(CJN Sept. 10, 2024) Maj. (Ret.) John Spencer is an American army veteran who heads the Modern War Institute at the U.S. military’s prestigious West Point Academy in New York State. His books and courses about fighting historic urban and tunnel wars have been widely quoted—he’s even interviewed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—who name-dropped the former combat officer’s research during his speech to Congress in July. The Israel Defence Forces like Spencer’s work so much that they’ve brought the Iraq veteran with them three times inside some of the captured Hamas tunnels under Gaza.

Ahead of two speaking engagements in Canada this week—in Winnipeg on Sept. 11 and Toronto on Sept. 12 —Spencer joined The CJN Daily podcast to share his eyewitness accounts of three research tours with the IDF inside the terrorists’ tunnels. Spencer explains why the Philadelphi corridor and 100 tunnels between Egypt and Gaza are what’s holding up a ceasefire deal that some believe could free the hostages.

Although Spencer wasn’t present 10 days ago when the IDF discovered the bodies of six executed hostages under Rafah, he understands why the entrance to that tunnel was actually hidden in the bedroom of a Palestinian child’s room in Gaza. Despite the latest heinous war crime that has rocked Israel and people around the world, Spencer feels Israel is still winning the war against Hamas.

The CJN: Readers may not have been following your prolific writings about what’s been happening in Israel since Oct. 7, but they may have seen when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu name-dropped you in his speech to Congress. Can you just give our listeners a bit of background on what role, if any, you are playing officially or unofficially advising the Israeli government in this war? 

Spencer: Sure. So I’m playing absolutely no official or unofficial role, but my research and my writings have been used significantly to fight the disinformation. I have done multiple visits to Israel and three visits into Gaza with the IDF since Oct. 7, which has informed my writing and research, but no official or unofficial role. 

My research has been, including by the prime minister, many, many times, used to fight the disinformation about what the IDF are actually doing in Gaza to pursue the political objectives provided by the government for the war against Hamas. 

The CJN: We’re interviewing you just a few days after the bodies of the six Israeli executed hostages were discovered in a 20-metre deep tunnel under Rafah. What can you tell us about this particular tunnel, and what is significant about it?

Spencer: There’s a lot of unknowns about it, but we know that it was in conjunction to the IDF recent discovery of a living hostage. Nobody knew that in those targeted operations, because intelligence drives operations. Israel was conducting this operation in the Rafah area, successfully retrieving the live hostage in a tunnel, but without knowing nearby Hamas saw and heard the IDF and then entered another tunnel without the IDF’s knowledge, basically in very close proximity. And because of that IDF operation, I believe that Hamas entered their deep tunnel that they were holding the hostages for all their reasons that are illegal and not in accordance with the law of war, and brutally murdered each one of those six hostages. Then we saw the release of the videos that were very recently filmed. 

We don’t know if that was filmed in the tunnel, but we do know where the bodies were found was in this 20-metre deep tunnel in Rafah, which does pain a lot of people because of the different delays in the Rafah operation to basically search and clear the areas in which now where this all occurred, where they were later discovered through the IDF operation and brought home, finally to their families. 

The CJN: You’ve been in the tunnels. Tell us what you saw. Where did you go? 

Spencer:  My first visit (was) in December.  I actually was taken to the massive tunnel that was discovered outside of the Erez humanitarian zone. So this is a two-and-a-half mile tunnel that went a hundred feet underground. It was a massive invasion tunnel that you could drive trucks through, that had advanced wiring, ventilation, power, telecommunications. It was a multimillion-dollar tunnel that went right up to the Israeli-Gaza wall. It wasn’t used on Oct. 7, but the discovery is just massive. And then it went all the way back into the Gaza urban areas and had many branches. For me as somebody who studies underground warfare, just the sophistication of this and the realization that this is just one of hundreds of massive tunnels that they have found. And the realization of this underground world that Hamas built.

I got to tour this one, but it was also a realization of the 400-plus miles of tunnels in Gaza, costing billions of dollars, unmeasurable amounts of concrete and steel to build this infrastructure underground for the sole purpose of terror. No civilians are allowed in this. 

