World Jewish News
Thomas Friedman explains how devastating Israel’s attacks on Iran have been
By BERNIE BELLAN I’m not sure how many readers follow Thomas Friedman’s writing in the New York Times; after all, he’s been highly critical of Netanyahu for years, which probably makes him persona non grata for a lot of you.
But, on Tuesday, November 26, Friedman wrote a piece that was so particularly incisive – and came across as so laudatory of what Israel has been able to achieve in the past 13 months, that even diehard Friedman critics should be able to take some very meaningful lessons away from that column.
Toward the beginning of what he wrote, Friedman makes what, for most readers of his columns, would probably be perceived as a fairly shocking statement when he writes: “In just the last two months, the Israeli military has inflicted a defeat on Iran that approaches its 1967 Six-Day War defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Full stop.”
He goes on to describe what Israel has been able to do to Hezbollah in the past few months as so destructive of that terrorist organization’s abilities that “Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran have decided to delink themselves from Hamas in Gaza and stop the firing from Lebanon for the first time since Oct. 8, 2023, the day after Hamas invaded Israel.”
Friedman then provides some very interesting information about how effective two attacks Israel launched against Iran – one in April and then one in October, were, both in inflicting tremendous damage to Iran’s capability to defend itself against a full scale Israeli attack – should one be launched, and in undermining Iran’s confidence that it can continue to arm Hezbollah without severe repercussions.
Here is what Friedman wrote:
“There is a reason for this (Hezbollah’s agreeing to a cease fire). Hezbollah’s mother ship has suffered a real blow. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s April strike on Iran eliminated one of four Russian-supplied S-300 surface-to-air missile defense batteries around Tehran, and Israel destroyed the remaining three batteries on Oct. 26. Israel also damaged Iran’s ballistic missile production capabilities and its ability to produce the solid fuel used in long-range ballistic missiles. In addition, according to Axios, Israel’s Oct. 26 strike on Iran, which was a response to an earlier Iranian attack on Israel, also destroyed equipment used to create the explosives that surround uranium in a nuclear device, setting back Iran’s efforts in nuclear weapons research.
“A senior Israeli defense official told me that the Oct. 26 attack on Iran ‘was lethal, precise and a surprise.’ And up to now, the Iranians ‘don’t know technologically how we hit them. So they are at the most vulnerable point they have been in this generation: Hamas is not there for them, Hezbollah is not there for them, their air defenses are not there anymore, their ability to retaliate is sharply diminished, and they are worried about Trump.’ “
Friedman’s column goes on to offer advice to President-elect Trump how to deal with other changing realities in the world, including the rapid pace of artificial intelligence development in which, Friedman points out, Israelis are playing a leading role. But one has to wonder whether anyone in Trump’s circle bothers to read anything written by Friedman. After all, he was very close to President Biden – which would certainly put him into Trump’s enemies’ camp, on top of which he writes for that most hated of all media: The New York Times.
Still, if someone who is as critical of Israel’s government as Friedman has been is capable of pointing out the vastly changed dynamic now permeating the entire Middle East as a result of the huge blows Israel has inflicted both on Iran’s number one proxy in the region – Hezbollah, and on Iran itself, once can more readily understand how Israel’s strategy of taking on different enemies all at the same time has paid off.
I, for one, will admit that I was quite surprised to read Friedman’s analysis – and it leads me to question my own thoughts as to what would happen when Israel opened up a new front in Lebanon at the same time as it was still engaged in Gaza. I had thought that it might lead to a repeat of the 2006 debacle, in which a ground invasion by Israel into Lebanon led to heavy Israeli losses and what was, in effect, a victory for Hezbollah – not by being able to defeat Israel, but simply by surviving that invasion.
This time around though – and we’ll have to wait for military analysts to tell us just how effective the heavy Israeli bombardment of Lebanese areas has been in terms of degrading Hezbollah’s military capabilities, Israel has managed to keep its own casualties relatively low by relying upon bombing of Hezbollah infrastructure. As has been the case in Gaza, however, it’s so difficult to tell what those devastating bombings have actually accomplished in specific terms beyond realizing that they have thoroughly degraded both Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capacities. It seems though that the aphorism that “the sum is greater than its parts” is particularly apt in describing what the Israel Air Force has been able to achieve.
