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Israel Needs a Large Army — Not Just Advanced Technology (PART TWO)
Israeli soldiers drape their country’s flag over an IDF tank near the border with Gaza after the October 7 Hamas massacre. Photo: Reuters/Ronen Zvulun
For Part One of this article, click here.
The offensive fighting in Gaza has drawn the bulk of the IDF’s effort. Meanwhile, approximately 100,000 Israeli citizens cannot return to their homes on the Lebanese border, and no one is able to commit to a date for dealing with this problem. Again, there are several reasons for this, but the most influential is the lack of sufficient forces. The IDF was unable to simultaneously conduct major ground offensives in both Gaza and Lebanon. Although the IDF’s achievements in the ongoing war of attrition on the Lebanese front have been good, they are far from sufficient to achieve Israel’s political goal: the removal of Hezbollah forces from the border to allow our citizens to return home.
Consider the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. After that war, the IDF increased its standing forces to deal with the threat of another multi-front surprise, but it also increased its reserve forces to enable victory to be achieved faster. Over the past few decades, the IDF has drastically reduced both its standing and reserve forces (about 170,000 soldiers were dismissed from the reserves due to a decision by IDF leadership that they were no longer required). The current war has demonstrated that this reduction of the reserve forces was a mistake in every possible respect. Not only were they reduced numerically, but most of those not cancelled had their training budgets drastically reduced. It is no coincidence that it took almost three weeks of retraining before the IDF was able to go on the attack in the current war. In the Yom Kippur War, reserve forces were fighting in large numbers within a single day on the Syrian front and within two and a half days on the Egyptian front.
The IDF has always depended on the reserve forces to complete its combat power on the battlefield – in fact, the reserves were considered the main force. However, the mobilization of reserves dictates short wars. Israel is also committed to short wars because of the intense political pressure it is invariably under to stop fighting before it has reached the achievements required to guarantee its security.
This is not a new situation. But the need for short wars returns us to the issue of the size of the force, and this war created a chain reaction: the inability to attack the whole Gaza Strip simultaneously led to the prolongation of the fighting, which led in turn to the release of reserves before the mission was completed. The continuation of the war also led to the loss of patience of countries that had supported Israel, which ratcheted up the pressure on Israel and led to the partial stagnation that now prevails in Gaza.
The fact is that after over six months of war, despite all the operational achievements of the IDF, politically and strategically the State of Israel is still in the basic state of defeat it suffered on October 7. Israelis remain expelled from their homes with no possibility of defining a clear time limit on their status as internal refugees, and this is because the full sovereignty of the State of Israel has not yet been restored to all its territories.
The military technology used by IDF forces, for all its sophistication, cannot change this strategic reality. Over the past two decades, some of the most advanced technologies in the world have been acquired by the IDF. Much has been said about the use of computer network warfare technologies, precision weaponry and remotely operated means to replace old and supposedly obsolete means that are no longer needed. This concept failed in the war in Ukraine, and it failed once again in the war in Gaza.
The most efficient and useful tools turned out to be the “unnecessary” ones that had been reduced in number and were not sufficiently available for the forces – tanks, bulldozers, mortars, etc. This does not mean the new technologies have no value; they add additional performance, but do not obviate the need for the old means. In the war in Ukraine, the leading powers in the field of cyber warfare did not achieve a single achievement of strategic significance. Also, despite the use of many varieties of precision weaponry and remotely operated aircraft, battles are decided by “outdated” statistical artillery and mass. If the IDF had had two or three additional divisions available, even equipped with less advanced technology, Israel’s strategic situation would have improved considerably.
Advanced technology is important, but the question is which technology and at what level of investment and equipment. Most of us have phones and computers with many tools and options we don’t use or need, but we pay a lot for the latest models anyway. The IDF has spent huge amounts on advanced technologies whose overall contribution to the results on the battlefield is less than their alternative cost. Interception systems for the defense of the home front are a necessary technology; systems such as the “Trophy” (which has saved hundreds of fighters) are necessary; but many other technologies, while scientifically amazing, cost more than they are worth.
For example, a basic Merkava 4 costs 150% more than a Merkava 3. An advanced Merkava 4 costs even more. But some of the additions and upgrades it contains do not provide sufficient tactical value to justify the additional cost. The lack of sufficient tanks was due not only to the perception that they are unnecessary but also to their increasingly high price. Among other things, the steep price led to a reduction in training in a way that diminished the competence of commanders and crews. Cheaper tanks in greater quantity, with advanced technology limited to specific tactically important capabilities rather than the best that can be created whatever the cost, would have enabled maintaining larger and better-trained tank forces — forces that were lacking during this war.
