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The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7

Families and supporters of hostages that are being held in Gaza after they were kidnapped from Israel by Hamas gunmen on October 7, hold a demonstration to demand their immediate release, outside of the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, November 5, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville

In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities — not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization; certainty; preoccupation with cyber, targeting; professionalism; understanding; and risk management.

Israel’s intelligence community is among the most powerful in the world, certainly relative to the size of the country. Early warning is the historical cornerstone and a key element of Israel’s security doctrine. It failed catastrophically on October 7.

The early warning pillar was developed to bridge the inherent tension between Israel’s relatively small size, which has resulted in limited access to resources it can allocate to security needs, and the magnitude and intensity of the security threats with which it has always to deal.

These threats have grown over the years from knife attacks to the threat of a nuclear attack; from the threat of terrorism in the streets to the threat of precision weapons launched from a distance; and from the threat of lone wolves to threats from regional powers and even superpowers.

The main problem with early warning is that it requires not only an understanding of the present but a capacity to predict the future. The assessment of future events, when they concern human behavior, is always marked by great uncertainty and contains a built-in margin of error.

A quick analysis of the professional literature dealing with business strategies reveals that “outstanding organizations” only manage to achieve two-thirds of their long-term goals. If we translate this to intelligence work, this means that even those intelligence organizations that are the most outstanding in terms of information-gathering, analysis and understanding — even those that conduct the kind of in-depth soul-searching I advise in the second part of this article — will be wrong in their estimates of the future a third of the time.

The statement, “Once every 50 years, intelligence will be wrong in a way that leads to a severe blow to national security” exposes the need for a fundamental change in Israel’s security doctrine. Unlike the first decades of the State of Israel’s existence, when early warning was adopted as a central component, Israel is now in a situation where it is possible to increase the security margin. Israel is an economically and technologically strong country, both in absolute terms relative to its size and relative to its environment.

If the resources allocated to date provide a quality response to the country’s security challenges, then a wise increase in resources would create a level of security that reduces the problematic reliance on early warning. This resource increase should be based on careful risk management and should contain internal and external controls.

The security margin can be based on a clear technological and operational advantage over both known enemies and possible adversaries; broad and effective integrated land maneuvering capabilities, which are the insurance policy of national existence; accurate targeting and countering capabilities of both near and distant threats; aggregate power that creates deterrence and is a basis for effective international and regional alliances; use of security strengths as a lever to promote the solid economic base and national infrastructure; and a base of agreed values ​​that strengthens vital national cohesion.

One of the more effective uses of additional resources would be the further development of a strong intelligence community. This would form the basis for the detection of threats, accurate intelligence for targeting and operations, and a base cooperation with international and regional alliances. It would also provide an improved early warning capability that would allow at least two-thirds of the threats to be predicted in advance and thwarted ahead of time.

To develop such an intelligence community, we must draw relevant lessons from the failure of early warning on October 7. I suggest that there were seven failures, or “sins,” of intelligence that led to the catastrophe. The following is intended to open the conversation, not end it, and support analysis of the reasons for what happened and the lessons learned.

It is possible that some of the ideas raised here will turn out to be incorrect, but in this writer’s opinion, they should all be discussed. These failures are aimed at different levels of the intelligence work: from the decision-making at the top of the pyramid to the junior levels of collection and research, which are sometimes the most important, as can be learned from those who did think differently and tried to warn of what was to come.

“Sin” #1: Politicization. The year before the failure was not good for the intelligence community in this regard. The heads of that community found themselves in the midst of a political storm but seemed unable to steer the ship. They sent letters and early warnings up to the political level, but the necessary conclusions were not subsequently drawn by that level. Early warning of a change in the enemy’s intentions should have led to an obsessive preoccupation with operational early warning, but this did not happen. There were too many briefings by senior intelligence community members to the media on political matters, whether or not they were identified as such, which interfered with proper professional functioning.

Another significant issue was the failed handling of the refusal/non-volunteering initiatives. The failure to eliminate them decisively harmed the functioning of the intelligence echelons, shook them, and diverted attention away from the preoccupation with early warning.

