RSS
Israel Needs a Large Army — Not Just Advanced Technology (PART TWO)
Israeli soldiers drape their country’s flag over an IDF tank near the border with Gaza after the October 7 Hamas massacre. Photo: Reuters/Ronen Zvulun
For Part One of this article, click here.
The offensive fighting in Gaza has drawn the bulk of the IDF’s effort. Meanwhile, approximately 100,000 Israeli citizens cannot return to their homes on the Lebanese border, and no one is able to commit to a date for dealing with this problem. Again, there are several reasons for this, but the most influential is the lack of sufficient forces. The IDF was unable to simultaneously conduct major ground offensives in both Gaza and Lebanon. Although the IDF’s achievements in the ongoing war of attrition on the Lebanese front have been good, they are far from sufficient to achieve Israel’s political goal: the removal of Hezbollah forces from the border to allow our citizens to return home.
Consider the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. After that war, the IDF increased its standing forces to deal with the threat of another multi-front surprise, but it also increased its reserve forces to enable victory to be achieved faster. Over the past few decades, the IDF has drastically reduced both its standing and reserve forces (about 170,000 soldiers were dismissed from the reserves due to a decision by IDF leadership that they were no longer required). The current war has demonstrated that this reduction of the reserve forces was a mistake in every possible respect. Not only were they reduced numerically, but most of those not cancelled had their training budgets drastically reduced. It is no coincidence that it took almost three weeks of retraining before the IDF was able to go on the attack in the current war. In the Yom Kippur War, reserve forces were fighting in large numbers within a single day on the Syrian front and within two and a half days on the Egyptian front.
The IDF has always depended on the reserve forces to complete its combat power on the battlefield – in fact, the reserves were considered the main force. However, the mobilization of reserves dictates short wars. Israel is also committed to short wars because of the intense political pressure it is invariably under to stop fighting before it has reached the achievements required to guarantee its security.
This is not a new situation. But the need for short wars returns us to the issue of the size of the force, and this war created a chain reaction: the inability to attack the whole Gaza Strip simultaneously led to the prolongation of the fighting, which led in turn to the release of reserves before the mission was completed. The continuation of the war also led to the loss of patience of countries that had supported Israel, which ratcheted up the pressure on Israel and led to the partial stagnation that now prevails in Gaza.
The fact is that after over six months of war, despite all the operational achievements of the IDF, politically and strategically the State of Israel is still in the basic state of defeat it suffered on October 7. Israelis remain expelled from their homes with no possibility of defining a clear time limit on their status as internal refugees, and this is because the full sovereignty of the State of Israel has not yet been restored to all its territories.
The military technology used by IDF forces, for all its sophistication, cannot change this strategic reality. Over the past two decades, some of the most advanced technologies in the world have been acquired by the IDF. Much has been said about the use of computer network warfare technologies, precision weaponry and remotely operated means to replace old and supposedly obsolete means that are no longer needed. This concept failed in the war in Ukraine, and it failed once again in the war in Gaza.
The most efficient and useful tools turned out to be the “unnecessary” ones that had been reduced in number and were not sufficiently available for the forces – tanks, bulldozers, mortars, etc. This does not mean the new technologies have no value; they add additional performance, but do not obviate the need for the old means. In the war in Ukraine, the leading powers in the field of cyber warfare did not achieve a single achievement of strategic significance. Also, despite the use of many varieties of precision weaponry and remotely operated aircraft, battles are decided by “outdated” statistical artillery and mass. If the IDF had had two or three additional divisions available, even equipped with less advanced technology, Israel’s strategic situation would have improved considerably.
Advanced technology is important, but the question is which technology and at what level of investment and equipment. Most of us have phones and computers with many tools and options we don’t use or need, but we pay a lot for the latest models anyway. The IDF has spent huge amounts on advanced technologies whose overall contribution to the results on the battlefield is less than their alternative cost. Interception systems for the defense of the home front are a necessary technology; systems such as the “Trophy” (which has saved hundreds of fighters) are necessary; but many other technologies, while scientifically amazing, cost more than they are worth.
For example, a basic Merkava 4 costs 150% more than a Merkava 3. An advanced Merkava 4 costs even more. But some of the additions and upgrades it contains do not provide sufficient tactical value to justify the additional cost. The lack of sufficient tanks was due not only to the perception that they are unnecessary but also to their increasingly high price. Among other things, the steep price led to a reduction in training in a way that diminished the competence of commanders and crews. Cheaper tanks in greater quantity, with advanced technology limited to specific tactically important capabilities rather than the best that can be created whatever the cost, would have enabled maintaining larger and better-trained tank forces — forces that were lacking during this war.
