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The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7
Families and supporters of hostages that are being held in Gaza after they were kidnapped from Israel by Hamas gunmen on October 7, hold a demonstration to demand their immediate release, outside of the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, November 5, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville
In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities — not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization; certainty; preoccupation with cyber, targeting; professionalism; understanding; and risk management.
Israel’s intelligence community is among the most powerful in the world, certainly relative to the size of the country. Early warning is the historical cornerstone and a key element of Israel’s security doctrine. It failed catastrophically on October 7.
The early warning pillar was developed to bridge the inherent tension between Israel’s relatively small size, which has resulted in limited access to resources it can allocate to security needs, and the magnitude and intensity of the security threats with which it has always to deal.
These threats have grown over the years from knife attacks to the threat of a nuclear attack; from the threat of terrorism in the streets to the threat of precision weapons launched from a distance; and from the threat of lone wolves to threats from regional powers and even superpowers.
The main problem with early warning is that it requires not only an understanding of the present but a capacity to predict the future. The assessment of future events, when they concern human behavior, is always marked by great uncertainty and contains a built-in margin of error.
A quick analysis of the professional literature dealing with business strategies reveals that “outstanding organizations” only manage to achieve two-thirds of their long-term goals. If we translate this to intelligence work, this means that even those intelligence organizations that are the most outstanding in terms of information-gathering, analysis and understanding — even those that conduct the kind of in-depth soul-searching I advise in the second part of this article — will be wrong in their estimates of the future a third of the time.
The statement, “Once every 50 years, intelligence will be wrong in a way that leads to a severe blow to national security” exposes the need for a fundamental change in Israel’s security doctrine. Unlike the first decades of the State of Israel’s existence, when early warning was adopted as a central component, Israel is now in a situation where it is possible to increase the security margin. Israel is an economically and technologically strong country, both in absolute terms relative to its size and relative to its environment.
If the resources allocated to date provide a quality response to the country’s security challenges, then a wise increase in resources would create a level of security that reduces the problematic reliance on early warning. This resource increase should be based on careful risk management and should contain internal and external controls.
The security margin can be based on a clear technological and operational advantage over both known enemies and possible adversaries; broad and effective integrated land maneuvering capabilities, which are the insurance policy of national existence; accurate targeting and countering capabilities of both near and distant threats; aggregate power that creates deterrence and is a basis for effective international and regional alliances; use of security strengths as a lever to promote the solid economic base and national infrastructure; and a base of agreed values that strengthens vital national cohesion.
One of the more effective uses of additional resources would be the further development of a strong intelligence community. This would form the basis for the detection of threats, accurate intelligence for targeting and operations, and a base cooperation with international and regional alliances. It would also provide an improved early warning capability that would allow at least two-thirds of the threats to be predicted in advance and thwarted ahead of time.
To develop such an intelligence community, we must draw relevant lessons from the failure of early warning on October 7. I suggest that there were seven failures, or “sins,” of intelligence that led to the catastrophe. The following is intended to open the conversation, not end it, and support analysis of the reasons for what happened and the lessons learned.
It is possible that some of the ideas raised here will turn out to be incorrect, but in this writer’s opinion, they should all be discussed. These failures are aimed at different levels of the intelligence work: from the decision-making at the top of the pyramid to the junior levels of collection and research, which are sometimes the most important, as can be learned from those who did think differently and tried to warn of what was to come.
“Sin” #1: Politicization. The year before the failure was not good for the intelligence community in this regard. The heads of that community found themselves in the midst of a political storm but seemed unable to steer the ship. They sent letters and early warnings up to the political level, but the necessary conclusions were not subsequently drawn by that level. Early warning of a change in the enemy’s intentions should have led to an obsessive preoccupation with operational early warning, but this did not happen. There were too many briefings by senior intelligence community members to the media on political matters, whether or not they were identified as such, which interfered with proper professional functioning.
Another significant issue was the failed handling of the refusal/non-volunteering initiatives. The failure to eliminate them decisively harmed the functioning of the intelligence echelons, shook them, and diverted attention away from the preoccupation with early warning.
