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Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here?

Terrorists in Gaza using humanitarian aid bags to prop up rockets. Photo: Screenshot

One claim frequently heard from commentators and experts, both within and outside Israel, is that Jerusalem lacks a clear strategy and political plan for the day after the Iron Swords War.

According to this argument, while Israel may have achieved significant military gains in the north and in Gaza, Israel has no plan in place to translate those achievements into political arrangements that end the war and improve Israel’s security and international position. These commentators consistently repeat the phrase well-known to every first-year student of international relations: that the purpose of military action is to bring about an improved political situation, meaning there is no military solution without a concluding political leg (this has at least been true of most contemporary wars).

However, any implementation of a political arrangement that improves Israel’s security-political situation after October 7 will require military achievements and an end state that most of these commentators either refuse to accept or do not believe can be reached.

Until mid-September and the exploding pagers attack on Hezbollah — the first in a series of severe blows inflicted on Hezbollah by Israel, including the elimination of most of its leadership — many insisted that Israel must end the war as soon as possible. Their argument was based primarily on the need for an immediate hostage deal. This is a legitimate need that stands on its own. However, it would not be the precursor to a dramatic strategic-political change that brings with it peace on the borders, normalization with Saudi Arabia, improved relations with the US, and other desirable developments, as is erroneously claimed by many pundits and observers.

Those arguing against the expansion of the war into the north pointed out that in Gaza, Hamas has not been completely eliminated and is still tying up IDF forces. There was therefore no possibility of opening another front against Hezbollah, which is a much stronger opponent. However, contrary to these assessments, Israel reached a point in the Gaza campaign when it was able to shift its strategic attention and resources sufficiently to take aggressive action in Lebanon (indeed, it can be argued that it took Israel too long to reach this point in the campaign).

It appears that for the time being, Israel’s strategic patience has paid off, and most of its critics have been revealed as short-sighted. (It is worth noting that in most cases, these were the same people who warned against a ground operation in Gaza and insisted that Israel had no chance of operating in the Philadelphi Corridor and taking control of Rafah.)

Had Israel sought an arrangement in the days before it launched its campaign against Hezbollah, it would likely have received “shame and war together” in return, as Churchill famously put it.

Israel is now on the verge of a strategic turning point. It is in a position where it has restored its military superiority over Iran and its proxies. We should of course not rush to celebrate while the campaign is still ongoing, and the pendulum can still swing in any direction. At the time of writing, we do not yet know what Israel’s response will be to the recent direct Iranian missile attack, what Iran’s response will be to the Israeli response, and so on.

What, then, are Israel’s strategic goals in the war, and how can they be translated into political goals?

As in any war, Israel has both explicitly defined, declared goals and implied, undeclared goals that it would like to realize as a result of the war. It is essential to stress that in the Israeli view, this is an existential war.

Post-October 7, Israel now understands that it can no longer allow hostile terrorist armies to exist on its borders waiting for the order to invade Israeli territory. When a war is existential, the goal is first to remove the threat and only then to clarify arrangements for “the day after”. This is not, after all, the American invasion of Iraq, a war that took place thousands of kilometers from US borders.

Here are Israel’s declared strategic and political goals in Operation Iron Swords:

In Gaza: 1) To eliminate Hamas’ military power and force the collapse of its rule, with the object of bringing about a situation in which there is no longer any security threat from the Gaza Strip; and 2) to create conditions for the return of the hostages.
In Lebanon: To return the residents of the Israeli north to their homes by destroying and pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.

However, it appears there is also an undeclared goal for the overall campaign that takes a more comprehensive and long-term view: the creation of a new regional security reality.

Israel aims to dismantle the two Iranian proxies — Hamas and Hezbollah — that threatened it on its borders, creating a ring of fire that contained the threat of ground invasion. Without these two proxies, Iran will be much weaker, and decades of investment are now going down the drain. Considering Iran’s current economic state, it is doubtful that it will be able to reinvest in its proxies on the same scale.

