents a drop of 16 percent from 2024’s 202.
Geographically, the CST identified the majority of incidents (61 percent) occurring in Greater London (1,844) and Greater Manchester (425) since “these hubs of Jewish life are where the majority of the UK’s Jewish community resides and remain the main targets of anti-Jewish prejudice.” Other hot spots for antisemitism in the UK included West Yorkshire (131), Hertfordshire (126), Scotland (101), Sussex (68), Essex (67), and West Midlands (67).
“In all walks of life, Jewish people have been attacked, targeted, ostracized and excluded,” said John Mann, who serves in the House of Lords and as the country’s independent adviser on antisemitism. “Anti-Jewish racism is present in every sector and every corner of society.”
A further trend that CST identified was the evolving nature of antisemitism in the UK, noting that far right and far left narratives have begun to blend together in an expression of what political scientists have described as the “horseshoe theory” wherein extremists from both sides of the ideological spectrum come to unite around recognizing their common enemy.
“The far-right discourses pervading Israel-related antisemitism showcase the mechanism of contemporary anti-Jewish hate, wherein traditional doctrines of extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing antisemitism overlap in their centralizing demonization of Israel, Zionism and, to varying degrees of unambiguity, Jews,” the report stated.
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Trump is poised to reinforce Iran’s regime — despite Netanyahu’s pressure
President Donald Trump’s Wednesday meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took place with an air of urgency around Iran. Yet the men left their three-hour conclave without resolving a fundamental divergence: Israel is deeply suspicious of any agreement with the Islamic Republic, and Trump has a visible preference for keeping diplomacy alive.
So visible, in fact, that Trump announced on Truth Social after the meeting that negotiations with Iran will continue. Where does that leave Israel, which is deeply concerned that Trump, in search of a quick win, will go for a deal that eases sanctions — strengthening the Iranian regime at precisely the time when it seems brittle enough to fall? And what about Iranian critics of the regime, who have good reason to feel betrayed by an American president who encouraged them to protest, and now seems poised to pursue accommodation with the authorities who had protesters killed en masse?
Of course, nothing in the Trump era can be analyzed with absolute certainty. Strategic misdirection is a recognized feature of even normal statecraft, and Trump has elevated unpredictability into something close to doctrine. Yet even allowing for that ambiguity, the meeting made clear that Israel and the United States are not aligned on an absolutely key issue — a potentially perilous state of affairs.
What does Israel want?
Israel does not trust the Iranian regime, for myriad reasons. The Islamic Republic’s missile programs, its sponsorship of proxy militias, and its long record of hostility toward Israel are viewed as elements of a single strategic problem.
Because of that deep and deeply justified mistrust, Israel is wary of any deal that might stabilize or legitimize the regime — a risk raised by Trump’s interest in a new nuclear deal. Israeli leaders are concerned about long-term risk. A renewed agreement focused narrowly on nuclear restrictions would almost inevitably entail sanctions relief or broader economic normalization. Such measures, from Jerusalem’s perspective, would strengthen the very Iranian system that has spent decades spreading havoc across the region.
That doesn’t mean Israel would prefer immediate military confrontation, or that it will speak out against any deal. An agreement that would dismantle Iran’s expanding missile range, including systems capable of reaching Europe, and cut funding from its network of allied armed groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Palestinian factions Hamas and Islamic Jihad — would possibly be of interest. Trump has so far not publicly stressed those demands.
Israel is politically divided, but when it comes to Iran, a broad consensus cuts across political lines. The regime must fall or radically change, for the sake of human rights within Iran’s borders, and that of a healthy regional future outside them.
What does Trump want?
The American position is less straightforward, largely because it is filtered through Trump’s distinctive political style, and his limited regional knowledge. Trump often appears unbothered by expert and public opinion; he seeks drama, through visible wins, deals, and dramatic reversals. He will present any outcome as an amazing achievement that no predecessor could have hoped for — even if he ends up signing an agreement that looks quite a lot like former President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal, which he walked away from in 2018.