Another relevant matter was the political statements made by former senior officials in the name of alleged intelligence analysis, which did not help.
“Sin” #2: Certainty. Predicting the future is inherently uncertain. It requires extreme caution. Alternatives must be presented, but they can never cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. A leading alternative must be determined and other alternatives evaluated according to their decreasing probability. Possible turning points need to be considered, together with the risks arising from their realization. There must be transparency with regard to the uncertainty levels of those alternatives and risks.
All of this has been eroded in recent years, at least as far as the assessment of Hamas in Gaza is concerned. This is the result of three main problems: excessive confidence in the assessment, which resulted in a failure to recognize how the adversary had changed; an effort to satisfy the demands of decision-makers and security system officials for higher certainty through an improbably precise description of a future reality; and the desire to give greater validity to the policy and operational recommendations of the intelligence.
“Sin” #3: Cyber. In recent years, cyber has occupied the attention of the intelligence community to a greater and greater extent. This is reflected in three characteristics: the focus of attention on cyber operations; shifting the balance sharply towards cyber at the expense of classic sigint, humint and visint; and an increased preoccupation with cyber threats to the State of Israel and defense that drew resources from other threats. Adapting the intelligence system to new capabilities is a welcome process, and the various efforts in the cyber domain have resulted in significant intelligence and operational achievements. The claim, to be clear, is that there was an imbalance in terms of the distribution of resources and quality personnel and their transfer from other intelligence tasks to cyber tasks.
“Sin” #4: Targeting. In recent years, the attention of intelligence personnel dealing with analysis and assessment has been directed toward dealing with operations. The greatest attention has been given to research that creates targets. There is no doubt that the contribution of accurate intelligence to operational activity – with an emphasis on accurate fire – that effectively damages the adversary and reduces collateral damage fulfills a vital need. The problem is that the focus on targeting resulted in the breaking down of the enemy into tiny elements, which resulted in a decreased ability to analyze that enemy as a strategic and operational entity. In addition, the preoccupation with promoting recommendations for policy and operational action and participating in their implementation seriously damaged the ability to perform an assessment detached from the perspective of the “blue side” regarding the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Despite the resource challenge, there is a need to maintain a dedicated group of intelligence personnel to deal exclusively with analysis and evaluation of the “red side.”
“Sin” #5: Professionalism. In recent years, the professionalism of analysis and assessment has been eroded in two areas that are critical to early warning, both of which failed on October 7: a political-strategic analysis of the perceptions, strategies and intentions of the other side; and a professional analysis of its military organizations and operations. This erosion caused Israel to view its adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, as armies rather than state-level entities. An analysis of the leaked NCO V from 8200 might indicate that looking at Hamas as a military system, rather than as a terrorist organization capable of only local and limited operations, could have led to a more substantial reference to the raid plan known as the “Wall of Jericho.” A reference of this kind was required in the fields of both collection and analysis for early warning and should have led to other conclusions and a different preparation by the Southern Command and the Gaza division against the potential threat.
“Sin” #6: Understanding. In recent years, intelligence organizations has given less respect to expertise from the fields of humanities and social sciences, which are in fact the basis of intelligence analysis and assessment. This eroded Israel’s understanding of the language and culture of the other side. In-depth knowledge of the history of the Middle East is required, as is the use of theoretical tools from fields in the social sciences, such as international relations, comparative politics, sociology, anthropology, economics, and more. The “best for technology” approach has replaced the “best for analysis and assessment” approach. Technological tools for language translation and the monitoring of human behavior were seen as substitutes for the knowledge and deep understanding once required of intelligence analysts. But rather than strengthen human ability, these tools actually weakened it and eroded the required ability for analysis and assessment.