When I went back in February, I went with the IDF, the 98th division, into Khan Younis.

It was really going through all they’re doing to protect civilians, which I’m sure we’ll talk about, but also just how hard it is to find the tunnels. One of the places I went with the division commander was where they had had intelligence that there was a tunnel, but you just couldn’t see it while standing on the surface. And actually they were doing their procedures to drill and look for the tunnel that was really connecting to a mosque and was coming out of a mosque.

And they found that tunnel. I was basically standing on top of an enemy tunnel that was deep underground. When I went back in July 2024, I went into the Netzarim corridor with the IDF. This area where they’re creating a corridor, not just a road, from Israel all the way to the Mediterranean through Gaza, to create this security zone.

I had this realization and saw on the maps how many tunnels were just in the corridor. You can’t take a step in Gaza without actually feeling and having some belief that there’s a tunnel underneath you. 

Now, I also learned through these different visits from December, February, and July that there are different types of tunnels in Gaza.  As you were wrestling with, well, how many tunnels, how many tunnels has the IDF destroyed, is that there are levels of tunnels: from strategic ones, like that one I was in December that is for large movements or there are ones that actually connect northern Gaza to southern Gaza, which most people didn’t know. They’re in the Netzarim corridor. This is in the area of the Wadi Gaza, which is this river basin that splits northern Gaza and southern Gaza. It used to be a river, but it isn’t anymore. They’ve discovered over a mile-long, two-mile-long tunnels that go underneath that river basin. So something they just didn’t think was possible. So you can basically enter northern Gaza, the very tip of Gaza and come out in Rafah basically in a tunnel.

And those are strategic tunnels. But there are also little tactical tunnels that go from one building to another. 

There are tunnels that are used for command and control, like in Khan Younis they found luxury tunnels for the leadership of Hamas, with air conditioners and ceilings and, you know, kitchens and barracks. The IDF is then making a decision on which ones are critical to military capabilities that have to be destroyed. Can you ever really destroy all these? That’s some of what I’ve learned. 

The CJN: What are the challenges for the IDF in this kind of warfare that we wouldn’t know about from, let’s say,the equipment that doesn’t work, that would work above ground? 

Spencer: So this is getting into the classes I teach in our urban warfare operations course. Underground, people think it’s just the extension of the surface. You have something like a building or something, you have an underground. 

The CJN: Yeah, well we’re used to subway tunnels where the Wi-Fi works, right? 

Spencer: Yes. When you enter the underground, it’s more like going underwater. You can’t breathe without assistance underground and all the contaminants that are underground. It’s very dangerous to just breathe. You can’t see. For military personnel, none of your night vision goggles work, because usually night vision relies on ambient light. And this is a “no light” area.

You can’t communicate because most communication equipment relies on line-of-sight or satellites. So you can’t communicate underground. You can’t navigate. GPS, all of that doesn’t work. You can’t even shoot your weapons because of the concussion of your weapon. So you have to have all specialized equipment designed only for the underground.

Now, unique to Israel, and this is why I’ve been studying Israel for years, is they developed a special unit, the Yahalom, it’s their basic version of a tunnel rats, an entire brigade of special forces engineers who try to develop the equipment, all the drones and robots and dogs and everything that can operate underground, but also the equipment for the soldiers, the tactics. They have the biggest world force that has been dedicated to being able to operate underground and they have been used heavily in Gaza. I also came to the quick realization that yes, you have this specialized unit, soldiers, equipment, everything, but it’s nowhere near the amount that you will need for the size of the tunnels in Gaza. 

The CJN: Okay. And you were mentioning the fact that the IDF is being pilloried for not being humanitarian enough in its military operations and you’ve studied war in tunnels as well in other countries and you’ve been deployed yourself. Why do you feel that the world is not giving Israel a fair shake in terms of how it’s doing this war against civilians? 

Spencer: Well, at the macro level, it seems for Israel, Gaza is where the truth dies. The accusation that Israel has been disproportionate, indiscriminate, excessive, or starving the population. While none of those are true, there’s actually a counterfactual huge body of evidence, actually real and physical. Like the “starvation”. I went to the Netzarim corridor, saw where the (U.S. humanitarian) pier used to be, and there were just mountains, a whole field of humanitarian aid that just hadn’t been picked up. But from the actual execution of war, like you said, for the IDF, there’s no comparison. So the IDF was being compared to other operations where just this tunnel challenge of being able to find and operate with an entire world underneath the urban areas.