While we have been witnessing the wholesale destruction of civilian areas – in both Gaza and Lebanon, it now seems evident that Israeli intelligence has been able to locate terrorist locations with tremendous accuracy. The fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah have been so thoroughly embedded within civilian population areas made it inevitable that, once the IAF embarked upon a relentless campaign to destroy terrorist infrastructure and locations where terrorists were embedded within the civilian population, there would be huge civilian casualties – but ultimately Israel would be able to degrade both Hamas and Hezbollah’s fighting abilities to the point where they have both been neutralized in large part.
The question, of course, is what will now happen as a result of Friedman himself describing Israel’s having forced Hezbollah and Iran to “delink” themselves from Hamas. Hamas is, in effect, nothing more than a mafia type organization, now terrorizing the Palestinian population in Gaza, with its own survival now being its purpose. The Israel Defence Forces seem content to let Hamas carry on its campaign of looting aid trucks and terrorizing the population for its own benefit.
But Hamas fighters, however many may remain, don’t have the same option as Hezbollah’s fighters – which is to retreat behind a defined line north of the Litani River in Lebanon. How many are in the tunnels? How many are embedded within the rest of the Gaza population? If the IDF has an idea what the answers to those questions are, I haven’t seen them.
So, the war in Gaza will likely carry on for some time. It appears that the bombing campaign has thoroughly reduced Hamas’s ability to carry on any effective strikes on Israeli targets, but it is not clear at what point the Israeli government might be willing to accept any sort of a ceasefire. The government’s position has been that a ceasefire can only be entered into when at least the majority of the hostages are released, but frankly, Israel is now operating from such a position of strength vis-a-vis Hamas, that the idea of accepting a ceasefire that would allow Hamas fighters to remain in place seems unconscionable to the vast majority of Israelis. It may seem perverse to think that the government has been willing to sacrifice hostages’ lives for the sake of dealing a final, crushing blow to Hamas, but that’s the sad reality.
Still, who would have thought that Israel would be able to wage successful wars on so many fronts? As Thomas Friedman has noted, Israel has upended the situation in the Middle East, albeit at a very heavy price. And even though I’ve been questioning from the outset the Israeli government’s strategy of seeking total victory over Hamas, given how thoroughly Israel has been able to undermine Hezbollah’s and Iran’s positions, perhaps I was wrong to question Netanyahu’s goal of thoroughly crushing Hamas. Credit has to be given though to the IDF and how much they learned from previous wars with Hamas and Hezbollah.
Amidst all this though, one has to feel great sympathy for the people of Gaza. They are being held to ransom by a gang of thugs and there does not appear to be any way out for them. For their sake, let’s hope that Israel can “finish the job” quickly, although how that can be done remains difficult to know. Perhaps Thomas Friedman, who is always so thoughtful and insightful, can shed some answers to that question as well.
World Jewish News
Trump’s plan to enlist Elon Musk began at Lubavitcher Rebbe’s grave
In podcast interview, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick recalled the visit, which occurred on the anniversary of the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel
By Jacob Kornbluh “This story was originally published in the Forward (Click here to get the Forward’s free email newsletters delivered to your inbox.”)
President Donald Trump first discussed the idea to enlist Elon Musk to lead the Department of Government Efficiency, also known as DOGE, after a visit to the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s grave on Oct. 7, 2024, the anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel.
Trump drove to and from the New York City gravesite, known as the Ohel, with Howard Lutnick, the eventual pick for commerce secretary. During the car ride, the two discussed ways to balance the U.S. budget. “I’m going to go recruit Elon,” Lutnick told Trump. “I don’t know Elon, but he’s perfect for this.”
A week later, Lutnick flew to Texas, where he met with Musk for two hours. Musk told Lutnick he wanted to cut 80% of the federal workforce, similar to what he had done at Twitter when he acquired the social media platform.