“Sin” #7: Risk management. The senior intelligence officials committed to providing early warning with high certainty did not present its limitations and inherent risks, especially after the strategic early warnings that they allegedly passed on to the political level. Based on leaks from internal forums, it seems that they even saw it as a substitute for deploying forces and maintaining alertness. However, the problem of assessing and preparing for risk is consigned not only to intelligence officials but also to political and military decision-makers. An orderly risk analysis could have shown that the deployment of the IDF on the Gaza border was insufficient in the face of scenarios that were broader than a few raids at once, especially in the face of the dangerous course of action (DPA) of implementing the “Wall of Jericho” plan. The IDF and the decision-makers above it need to substantially improve the process of risk management.
The “seven sins” presented above represent a proposal for the analysis of the debriefings that will occur on the intelligence failure that led to October 7. They are critical to a re-strengthening of the analysis and assessment capacities that are the basis of early warning and that remain important components of the Israeli security doctrine.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7 first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Israeli-Organized Music Festival in Portugal Canceled Amid BDS Threats
Supporters of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions campaign. Photo: Alex Chis.
An Israeli-organized music festival set to open in Portugal today was canceled after one of the latest anti-Israel campaigns by the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement pressured local authorities to intervene.
“It is with the heaviest of hearts that we announce the cancellation of Anta Gathering,” the organizers of the five-day music festival wrote in a social media post on Instagram. “You came to celebrate life, music, and connection — and instead we find ourselves forced to cancel. This is heartbreaking for us, and we are still processing the shock.”
On Wednesday, organizers said they were expecting final approval for the event, but the local municipality informed them that additional regulations still needed to be met. According to a festival spokesperson, organizers tried to postpone the festival to secure the necessary permits after encountering unexpected regulatory hurdles.
“The reason is clear: in the last days we faced a well-funded and orchestrated BDS campaign built on lies and hatred,” the organizers, brothers Shahar and Dean Bickel, wrote.
“For months, they worked to sabotage our vision, spreading disinformation fueled by money and nationalism. Their goal was never about music or community, but only to divide, intimidate, and cause pain,” the statement reads.
“The damage has been devastating and made it impossible to move forward,” it continued.
The organizers have launched a GoFundMe campaign to help cover the losses.
According to local media, pro-Palestinian organizations, notably BDS Portugal, have made threats against the local municipality, with activists pressuring officials to block the festival’s permits and warning artists from attending.
However, even with all permits in place — including police and safety approvals, cleared health inspections, booked artists, and waiting audiences — the local municipality informed organizers just 24 hours before opening that the festival could not proceed.
“Not because of safety. Not because of logistics. But because of hate based on nationality,” the organizers said in a statement.
“This is not just about a festival. This is about the right to create without fear. It is about protecting culture from being destroyed by prejudice,” the statement reads.
In a post on social media, BDS Portugal admitted to threatening several of the participating artists, prompting some to cancel their appearances. The group also claimed the festival is being organized by Israeli soldiers who “took part in the genocide.”
Given the unexpected cancellation, the festival is facing significant financial challenges — from supplier payments and booked artist flights to legal costs and ticket refunds — with losses already exceeding €50,000.
“Every contribution, small or big, makes a difference — helping us cover debts, refunds, and keep the dream alive,” the organizers said.
“This is not the end. Anta is about love, freedom, and community — and no campaign of hate will ever destroy that. With your support, we will heal, rebuild, and dance together again,” the statement reads.
This five-day electronic music festival is organized by two Israeli brothers, Shahar and Dean Bickel, and brings together 100 artists from around the world and more than 800 participants.
According to a festival’s spokesperson, Shahar Bickel served two weeks of reserve duty in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) at the start of the war in Gaza but never left Israel’s borders, while his brother Dean did not serve in the army.
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Iran and Terrorism: Empty Gestures or Genuine Change?
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi speaks during a meeting with foreign ambassadors in Tehran, Iran, July 12, 2025. Photo: Hamid Forootan/Iranian Foreign Ministry/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
In a world grappling with persistent threats of terrorism and financial crimes, the international community must not be swayed by superficial gestures.