Trump’s broader worldview might provide insight. Unlike earlier American administrations that explicitly championed democracy promotion, with mixed results, Trump’s national security posture has consistently downplayed ideological missions. His rhetoric and policy frameworks have reflected skepticism toward efforts to reshape other societies’ political systems, instead emphasizing transactional relationships and the avoidance of prolonged entanglements.
This orientation is reinforced by his political base. A significant segment of MAGA-aligned voters wants a more isolationist foreign policy. Within that framework, negotiations that promise de-escalation and risk reduction are politically attractive. Military confrontation, by contrast, carries unpredictable costs.
Trump’s posture, oscillating between threats of force and enthusiasm for negotiation, reflects the strange truth that American political alignments on Iran defy traditional expectations, with hawkishness losing favor on the right. He has preserved the military option while simultaneously projecting optimism about a deal. Meanwhile, a huge and growing armada is parked in the waters near Iran.
What does Iran want?
Assessing Iranian intentions is notoriously difficult. The regime’s history of opaque decision-making, tactical deception, and disciplined negotiation complicates any definitive reading.
Yet certain baseline assumptions are reasonable. First, the regime seeks survival. Whatever ideological ambitions authorities may harbor, self-preservation remains paramount. Sanctions relief, economic stabilization, and reduced risk of direct confrontation with the U.S. all serve that objective.
Second, Iran is unlikely to accept a permanent prohibition on uranium enrichment, particularly at civilian levels. Tehran has consistently framed demands for “zero enrichment” as infringements on sovereignty — a defensible position under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Third, the regime has strong incentives to resist constraints on its missiles and militias, even though the militias are completely indefensible. But the regime exists, essentially, to export jihad, and those groups have been a central pillar of Iran’s project for decades.
Could the Iranian regime be brought down?
This question lurks behind every discussion of Iran, though policymakers rarely address it directly. Regime change, while rhetorically invoked at times, presents immense practical challenges. Many observers doubt that aerial strikes alone could produce political collapse. Modern regimes, particularly those with entrenched security apparatuses, rarely disintegrate solely under external bombardment. Iran’s leadership has demonstrated resilience under severe economic and military pressure, maintaining internal control despite periodic unrest.
That means meaningful regime destabilization would almost certainly require fractures within the state’s military, intelligence, and security forces, or coordinated ground dynamics that external actors can neither easily predict nor control. Such scenarios introduce enormous risks, including civil conflict, regional spillover and severe disruptions to global energy markets.
The regime’s brutality may reinforce its durability. A leadership willing to impose extreme domestic repression is less vulnerable to popular pressure than one constrained by public accountability. Last month Trump suggested the U.S. would support the protesters; that pledge appears to no longer be on his radar. The protesters were not seeking a better nuclear deal — which is now his apparent sole focus — but better lives.
So what happens now?
All of this suggests that Israel will be unhappy with any outcome to this period of tensions. It is much less likely that pressure from Trump will bring real reform to the Iranian regime is than that Trump will sign off on a deal that seems counter to Israel’s long-term interests.
In the coming days, it may become clearer whether Netanyahu persuaded Trump to expand the scope of negotiations to include Iran’s missile program and its network of proxy militias. It is also possible that talks will collapse, and that military action will follow.
But this much is clear: If the regime survives intact and is strengthened in the process, that would be a profound tragedy. For 47 years, the Islamic Republic has oppressed its own people while exporting instability across the Middle East. That is roughly the same span of time that communism endured in Eastern Europe before popular unrest finally brought it down.
Only a month ago, there was a palpable sense that the Iranian people were courageously pressing for a similar reckoning. To reward a weakened and discredited regime at such a moment by helping it stabilize itself — in exchange for promises about uranium enrichment alone — would be a historic missed opportunity.
The post Trump is poised to reinforce Iran’s regime — despite Netanyahu’s pressure appeared first on The Forward.

Spain under Sanchez: authoritarian drift and the threat to democratic standards