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Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree?

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS

Relations between Iran and Russia have significantly expanded since the onset of the full-scale military conflict in Ukraine in February 2022.

Iran’s new president has promised to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Moscow during the BRICS summit in Russia, scheduled to take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24, 2024. This agreement is expected to replace the 10-year cooperation treaty signed in 2001, which has been extended every five years, most recently in 2021. The new Russian-Iranian agreement will officially establish the “comprehensive strategic nature” of the partnership between Moscow and Tehran, although it will not constitute an official military alliance.

This distinction is crucial, especially given the post-Soviet tradition of not adhering to official military alliances. For example, despite the Collective Security Treaty (1994), Russia refused to deploy troops to southern Kyrgyzstan following the anti-Uzbek pogroms that erupted after the 2010 revolution, and later did not provide military support to Armenia during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Similarly, other participants in the Collective Security Treaty (with the notable exception of Belarus and its president, Alexander Lukashenko, albeit with certain reservations) did not support Russia in its conflict with Ukraine.

Talk of a Russian-Iranian military alliance intensified after the Russian Security Council Secretary, former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, met with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the commander of the Iranian armed forces, Brigadier General Mohammad Bagheri, on August 5. General Bagheri told Shoigu that the relations between their countries are “deep, long-term, and strategic” and will only expand under Iran’s new government.

We are ready for full cooperation with Iran on regional issues,” Shoigu stated. Following this meeting, reports emerged in the press about Russian air defense systems being supplied to Iran.

Given the intense conflict between Iran and Israel, teetering on the brink of full-scale war, a deep analysis of the nuances in the growing closeness between Russia and Iran becomes increasingly relevant. To what extent will Russia be willing to support Iran if it decides to launch a full-scale attack on Israel?

A model for analysis could be the earlier rapprochement between Russia and China, the logic of which as a “marriage of convenience” is well described in Bobo Lo’s renowned work, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. Bobo Lo argues that the relationship between Russia and China is a pragmatic alliance based on shared interests and benefits rather than deep trust or mutual affinity. On the one hand, this limits the possibility of such relations evolving into a full-scale military alliance like the one that once existed between Stalin and Mao Zedong. On the other hand, it does not provide grounds to predict that the partnership between the Kremlin and China will cease as long as it remains beneficial and no more advantageous alternatives arise.

Let us try to apply a similar logic, as employed by Bobo Lo, to analyze the relationship between Russia and Iran. It will become apparent that the instances of pure benefit that the Russian leadership derives from cooperation with Iran are far fewer than in the case of China, and the opportunities to gain from refraining from a sudden change of position are much greater.

Lack of ideological unity. Despite Russia’s extensive use of left-wing “anti-colonial” and simultaneously right-wing “conservative” rhetoric, which brings modern Russian and Iranian ideologies closer together, there remains a chasm between the Kremlin’s ideology and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini once described the Soviet Union as the “lesser Satan” compared to the “greater Satan” of the United States. It is unlikely that the conservative Tehran elite perceives the heirs of the Soviet KGB in any other light.

The Kremlin, having long fought against radical Islam in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, cannot have serious trust in Iranian Islamists. While Russia’s struggle was primarily against Sunni Islamic radicals, with whom Iran itself is in conflict, it is doubtful that a broad segment of the Russian elite wants to delve into the nuances of conflicts between different groups of Islamists who practice similar terrorist tactics. If we look at the comments of Putin’s most sincere ideological supporters, the Z-bloggers, regarding the fighting between Israel and its opponents — allies of Iran — it becomes clear that most of them do not have strong sympathies for either side of the conflict.

Their antisemitic and Islamophobic sentiments clearly compete with each other. The dominant right-wing ideology of Russia today is racist in its essence, and, therefore, all the elements of “anti-colonialism” that Putin tries to add to it look to Russian elite as an ideological trick for foreign consumption. One can find this mood in the paper published by former deputy head of presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, who often in his previous papers predicted Putin’s future policy.

In the paper titled “The birth of the North,” Surkov predicted that Russia in the future will become an organic part of the “Global North” (including Russia, USA and EU), while the idea of the “Global South” is basically unacceptable for Russia. Some experts see this as a description of potential compromise between Putin and Trump, with refusal of an alliance between Russia and Iran being the inevitable price for such a compromise.

