Features
Access to Canadian records of Nazi war criminals
Introduction: Following upon the huge embarrassment caused not only to the Canadian Government, but to Canada as a whole, by the decision to invite a former member of a Ukrainian Waffen SS unit into the House of Commons where he was applauded as a “war hero,” we asked David Matas, renowned lawyer and expert on the issue of Nazi war criminals who were allowed into Canada following World War II, to write a piece providing an analysis how Canada has failed so badly, not only to prevent Nazis and individuals who cooperated with the Nazi regime, to enter Canada, but also to continually refuse to identify who those individuals were. Following is David Matas’s piece:
Getting access to Canadian Nazi war criminal records has to date been nearly impossible. Efforts to obtain access to relevant files and documents have been constantly frustrated and gone nowhere. The record is this.
On January 12, 2022, B’nai Brith Canada put in a request to Library and Archives Canada for Part II of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals. Part I was public in 1986 when the Commission reported. Part II was confidential.
Part II contained, according to Part I, 822 opinions on individual cases. The Commission recommended that the Government give “urgent attention” to investigating 20 files of alleged Nazi war criminals who might still be living in Canada. The report also recommended further investigation of 218 other possible Nazi war criminals living in Canada.
What happened to the 20 cases which were recommended for urgent attention and the further 218 which were recommended for further investigation? We have no idea. We know that there some cases which went to Court and we have the Court records of those cases. But which of these were part of the 20 or 218, if any, were not disclosed.
As of today, Library and Archives Canada, one year and ten months later, has not responded to the request for Part II, other than to acknowledge receipt and assign the request a file number. B’nai Brith Canada complained on December 5, 2022 to the Office of the Information Commissioner asking the Commissioner to issue an order setting a deadline for Library and Archives Canada to provide B’nai Brith with a copy of the Part II Report. That complaint, as of today, has not been decided.
Also on January 12, 2022, B’nai Brith Canada put in a request to Library and Archives Canada for records relating to investigations of alleged Nazi war criminals of the War Crimes Unit of the Department of Justice and the RCMP. Canada’s Program on Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Eighth Annual Report 2004-2005 stated that, since beginning this work, the Department of Justice had opened and examined over 1,800 files. Who are these people? What was the result of the investigations in these cases?
With that request too, Library and Archives Canada has not responded, other than to acknowledge receipt and assign the request a file number. B’nai Brith Canada complained as well on December 5, 2022 to the Office of the Information Commissioner asking the Commissioner to issue an order setting a deadline for Library and Archives Canada to provide B’nai Brith with copies of the war crimes records. That complaint, as of today, has, like the other complaint, not been decided.
B’nai Brith Canada on March 6, 2023 asked for an unredacted copy of Library and Archives Canada the September, 1986 report prepared by Alti Rodal titled “Nazi War Criminals in Canada: The Historical and Policy Setting from the 1940s to the Present” prepared for the
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals. Justice Jules Deschênes who headed the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals recommended release of the report in its entirety. He wrote: “This substantial study no doubt constitutes an outstanding contribution to the knowledge of this particular question and deserves wide distribution.”
Library and Archives Canada provided B’nai Brith Canada on July 5th 2023 a redacted copy of the report, albeit with fewer redactions than there were at the time of the original release of the report. B’nai Brith Canada complained to the Office of the Information Commissioner within 30 days of the refusal to release the unredacted report. That complaint remains undecided.
The 2000 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Stockholm Declaration commits the signatories to “take all necessary steps to facilitate the opening of archives in order to ensure that all documents bearing on the Holocaust are available to researchers.” Canada joined the Alliance in 2009.
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Monitoring Access to Archives Project recommended in 2017 that governmental archival institutions “release Holocaust related records, irrespective of any personal identifying information or national security classifications”.
The US Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 created an interagency war criminals records working group to locate, identify, inventory for declassification and make public all classified Nazi war criminal records. The records subject to the Act include records of the assets of persecuted persons. The Act kept existing exemptions to disclosure in general laws, but required that they be strictly defined, with a presumption against the exemptions.