In Gaza, the fight against remnants of Hamas, isolated terrorist cells that continue to operate, will go on for many months and perhaps even years. The realistic goal is to hit Hamas hard enough that Gaza does not pose a greater threat than that posed by Palestinian terrorists on the West Bank. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other organizational cells are present and active on the West Bank, but they do not pose a strategic threat. Israel will have to reach a hostage deal and thereafter to “mow the lawn” in Gaza as it is doing in the West Bank for the foreseeable future.

Israel is faced with an unresolved dilemma regarding Hamas’ control over humanitarian aid. If Israel distributes the aid, it will become the de facto force ruling Gaza, which it does not want. But if it does not act on the matter, it allows Hamas to control both the aid and the population. A solution needs to be found to this quandary.

However, Gaza is a relatively small area, and Israel currently controls the exits and entrances. It can gradually erode Hamas’ power, as the group is almost entirely unable to replenish its lost assets. Even the new fighters it is recruiting from among the local population lack the knowledge and equipment of the people Hamas has lost. Hamas has been stripped of most of its military assets and will not be able to restock them under the conditions of the Israeli closure and continuing military pressure.

One can hope that at some point, Hamas will be weak enough that an agreement can be reached with a body or agency (or a combination thereof) that will manage the Strip and maintain law and order. As of now, no body other than the IDF will agree to confront the remnants of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, no Palestinian element is currently capable of committing to such an arrangement, even if it were willing to do so. (The Americans, who have spoken about the need for reform in the Palestinian Authority, are aware of this.)

The IDF understands that in Lebanon, unlike in Gaza, it is not possible to destroy most of the enemy’s forces. It is, however, possible to hit Hezbollah extremely hard, as the IDF has already managed to do. The IDF is capable of pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River and destroying its infrastructure, as well as severely damaging its long-range missile and rocket array.

The undeclared goal in Lebanon is to bring Hezbollah to the point where it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel and is unable to carry out the horror scenarios that were outlined before the current operation, which included a massive invasion of the Galilee and severe damage to army bases, critical infrastructure, ports, airports, and so on. From this point on, Israel’s test will be whether or not it can prevent Iran from rehabilitating Hezbollah.

Israel’s strategic achievement here (beyond returning the residents of the north) is breaking free from the equation of mutual deterrence that has paralyzed it from acting against Hezbollah in Lebanon all these years. This means Israel will have to expand the campaign between the wars that it has been conducting in Syria for 10 years. It will now need to include Lebanon for the purpose of disrupting, delaying, and perhaps even preventing Hezbollah’s buildup. At some point, Israel may have to launch a broad preventive strike if Hezbollah manages to rebuild its power. Until then, Israel will gain a few years of quiet and rehabilitation of the north.

This scenario is based on Iran’s continuing as usual without any significant change. However, it is possible that Israel’s release from the grip of the Iranian proxies will allow to focus more strategic attention on Iran. This could lead to moves that weaken Iran and possibly even bring an end to the regime. If this occurs, Israel will be free to take some risks and break through to new arrangements in the Middle East. Its partners, primarily Saudi Arabia and other countries, would also be free to promote agreements with Israel. Other possibilities could open up for an accommodation with the Palestinians that both addresses the interests of both sides and has a chance of holding up.

Those familiar with the cabinet discussions that were conducted during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 know that after the lines on the fronts were stabilized on October 8, there was great fear of a continued war of attrition in which Israel would be at a disadvantage. The question facing the cabinet was how to bring Syria and Egypt to want a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Initially, there was an unsuccessful attempt that included shelling Damascus and a ground advance that was eventually halted. The Syrians were not impressed. Subsequently, the crossing of the Suez Canal plan matured, and the encirclement of and threat to destroy the Third Army led to an Egyptian request for a ceasefire on terms favorable to Israel. Henry Kissinger, who thought Israel was seeking a ceasefire on October 11, was horrified by the thought that Israel would negotiate from a position of military weakness.