Another example is drones. The cost of professional military drones is much higher than that of commercial civilian drones. Military UAVs have important capabilities that civilian models do not, and a certain number of them is required — but, as was proven in the war in Ukraine and again in athe current war in Gaza, cheap civilian UAVs and drones of all kinds are able to provide most of the required capabilities at a negligible cost. It is possible to distribute them widely in the army, not only to a small number of specialist units, and thus better exploit their unique tactical contribution.
In conclusion, the IDF needs more ground forces than it currently has at its disposal. It is important not to exaggerate and increase forces to dimensions the State of Israel cannot sustain without intolerable financial cost. Technology is an important component of war-fighting too – but again, it is important not to exaggerate. Operational experience, not only from the current war but also from Israel’s previous wars and the wars of others, shows that not every technological innovation is beneficial. Sometimes their costs cause more damage than the added capability they provide because acquiring them reduces the ability to acquire other no-less necessary capabilities.
In our opinion, considering the existing and emerging threats surrounding the State of Israel, the IDF needs at least two more armored/mechanized divisions, and preferably three. It is desirable for Israel to have technological superiority over its enemies, but the benefit of this superiority is not equal in every field. There are areas in which it would be advantageous for the IDF to equip with the most modern technology available, provided it is able to purchase a reasonable amount — a “critical mass” — and still have a budget that enables the training of operators and the purchase of quantities of older tools. Inadequate skill levels due to a sharp cut in the depth and quality of training over many years led to Israel’s paying a price in casualties and insufficient performance, despite the very advanced technologies the forces had at their disposal.
In most cases, an improved technology that is “good enough” in large quantities is many times better than an excellent technology, even the most advanced that exists, but in a tiny quantity. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule that must be identified and invested in.
One area where a particularly large shortage was discovered is ammunition. The ammunition shortage is not unique to Israel. Russia and Ukraine have also discovered that they do not have either enough stocks or sufficient capacity to produce new ammunition, and this shortage has severely limited their ability to conduct operations. The NATO countries are behind Ukraine, but all of them put together are unable to meet the needs of the Ukrainians. Russia’s situation is a little better, and this gap is greatly affecting the results of the fighting. Although there is a huge effort by many countries to increase production, there are also shortages in raw materials, production machines and skilled workers, slowing down the industrial build-up to increase production. To this must be added fear of an escalation of conflict in East Asia over the issue of Taiwan or other possible flashpoints, which, if it occurs, will create an even greater shortage. Therefore, Israel should do as much as it can to increase its independent production capacities and accumulate stocks much bigger than the ones with which it started the current war.
Dr. Eado Hecht is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and a lecturer in the master’s degree program in Security Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Prof. Eitan Shamir is Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
The post Israel Needs a Large Army — Not Just Advanced Technology (PART TWO) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
RSS
Iran and Terrorism: Empty Gestures or Genuine Change?
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi speaks during a meeting with foreign ambassadors in Tehran, Iran, July 12, 2025. Photo: Hamid Forootan/Iranian Foreign Ministry/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
In a world grappling with persistent threats of terrorism and financial crimes, the international community must not be swayed by superficial gestures.
While Tehran’s recent ratification of the Palermo Convention against transnational organized crime may seem like a step in the right direction on the surface, it is likely a calculated move designed to distract from the regime’s continued and unwavering support for global terrorism.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reportedly plans to meet with Tehran’s bureaucrats to review whether the Islamic Republic of Iran has complied with its action plan to be removed from its blacklist.
However, the global financial watchdog must resist the temptation to remove Tehran from the list, because the Islamic Republic fundamentally remains committed to funding terrorism and engaging in illicit financing. To remove Tehran would be to ignore a mountain of evidence that supports this unequivocal fact.
In fact, removing Iran would endanger the integrity of the international financial system.
For years, the Islamic Republic has been a leading state sponsor of terrorism. No single treaty that Iran may ratify can disguise this fact.
The regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has a long and bloody history of plotting assassinations on American soil and overseas, targeting high-profile figures like President Donald Trump, journalists, dissidents, and ordinary citizens. This is not the conduct of a state genuinely committed to combating organized crime. It is the action of a rogue regime that uses terror as a primary tool of its foreign policy.
The recent move by Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council to ratify the United Nations’ Palermo Convention — after years of refusing to do so — is a classic example of Tehran’s diplomatic gamesmanship.
Tehran understands its presence on the FATF blacklist has crippled its economy, It is desperate for a reprieve. However, the regime has refused to ratify the most crucial of the FATF-required treaties: the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT).