Another relevant matter was the political statements made by former senior officials in the name of alleged intelligence analysis, which did not help.

“Sin” #2: Certainty. Predicting the future is inherently uncertain. It requires extreme caution. Alternatives must be presented, but they can never cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. A leading alternative must be determined and other alternatives evaluated according to their decreasing probability. Possible turning points need to be considered, together with the risks arising from their realization. There must be transparency with regard to the uncertainty levels of those alternatives and risks.

All of this has been eroded in recent years, at least as far as the assessment of Hamas in Gaza is concerned. This is the result of three main problems: excessive confidence in the assessment, which resulted in a failure to recognize how the adversary had changed; an effort to satisfy the demands of decision-makers and security system officials for higher certainty through an improbably precise description of a future reality; and the desire to give greater validity to the policy and operational recommendations of the intelligence.

“Sin” #3: Cyber. In recent years, cyber has occupied the attention of the intelligence community to a greater and greater extent. This is reflected in three characteristics: the focus of attention on cyber operations; shifting the balance sharply towards cyber at the expense of classic sigint, humint and visint; and an increased preoccupation with cyber threats to the State of Israel and defense that drew resources from other threats. Adapting the intelligence system to new capabilities is a welcome process, and the various efforts in the cyber domain have resulted in significant intelligence and operational achievements. The claim, to be clear, is that there was an imbalance in terms of the distribution of resources and quality personnel and their transfer from other intelligence tasks to cyber tasks.

“Sin” #4: Targeting. In recent years, the attention of intelligence personnel dealing with analysis and assessment has been directed toward dealing with operations. The greatest attention has been given to research that creates targets. There is no doubt that the contribution of accurate intelligence to operational activity – with an emphasis on accurate fire – that effectively damages the adversary and reduces collateral damage fulfills a vital need. The problem is that the focus on targeting resulted in the breaking down of the enemy into tiny elements, which resulted in a decreased ability to analyze that enemy as a strategic and operational entity. In addition, the preoccupation with promoting recommendations for policy and operational action and participating in their implementation seriously damaged the ability to perform an assessment detached from the perspective of the “blue side” regarding the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Despite the resource challenge, there is a need to maintain a dedicated group of intelligence personnel to deal exclusively with analysis and evaluation of the “red side.”

“Sin” #5: Professionalism. In recent years, the professionalism of analysis and assessment has been eroded in two areas that are critical to early warning, both of which failed on October 7: a political-strategic analysis of the perceptions, strategies and intentions of the other side; and a professional analysis of its military organizations and operations. This erosion caused Israel to view its adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, as armies rather than state-level entities. An analysis of the leaked NCO V from 8200 might indicate that looking at Hamas as a military system, rather than as a terrorist organization capable of only local and limited operations, could have led to a more substantial reference to the raid plan known as the “Wall of Jericho.” A reference of this kind was required in the fields of both collection and analysis for early warning and should have led to other conclusions and a different preparation by the Southern Command and the Gaza division against the potential threat.

“Sin” #6: Understanding. In recent years, intelligence organizations has given less respect to expertise from the fields of humanities and social sciences, which are in fact the basis of intelligence analysis and assessment. This eroded Israel’s understanding of the language and culture of the other side. In-depth knowledge of the history of the Middle East is required, as is the use of theoretical tools from fields in the social sciences, such as international relations, comparative politics, sociology, anthropology, economics, and more. The “best for technology” approach has replaced the “best for analysis and assessment” approach. Technological tools for language translation and the monitoring of human behavior were seen as substitutes for the knowledge and deep understanding once required of intelligence analysts. But rather than strengthen human ability, these tools actually weakened it and eroded the required ability for analysis and assessment.

“Sin” #7: Risk management. The senior intelligence officials committed to providing early warning with high certainty did not present its limitations and inherent risks, especially after the strategic early warnings that they allegedly passed on to the political level. Based on leaks from internal forums, it seems that they even saw it as a substitute for deploying forces and maintaining alertness. However, the problem of assessing and preparing for risk is consigned not only to intelligence officials but also to political and military decision-makers. An orderly risk analysis could have shown that the deployment of the IDF on the Gaza border was insufficient in the face of scenarios that were broader than a few raids at once, especially in the face of the dangerous course of action (DPA) of implementing the “Wall of Jericho” plan. The IDF and the decision-makers above it need to substantially improve the process of risk management.