In addition to general requirements of strict definition and presumption against the exemptions, some of the exemptions were themselves redefined to limit their scope. The exemption from disclosure in favour of privacy is redrafted to become an exemption where there would be “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”. The exemption in favour of national security interests is redrafted to become an exemption where disclosure “would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States”. The exemptions in favour foreign relations and diplomatic activities is redrafted to become an exemption where disclosure “would clearly and demonstrably damage” foreign relations or diplomatic activities. The exemption in favour of emergency preparedness plans is redrafted to become an exemption for information that “would seriously and demonstrably impair” those plans.
The records which were disclosed as a result of US Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act give us an insight into why the documents were withheld. One set of documents showed that the US Government had a lot more detailed knowledge of the Holocaust while it was happening. Keeping this information confidential and not acting on it at the time, whether or not it fits arguably within any of the exemptions, does make the US government of the time look bad. There is presumably similar information in currently withheld documentation of other governments.
A second set of documents initially withheld and then disclosed through the US legislation was documents showing that the Government was providing haven for those complicit in Nazi war crimes because of their potential to assist the US in the Cold War. Again this sort of information now withheld may well be found in other archives.
A third set of documents initially withheld and then disclosed because of the legislation were documents which showed the initial unwillingness to bring Nazi war criminals to justice, and the argumentation both for and against within the government. This argumentation we know has been replicated elsewhere.
A fourth set of documents not yet fully available relates to the effectiveness and operational difficulties of Nazi war crimes prosecution efforts once those efforts got going. In Canada, there was a split between the investigation and prosecution efforts, with investigations allocated to the national police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and prosecution allocated to the Department of Justice. This fragmentation caused a sequence of operational difficulties about which we now have only partial knowledge.
There was also in Canada internal feuding within the Nazi war crimes Justice department unit, arguments whether the unit was too slow and cautious or overly energetic in the pursuit of their efforts. The documents we have now provide only a glimpse of this feuding.
A sixth set of documents not now completely disclosed is efforts of Nazi war crimes prosecution units that were established to obtain access to relevant documents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We know that there was a good deal of difficulty in getting that access and that eventually international agreements were negotiated that allowed foreign war crimes units direct access to those archives rather than working through local archivists. Again, this is a story which could be fully told only with release of all relevant documents.
A seventh difficulty is the inclination of archivists, government officials and Parliamentarians to address the difficulties in access to documentation all at once. Yet, attempting to do everything before one does anything is a recipe for doing nothing. Each request is particular, not least in the archival access issues it presents. An effort to resolve all these myriad issues in one fell swoop goes nowhere.
We can see in several countries self-exoneration and blame shifting as a form of Holocaust distortion. Everywhere the Nazis went they relied on local collaboration to identify, locate, detain and murder the Jewish population. What we see now in several countries is an effort to pretend that the locals were innocent, that the only perpetrators were the invading Nazis.
This whitewashing is not confined to the countries invaded. It is an attitude held within the populations which have emigrated from the invaded countries. This attitude had generated opposition to the effort to bring Nazi war criminals to justice and now generates opposition to disclosure of archives about those efforts.
Canadian privacy law allows for the lapse of the right to privacy twenty years after death. However, in the case of Nazi war criminal files, since the names of those, other than those whose cases have gone to court, are not known, neither is their dates of death. While the dates of death are not known to outsiders, they are either known or knowable to archivists.
The situation justifies these recommendations:
1) Obstacles to access to Nazi war criminal records stem from legislation which is general in nature. There needs to be legislation which is specific to Holocaust records and which provides an exception to these general requirements. The legislation needs to encompass Holocaust related archives concerning both perpetrators and victims.
2) National archives need to establish and maintain separate Holocaust records within their general collections.
3) Insofar as there is discretion in current legislation to allow for exceptions to prohibitions to access, that discretion should be exercised in favour of access to Holocaust related records, including Nazi war crimes records.
4) Parliament can obtain documents from Governments which the public can not obtain. Parliament should exercise that power to obtain Holocaust related records.
5) The public interest in access to Nazi war criminal files should prevail over the right to be forgotten.