While Tehran’s recent ratification of the Palermo Convention against transnational organized crime may seem like a step in the right direction on the surface, it is likely a calculated move designed to distract from the regime’s continued and unwavering support for global terrorism.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reportedly plans to meet with Tehran’s bureaucrats to review whether the Islamic Republic of Iran has complied with its action plan to be removed from its blacklist.
However, the global financial watchdog must resist the temptation to remove Tehran from the list, because the Islamic Republic fundamentally remains committed to funding terrorism and engaging in illicit financing. To remove Tehran would be to ignore a mountain of evidence that supports this unequivocal fact.
In fact, removing Iran would endanger the integrity of the international financial system.
For years, the Islamic Republic has been a leading state sponsor of terrorism. No single treaty that Iran may ratify can disguise this fact.
The regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has a long and bloody history of plotting assassinations on American soil and overseas, targeting high-profile figures like President Donald Trump, journalists, dissidents, and ordinary citizens. This is not the conduct of a state genuinely committed to combating organized crime. It is the action of a rogue regime that uses terror as a primary tool of its foreign policy.
The recent move by Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council to ratify the United Nations’ Palermo Convention — after years of refusing to do so — is a classic example of Tehran’s diplomatic gamesmanship.
Tehran understands its presence on the FATF blacklist has crippled its economy, It is desperate for a reprieve. However, the regime has refused to ratify the most crucial of the FATF-required treaties: the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT).
By refusing to do so, Tehran is signaling its intention to continue funding terrorist proxies including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Nor has Iran abandoned the facilitation network it has provided to Al-Qaeda. While Tehran may one day feel compelled to ratify the CFT for economic reasons, removing it from the blacklist should take place only if commensurate conduct changes on the terrorism front — and that change is sustained.
The international community has already witnessed the devastating consequences of Iran’s terror financing. The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was inspired, funded, and enabled by Tehran. The regime’s support for the Houthis in Yemen has destabilized the region and disrupted global trade, costing the United States and its allies billions of dollars. Tehran’s backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon threatens the security of Israel and the stability of the entire Middle East. Iran should not be welcomed back into the global financial fold until it changes its conduct, not merely purports to agree to an item on a technical checklist.
The FATF has a clear mandate: to protect the global financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing. To fulfill this mandate, it must hold Iran to the same standard as every other nation. This means insisting on full and unconditional compliance with all FATF requirements, including the ratification of the CFT and demonstrable adherence to its principles. There can be no exceptions, carve-outs, or special treatment for a regime that has blatantly and repeatedly violated international law and circumvented sanctions.
Tehran’s diplomatic overtures are nothing but a smokescreen. As long as the regime continues to fund terrorism, plot assassinations, and destabilize the Middle East, it must remain on the FATF blacklist. The security of the United States and its allies, and the integrity of the global financial system, depend on it. The message to Tehran must be clear: words are not enough. Its actions and malign conduct must change.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Toby Dershowitz is managing director at FDD Action, FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy. FDD Action is a non-partisan 501(c)(4) organization established to advocate for effective policies to promote US national security and defend free nations. Follow the authors on X @SGhasseminejad and @tobydersh.
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From Sacred to Strategic: Hamas Turns Civilian Infrastructure Into Targets
Palestinian Hamas terrorists stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly Oct. 7, 2023, attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, Feb. 22, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Hatem Khaled
Two weeks ago, the IDF revealed a chilling incident: Hamas operatives posed as World Central Kitchen aid workers, wearing yellow vests and using WCK-branded vehicles. WCK swiftly confirmed that the imposters had no affiliation — that this was terrorism hiding in humanitarian garb.
Then, earlier this week, Israel struck Nasser Hospital in Southern Gaza — not randomly, cruelly or without reason, but because Hamas was using the hospital to operate surveillance cameras to track IDF movements.
A tragic battlefield misstep occurred when tank fire was used to disable those cameras instead of drones, killing 6 Hamas terrorists who were either operating or near the targeted cameras, but also resulting in unintended civilian casualties. This outcome was tragic — but sadly predictable.