The “seven sins” presented above represent a proposal for the analysis of the debriefings that will occur on the intelligence failure that led to October 7. They are critical to a re-strengthening of the analysis and assessment capacities that are the basis of early warning and that remain important components of the Israeli security doctrine.

Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7 first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Brooklyn Woman Denied Bail, Claims She Didn’t Kill Anyone in Car Crash That Killed Jewish Mother, Two Daughters

An overturned auto in a car crash flipped on its roof landing on a mother and her three children, killing two children on March 29, 2025, in Brooklyn, New York. Photo: ZUMA Press Wire via Reuters Connect

A Brooklyn woman denied killing anyone when she appeared in court on Thursday, less than a week after a Jewish woman and her two daughters died when she crashed her car into them at a crosswalk.

Miriam Yarimi, 32, appeared in Brooklyn Criminal Court via a video stream from her room in NYU Langone Hospital-Brooklyn, according to the New York Daily News. She is undergoing a psychological evaluation at the hospital following Saturday’s deadly car crash.

After the crash, Yarimi told first responders she was “possessed” and believed the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was following her. She has made similar claims about being pursued by the CIA on social media several times in the past, The Algemeiner previously reported.

Yamini, who is also Jewish, faces a slew of charges that include three counts of second-degree manslaughter, three counts of criminal negligent homicide, and four counts of second-degree assault.

“The devil is in my eyes. I am haunted inside. I didn’t kill anyone. I didn’t hurt anyone. Prove it. Show me the proof. You have no proof,” Yarimi said in a statement after Saturday’s crash, according to Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Nocella. “I need CT scans in my eyes. I need to get the scanning done now … Where’s my daughter? My daughter’s always in my heart.”

“People are out to get me,” added the single mother. “I need CT scans on my entire body. F— you. I need a whole work up to get whatever is in my body out of it. I did not hurt anyone. All the evidence is on my phone.”

Nocella called Yamini a flight risk and asked the judge that she be held without bail due to the “nature and severity” of the allegations, as reported by the Daily News. Judge Jevet Johnson agreed with Nocella and ordered Yamini to be held without bail. Nocella said prosecutors are prepared to present grand jury indictment on the manslaughter charges.

New York City Mayor Eric Adams said his administration is “committed” to taking more action to prevent traffic violence and deaths following the fatal car crash that killed Natasha Saada, 35, along with her daughters Diana, 8, and Deborah, 5. Saada’s 4-year-old son Philip was injured in the crash and is still being hospitalized in critical condition.

Adams’ office announced on Wednesday that there were 41 traffic deaths during the first three months of 2025 — 24 fewer than last year and the second fewest since they started being recorded by the city. Despite the decline in traffic deaths, Adams admitted that more work needs to be done to keep New Yorkers safe on the streets, as evident by Saturday’s deadly car crash.

“In order to make New York City the best place to raise a family, we need to be safer at every level — including on our streets,” he said in a released statement on Wednesday. “Our administration’s investments in intersection safety improvements, treating traffic violence as the serious crime that it is, and our expanding automated camera enforcement are all helping ensure we’re leading the way toward a safer future for all New Yorkers — whether they are pedestrians, cyclists, or motorists.”

“We understand there is more work to do, as evidenced this past weekend’s tragic crash in Brooklyn because one lift [sic] lost to traffic violence is one life too many, but our administration remains committed to reducing traffic violence as much as any other form of violence,” Adams added.

On Saturday afternoon, Yarimi crashed her car into an Uber and then slammed into four members of the Saada family as they were trying to walk across the street at an intersection on Ocean Parkway in Midwood.

Yarimi was speeding at the time of the incident, “probably doing close to twice the speed limit,” and “ran a red light” just before the crash, Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez revealed on Wednesday while speaking to Eyewitness News. Yamini was also driving on a suspended license and has accumulated almost 100 parking and camera violations, including 21 speed camera tickets and five red light tickets.