Hamas built this world underneath their civilians for the sole purpose of using everything on the surface to cause [criticism from] the international community. the destruction, the civilian casualties, everything, but all these lies about being disproportionate, proportionality–nobody’s faced this challenge in modern history. No military has. 

And then the other thing, which is what the prime minister and other Israeli officials or government use, which is backed up by data, is that in this execution of this war against Hamas, a defender who’s had 15 years to prepare for the attack of the IDF, Israel has done more and has implemented more civilian harm-mitigation measures than any military in the history of war, to include the U. S., Canada, the coalitions, to prevent civilian casualties and destruction. Like evacuating cities, like dropping [leaflets], the use of daily pauses, the use of certain munitions. There’s a long list that I go through. There’s actually over 10 civilian harm-mitigation measures that Israel has implemented, some that have never been created before in the history of war, like tracking civilian populations with their cell phones on or off and then restricting them. This is what I saw in Khan Younis, restricting the IDF operations because of that overriding aspect of preventing civilian harm, trying to get the civilians out of harm’s way, even though Egypt, which owns a lot of the destruction, the civilian casualties, and [took in] not a single refugee. So even that aspect of fighting a war against a military who’s trying to get their civilians killed without a complete area to move civilians to, into the Sinai, which would be really realistic. So the idea of how to find a way to create a safer zone within Gaza while still moving against Hamas.

The CJN:  I know that a lot of people have criticized your view saying, ‘Well, it’s hard for them to be humanitarian when they’re trapped, or their cell phones aren’t working’. But we don’t have to talk about that now, I just wanted to raise the point that some people wouldn’t agree. 

I want to talk about what the challenges are for Hamas in these tunnels. You said Israel can’t see, some of their stuff doesn’t work. But in terms of Hamas and the soldiers that are living down there, I read somewhere recently that there’s sort of an operations manual that was recently discovered that they have to switch them out, because they can’t be in the dark. It’s bad for their mental health. What do you know about the psychological and physical challenges for Hamas [and the hostages and the IDF] to stay down there?

Spencer: Well, so it’s being sensory deprived basically. So when you enter a tunnel, you’re being sensory deprived. And matter of fact, not all soldiers can operate underground. You get things like vertigo, you get claustrophobia.  Just for the breathing, you start to get breathing problems, right? Because even if you have ventilation, which many of these [tunnels] do, there’s still immense amounts of contaminants, from going to the bathroom down there. It’s foreign to the human body. So all of those start to come into place. You can’t spend your life underground without ever coming to the surface. They rotate them because of that psychological impact of being sensory deprived, the contaminants in the air, all really human functions that you’re dealing with down there. You can lose a sense of time.

We kind of know that you kind of need vitamin D every once in a while, so you need the sunlight. So there’s a whole bunch of reasons why it’s really bad. For me, it reckons the understanding that the hostages have been held, many of them—although some of them have been held in civilian apartments and doctors’ apartments and things like that—are being held in this place that’s really unhealthy, inhumane, and unsanitary for humans to live in.

For Hamas, which I don’t really care about, yeah, it’s bad for them to stay underground for a long time. And if they’re rotated, it may help with that. 

The CJN: In terms of where (Hamas leader) Yahya Sinwar is, does anyone know if there is any evidence that he’s still in a tunnel somewhere? 

Spencer: I consult open source intelligence, I do only unclassified. There is, I guess, direct evidence. I think from all rational, reasonable analysis that is the belief that he’s there and what he would lose if he left just from a war objective stance. Just for the fact that Israel was able to take out Mohammed Deif, who is considered like the ghost of Hamas, the original founder of Hamas’s military. I think it’s highly likely that Israel, to include all of the intelligence organizations, have a really good idea of where he’s at in Gaza, but that he has surrounded himself with hostages and that he’s likely surrounded himself with tens of thousands of Palestinians in the areas in which Israel has had to create the safer zones that Hamas has since day one used for their advantages to include firing rockets from within. Mohammed Deif was within a stone’s throw of the humanitarian zone.