Another example is drones. The cost of professional military drones is much higher than that of commercial civilian drones. Military UAVs have important capabilities that civilian models do not, and a certain number of them is required — but, as was proven in the war in Ukraine and again in athe current war in Gaza, cheap civilian UAVs and drones of all kinds are able to provide most of the required capabilities at a negligible cost. It is possible to distribute them widely in the army, not only to a small number of specialist units, and thus better exploit their unique tactical contribution.
In conclusion, the IDF needs more ground forces than it currently has at its disposal. It is important not to exaggerate and increase forces to dimensions the State of Israel cannot sustain without intolerable financial cost. Technology is an important component of war-fighting too – but again, it is important not to exaggerate. Operational experience, not only from the current war but also from Israel’s previous wars and the wars of others, shows that not every technological innovation is beneficial. Sometimes their costs cause more damage than the added capability they provide because acquiring them reduces the ability to acquire other no-less necessary capabilities.
In our opinion, considering the existing and emerging threats surrounding the State of Israel, the IDF needs at least two more armored/mechanized divisions, and preferably three. It is desirable for Israel to have technological superiority over its enemies, but the benefit of this superiority is not equal in every field. There are areas in which it would be advantageous for the IDF to equip with the most modern technology available, provided it is able to purchase a reasonable amount — a “critical mass” — and still have a budget that enables the training of operators and the purchase of quantities of older tools. Inadequate skill levels due to a sharp cut in the depth and quality of training over many years led to Israel’s paying a price in casualties and insufficient performance, despite the very advanced technologies the forces had at their disposal.
In most cases, an improved technology that is “good enough” in large quantities is many times better than an excellent technology, even the most advanced that exists, but in a tiny quantity. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule that must be identified and invested in.
One area where a particularly large shortage was discovered is ammunition. The ammunition shortage is not unique to Israel. Russia and Ukraine have also discovered that they do not have either enough stocks or sufficient capacity to produce new ammunition, and this shortage has severely limited their ability to conduct operations. The NATO countries are behind Ukraine, but all of them put together are unable to meet the needs of the Ukrainians. Russia’s situation is a little better, and this gap is greatly affecting the results of the fighting. Although there is a huge effort by many countries to increase production, there are also shortages in raw materials, production machines and skilled workers, slowing down the industrial build-up to increase production. To this must be added fear of an escalation of conflict in East Asia over the issue of Taiwan or other possible flashpoints, which, if it occurs, will create an even greater shortage. Therefore, Israel should do as much as it can to increase its independent production capacities and accumulate stocks much bigger than the ones with which it started the current war.
Dr. Eado Hecht is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and a lecturer in the master’s degree program in Security Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Prof. Eitan Shamir is Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Down and Out in Paris and London
The Oxford Circus station in London’s Underground metro. Photo: Pixabay
JNS.org – In my previous column, I wrote about the rape of a 12-year-old Jewish girl in Paris at the hands of three boys just one year older than her, who showered her with antisemitic abuse as they carried out an act of violation reminiscent of the worst excesses of the Oct. 7 Hamas pogrom in southern Israel. This week, my peg is another act of violence—one less horrifying and less traumatic, but which similarly suggests that the writing may be on the wall for the Jews in much of Europe.
Last week, a group of young Jewish boys who attend London’s well-regarded Hasmonean School was assaulted by a gang of antisemitic thugs. The attack occurred at Belsize Park tube station on the London Underground, in a neighborhood with a similar demographic and sensibility to New York’s Upper West Side, insofar as it is home to a large, long-established Jewish population with shops, cafes and synagogues serving that community. According to the mother of one of the Jewish boys, an 11-year-old, the gang “ran ahead of my son and kicked one of his friends to the ground. They were trying to push another kid onto the tracks. They got him as far the yellow line.” When the woman’s son bravely tried to intervene to protect his friends, he was chased down and elbowed in the face, dislodging a tooth. “Get out of the city, Jew!” the gang told him.
Since the attack, her son has had trouble sleeping. “My son is very shaken. He couldn’t sleep last night. He said ‘It’s not fair. Why do they do this to us?’” she disclosed. “We love this country,” she added, “and we participate and we contribute, but now we’re being singled out in exactly the same way as Jews were singled out in 1936 in Berlin. And for the first time in my life. I am terrified of using the tube. What’s going on?”
The woman and her family may not be in London long enough to find out. According to The Jewish Chronicle, they are thinking of “fleeing” Britain—not a verb we’d hoped to encounter again in a Jewish context after the mass murder we experienced during the previous century. But here we are.