“It actually exceeds just being reckless, it’s almost being wanton, we’re not going to tolerate that,” Gonzalez told Eyewitness News. “Her vehicle had been ticketed many times by red light cameras and speed cameras, that car was a frequent violator of both speed laws and red-light laws, and there is no excuse for running a red light.”

Saada and her daughters were buried in Israel this week. Four-year-old Philip remains at the hospital for his injuries and is facing “tough straights,” Gonzalez said. “We expect him to make some kind of recovery, but it’s going to be a long road for him.”

The boy lost one of his kidneys during treatment at Maimonides Medical Center, according to New York City Comptroller Brad Lander. “It’s heartbreaking,” Lander said after he visited the home of the Saada family, according to the New York Post. “He’s still in critical condition. He lost one kidney but they are hopeful about his prognosis.”

Five people in the Uber hit by Yarimi’s car suffered minor injuries.

Supporters of a proposed state law that would stop repeat super speeders in New York have rallied together since the car accident on Saturday, calling for the passage of the bill that they said could have prevented the crash. The legislation would require speed limiters to be installed on vehicles owned by repeat reckless drivers, like Yarimi. The device automatically limits the vehicles to within 5 mph of the legal speed of the road. The “Stop Super Speeders” bill was sponsored by New York State Assembly Member Emily Gallagher and Senator Andrew Gounardes.

The New York City Comptroller, Brad Lander, supports the bill and criticized Adams for not already implementing such measures.

The post Brooklyn Woman Denied Bail, Claims She Didn’t Kill Anyone in Car Crash That Killed Jewish Mother, Two Daughters first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Hungary Announces Withdrawal From ‘Political’ ICC as Netanyahu Visits Country, Defying Arrest Warrant

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban speaks to the media next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in Budapest, Hungary, April 3, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

Hungary on Thursday announced that it will withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the country welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the capital city of Budapest, defying an ICC arrest warrant against him over allegations of war crimes in Gaza.

Despite Hungary’s status as a signatory of the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, Netanyahu was not taken into custody upon his arrival in Budapest. Instead, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban welcomed his Israeli counterpart with full military honors.

Netanyahu’s visit to Hungary, which is scheduled to last until Sunday, is his first trip to Europe since the ICC issued an arrest warrant against him last year. In February, he made his first foreign trip altogether since the ICC’s decision to the United States, where he met with US President Donald Trump.

As Orban and Netanyahu met to discuss regional developments and bilateral cooperation, Hungarian Minister Gergely Gulyas released a statement announcing that “the government will initiate the withdrawal procedure” from the ICC, which could take a year or more to complete.

After their meeting, Orban said he believes the ICC is “no longer an impartial court, not a court of law, but a political court.”

“I am convinced that this otherwise important international judicial forum has been degraded into a political tool, with which we cannot and do not want to engage,” Orban said during a press conference.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar praised Budapest’s decision to withdraw from the international court, highlighting the country’s “strong moral stance alongside Israel and the principles of justice and sovereignty.”

“I commend Hungary’s important decision to withdraw from the ICC,” Saar wrote in a post on X. “The so-called ‘International Criminal Court’ lost its moral authority after trampling the fundamental principles of international law in its zest for harming Israel’s right to self-defense.”

In November, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant, and now-deceased Hamas terror leader Ibrahim al-Masri (better known as Mohammed Deif) for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza conflict. The ICC said there were reasonable grounds to believe Netanyahu and Gallant were criminally responsible for starvation in Gaza and the persecution of Palestinians — charges vehemently denied by Israel, which until a recently imposed blockade had provided significant humanitarian aid into the enclave throughout the war. Israel also says it has gone to unprecedented lengths to try and avoid civilian casualties, despite Hamas’s widely acknowledged military strategy of embedding its terrorists within Gaza’s civilian population and commandeering civilian facilities like hospitals, schools, and mosques to run operations and direct attacks.

After the court issued the warrant against Netanyahu, Orban rejected the decision by inviting the Israeli leader to Budapest and accusing the court of “interfering in an ongoing conflict for political purposes.”