By refusing to do so, Tehran is signaling its intention to continue funding terrorist proxies including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Nor has Iran abandoned the facilitation network it has provided to Al-Qaeda. While Tehran may one day feel compelled to ratify the CFT for economic reasons, removing it from the blacklist should take place only if commensurate conduct changes on the terrorism front — and that change is sustained.
The international community has already witnessed the devastating consequences of Iran’s terror financing. The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was inspired, funded, and enabled by Tehran. The regime’s support for the Houthis in Yemen has destabilized the region and disrupted global trade, costing the United States and its allies billions of dollars. Tehran’s backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon threatens the security of Israel and the stability of the entire Middle East. Iran should not be welcomed back into the global financial fold until it changes its conduct, not merely purports to agree to an item on a technical checklist.
The FATF has a clear mandate: to protect the global financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing. To fulfill this mandate, it must hold Iran to the same standard as every other nation. This means insisting on full and unconditional compliance with all FATF requirements, including the ratification of the CFT and demonstrable adherence to its principles. There can be no exceptions, carve-outs, or special treatment for a regime that has blatantly and repeatedly violated international law and circumvented sanctions.
Tehran’s diplomatic overtures are nothing but a smokescreen. As long as the regime continues to fund terrorism, plot assassinations, and destabilize the Middle East, it must remain on the FATF blacklist. The security of the United States and its allies, and the integrity of the global financial system, depend on it. The message to Tehran must be clear: words are not enough. Its actions and malign conduct must change.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Toby Dershowitz is managing director at FDD Action, FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy. FDD Action is a non-partisan 501(c)(4) organization established to advocate for effective policies to promote US national security and defend free nations. Follow the authors on X @SGhasseminejad and @tobydersh.
RSS
From Sacred to Strategic: Hamas Turns Civilian Infrastructure Into Targets
Palestinian Hamas terrorists stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly Oct. 7, 2023, attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, Feb. 22, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Hatem Khaled
Two weeks ago, the IDF revealed a chilling incident: Hamas operatives posed as World Central Kitchen aid workers, wearing yellow vests and using WCK-branded vehicles. WCK swiftly confirmed that the imposters had no affiliation — that this was terrorism hiding in humanitarian garb.
Then, earlier this week, Israel struck Nasser Hospital in Southern Gaza — not randomly, cruelly or without reason, but because Hamas was using the hospital to operate surveillance cameras to track IDF movements.
A tragic battlefield misstep occurred when tank fire was used to disable those cameras instead of drones, killing 6 Hamas terrorists who were either operating or near the targeted cameras, but also resulting in unintended civilian casualties. This outcome was tragic — but sadly predictable.
This is the logic of Hamas’ strategy: weaponize Gaza’s hospitals, schools, mosques, and aid centers, force civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, and then broadcast them as evidence of Israeli atrocity.
Hospitals: Protected — Until Abused
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) stands firm: during a war, hospitals may not be targeted — unless they are being used for military purposes. Hamas’ use of these sites as command or surveillance posts nullifies their protection.
Mosques and Schools: Sacred — Until Militarized
Houses of worship and schools are also granted special status under IHL. But that protection dissolves once they are used for military advantage — a tactic Hamas consistently employs, turning places of worship into weapons depots and schools into hideouts.
Humanitarian Aid: Safe — Until Exploited
Under IHL, even aid workers can become legitimate targets when Hamas impersonates them. The WCK incident not only endangered genuine aid efforts, but it also weaponized the trust people place in humanitarian organizations, and eroding that trust endangers aid workers everywhere in Gaza.
This Is Calculated — Not Casual
These are not random errors — they are deliberate Hamas strategies: embed fighters and military and tactical equipment in civilian infrastructure, provoke strikes, and unleash graphic narratives. The recent hospital strike and the WCK impersonation reflect this grim choreography.
A Double Standard with Deadly Consequences
When US or UK forces faced civilian casualties in Mosul or Aleppo, the world understood the moral complexity caused by ISIS embedding itself among civilians and fighting in civilian clothes.
But when Israel confronts Hamas — whose tunnel networks under hospitals and all other civilian infrastructure in Gaza rival entire urban subway systems — the narrative is nearly monolithic: Israel is the villain.
This is the double standard defined in the IHRA working definition of antisemitism.
No Safe Haven for Gaza Civilians
Hamas’ cynical human shield strategy and its use of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure as cover is enhanced as a tactical tool by the actions of Gaza’s Arab neighbors.
In Syria and Ukraine, civilians fled across borders to safety in Jordan, Poland, Turkey.
In fact, in every war in modern history, civilians have left combat zones to go to neighboring non-hostile countries.
But after October 7, Egypt and Jordan closed their borders, citing political fears. That leaves Gaza civilians trapped — forced to rely on limited “humanitarian zones” Israel sets up — zones Hamas routinely targets and even tries to stop Gazans from entering.