6) There needs to be active review of Nazi war criminal files both to make publicly available the files where the dates of death are known and the fixed periods after dates of death in privacy legislation have passed, and to determine whether any of those to whom the files relate are still alive or, if dead, the dates of death, where the deaths or dates of death are not known.
Canada, as a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, is committed to Holocaust remembrance. To remember the Holocaust, we must remember the victims. We must also not forget their murderers. While the murderers are alive, that means bringing them to justice. Once they are gone, it means providing public access to the record of their atrocities.
During the Holocaust, the murderers were in Europe. After the Holocaust, the murderers scattered around the world to escape justice. Thousands came to Canada. Howard Margolian, a historian with the War Crimes Unit with the Department of Justice, in his book Unauthorized Entry, estimated that 2,000 Nazi war criminals and collaborators entered Canada after World War II.
It is understandable that files about individuals who are still alive are not made accessible to the public unless there is legal action. But once the individual has died, there is no reason why the file could not be made public, no matter what the state of the evidence about the individual. Not doing so amounts to covering up the haven Canada has given to those complicit in Nazi war crimes with a blanket of secrecy.
Philosopher George Santayana wrote: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Yet, we can not remember a past which remains hidden from us. To remember the past we must know the past. Only through public access to Holocaust archives can we learn lessons from those archives.
Learning lessons from the Holocaust is a legacy we can create for the victims, creating meaning from the senseless death of innocents. To learn those lessons, we need access to the archives which can convey them.
The effort at understanding, of learning the lessons from the Holocaust must never stop. For that history to be written, the files of those against whom there is compelling evidence of complicity in Nazi war crimes and who are now dead must be made public.
We have a duty to the victims, not just to remember that they died, but why they died, how they died. The picture of memory we paint must be real and complete. That picture must include the murderers.
Because we will soon be at a stage where the memory of the Holocaust conveyed by survivors will no longer be with us, access to Holocaust archives looms in importance for keeping the memory of the Holocaust alive. Access to Holocaust archives should be a matter of priority to Governments, Parliaments and archival collections.
David Matas is a Winnipeg lawyer and senior honorary counsel to B’nai Brith Canada
Features
What Attachment Styles Can Reveal About Dating Habits
How many evenings with a stranger does it take before anything reliable is known about them? Most people answer with a number and then ignore their own answer. What actually gets measured across those evenings is the pattern each person carries into every new pairing, and that pattern has been studied under one name since 1987.
Attachment research began with infants and moved into adult romance almost by accident. It now supplies the best available vocabulary for a question most people ask eventually, which is why their dating life keeps taking the same shape.
A Newspaper Quiz in 1987
Cindy Hazan and Phillip Shaver tested a hunch in 1987 by publishing a quiz in the Rocky Mountain News asking readers about their romantic history. They received 620 replies. Roughly 56% of respondents described themselves in secure terms, about 25% in avoidant terms and around 19% in anxious terms.
Those proportions were close to what Mary Ainsworth had recorded in infants decades earlier. A distribution found in toddlers separated from a parent for 3 minutes in a laboratory had turned up again in adults describing love affairs, and that correspondence is what made the field take notice.
The method had obvious weaknesses. Newspaper readers who answer a quiz about their love lives are not a random sample, and every answer was self-reported by people describing their own behavior in the most favorable terms available. Later work with better samples moved the numbers around without dislodging the structure, and the structure is what has lasted.
Two Axes and Four Positions
Two questions turned out to organize the whole field. Does a person hold a positive or negative view of themselves, and do they hold a positive or negative view of other people? Kim Bartholomew and Leonard Horowitz built their 1991 model on exactly that pair.
Crossing those axes produces 4 positions. Secure covers positive views of both. Preoccupied means a negative view of self with a positive view of others, which produces someone who wants closeness and doubts they deserve it. Dismissing means the reverse, a positive self-view paired with low expectations of anyone else. Fearful covers negative views on both axes, which produces wanting closeness and distrusting it at the same time.
Two axes beat a list of 3 types, because the axes explain why 2 people who both avoid intimacy can look nothing alike in practice.