When I was a schoolboy in London, I had a history teacher who always told us that no two situations are exactly alike. “Comparisons are odious, boys,” he would repeatedly tell the class. That was an insight I took to heart, and I still believe it to be true. There are structural reasons that explain why the 2020s are different from the 1930s in significant ways. For one thing, European societies are more affluent and better equipped to deal with social conflicts and economic strife than they were a century ago. Laws, too, are more explicit in the protections they offer to minorities, and more punishing of hate crimes and hate speech. Perhaps most importantly, there is a Jewish state barely 80 years old which all Jews can make their home if they so desire.
Therein lies the rub, however. Since 1948, Israel has allowed Jews inside and outside the Jewish state to hold their heads high and to feel as though they are a partner in the system of international relations, rather than a vulnerable, subjugated group at the mercy of the states where we lived as an often hated minority. Israel’s existence is the jewel in the crown of Jewish emancipation, sealing what we believed to be our new status, in which we are treated as equals, and where the antisemitism that plagued our grandparents and great-grandparents has become taboo.
If Israel represents the greatest achievement of the Jewish people in at least 100 years, small wonder that it has become the main target of today’s reconstituted antisemites. And if one thing has been clear since the atrocities by Hamas on Oct. 7, it’s that Israel’s existence is not something that Jews—with the exception of that small minority of anti-Zionists who do the bidding of the antisemites and who echo their ignorance and bigotry—are willing to compromise on. What’s changed is that it is increasingly difficult for Jews to remain in the countries where they live and express their Zionist sympathies at the same time. We are being attacked because of these sympathies on social media, at demonstrations and increasingly in the streets by people with no moral compass, who regard our children as legitimate targets. Hence, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that while the 2020s may not be the 1930s, they certainly feel like the 1930s.
And so the age-old question returns: Should Jews, especially those in Europe, where they confront the pincer movement of burgeoning Muslim populations and a resurgent far-left in thrall to the Palestinian cause, stay where they are, or should they up sticks and move to Israel? Should we be thinking, given the surge in antisemitism of the past few months, of giving up on America as well? I used to have a clear view of all this. Aliyah is the noblest of Zionist goals and should be encouraged, but I always resisted the notion that every Jew should live in Israel—firstly, because a strong Israel needs vocal, confident Diaspora communities that can advocate for it in the corridors of power; and secondly, because moving to Israel should ideally be a positive act motivated by love, not a negative act propelled by fear.
My view these days isn’t as clear as it was. I still believe that a strong Israel needs a strong Diaspora, and I think it’s far too early to give up on the United States—a country where Jews have flourished as they never did elsewhere in the Diaspora. Yet the situation in Europe increasingly reminds me of the observation of the Russian Zionist Leo Pinsker in “Autoemancipation,” a doom-laden essay he wrote in 1882, during another dark period of Jewish history: “We should not persuade ourselves that humanity and enlightenment will ever be radical remedies for the malady of our people.” The antisemitism we are dealing with now presents itself as “enlightened,” based on boundless sympathy for an Arab nation allegedly dispossessed by Jewish colonists. When our children are victimized by it, this antisemitism ceases to be a merely intellectual challenge, and becomes a matter of life and death. As Jews and as human beings, we are obliged to choose life—which, in the final analysis, when nuance disappears and terror stalks us, means Israel.
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Hamas Says No Major Changes to Ceasefire Proposal After ‘Vague Wording’ Amendments by US
FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Joe Biden speaks during a campaign rally in Raleigh, North Carolina, U.S., June 28, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Elizabeth Frantz/File Photo
i24 News – A senior official from the terrorist organization Hamas called the changes made by the US to the ceasefire proposal “vague” on Saturday night, speaking to the Arab World Press.
The official said that the US promises to end the war are without a clear Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and agree to a permanent ceasefire.
US President Joe Biden made “vague wording” changes to the proposal on the table, although it amounted to an insufficient change in stance, he said.
“The slight amendments revolve around the very nature of the Israeli constellation, and offer nothing new to bridge the chasm between what is proposed and what is acceptable to us,” he said.
“We will not deviate from our three national conditions, the most important of which is the end of the war and the complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip,” he added.
Another Hamas official said that the amendments were minor and applied to only two clauses.
US President Joe Biden made the amendments to bridge gaps amid an impasse between Israel and Hamas over a hostage deal mediated by Qatar and Egypt.