During Thursday’s news conference, Netanyahu commended Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC, calling it a “bold and principled action” as “the first state that walks out of this corruption and this rottenness.”

“The ICC directs its actions against us fighting a just war with just means,” Netanyahu said. “I think [this decision will] be deeply appreciated, not only in Israel but in many, many countries around the world.”

After the Israeli leader was welcomed in Budapest, Hamas issued a statement calling on the Hungarian government to reverse its decision and extradite Netanyahu to the ICC to stand trial, calling the decision an “immoral stance that shows collusion with a war criminal who is running away from justice.”

In a post on X, Israel’s top diplomat reiterated his support for Hungary’s decision, arguing that Hamas’s statement only proves the country is taking the correct stance in this matter.

“Whoever needed further proof as to how justified, moral and necessary Hungary’s decision to withdraw from the ICC is: Hamas just condemned it,” Saar wrote.

“Hamas is defending the politicized and twisted so-called ‘International Criminal Court.’ And that’s the whole story.”

After the ICC’s decision to issue the warrants, several countries, including Hungary, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, France, and Italy, have said they would not arrest Netanyahu if he visited.

US and Israeli officials issued blistering condemnations of the ICC move, decrying the court for drawing a moral equivalence between Israel’s democratically elected leaders and the heads of Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that launched the ongoing war in Gaza with its massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2o23.

The ICC has no jurisdiction over Israel as it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute. Other countries including the US have similarly not signed the ICC charter. However, the ICC has asserted jurisdiction by accepting “Palestine” as a signatory in 2015, despite no such state being recognized under international law.

The post Hungary Announces Withdrawal From ‘Political’ ICC as Netanyahu Visits Country, Defying Arrest Warrant first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Jewish Individualism Will Not Work, But Solidarity Must

The Western Wall and Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.

During the events of Purim, Haman approached King Xerxes I and said, “There is a certain race of people scattered through all the provinces of your empire who keep themselves separate from everyone else. Their laws are different from those of any other people, and they refuse to obey the laws of the king. So, it is not in the king’s interest to let them live.”

Queen Esther’s solidarity with her dispersed people in Persia, and her profound loyalty to her Jewish identity, saved them from Haman’s genocide and secured their self-defense when she courageously revealed her heritage to Xerxes I.

Today, Israeli Jews are once again fighting for their Jewish and Zionist survival. Since Oct. 7, 2023, this Jewish Armageddon has extended anew to Diaspora Jews, who have felt the past’s chilling draft. Antisemitism has reawakened, infecting non-Jews and Jews alike. Few people contribute to antisemitic attitudes more than “self-loathing” Jews. These “self-loathing” Jews, who cynically reveal only the negative aspects of their Jewishness, believe they can avoid antisemitic attacks if they condemn Israel. But they achieve only self-betrayal, gaining neither acceptance nor respect from those who hate all Jews. Jews are a nation of people who question, not people who answer.

Questions pervade the Jewish mind to such a degree that the adage, “two Jews, three opinions,” has become a common characteristic of Jewish identity. Moreover, the pursuit of an answer often serves as a springboard for further inquiry. For us, as Jews, the ultimate answer, akin to the messianic ideal, remains a distant, undefined future. This traditional perspective has granted Jews a sort of perpetual license to disagree. Jews enjoy engaging in debate with others, but they sometimes find particular delight in debating amongst themselves, which allows their intellects to roam and their sardonic wit to playfully engage with each other’s vulnerabilities, finding humor without causing offense.

This love for discourse, for questioning everything in sight, including Hashem himself, is by no means the only puzzle that makes up our Jewish identity. Another crucial element of our makeup is solidarity. In times of major upheavals, we have always stood together against the masses who rose against us. To our enemies, we Jews — atheists, nihilists, Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, Haredi, religious Zionists, non-religious Zionists, or undecided — look, taste, and feel the same. They care nothing for our ingrained liberalism. Our enemies seek cracks within our communities in order to break us apart and cause irreparable damage.