Pacing and the First Month
There is no fixed amount of dates that settles the question of compatibility, and attachment position changes how quickly a person believes they have settled it. Secure people tend to form an assessment gradually and revise it when new information arrives.
Preoccupied people often decide fast and commit to the decision before it is warranted. Dismissing people frequently take longer and still leave with less, since their default is to withhold the information that would let anyone assess them back.
Separating the decision from the feeling by a fixed interval helps the first group. Deciding after a set number of meetings rather than after a strong evening will not make the assessment more accurate. It removes the largest single source of error, which is a conclusion reached inside the honeymoon phase while everything still looks promising.
Hyperactivation and Deactivation
The mechanism underneath all of this has 2 modes. Anxious patterns run on hyperactivation, which means turning up the volume on distress to draw a partner closer. Avoidant patterns run on deactivation, which means suppressing the signal entirely to keep distance manageable.
In early dating this shows up in small behaviors. Hyperactivation shows up as checking your phone every few minutes after an unanswered message, and as the escalation of a minor scheduling conflict into something larger. Researchers call the wider category protest behavior, and it covers everything from pointed silence to deliberately provoking a reaction. Deactivation produces the pleasant evening that goes nowhere and the topic changed each time a real question arrives.
Both patterns are attempts to manage the same discomfort, pointed in opposite directions. The deactivating version accounts for most of what people mean when they call someone emotionally unavailable.
The Anxious-Avoidant Loop
The most documented pairing in the literature puts a hyperactivating person with a deactivating one. Fearful-avoidant attachment complicates the picture further, since one person can run both strategies in sequence and produce the same loop without a partner’s help. Each strategy strengthens the other. Pursuit triggers withdrawal, withdrawal triggers more pursuit, and the loop holds steady for years because neither person is doing anything the other did not provoke.
The reason this pairing is so common is easy to miss. To someone whose nervous system learned early to associate intensity with love, a secure partner can feel flat. The anxious-avoidant cycle produces intensity on demand.
Positions Move
Attachment position is a tendency, and tendencies move. Positions change across the lifespan with relationships, therapy and circumstance, and a single difficult partner can push someone temporarily toward a pattern that is not their baseline.
That matters for how any of this gets applied. A person behaving in a preoccupied way with one partner may be entirely secure with the next, so the category describes the current pairing as much as the individual in it.
It also rules out the most common misuse of the framework, which is deciding early that a new person is avoidant and treating every subsequent behavior as confirmation. Two quiet weeks can mean an avoidant pattern, a demanding job, a sick parent or ordinary early caution, and the categories offer no way to tell those apart from the outside.
Reading the Categories Correctly
There is one more thing the framework cannot do, and it is the thing people most want from it. Nothing in attachment theory tells anyone which partner to choose. It describes how a person is likely to behave once the choosing is over and the uncertainty starts, which is a different and much smaller claim than the one made by most of the writing built on top of it.
An attachment style is a description of a habit. It names what someone tends to do when closeness is on offer and they are uncertain about it, and nothing in the framework predicts what any specific person will do on any specific evening.
Used that way the idea is genuinely worth having. A person who knows their own pattern can catch it while it is running, and a pattern caught mid-run is the only kind that can be interrupted. Noticing that you commit early and regret it a month later teaches you more than any number of verdicts about the people you committed to.
Uncategorized
Four Seats or No Seats? Why Israel’s Final Polls Disagree Over Amcha Yisrael
Conflicting projections for Ofer Winter’s party illustrate the uncertainty of measuring public support near an electoral threshold.
A Channel 12 poll gives Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael four parliamentary seats.
An i24NEWS survey reaches the same seat total.
Other final polls find that the party does not qualify for representation.
How can surveys conducted close to the same election produce such different results?
The answer lies partly in the difference between measuring a vote share and converting it into parliamentary seats.
A Statistical Boundary
Israel’s electoral threshold is 3.25 percent.
For a party receiving substantially more than that percentage, modest sampling fluctuations may change its expected number of seats without calling its parliamentary presence into question.