Relationships Based on Pure Benefit. Here, the situation is even more complex compared to China. The relationship between Russia and Iran is built on geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. However, in almost all these cases, the benefits are questionable, making the constant search for alternative alliances a realistic possibility for both sides.
Geopolitically, Russia’s key area of interest is now the post-Soviet space, particularly the European direction, with Ukraine at the forefront. This focus does not conflict with Iran’s interests, but neither does it advance them. Therefore, Iran can always exchange Russian support for a compromise with the U.S. (for example, lifting sanctions in exchange for a compromise on its nuclear program) if such an opportunity arises. Iran is focused on advancing its “axis of resistance” project in the Middle East. For Russia, this is useful only as a way to distract the U.S. from Ukraine and other post-Soviet issues. Thus, if the opportunity arises, Russia may trade its support for Iran for a compromise with the West.
Military cooperation has now become the most promising area in Russia-Iran relations. Russia has received drones and drone production technologies from Iran. However, Iran is avoiding supplying certain types of missiles to Russia due to US pressure. Russia may have started supplying air defense systems to Iran, but these deliveries are clearly not very extensive. Deliveries of military aircraft from Russia are limited to training aircraft. Both sides, being involved in military conflicts, simply cannot afford large-scale supplies of modern military equipment, as they need it for themselves.
From an economic perspective, unlike China, which has become a full-fledged alternative to Russia’s previously dominant trade relations with Europe, Iran cannot offer much to Russia. The economies of Russia and Iran are similar, both being heavily focused on fuel and raw materials, leaving them with little to trade. The trade balance is in favor of the more developed Russia. Putin’s Russia has already faced many situations where politically motivated trade expansion led to the accumulation of trade imbalances, debt, and subsequent debt write-offs. It is likely that the same will happen with Iran. A similar pattern is seen in Rosatom’s relations with all its clients, to whom it built nuclear power plants using Russian budget funds, with the expectation of repayment later. Iran refused to repay the debt for the construction of the Bushehr-2 nuclear power plant. In the area of oil smuggling to bypass Western sanctions, Russia and Iran are competitors, mainly vying for the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indian market. The International North-South Transport Corridor, promoted by Russia and Iran, is losing the support of its key participant—India—due to the current geopolitical situation. India initially joined the project in search of partners to counter the Pakistan-China bloc. Now, Russia and Iran are partners of China and its Belt and Road Initiative. The North-South project is not advantageous for China and is not included in the Belt and Road Initiative. China, along with Pakistan, is developing a transport project through the Pakistani port of Gwadar, while the Iranian port of Chabahar, a key point on the North-South route, is a competitor to Gwadar.
Limited Trust: Despite mutual interests, there is significant distrust between Russia and Iran. Iran is well aware of the conflict prevention mechanism in Syria between Russian and Israeli forces. This mechanism allows Israel to carry out airstrikes against pro-Iranian groups in Syria without fearing a direct conflict with Russian forces stationed there. Taking advantage of Russia’s difficult position in the war with Ukraine, Iran has long delayed signing the expanded strategic partnership agreement, constantly introducing new conditions.
The Tactical Nature of the Alliance and Possible Exit Strategies. The relationship between Russia and Iran is characterized as tactical and situational, even though both sides formally call it “strategic.” It evolves and deepens depending on external circumstances, such as Iran’s conflict with Israel and Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In a tactical alliance, when circumstances change, it is always possible to switch sides. Simply put, Moscow and Tehran are constantly forced to fear that their partner might “betray” them, while simultaneously working on scenarios in which they are prepared to “betray” their partner.

Let us try to analyze the possible exit strategies from the alliance for Russia and Iran. For the Kremlin, the conflict in the Middle East is beneficial as it distracts the West’s attention from Ukraine and could lead to a rise in oil prices. The latter is necessary for Russia in the context of the growing problems in its economy.