Years of relative peace and prosperity since the Holocaust have allowed us to gather again and engage in countless polemics over the fate of Israel, Jews, Judaism, and Zionism. However, we have failed to notice that we are at war again, and that our enemies eagerly exploit the divisions within a nation that comprises only 0.2% of the world’s population. These enemies — radical Islamists and progressive Western leftists who view Jews and Israel as white oppressors and colonizers — avidly listen to Jewish internal squabbles and criticisms of the Israeli government.

Despite the significant progress the Shin Bet and IDF have made in dismantling much of Hamas’s leadership and terrorist infrastructure, destroying its complex network of tunnels and command centers, and weakening Hezbollah, in addition to eliminating tens of thousands of Hamas terrorists, many Jews remain critical of, and disagree with, what Israel represents today. Aware of government problems, Israelis desire improvement. However, their rage and almost addictive pattern of anti-government protests have provided their adversaries with more opportunities to exploit perceived weaknesses.

This has resonated with some Jews worldwide. In New York, some Jewish intellectuals have defended “free-Palestine” and pro-Hamas protesters harassing Jewish students, invoking freedom of speech. They appear to have fallen prey to what they perceive as the lies of progressive anti-Zionist media, which systemically omits crucial facts about Israel. This includes the IDF’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties, and its role in eliminating thousands of Hamas terrorists and dismantling their terror network, which posed a significant threat to Israel (and innocent Palestinians themselves).

These “romantic” progressive Jews also forget that no matter how critical they are of that “brutal” IDF, it is still fighting on their behalf, because it is fighting on behalf of every Jew. Civilian deaths do occur, but they are either unfortunate incidents of war or, more often, a direct result of Hamas’s cruelty, as Hamas terrorists purposefully embed themselves within the civilian population. I once sat at dinner in Israel with a wealthy American Jewish couple who came on a sympathy tour a few months after Oct. 7. Nevertheless, the husband was convinced that the IDF was deliberately killing Palestinian children.

Those were wealthy, educated American Jews who thought they were charitable because they donated to Jewish causes, and therefore, believed they had the right to express their views on everything. This is where I, a Soviet Jew who grew up deprived of Judaism yet targeted by antisemitism, felt differently. To begin with, the husband was completely wrong. Second, in times of existential crisis, we, as Jewish people, must set aside our irresistible urge to disagree and criticize Israel on basic premises such as Israel’s fight to ensure Jews don’t live through a second genocide. The freedom to speak our minds has been ours for thousands of years. We conversed with Hashem, we obeyed Him, we sacrificed for Him, and then we quickly learned to disobey and question Him, even before we began arguing amongst ourselves.

Still, throughout our dotted and punctured history, it wasn’t our tongues or our disagreeable minds that kept our small nation together; it was our solidarity. In solidarity, we walked out of Egypt. In solidarity, tens of thousands of Eastern European Jews came to their promised land as early as the 1920s and began to build from nothing. In solidarity with his orphans, Dr. Janusz Korczak, despite being given the chance to save himself, chose to march with them, hand in hand, through the ghetto to the deportation point, on their way to Treblinka, where they met their final hour. In solidarity with other Jews across the Soviet Empire, Soviet Jews secretly tried to remember who they were, despite years of persecutions and purges.

In solidarity with their Soviet brethren, powerful American Jewry fought for Russian Jews to be able to emigrate to Israel and the United States. One of the main reasons our small nation has not disappeared into the abyss is because, in Diaspora, across oceans, and through impenetrable iron curtains, we never ceased to support one another. We knew we could not afford the luxury of neglecting our faith, traditions, and, most importantly, we could never abandon defending ourselves against our enemies.

Caesar’s “Divide et impera” (“Divide and Conquer”), though a cliché, is particularly relevant here. Seeing fractures within our communities, our enemies have intensified these divisions through incessant anti-Zionist and antisemitic propaganda and violence. Therefore, only as an undivided people, united by a single purpose — eradicating our enemies and protecting our promised land — do we stand a chance of survival. Perhaps only then will the day come when Jewish people gather on virtual street corners to argue and ask questions to which they seek no answers.

Anya Gillinson is an immigration lawyer and author of the new memoir Dreaming in Russian. She lives in New York City. More at www.anyagillinson.com.

The post Jewish Individualism Will Not Work, But Solidarity Must first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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