For a party whose support lies near 3.25 percent, the same type of fluctuation may change its projected representation from several seats to zero.
This does not necessarily mean the polls are measuring completely different political realities.
They may be producing estimates close to the same threshold but on opposite sides of it.
Sample Size Is Only One Factor
The i24NEWS survey conducted on October 22 included 5,124 adult respondents and reported a sampling error of plus or minus 1.4 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.
That is a substantial sample by conventional political polling standards.
But a larger sample does not eliminate every source of uncertainty.
Different pollsters may employ different recruitment methods, weighting systems and procedures for estimating turnout.
They may also differ in how they handle respondents who are undecided or reluctant to state their preferences.
These choices can matter particularly for smaller parties.
The Problem of Turnout
Opinion polls generally estimate voting preferences before actual voting takes place.
Election results reflect the ballots cast by people who participate.
Differences between intended and actual turnout can affect parties in different ways.
Analysts must therefore consider not only how many respondents express support for a party, but also whether the poll’s turnout model accurately reflects the eventual electorate.
Without transparent, comparable information about the methods used by each polling organization, it is difficult to identify which methodological difference is responsible for a particular disagreement.
Reading the Final Surveys
The appropriate interpretation of Amcha Yisrael’s polling is neither that its parliamentary representation is guaranteed nor that exclusion is certain.
The available surveys demonstrate uncertainty around a legally decisive boundary.
The four-seat projections reported by Channel 12 and i24NEWS are meaningful observations.
So are the below-threshold findings published by Channel 13, Maariv and Zman Yisrael.
Each survey is a measurement of electoral intentions under a particular methodology, not a count of actual votes.
For readers following Israel’s election, this makes Amcha Yisrael an instructive case study in how polling uncertainty interacts with electoral law.
The final result will provide the definitive seat allocation. The polls explain why the outcome was difficult to measure in advance.
Features
What Constitutes Genocide, and is Israel Guilty?
By HENRY SREBRNIK Genocide is a grave and exceptional violation of international law, defined and prohibited by the Genocide Convention of 1948. But maybe Raphael Lemkin did us no favour in coining the word during the Holocaust. It is now used by antisemites against Israel.
Raphael Lemkin was a Polish-Jewish jurist who escaped from Europe when the Nazis occupied Poland. He moved to Washington, DC, in the summer of 1942, and went on to document Nazi atrocities in his 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. In this text, he introduced the word “genocide,” the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, ethnicity or tribe) and the Latin cide (killing).
But it’s not that cut and dried. Even before the antisemites accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, as a way of ridding themselves of any residual guilt about the destruction of European Jewry, the word had become little more than a term used by states and “human rights” groups who for one reason or another want to punish their adversaries.
Most of the time they really are talking about “ethnic cleansing,” pogroms, massacres and war crimes. By such criteria, every participant in World War II committed “genocide.” The mass killings of civilians in Hiroshima and Dresden in 1945 would today qualify. But these were acts against even far worse perpetrators of what we now call genocide, designed to speedily end the war.
What about the American war in Vietnam, and of course the almost numberless conflicts across Africa? The wars that dismembered Yugoslavia involved terrible massacres, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, but did they really meet the criterion for genocide? The numbers killed needn’t be huge. About 8,000 Bosniak Muslims were murdered in Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb militias in 1995 during the Bosnian war. In the Western Hemisphere it would — and lately does — refer to the cultural and also physical extinction of pre-contact peoples from the Arctic down to Patagonia.
Are ideological attempts to kill groups of identifiable people within a state — the Holodomor in Ukraine, but also elsewhere in Stalin’s USSR — genocide? What about the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia? Should we call this an “auto-genocide,” since it was perpetrated by the nation’s own mad Maoist regime? Was China’s Cultural Revolution a genocide? Millions probably died. Rwanda is an interesting case — obviously a mass murder by one class-cum-ethnic group against another, a giant pogrom involving intertwined peoples, but where the victims have now turned the tables.