Israel is only one side in any set of political arrangements. It cannot dictate terms unilaterally. Nor can it determine who the leaders will be on the opposing side. At most, it can perhaps determine who will not be those leaders, as it has done to Hezbollah’s leadership and to a significant part of Hamas’ leadership. Israel can ensure an improved military-security situation and hope conditions mature on the other side, whether Lebanese or Palestinian, to the point that agreements can be reached that are worth the paper they’re written on. Israel does not control the internal political processes of the peoples surrounding it.

With that said, Israel is committed first and foremost to achieving a military achievement that significantly improves its security situation and places the other side in a position of clear military inferiority, which would improve the chance that that side is eventually interested in coming to an agreement.

The cabinet discussion of November 19, 1973, almost a month after the end of the Yom Kippur War, was recently published. Then-Prime Minister Golda Meir said, “Many things will be forgiven us, but one thing will not: weakness. The moment we are registered as weak, it’s over.”

In the same discussion, then-defense minister Moshe Dayan said, “Once we relied on the fact that we have deterrence power regarding the Arabs. I am very much afraid of a conception [arising] among us that we will be the deterred [party] – that we will fear confrontation with the Arabs and enter a psychosis of reverse deterrence.”

These words resonate strongly, even today. 

Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Israel Has Proved Its Doubters Wrong in Gaza and Lebanon; Where Does It Go From Here? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Lebanon Claims It Is Replacing Hezbollah in the South

Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam speaks at the presidential palace on the day he meets with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, in Baabda, Lebanon, Jan. 14, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

JNS.orgLebanon’s leadership declared in recent days that the Lebanese Army has begun replacing Hezbollah forces in the country’s southern region.

In an April 15 interview with The New Arab, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun announced that 2025 would be the year of the Lebanese state’s monopoly on arms.

Aoun pledged that only the state would have weapons, referring to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and stressed this goal would be achieved through direct dialogue with Hezbollah, while explicitly ruling out steps that could ignite conflict with Hezbollah.

“I told the Americans that we want to remove Hezbollah’s weapons, but we will not ignite a civil war in Lebanon,” Aoun said, referencing a meeting with US Deputy Envoy Morgan Ortagus.

Aoun added that Hezbollah members could potentially integrate individually into the LAF but rejected replicating the Iraqi model where Shi’ite, Iranian-backed paramilitary groups formed independent units within the military. He asserted the LAF was conducting missions throughout the country “without any obstruction from Hezbollah.”

Hezbollah member Mahmoud Qamat, however, responded by stating, “No one in the world will succeed in laying a hand on this weapon,” according to Lebanese media.

Hezbollah Member of Parliament Ali Fayyad stated the group was open to internal dialogue but warned against pressure on the LAF to disarm Hezbollah.

Col. (res.) Dr. Hanan Shai, a research associate at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy and a former investigator for the IDF’s commission on the 2006 Second Lebanon War, told JNS on Wednesday that statements by Lebanese officials and the activities of the Lebanese army are “unequivocally an achievement for Israel.”

But Shai warned that due “the weakness of the Lebanese army, the IDF cannot rely on it and must back it up with its own parallel defense—mainly through detailed intelligence monitoring and targeted thwarting of any violation not only in Southern Lebanon but also [deep] within it, including at sea and air ports.”

The fragility of the situation was highlighted when a LAF soldier was killed, and three others were wounded while attempting to neutralize suspected Hezbollah ordnance in the Tyre district of Southern Lebanon on April 14.

Hezbollah’s real intentions were also apparent when its supporters reportedly burned billboards celebrating Lebanon’s “new era.”

Most tellingly, the Israel Defense Forces is continuing to detect intelligence of illegal Hezbollah activity in Southern Lebanon, and acting on that intelligence. Overnight between April 15 and 16, the IDF conducted strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in Southern Lebanon.

In one strike near Aitaroun in Southern Lebanon, an IDF aircraft killed Ali Najib Bazzi, identified by the IDF as a squad commander in Hezbollah’s Special Operations unit. Other recent IDF actions included strikes and artillery fire targeting a Hezbollah engineering vehicle near Ayta ash-Shab in Southern Lebanon.