This is the logic of Hamas’ strategy: weaponize Gaza’s hospitals, schools, mosques, and aid centers, force civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, and then broadcast them as evidence of Israeli atrocity.
Hospitals: Protected — Until Abused
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) stands firm: during a war, hospitals may not be targeted — unless they are being used for military purposes. Hamas’ use of these sites as command or surveillance posts nullifies their protection.
Mosques and Schools: Sacred — Until Militarized
Houses of worship and schools are also granted special status under IHL. But that protection dissolves once they are used for military advantage — a tactic Hamas consistently employs, turning places of worship into weapons depots and schools into hideouts.
Humanitarian Aid: Safe — Until Exploited
Under IHL, even aid workers can become legitimate targets when Hamas impersonates them. The WCK incident not only endangered genuine aid efforts, but it also weaponized the trust people place in humanitarian organizations, and eroding that trust endangers aid workers everywhere in Gaza.
This Is Calculated — Not Casual
These are not random errors — they are deliberate Hamas strategies: embed fighters and military and tactical equipment in civilian infrastructure, provoke strikes, and unleash graphic narratives. The recent hospital strike and the WCK impersonation reflect this grim choreography.
A Double Standard with Deadly Consequences
When US or UK forces faced civilian casualties in Mosul or Aleppo, the world understood the moral complexity caused by ISIS embedding itself among civilians and fighting in civilian clothes.
But when Israel confronts Hamas — whose tunnel networks under hospitals and all other civilian infrastructure in Gaza rival entire urban subway systems — the narrative is nearly monolithic: Israel is the villain.
This is the double standard defined in the IHRA working definition of antisemitism.
No Safe Haven for Gaza Civilians
Hamas’ cynical human shield strategy and its use of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure as cover is enhanced as a tactical tool by the actions of Gaza’s Arab neighbors.
In Syria and Ukraine, civilians fled across borders to safety in Jordan, Poland, Turkey.
In fact, in every war in modern history, civilians have left combat zones to go to neighboring non-hostile countries.
But after October 7, Egypt and Jordan closed their borders, citing political fears. That leaves Gaza civilians trapped — forced to rely on limited “humanitarian zones” Israel sets up — zones Hamas routinely targets and even tries to stop Gazans from entering.
The result: Israel is held to an impossible standard: avoid civilian casualties even when terrorists hide themselves and their military and tactical infrastructure next to, among, and beneath them, while Gaza’s Arab neighbors are held to no standard of refuge for their fellow Arabs whatsoever.
Casualty Figures — Propaganda Masquerading as Data
To make matters worse, most media outlets parrot casualty numbers from Hamas’ so-called “Health Ministry.”
The Gaza Health Ministry’s numbers lump together civilians, combatants, natural deaths, and even those killed by Hamas’ own misfired rockets. For years before October 7th, between 5,000 and 7,000 people in Gaza died from natural causes. Meanwhile, at least 15% to 25% of Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s rockets fall short, killing Gazans.
And Hamas routinely kills Gazans it decides are “collaborators” with Israel. All these deaths — along with the death of Hamas fighters — are aggregated in Hamas’s “death tolls” for the October 7th war it started.
Yet the narrative advanced by major media outlets and on social media paint every death as of a civilian killed by Israel. This is propaganda masquerading as data.
Conclusion: Accountability, Not Convenient Narratives
Hamas will continue to weaponize its own civilians — and civilian spaces — if excuses remain for its behavior. Only when the global dialogue refuses to blame Israel for the foreseeable results of Hamas’ human-shield warfare can moral clarity return.
The responsibility lies — with Hamas, not Israel — to stop turning Gaza’s hospitals, schools, and civilian infrastructure generally into strategic targets. Let’s call this what it is: terrorism hiding behind civilian facades. Until the world stops tolerating and even rewarding Hamas’ cynical human shield tactics, they will continue.
Micha Danzig is a current attorney, former IDF soldier & NYPD police officer. He currently writes for numerous publications on matters related to Israel, antisemitism & Jewish identity & is the immediate past President of StandWithUs in San Diego and a national board member of Herut.