Actually, there have been very few ideologically intentional attempts to destroy a powerless and helpless people, in whole or in part. Only a few qualify by that definition, the Holocaust being an obvious one, as well as the Turkish mass murders of Armenians in World War I. The allegations that Israel committed this crime do not meet the established definition and standards of genocide, are unsupported by established facts, nor do they stand up to common sense scrutiny.
A finding of genocide requires evidence of acts that are intended to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. Israel has neither intended to, nor destroyed, Palestinians as a group in Gaza. Israel’s accusers allege genocide mostly because of the supposed number of civilians killed in Gaza. Such claims are rife with flaws. Genocide is not a quantitative crime; there is no specific number of civilian casualties that constitutes genocide.
Israel set a high bar for how to conduct urban warfare against an enemy who will stop at nothing, including the death of its own civilians. What kind of genocide is it when the population of Gaza is larger today than it was three years ago? And how could it be that Israel is trying to kill innocents when the ratio of civilian-to-combatant casualties is lower than that of other urban wars fought in even less-difficult conditions?
Dave Rich, an Associate Research Fellow at the Pears Institute for the Study of Anti-Semitism, writes extensively about the intersection of anti-Israel activism, far-left politics, and modern antisemitism. He observes that people respond to the genocide charge through facts and data: Israel’s supporters take the charge of genocide on its face, as an evidence-based allegation of a crime, and try to construct the case for the defence. But there is no defence, because the charge is not made on that basis, or for that purpose, he states.
The term “genocide,” he notes in “From Be’eri to Bondi: Global Antisemitism After October 7, published in Fathom, October 2026, has shed its legal meaning and become a political label, whose antithesis is “resistance.” These two terms represent two states of being: in a colonial setting, either you are engaging in genocide or you are resisting it. There is no middle ground. “Israel is condemned as genocidal, not by observation, but through logical deduction: Israel is colonial, therefore by definition it is genocidal. It cannot be otherwise. And Gaza represents resistance against the entire Western colonial and capitalist power structure.”
Maia Zelkha, editor-in-chief of Yad Mizrah, a Sephardi and Mizrahi cultural magazine, also contends that the left employs the word “genocide” as an ideological weapon. “Before Israel had even launched its ground invasion of Gaza, and before there was any evidentiary record of Israel’s military campaign,” she writes, in her article “Genocide and Its Jurors,” in Quillette, Sept. 24, 2026, many leftist groups “were already describing Israel’s response as genocide.”
On Oct. 8, just a day after Hamas’s massacre and kidnappings, thousands of demonstrators gathered in New York’s Times Square in an “All Out for Palestine” rally to support “Palestinian resistance.” Within days, other organizations were issuing statements describing Israel’s unfolding military response as genocide, situated within a pre-existing theory of Israel as a colonial project that had produced genocidal dehumanisation. Prominent academics, human-rights organisations, activists, journalists, and public intellectuals described Israel’s conduct as genocidal.
Although the conviction that Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinians is not new, it has garnered ever more strength since the beginning of this war. In March 2024, the UN special rapporteur on the Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, published a report alleging that the Israeli war in Gaza constituted a genocide. In December of the same year, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch did the same. Then in July 2025 came both Physicians for Human Rights and B’Tselem, followed almost immediately by the International Association of Genocide Scholars. A resolution from the latter organization requires a two-thirds vote of its members, academics in the field of genocide studies, to pass. One would be hard-pressed to find a more reputable source for the libel.
On Sept. 16, 2025, a UN Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza; other prominent left-wing organisations and scholars have reached the same conclusion. And finally, on Oct. 9, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that it awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2026 to South African judge Navanethem “Navi” Pillay, who led the 2025 UN commission that found Israel guilty of genocide against the Palestinians while completely ignoring many of the world’s worst human rights abusers, including, of course, Hamas. Pillay’s commission found that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups committed war crimes. Yet it accused Israel of genocide. This is a staggering moral inversion. And now the award of the Nobel; this appears to be the greatest possible legitimization of the now-established consensus about Israel’s war in Gaza. The icing on the cake!
But remember this: When a jihadist terrorist organization like Hamas applauds a Nobel Peace Prize, the moral judgment of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee should rightly be called into question.
Henry Srebrnik is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