Meanwhile, reports emerged suggesting Hezbollah was actively adapting its methods for acquiring weapons. Reports indicated a shift towards sea-based smuggling routes utilizing Beirut Port.

The Saudi Al-Hadath news site reported on April 8 that Iran’s Quds Force created an arms smuggling sea route that bypasses Syria.

Amidst these reports, Aoun visited Beirut Port on April 11, calling for strict government cargo monitoring.

Karmon expresses skepticism

Senior research scholar Ely Karmon of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University in Herzliya stated, “There’s no doubt there’s a change in Lebanon, first of all on the political level— the fact that President Joseph Aoun was elected—supported by the West, the United States, Saudi Arabia.”

In addition, he said, “Hezbollah’s political weight in parliament and in Lebanon in general has dropped significantly after the blow they received from the IDF.”

On the other hand, Karmon expressed deep skepticism about Aoun’s stated path to disarming Hezbollah. Aoun’s statement that he “isn’t interested in coming to military confrontation with Hezbollah,” and that it needs to be a “slow process,” as well as his call for Hezbollah to enter Lebanese army units, should not be taken at face value, according to Karmon.

“I don’t really believe it. First of all, because traditionally, in the Lebanese Army, most of the soldiers were Shi’ites, for a simple demographic reason. And therefore, the integration of thousands of Hezbollah fighters or personnel into the army—certainly at this stage in my opinion—it’s a danger that they’ll take control of the army from within, after they’ve already for years cooperated with the army.”

He added, “We know, for example, that they received weapons from the Lebanese Army—tanks and APCs—when they operated in Syria in 2013, 2010, and they even presented them publicly in Qusayr [in Syria]. On the other hand, we also heard one article from a Hezbollah representative who’s on their political committee, stating, ‘Absolutely not, we will not give up the weapons!’ It is clear there’ll be opposition.”

Karmon said he was skeptical about Lebanese government claims about taking over around 95 out of some 250 Hezbollah positions in Southern Lebanon. Karmon assessed that Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors would be cautious but that they would continue to try “as usual, to act and to bring in weapons, to prepare some infrastructure in case, for example, there is a crisis in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue.”

The post Lebanon Claims It Is Replacing Hezbollah in the South first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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‘Tradition, Tradition!’

An image from “Family at the Seder,” from the 1935 Haggadah by artist Arthur Szyk (b. 1894, Lodz, Poland—d. 1951, New Canaan, CT). Photo: Courtesy of Irvin Ungar

JNS.orgHow important is tradition in Judaism? Obviously, the answer is that it is very important. I mean, they even dedicated a major song by that title in “Fiddler on the Roof!”

How strong is the need for tradition in the spiritual consciousness of Jews today? Despite the effects of secularism, I’d venture to suggest that there is still a need inside us to feel connected to our roots, our heritage and our sense of belonging to the Jewish people. Perhaps more than any time of the year, Passover is the season when millions of Jews embrace their traditions with love, warmth and lots of nostalgia.

But for vast numbers of our people, tradition alone has not been enough. And that applies not only to the rebellious among us who may have cast aside their traditions with impunity, but also to many ordinary, thinking people who decided that to do something just because “that’s the way it has always been done” was simply not good enough.

So what if my grandfather did it? My grandfather rode around in a horse and buggy! Must I give up my car for a horse just because my Zaidy rode a horse? And if my Bubbie never got a university degree, why shouldn’t I? Just because my grandparents practiced certain Jewish traditions, why must I? Perhaps those traditions are as obsolete as the horse and buggy?

There are masses of Jews who think this way and who will not be convinced to behave Jewishly just because their grandparents did.

We need to tell them why their grandparents did it. They need to understand that their grandparents’ traditions were not done just for tradition’s sake, but there was a very good reason why their forbears practiced those traditions. And those very same reasons and rationales still hold good today. There is, in fact, no such thing as “empty ritual” in Judaism. Everything has a reason, and a good one, too.