Under what conditions might an exit from the alliance with Iran occur? It is evident that such conditions could arise if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election. Trump and his inner circle are quite skeptical about supporting Ukraine. Trump has hinted multiple times that he is willing to resolve the Ukrainian issue with Putin. At the same time, Trump places great importance on addressing Middle Eastern problems and containing Iran. Consequently, Trump and Putin could theoretically attempt to agree on some form of freezing the Ukrainian conflict in exchange for Putin’s withdrawal of support for Iran.

In this scenario, Trump might use both a “stick” (e.g., the threat of reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or expanding oil extraction in the US) and a “carrot” (withdrawing support for Ukraine and pressuring Kyiv to give up territories controlled by Russia) in his dealings with Putin. In turn, Saudi Arabia could theoretically agree to increase oil production in exchange for Trump’s promise to intensify military pressure on Iran, making this threat quite real.

For Iran, an interesting opportunity to abandon the alliance with Russia might arise if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election. She represents the more left-wing faction of the Democratic Party, which is more skeptical of the alliance with Israel. As a result, this faction might be potentially more inclined towards a deal with Iran as potential instrument to pressurize Russia. The victory of reformist President Pesezhkian in Iran, following a long period of conservative dominance, also creates such an opportunity. Pesezhkian is more inclined to compromise with the West than many of his predecessors (although he is significantly constrained in his real capabilities by the control of Iran’s actual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei). Under certain conditions, a new Democratic administration in the US might decide that the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is to return to the nuclear deal that Donald Trump withdrew from. In this case, Iran would have the opportunity to release significant volumes of oil onto global markets, potentially leading to a drop in prices and serious problems for the Russian economy. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats do not have internal divisions regarding the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, they might very well attempt to use agreements with Iran as a means of pressuring Russia.

Let us try to analyze from the perspective of the “marriage of convenience” logic described above the extent to which Russia might increase its military assistance to Iran. It is unlikely that Russia would be willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over Iran in the event of a major war. It is evident that Moscow would prefer to reserve this “last argument of kings” for serious complications in Ukraine or for the defense of Russian territory itself.

Of course, in theory, Moscow could issue a nuclear ultimatum in support of Iran, similar to Khrushchev’s approach during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (it should be noted that Khrushchev’s ultimatum, which led to the withdrawal of the anti-Nasser coalition troops from Egypt, was possible only because the United States did not support the UK, France, and Israel at that time). However, the threat of nuclear war over distant Iran, especially after Russia refrained from such an ultimatum concerning Ukraine, would seem odd even to the Russian elite itself.

It is more logical to assume that Russia’s support for Iran will be primarily political, accompanied by limited deliveries of advanced weapons, given Russia’s growing need for modern weaponry. However, such deliveries are unlikely to shift the balance of power in the air, even between Israel and Iran, not even mentioning huge disparity between the US and Iran.

According to leaked reports in the press, during a visit to Tehran on August 5th, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu conveyed Putin’s request to Ayatollah Khamenei to respond cautiously to the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This aligns well with the “marriage of convenience” logic. It is more advantageous for Russia to use the threat of a major war in the Middle East as leverage in its relations with the US, specifically as a threat and as a means to compel the American leadership to negotiate over Ukraine. If a war in the Middle East were to break out, it would be too late to use such an argument for negotiations with the US.

In 2015, the Russian leadership deployed troops to Syria to give Moscow an instrument to influence Middle Eastern problems. The Kremlin’s goal at the time was to trade what it described as “counterterrorism cooperation” in the Middle East for the West’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine following the start of the conflict in 2014. Now, Russia has the opportunity to wield a much more powerful key to the Middle Eastern conflict through its interaction with Iran. From this perspective, it is beneficial for Russia to supply small quantities of weapons to Iran with one hand while signaling to the Americans with the other, offering to negotiate over Ukraine.

Limited cooperation with Iran is a win-win for the Kremlin. If a major war breaks out in the Middle East, it would lead to a significant diversion of Western resources away from Ukraine. Additionally, it would cause a rise in oil prices, delivering a severe blow to the global economy but providing relief to Russia’s economy. If a war in the Middle East does not occur, Russia will be perceived as a key player without whom the Middle East problem cannot be resolved. Theoretically, Russia could even act as some kind of peacemaker, restraining Iran. Putin already has such experience in successful mediation from 2013 in the case of Syrian chemical weapons under President Obama.