The result: Israel is held to an impossible standard: avoid civilian casualties even when terrorists hide themselves and their military and tactical infrastructure next to, among, and beneath them, while Gaza’s Arab neighbors are held to no standard of refuge for their fellow Arabs whatsoever.
Casualty Figures — Propaganda Masquerading as Data
To make matters worse, most media outlets parrot casualty numbers from Hamas’ so-called “Health Ministry.”
The Gaza Health Ministry’s numbers lump together civilians, combatants, natural deaths, and even those killed by Hamas’ own misfired rockets. For years before October 7th, between 5,000 and 7,000 people in Gaza died from natural causes. Meanwhile, at least 15% to 25% of Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s rockets fall short, killing Gazans.
And Hamas routinely kills Gazans it decides are “collaborators” with Israel. All these deaths — along with the death of Hamas fighters — are aggregated in Hamas’s “death tolls” for the October 7th war it started.
Yet the narrative advanced by major media outlets and on social media paint every death as of a civilian killed by Israel. This is propaganda masquerading as data.
Conclusion: Accountability, Not Convenient Narratives
Hamas will continue to weaponize its own civilians — and civilian spaces — if excuses remain for its behavior. Only when the global dialogue refuses to blame Israel for the foreseeable results of Hamas’ human-shield warfare can moral clarity return.
The responsibility lies — with Hamas, not Israel — to stop turning Gaza’s hospitals, schools, and civilian infrastructure generally into strategic targets. Let’s call this what it is: terrorism hiding behind civilian facades. Until the world stops tolerating and even rewarding Hamas’ cynical human shield tactics, they will continue.
Micha Danzig is a current attorney, former IDF soldier & NYPD police officer. He currently writes for numerous publications on matters related to Israel, antisemitism & Jewish identity & is the immediate past President of StandWithUs in San Diego and a national board member of Herut.
RSS
What Is the Future for Russian-Speaking Jews in America?
Morris Abram (left), chairman of National Conference on Soviet Jewry, with Ed Koch, former Mayor of New York City, and Natan Sharansky, former Prisoner of Conscience. Photo: Center for Jewish History via Flickr.
The Russian-speaking Jewish community (RSJ) has traveled a long road to America.
From pogroms and World Wars to Soviet repression, our families fled in search of freedom and opportunity. New immigration to the US has slowed, and today, the future of the community rests with the children of those who arrived decades ago. What will their identity look like?
To find out, the American Russian-Speaking Jews Alliance (ARSJA) surveyed RSJ parents and received over 250 responses summarized in a new report.
The findings show a community deeply committed to raising Jewish children — even if traditional religious observance is not at the center.
Although 54 percent of the respondents do not keep kosher and only 3 percent attend synagogue daily, 89 percent of parents expect their children will have a “Very strong” or “Somewhat strong” Jewish identity.
Community life seems to be more popular than ritual. More than half of those surveyed attend RSJ gatherings or Israel-related events, and 67 percent go to synagogue on the High Holidays.
Shaul Kelner, professor of Jewish Studies and Sociology at Vanderbilt University, reminded us that, “American Jews are a diverse population, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach. It’s important that organizations like ARSJA are working to identify and respond to the specific needs of the Russian-speaking Jewish community.”
The “Russian-speaking” part of the identity is more complicated.
Most parents (58 percent) want their children to speak Russian mainly to communicate with grandparents.
Grandparents (75 percent) and parents (70 percent) are the people children use Russian with most often.
Yet only 60 percent of parents believe their children will maintain a strong RSJ identity. For some, the label recalls a painful past. One respondent said that they “see [their] Russian-speaking identity as really more of being raised in the former USSR, a totalitarian regime, the type of which we hope our children will never experience.”
Still, the community is finding new expressions of identity. Judi Garrett, COO at Jewish Relief Network Ukraine, points out that RSJs have played an active role in fundraising efforts. She noted that American-born RSJs organized campaigns that raised significant support for humanitarian aid in Ukraine. Philanthropy may become one of the ways that the next generation expresses who they are.
Parents also voiced deeper concerns. When asked what they worried about most regarding their children’s Jewish identity, the most common answers were antisemitism and assimilation. These anxieties echo across the wider American Jewish community and underscore how forces outside the family shape identity.
The survey does not provide simple answers. It does, however, spark an important conversation. For RSJs in America, the challenge is not only how to preserve their heritage, but how to pass down a Jewish identity rooted in belonging, pride, and purpose.
Mariella Favel leads data analysis at ARSJA, as well as research into how various communal and national organizations are influencing civic discourse.