Too many young people were put off by tradition because some cheder or Talmud Torah teacher didn’t take their questions seriously. They were silenced with a wave of the hand, a pinch of the ear, the classic “when you get older, you’ll understand,” or the infamously classic, “just do as you’re told.”

There are answers. There have always been answers. We may not have logical explanations for tsunamis and other tzuris, but all our traditions are founded on substance and have intelligible, credible underpinnings. If we seek answers, we will find them in abundance, including layers and layers of meaning, from the simple to the symbolic to the philosophical and even mystical.

The seventh day of Passover recalls the “Song of the Sea” sung by Moses and the Jewish people following the splitting of the sea and their miraculous deliverance from the Egyptian armies. Early on, we find the verse, “This is my God and I will glorify Him, the God of my fathers, and I will exalt Him.”

The sequence is significant. First comes “my God,” and only thereafter “the God of my fathers.” In the Amidah prayer, the silent devotion, which is the apex of our daily prayers, we begin addressing the “Almighty, as our God and the God of our fathers … Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.” Again, “our God” comes first. So while the God of our fathers, i.e., tradition, most definitely plays a very important role in Judaism, an indispensable prerequisite is that we must make God ours, personally. Every Jew must develop a personal relationship with God. We need to understand the reasons and the significance of our traditions lest they be mistaken for empty ritual to be discarded by the next generation.

Authentic Judaism has never shied away from questions. Questions have always been encouraged and formed a part of our academic heritage. Every page of the Talmud is filled with questions and answers. You don’t have to wait for the Passover seder to ask a question.

When we think, ask and find answers to our faith, the traditions of our grandparents become alive, and we understand fully why we should make them ours. Once a tradition has become ours and we realize that this very same practice has been observed uninterruptedly by our ancestors throughout the generations, then tradition becomes a powerful force that can inspire us forever.

The seders we celebrated at the beginning of Passover are among the most powerful in our faith. They go back to our ancestors in Egypt, where the very first seder was observed. How truly awesome is it that we are still practicing these same traditions more than 3,300 years later!

Our traditions are not empty. They are rich and meaningful and will, please God, be held on to preciously for generations to come.

With acknowledgments to Chabad.org.

The post ‘Tradition, Tradition!’ first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Thousands of Protesters Rally Against Trump Across US

“Protect Migrants, Protect the Planet” rally in New York City, U.S., April 19, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Caitlin Ochs

Thousands of protesters rallied in Washington and other cities across the US on Saturday to voice their opposition to President Donald Trump’s policies on deportations, government firings, and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine.

Outside the White House, protesters carried banners that read “Workers should have the power,” “No kingship,” “Stop arming Israel” and “Due process,” media footage showed.

Some demonstrators chanted in support of migrants whom the Trump administration has deported or has been attempting to deport while expressing solidarity with people fired by the federal government and with universities whose funding is threatened by Trump.

“As Trump and his administration mobilize the use of the US deportation machine, we are going to organize networks and systems of resistance to defend our neighbors,” a protester said in a rally at Lafayette Square near the White House.

Other protesters waved Palestinian flags while wearing keffiyeh scarves, chanting “free Palestine” and expressing solidarity with Palestinians killed in Israel’s war in Gaza.

Some demonstrators carried symbols expressing support for Ukraine and urging Washington to be more decisive in opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.

Since his January inauguration, Trump and his billionaire ally, Elon Musk, have gutted the federal government, firing over 200,000 workers and attempting to dismantle various agencies.

The administration has also detained scores of foreign students and threatened to stop federal funding to universities over diversity, equity and inclusion programs, climate initiatives and pro-Palestinian protests. Rights groups have condemned the policies.

Near the Washington Monument, banners from protesters read: “hate never made any nation great” and “equal rights for all does not mean less rights for you.”

Demonstrations were also held in New York City and Chicago, among dozens of other locations. It marked the second day of nationwide demonstrations since Trump took office.

The post Thousands of Protesters Rally Against Trump Across US first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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