In any scenario, Russia cannot allocate many air defense systems to Iran. Ukraine has started receiving American fighter jets, so Russia needs air defense systems for itself. If a war breaks out between Iran and Israel, many experts believe that Russia will support Iran very cautiously and not on the scale that America supports Israel. For now, Russian supplies can be seen more as a diplomatic gesture, signaling that Moscow is an important player in the Middle East and that the US should negotiate with it (preferably regarding Ukraine). Of course, this policy may change in the future, but today the style of Kremlin’s game seems clear: to use Middle East as an instrument of Putin’s Ukraine policy.

So, the answer to the question “Will Russia Support Iran?” will be, yes, but this support will be very limited and mostly political. It will be also an instrument for improving Kremlin’s position in Russian-Ukrainan conflict, therefore, Russia can quickly reverse it policy if it becomes beneficial from this point of view.

The analysis above is based solely on considerations of the Kremlin’s rational interests. For the most part, Putin has adhered to non-sentimental and even brutal rationality in his actions, including in the Middle East, so this analysis has some validity. Of course, considering that in 2022 the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine showed an obvious miscalculation (or a deviation from rational policy based on identity or emotions), it is reasonable to consider that the same type of miscalculation or deviation could also occur regarding the Iran issue. Nevertheless, the experience of 2022 should already make the Kremlin more cautious. Therefore, it can be said that going beyond the logic of a “marriage of convenience” in Russia-Iran relations, as described in this article, is theoretically possible, but it does not seem very likely, at least for a year or two.

Prof. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.) affiliated research fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia’s foreign and security policy, and energy policy. He has previously worked in the Moscow Higher School of Economics, Moscow state institute of international relations, the European University Institute (Italy) and served as a Visiting Scholar at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Russia Will Likely Support Iran in a Middle East War — But to What Degree? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Jewish leaders welcome Canada’s decision to convene a second national antisemitism forum

Just one day after Israel’s president Isaac Herzog called on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to take “firm and decisive action” to combat the “intolerable wave of antisemitic attacks against the Canadian Jewish community”, the federal government announced on Dec. 20 it is convening a national forum on combating antisemitism.

Details are scarce, but the forum will take place in Ottawa in February 2025, under the direction of the justice department and the department of public safety. Political leaders from all three levels of government will be invited to discuss how to better coordinate the justice system and law enforcement and focus specifically on “the growing public safety threat of antisemitism,” according to a media release from the Department of Justice on Dec. 20.

“Canada has seen a troubling rise in antisemitic incidents, threats, and hate crimes,” the release stated. “The Government of Canada recognizes the urgent need for national leadership to ensure Jewish Canadians feel safe in their synagogues, schools, and communities.”

This announcement comes at the end of a turbulent week that saw Congregation Beth Tikvah Ahavat Shalom Nusach Hoari, west of Montreal, firebombed overnight on Dec. 18. It marked the second time since Oct. 7, 2023, that the Dollard-des-Ormeaux shul and adjacent Jewish school were targeted, as well as the West Island office of Montreal’s Federation CJA.

Then, on Dec. 20, in Toronto, the Bais Chaya Mushka girls’ school was attacked by unknown gunmen who opened fire at 2:30 a.m. into the front of the building. It was the third time this year that the school has come under fire. No one was injured in either incident.

Jewish leaders have been pressing Ottawa to do more than issue sympathetic statements condemning antisemitism. They want to address meaningful gaps in policing across jurisdictions, and to press police to better enforce existing laws. In 2023, there were 900 hate crimes against Jews reported to Canadian police; Jews were the target of 70 percent of all religion-motivated hate crimes.

However, many community leaders point out that there have been few prosecutions, and are decrying that many of the charges eventually get dropped. Weekly antisemitic and anti-Israel street protests continue in many Canadian cities. Canadian and U.S. federal authorities have recently foiled several terrorist plots involving suspects who were charged with planning attacks on Jews in Ottawa, New York and Richmond Hill, Ont.