So yes, I believe that Israel has a really good idea of the general area. Although it’s a small area, right? Gaza, the Gaza Strip, is 25 miles long, seven to five miles wide in its longest area. It’s still two million people for one person to hide. There’s rumours of him dressing up like a woman, things like that, to hide and move within the tunnels.

There’s one video of him and his family, which is interesting because it’s the only civilians ever allowed in the tunnels, moving through the tunnels of Khan Younis back in the beginning of the war. I think he’s there. I think he is mostly underground for most of the time, like a rat, but that he’s also within this area of hundreds of thousands of civilians. It would be really hard to know exactly where he’s at.

The CJN: Your position is Israel actually winning this war? Because you’ve said yes and, and I’d like to explore that a bit. 

Spencer:  I wrote a Foreign Affairs article countering actually four major articles that have been published on ‘Israel isn’t winning. Israel is actually creating more terrorists than it’s killing’. All of these wrong frameworks.

Israel absolutely is winning its war against Hamas in Gaza, because I taught strategy at West Point. Wars have a start, they have an end. They have political goals, which can change, although Israel hasn’t changed its three primary goals for the war against Hamas. Those are: number one, return the hostages. Number two, destroy Hamas, its political and military power in the Gaza Strip. And number three, secure the borders. 

There’s different wording for them, but those are the three goals. And Israel is absolutely [winning] all three of those.  Especially with the hostages.  They brought home over half the hostages to include over a hundred living hostages. But there is the myth that Israel could have brought them home a different way. It could have been negotiated in the beginning.

It could have done it without military force. It’s just not reality. 

And I go through that in this Foreign Affairs article, that it’s been a combination of diplomatic, military, and other forms of national power that have brought over half the hostages home.

The CJN:  So is Israel’s border with Gaza safer now? We’re not even talking about Hezbollah because that’s a whole other thing, and same with the West Bank, we don’t have time. How is Israel’s border safer today than on Oct. 7?

Spencer: Yeah, absolutely. The whole security framework that was before Oct. 7th will not ever happen again. The reliance on only technologies, minimal forces, the wall, everything. So Israel is building a buffer zone of up to a kilometer from where the wall was. It’s created more corridors through Gaza, which will allow it to project power. It’s secured, which is vital, the southern border between Gaza and Egypt and eliminated the super highway that we now know was there for underground smuggling of weapons, men, weapons, equipment, financing, everything. It sealed that. So just from an overall sense of securing southern Israel from Gaza and the threats of Gaza, it’s massive engineering projects, both creating the buffer zone all the way around, eliminating all the tunnels that were there, creating the Netzarim corridor. There’s new entry points into Gaza that will allow for this new security framework to be in place.

The CJN: You mentioned the Netzarim corridor, so let’s talk about it before we end. Our listeners may have started to hear the words Philadelphi corridor as part of the reason for the holdup [in any ceasefire deal] and the latest huge controversy out of Israel this past week between the government. You mentioned where it is. It’s the border between Gaza and Egypt, which Israel withdrew from in its agreement to disengage from Gaza years ago. And then they’ve reoccupied it because Egypt was allowing, as you said, all this smuggling to go through. And that’s been a big flashpoint.

Why is that so important now in what happens next? 

Spencer: In order to destroy Hamas, which is not the idea of Hamas, but the military power and the political power of Hamas, what Israel has done along this border between Gaza and Egypt, which is only like an eight-to-10-mile stretch of land, but they have moved in, secured it and cut off the bloodline to Hamas, which is in wars actually unique because even in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, that ability for the enemy to be resupplied, to have sanctuary, to get new stuff in,  the U.S. military really struggled with it.  But Israel has been able to actually cut off Hamas now because of the Philadelphi corridor, from all of that resupply of rockets, everything, even financing. Now the contention is how long does Israel need to hold that piece of ground? Does it always need to have forces there, physically there, securing it? I personally believe not so. 