We’re going to name it DOGE,” said Lutnick, who said he already registered the name. Lutnick recalled the story on a recent episode of the All-In podcast.
Musk told Fox News last week that he intends to cut $1 trillion from the U.S. deficit and wrap up his work with DOGE by the end of May.
‘Pretty cool’ way to get Orthodox votes
In the interview, Lutnick also said that Trump believed he’d secure tens of thousands of Orthodox votes in New York by visiting the gravesite.
“You know, the people who wear black hats think he’s the Messiah,” Lutnick said, referring to a movement that believes Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who died in 1994, is the messiah. The Chabad-Lubavitch leadership has long rejected such claims.
“They have a crypt for him where you write a note and you put a note in,” Lutnick said. “And so we agreed we’d go out to that grave site, and we would probably win 60,000 of those kinds of voters, which is pretty cool.”
Post-election polls showed Trump and Republican candidates increased their support in New York’s key swing districts with sizable Jewish populations. In Crown Heights, the worldwide headquarters of Chabad-Lubavitch, Trump received 65% of the vote.
The gravesite in Queens has become a popular pilgrimage point for followers of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement and the broader Jewish community, as well as politicians from all sides of the political spectrum.
Wearing a yarmulke and standing beside the grave alongside Chabad representatives, relatives of American hostages and Lutnick, Trump recited a chapter of Psalms, placed a note on the grave and laid a small stone on the headstone. He also lit a memorial candle to honor the Oct. 7 victims.
In 2016, Trump’s daughter Ivanka and her husband, Jared Kushner, prayed at the Ohel on the weekend before the election.
World Jewish News
New report from Pew Research Center provides interesting information about high number of Jews who still identify as Jewish
By BERNIE BELLAN A recent report from the Pew Research Center offers some interesting information about adult Jews in Israel and the United States. According to the report, 80% of the world’s Jews live in those two countries – which explains why there is no reporting about Jews in other countries.
Similar to the situation we reported on with respect to the Census of Canada in 2021, the Pew Report notes that “people may identify as Jewish in a multitude of ways, including ethnically, culturally, religiously or by family background. In this report, we use the term “Jewish” to mean only religious identity, because the survey questions used in the analyses ask about a person’s current religion and what religious group they were raised in (their childhood religion).”
It should be noted that the Canadian census allowed respondents to identify as Jewish both by religion and by ethnic identity. As a result, there were great disparities in the numbers who responded they were Jewish in both categories.
In a December 2023 article we noted that “Of all Winnipeg respondents only 6,700 reported that both their ethnic origin and their religion was Jewish. Yet, 10,700 people in total reported that at least one of their ethnic origins was Jewish, while 11,170 reported their religion was Jewish.”
As a result, after we did a cross-comparison of figures for both categories, we arrived at the conclusion that, at a maximum, the total possible number of individuals who identified as Jewish – either by religion or ethnicity, was 14,270. (But, when you consider, for instance, that of the 10,700 respondents in the census who reported their ethnic origin as Jewish, 1,080 reported their religion as Christian, it gives you some idea how amorphous Jewish identity is.)
The Pew Report, as noted, concentrated only on determining how many Jews in Israel and the United States reported their religion as “Jewish.”
Some of the findings of the report were:
• Most people who were raised Jewish in Israel and the U.S. still identify this way today, resulting in high Jewish retention rates in both countries – though it’s higher in Israel than in the U.S.
Leaving Judaism
• In the U.S., about a quarter of adults who were raised Jewish no longer identify as Jewish.• In Israel, fewer than 1% of adults who were raised Jewish no longer identify as such.
• Most adults who have left Judaism in both countries now are unaffiliated (i.e., they identify religiously as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”).
Entering Judaism
• Most Jewish adults in Israel and the U.S. were raised Jewish, meaning the “accession” (or entrance) rates into Judaism are fairly low in both places.
• But of the two countries, the U.S. has the higher accession rate, with 14% of Jewish Americans saying they were raised outside of Judaism, compared with just 1% of Israeli Jewish adults.