Second antisemitism summit since 2021

The February forum is being convened less than three years after the first antisemitism summit was held in July 2021, in the wake of the brief Hamas-Israel war earlier that year. Canada’s first special envoy on antisemitism, Irwin Cotler, helped steer that day-long event, which was held virtually due to the COVID pandemic. The guest list was restricted at first to Liberal ministers and lawmakers.

Following that first summit, the Canadian heritage ministry promised a series of actions to combat antisemitism, and, as The CJN has reported, some of these have come into being:

  • Boosting financial help for Jewish communities in the government’s next anti-racism action plan, which was launched earlier this year
  • Adjustment of the Security Infrastructure Program, announced this year, to help Jewish places of worship, camps, schools and offices more easily afford to hire security guards, and fortify their security equipment
  • Introduced an online hate bill, aimed at tackling hate speech on social media. It has not been adopted yet, due to concerns about infringement on free speech
  • More money and staff for the work of the office of the special envoy to preserve Holocaust remembrance and combat antisemitism, including a new handbook on antisemitism, issued Oct. 31 
  • Funding to revamp the national Holocaust monument signage in Ottawa
  • Hearings into antisemitism held on Parliament Hill, specifically looking at campus antisemitism

However, it has been more than a year since domestic antisemitism exploded in the wake of Oct. 7. The violence has cost the lives of more than 800 Israeli soldiers and thousands of Palestinians, including Hamas terrorists, in Gaza.

As of now, it appears that a Jewish Liberal MP from Montreal could play a key role in the summit. Rachel Bendayan, a lawyer who has represented the riding of Outremont since 2019, was named to the federal cabinet on Dec. 20. Aside from her new duties as minister of official languages, Bendayan was named associate minister of public safety.

Rachel Bendayan swearing in Dec. 20 2024 Ottawa
Rachel Bendayan, the newly appointed Minister of Official Languages and Associate Minister of Public Safety, was sworn in to Cabinet in Ottawa on Friday Dec. 20, 2024. (House of Commons photo)

While Bendayan’s office did not reply to The CJN by publication time, she said she was “honoured and humbled to be sworn in as Minister of Official Languages and Associate Minister of Public Safety,” in a post on social media. “Grateful to share this moment with my family. Ready to get to work.”

Her colleague Anthony Housefather took it as an important signal that Bendayan’s nomination came on the same day as the antisemitism forum announcement.

In July, Housefather, who has since repeatedly called for the Prime Minister to resign, was named special advisor to Trudeau on matters concerning the Jewish community and antisemitism. Housefather has been lobbying for this new summit, behind the scenes and publicly, for months.

“I will work very hard at this forum to push for immediate action and solutions across the levels of government and am gratified that my friend and colleague Rachel Bendayan is the new Associate Minister of Public Safety as her position will allow the Jewish community voice to be even more prominent in giving priority to the issue of anti-Jewish hate,” Housefather said in a statement to The CJN.

Housefather and the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs have been working with Special Envoy Deborah Lyons to get this new summit approved. As The CJN reported on Dec. 11, calls for the summit were growing louder in recent weeks.

However, according to Richard Marceau, a CIJA vice-president, a summit of words was meaningless unless such a forum focused specifically on policing, law enforcement and prosecutions.

“The forum’s ultimate value will be determined only by the concrete results that come from it,” said Marceau, adding that the values of all Canadians are at stake, not just for Jewish Canadians.

“Police need more resources and specialized training. Laws need to be enforced, charges need to be laid, and perpetrators must be fully prosecuted to end the domination of our streets by extremists,” he said. “And the glorification of terrorism must finally be made a criminal offence in this country. Through the Forum, we will push for these and other concrete measures—but what we won’t accept are photo ops and platitudes. Action to protect our community and all Canadians is long overdue.”

Ahead of Friday’s summit announcement, the other Canadian Jewish member of the federal cabinet, Ya’ara Saks, the minister of mental health and addictions, stood in solidarity outside the site of the Bais Chaya Mushka school in North York after it was shot at.

Saks told a media conference that no Jewish girl, including her own daughters, should have to wake up every morning and ask whether it is safe to go to school—although she didn’t give away any hints that such a summit announcement was imminent.

“The community has been very clear in what needs to be done,” Saks said. “We need all hands on deck, all heads coming together to navigate forward collectively, collaboratively and with one unified voice to ensure that the Jewish community stays safe.