The Israel-Gaza wall, the border wall between Israel and Gaza actually worked. It has a very deep subterranean aspect to it with a bunch of advanced sensors. Egypt was talking about that before it was actually discovered that there’s over a hundred massive tunnels going between Egypt and Gaza to include ones you can drive giant trucks through. Egypt was talking about putting up that wall.  Eventually, I think there will be a new, basically an Israeli-style wall there that will prevent that subterranean traffic because on the surface, you can use advanced technologies, although you don’t rely only on that. Egypt did send a division of armour, basically an armoured brigade to the border, early in the war, and put up a new wall because they also didn’t want anybody coming across their border. 

Why is this such a big issue for Hamas? Why is Hamas saying ‘You will not get any hostages back unless you leave the Philadelphi corridor’? Because it’s their vital aspect of surviving. All they have to do to win this war is survive.

They have ideas on how to do that.  They’re grasping for this corridor. This highway for them is very vital to their survival and to be able to bring more weapons in, to be able to get out, all these things. But they also have ideas to give up political power. I call this the Hezbollah model. Hamas has put forward a plan to bring in some technocrats to govern Gaza, but they maintain military power. Sounds a lot like Hezbollah in Lebanon, although Hezbollah is also part of the government. So they’re grasping at trying to survive the war and basically win. And Israel has said that’s not going to happen. We’re going to demilitarize the strip. We’re going to actually start de-radicalization programs. We’re going to secure the entire border around so that Hamas can’t survive.

The CJN: How long is this going to take and can Israel actually win or this is going to happen again? 

Spencer: So I got this [question] actually in October. How long will this take? How long will it take to clear the urban areas of Hamas’s military capabilities, tunnels, infrastructure? I mean, they found deep buried weapons manufacturing plants and just nobody knew that they were there, that it was possible to do that.

I always say, it isn’t how much time it will take, but how much time do they have? 

Even General Dwight Eisenhower, after World War II said it would take 50 years to re-educate the Nazis. And if you ever thought we were going to give them the ability to wage war again, you were crazy. How long will it take to demilitarize the Gaza Strip? A very long time.

How long will it take to de-radicalize Hamas? But there is a path, right? It is up to Israel. 

Israel is winning, but it’s up to Israel as a democratic country. It’s up to Israel if it ultimately wins, because what is very common in war, is you have to bring in another power. You can demilitarize and you can degrade Hamas to where it’s this guerrilla force, which Israel is very close to doing. Hamas doesn’t have military capability. It’s a guerrilla force hiding in the shadows, governing from the shadows, using humanitarian aid as coercive power over the people. But Israel has to basically help put in a new power.  That will be the ultimate win, is that Hamas never rules again. 

You have to put in another power. There are many ways to do that. You have to start post-conflict operations like de-radicalization programs, reconstruction, and new governance, institutions, all this stuff, which is very common in war, but it will take a very, very long time. And Israel has to, for their survival, the Israeli people especially have to understand that basically.

The CJN: Canada stopped arms permits to Israel back in January. Does that even make a difference to Israel? Are they being hurt by this?

Spencer: I’m sure it absolutely is a problem. It might not be what Canada is providing, it’s the international context that sends a signal to other allies. Israel’s strength is its allies in all wars. So when one ally of Israel says, ‘Because of this, because of these lies, this misinformation, we’re not going to support you with this small item’, which might not have an immediate impact, but globally, you know, in the international context, in the multi-international allies that is Israel’s strength, including in the region Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, it matters. So it’s a horrible signal to send to the world and to send to Israel. 

The CJN: And then Britain just did it too. 

Spencer: Yeah, Britain did it too.  It’s very bad because it’s baseless. It’s based on disinformation. It’s based on things like 40,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza, which is not true. It’s a lie. Where does the number come from? What does it mean? Because now there’s this effect-based ideology, kind of like we see with Canada, Britain, and others, they’re using the data on how many people have died. Look how much destruction. There was another way.

The huge myth of this war is that there was another way to bring the hostages home, remove Hamas from power so it can’t do another Oct. 7. Because since Oct. 7, Hamas has publicly said that’s their goal. They will do this as many times as it takes to achieve our goal. The idea that there was another way. And it’s actually a fallacy.