Hamas’s demands for a permanent ceasefire have been met with Israeli leaders vowing that the war would not end until the 120 hostages still held in Gaza are released and the replacement of Hamas in control of the Palestinian enclave.
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Sacred Spies?
A Torah scroll. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.
JNS.org – How far away is theory from practice? “In theory,” a new system should work. But it doesn’t always, does it? How many job applicants ticked all the boxes “theoretically,” but when it came to the bottom line they didn’t get the job done?
And how many famous people were better theorists than practitioners?
The great Greek philosopher Aristotle taught not only philosophy but virtue and ethics. The story is told that he was once discovered in a rather compromised moral position by his students. When they asked him how he, the great Aristotle, could engage in such an immoral practice, he had a clever answer: “Now I am not Aristotle.”
A similar tale is told of one of the great philosophers of the 20th century, Bertrand Russell. He, too, expounded on ethics and morality. And like Aristotle, he was also discovered in a similarly morally embarrassing situation.
When challenged, his rather brilliant answer was: “So what if I teach ethics? People teach mathematics, and they’re not triangles!”
This idea is relevant to this week’s Torah portion, Shelach, which contains the famous story of Moses sending a dozen spies on a reconnaissance mission to the Land of Israel. The mission goes sour. It was meant to be an intelligence-gathering exercise to see the best way of conquering Canaan. But it resulted in 10 of the 12 spies returning with an utterly negative report of a land teeming with giants and frightening warriors who, they claimed, would eat us alive. “We cannot ascend,” was their hopeless conclusion.
The people wept and had second thoughts about the Promised Land, and God said, indeed, you will not enter the land. In fact, for every day of the spies’ disastrous journey, the Israelites would languish a year in the wilderness. Hence, the 40-year delay in entering Israel. The day of their weeping was Tisha B’Av, which became a day of “weeping for generations” when both our Holy Temples were destroyed on that same day and many other calamities befell our people throughout history.
And the question resounds: How was it possible that these spies, all righteous noblemen, handpicked personally by Moses for the job, should so lose the plot? How did they go so wrong, so off-course from the Divine vision?
Naturally, there are many commentaries with a variety of explanations. To me personally, the most satisfying one I’ve found comes from a more mystical source.
Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, in his work Likkutei Torah, explains it thus: The error of the spies was less blatant than it seems. Their rationale was, in fact, a “holy” one. They actually meant well. The Israelites had been beneficiaries of the mighty miracles of God during their sojourn in the wilderness thus far. God had been providing for them supernaturally with manna from heaven every day, water that flowed from the “Well of Miriam,” Clouds of Glory that smoothed the roads and even dry cleaned their clothes. In the wilderness, the people were enjoying a taste of heaven itself. All their material needs were taken care of miraculously. With no material distractions, they were able to live a life of spiritual bliss, of refined existence and could devote themselves fully to Torah, prayer and spiritual experiences.
But the spies knew that as soon as the Israelites entered the Promised Land, the manna would cease to fall and they would have to till the land, plow, plant, knead, bake and make a living by the sweat of their brow. No more bread from heaven, but bread from the earth. Furthermore, they would have to battle the Canaanite nations for the land. What chance would they then have to devote themselves to idyllic, spiritual pursuits?
So, the spies preferred to remain in the wilderness rather than enter the land. Why be compelled to resort to natural and material means of surviving and living a wholly physical way of life when they could enjoy spiritual ecstasy and paradise undisturbed? Why get involved in the “rat race”?
But, of course, as “holy” and spiritual as their motivation may have been, the spies were dead wrong.
The journey in the wilderness was meant to be but a stepping stone to the ultimate purpose of the Exodus from Egypt: entering the Promised Land and making it a Holy Land. God has plenty of angels in heaven who exist in a pure, spiritual state. The whole purpose of creation was to have mortal human beings, with all their faults and frailties, to make the physical world a more spiritual place. To bring heaven down to earth.
While their argument was rooted in piety, for the spies to opt out of the very purpose of creation was to miss the whole point. What are we here for? To sit in the lotus position and meditate, or to get out there and change the world? Yes, the spies were “holy,” but theirs was an escapist holiness.
The Torah is not only a book of wisdom; it is also a book of action. Torah means instruction. It teaches us how to live our lives, meaningfully and productively in the pursuit of God’s intended desire to make our world a better, more Godly place. This we do not only by study and prayer, the “theoretical” part of Torah but by acts of goodness and kindness, by mitzvot performed physically in the reality of the material world. Theory alone leaves us looking like Aristotle with his pants down.
Yes, it is a cliché but a well-worn truth: Torah is a “way of life.”
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