“I am hopeful that we will all get together and do the right thing on behalf of the Jewish community.”

While full details of the new summit have not been released, its fate could be in jeopardy even before it begins.

Although Bendayan and the other cabinet ministers were sworn in officially on Friday, it is unclear how long the Liberal government will remain in power. Efforts are underway by the Opposition Conservatives and New Democrats to topple the government soon, either through a non-confidence motion when Parliament reconvenes on Jan. 27 or sooner. Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre is asking the governor general to force Parliament to come back before sooner than Jan. 27.

The post Jewish leaders welcome Canada’s decision to convene a second national antisemitism forum appeared first on The Canadian Jewish News.

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UN Extends Peacekeeping Mission Between Syria and Golan Heights

Fences are seen on the ceasefire line between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights, March 25, 2019. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad

The United Nations Security Council on Friday extended a long-running peacekeeping mission between Syria and the Israeli Golan Heights for six months and expressed concern that military activities in the area could escalate tensions.

Since a lightning rebel offensive ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad earlier this month, Israeli troops have moved into the demilitarised zone – created after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war – that is patrolled by the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

Israeli officials have described the move as a limited and temporary measure to ensure the security of Israel‘s borders but have given no indication of when the troops might be withdrawn.

In the resolution adopted on Friday, the Security Council stressed “that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire.”

It expressed concern that “the ongoing military activities conducted by any actor in the area of separation continue to have the potential to escalate tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, jeopardize the ceasefire between the two countries, and pose a risk to the local civilian population and United Nations personnel on the ground.”

Armed forces from Israel and Syria are not allowed in the demilitarized zone – a 400-square-km (155-square-mile) “Area of Separation” – under the ceasefire arrangement.

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said on Thursday: “Let me be clear: There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than U.N. peacekeepers – period.” He also said Israeli airstrikes on Syria were violations of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and “must stop.”

The post UN Extends Peacekeeping Mission Between Syria and Golan Heights first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Shots fired at Bais Chaya Mushka girls school for the third time this year  

Bais Chaya Mushka, an elementary girls’ school in Toronto, was shot at early in the morning on Dec. 20, the third time the school has been targeted in the past seven months.

Shots were fired at the school in May and then again in October, on Yom Kippur.

Officers from Toronto Police Service’s 32 Division responded to reports of gunfire to discover six bullet holes in the building’s exterior. No one was inside the school at the time and no injuries were reported.

“It’s incredibly unfortunate that I stand here to discuss yet another shooting at this school,” Supt. Paul MacIntyre of the Organized Crime Enforcement Unit said during a press conference outside the school Friday morning.

Police have made progress in previous incidents at the school, MacIntyre said, stating that two people, a man and a youth, were arrested in connection with the October shooting, and a firearm was recovered. Investigators are now working to determine whether the latest attack is connected to those earlier cases.

“We’ve solved the second case, and the same teams are now working on this investigation,” he said. “With just a few days before Hanukkah, we know how deeply disturbing this is to the Jewish community. We will leave no stone unturned.”

Insp. Roger Desrochers of the Hate Crime Unit said hate crimes require “careful investigation” to determine whether they meet the threshold for charges under the Criminal Code.

“These matters are challenging. Not all offensive actions meet the threshold for criminal charges, and each case must be weighed carefully,” Desrochers said during the presser on Friday afternoon.

Rabbi Yaakov Vidal, principal of the school, said it was challenging to inform parents about the third shooting this year.

“It’s very, very difficult. It’s very, very hard to be woken up in the middle of the night with such news—and it’s now the third time,” Rabbi Vidal said at a press conference outside the school.

Rabbi Yaacov Vidal, principal of Bais Chaya Mushka, School, speaking to reporters in Toronto after the school was shot at overnight on Dec. 20, 2024. (Credit: Lila Sarick)

“We were not sure if we were able to have school here, due to the police investigation, then we were told it was possible to have school here. I was actually looking for a different location… Parents are very, very frustrated, very afraid to send their kids to school. I am aware of a few that did not send their kids to school today. We hope they once again feel safe to do so every single day, as they deserve.

The school had full-time security during the day when students were present, but overnight security was too expensive, Rabbi Vidal said. “We may have to do this at this point. We’ll have to see what our next step is.”

The recent violence has raised questions about police efforts to protect Jewish institutions. MacIntyre said police have ramped up patrols in recent months under initiatives like Project Resolute but emphasized that officers are also working to balance broader community safety concerns.

When asked whether Jewish institutions should consider armed private security, MacIntyre said he does not support the idea, adding, “We are here to support the community and will continue providing all available resources to ensure their safety.”

Parents picking up their daughters at school expressed both their concern and their determination as the school dealt with a third shooting.

One mother was on the verge of tears as she discussed her decision to send her child to school this morning.

“I don’t even know what to think anymore. It’s the third time. The cops are here, so I feel safe today, but the rest of the time I don’t feel safe,” she said. “These are little girls they’re trying to scare. These idiots should be thrown in jail, but they can’t seem to catch them.”   

Her daughter, who suffers from anxiety now, made a grim joke about how easy it is to attack her school, the mother said. “This is my eight year old thinking this. She doesn’t watch violent things.”

Rabbi Yosef Hecht, a Chabad rabbi in Aurora, said he dropped off his two daughters at school this morning “with a very heavy heart,” especially since it was the third shooting.

“Did they catch the people? Do they know who’s behind this? Is it larger than what they are really telling us, is there something larger that we’re not aware of yet?” he asked.

But despite his concerns, he didn’t hesitate to send his children to school. “I felt the school did a good job repairing it temporarily. It shows that, no matter what, we are going to be resolute, strong, and this will just make us stronger and more proud.”

Local leaders call for action

At a press conference earlier in the day, politicians and leaders of the Jewish community were on hand to condemn the shooting and press all levels of government for more action.

The shooting came two days after a Montreal synagogue was firebombed for the second time since Oct. 7, 2023, the date of the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel and the start of the war in Gaza.

“There are common-sense things that our leaders can do to deal with this problem right away. We need funding for police to get the job done and we need to put a stop to the extremism in our streets that’s inciting this violence. The time for our leaders to speak, to tweet, is over. Now it’s time for them to take action,” said Noah Shack, interim president of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs.

“The fact is, this isn’t an isolated activity, whether it’s a synagogue being firebombed in Montreal or this school here that continues to suffer from gunfire in an effort to intimidate the girls that are here. There should be no daylight between the mayor of this city, the police of this city and the community that is facing this kind of threat day in and day out,” Shack said.

City councillor James Pasternak said Toronto police are stretched thin and need support from provincial police forces and the RCMP, and called for closer ties between elected officials and police forces.

“The police act forbids elected officials from directing police operations but the police act doesn’t stop us from nuance. We have to back up our police services, give them the political will to stop these roving mobs… that are inciting some of the violence that we are seeing in this neighbourhood and across the land,” he said.

Toronto Mayor Olivia Chow, who said in a statement that the shooting was “unacceptable,” was criticized by some Jewish community leaders for her weak stance on the antisemitism that has escalated in the city.

“Mayor Olivia Chow’s continued platitudes in response to antisemitic hate in Toronto ring hollow in the face of her permissive approach to this growing problem,” B’nai Brith Canada stated on social media.

“She has enabled an environment where such acts are allowed to flourish. Banal condemnations without concrete actions leave the Jewish community vulnerable and unsafe.”

Michael Levitt, a former Liberal MP and now the president of the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center, who attended the press conference, also laid responsibility on Chow.  

“We have not seen the mayor of the city draw a line through this type of activity and come out and be strong enough,” he said. “Sure, when shots are fired, but what about when all the other incidents have gone on? We need our mayor take a stand with the Jewish community and make it clear that keeping the Jewish community safe is a priority.”

MP Ya’ara Saks appeared at the press conference to expressed her support for the Jewish community. She pushed back on the suggestion that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau had not taken the issue seriously enough, pointing to increased funding for federal infrastructure grants, which can now be used for a wider variety of security resources.

This afternoon, the federal government also announced that a second national summit on antisemitism would be convened in February.

The post Shots fired at Bais Chaya Mushka girls school for the third time this year   appeared first on The Canadian Jewish News.

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