The report delved further into the question of the affiliation of individuals who said their religion was Jewish, but who no longer identify as Jewish.
• In Israel, only 1% of individuals who were raised Jewish said they are now not religiously affiliated. (The number who said they now had another religion was so low that the Pew Report gave the figure as 0. I wonder though, how “Jews for Jesus” – which has a considerable following both in Israel and the U.S. would be taken into account in reports about the number of Jews in the world? Are “Jews for Jesus” still Jewish – even if they consider themselves Jewish? It’s questions like this that make me wonder about the reliability of surveys that claim to provide credible information about how many Jews there are in the world.)
• In the U.S., however, the Pew Report noted that “17% of adults who were raised Jewish now identify as unaffiliated, while 2% now identify as Christian and 1% now identify as Muslim.”
In an earlier study, conducted in 2021 also by the Pew Research Centre, Jews were asked what were the most important aspects of their identifying as Jewish. I’ve written about that report before because I found the answers so fascinating. (I’ve noted that having a good sense of humour was considered an essential part of being Jewish by 33% of respondents, as opposed to only 3% who said that observing Jewish law was an essential part of being Jewish. But don’t tell that to the Winnipeg Council of Rabbis, who insist that the Simkin Centre serving kosher food – even when almost half its residents aren’t even Jewish, is essential to the Simkin Centre.)
Here, again, are the results of that survey:
World Jewish News
How Will Kurds Fare in a New Syria?
By HENRY SREBRNIK Syria’s 13-year civil war ended abruptly in December, when rebels belonging to the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) swept south from their bastions in the northwest of the country, precipitating the fall of the government of President Bashar al-Assad. In a matter of weeks, a regime that had lasted decades came to an end.
One group of Syrians was particularly worried. Since 2014, Washington has backed a de facto autonomous government in northeastern Syria formed principally, but not exclusively, of ethnic Kurdish factions. This coalition, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), took advantage of the chaos unleashed by Syria’s civil war to carve out an enclave along the border with Turkey.
Much of northeastern Syria has been controlled by Kurds, who call it Rojava, meaning western Kurdistan. The SDF fought off a host of enemies: Assad’s troops, Turkey and Turkish-backed militias, al-Qaeda-linked groups, and the Islamic State (ISIS). U.S. forces worked closely with the SDF in chasing ISIS from its last redoubts in Syria. The United States still maintains around 2,000 troops as well as contractors in roughly a dozen operating posts and small bases in eastern Syria.
But six years after the SDF captured the last ISIS stronghold in Syria, ISIS fighters still operate in central and eastern Syria. The SDF’s actions also bred resentment among local Arab communities. Tightly controlled by the People’s Defense Units, a Kurdish militia known as the YPG, the SDF committed extrajudicial killings and conducted extrajudicial arrests of Arab civilians; extorted Arabs who were trying to get information about or secure the release of detained relatives; press ganged young Arabs into its ranks; twisted the education system to accord with the political agenda of the YPG; and recruited many non-Syrian Kurdish fighters.
To be sure, these excesses pale in comparison with those of the Assad regime, but they caused substantial friction with Arab communities, especially in Arab-majority cities like Raqqa. Particularly in areas where the YPG led SDF forces, many in the region were therefore calling for reintegration with the rest of Syria
The SDF was also hampered by ongoing hostility between Turkey and the YPG. Turkey viewed the YPG is a terrorist group. But in late February, a key Kurdish leader in Turkey called for a cease-fire with Ankara. Abdallah Ocalan, the head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known as the PKK — a Kurdish militant group affiliated with the YPG that has long fought the Turkish state — told fighters loyal to him to lay down their weapons and stop waging war against Turkey. This allowed for a rapprochement between the SDF and the new government in Damascus.
Syria made the announcement on March 10 and released images of a signing ceremony featuring the Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the head of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi. The deal will integrate SDF institutions into the new government, handing over control of border checkpoints as well as the region’s oil and gas fields to the central government.
The safety and prosperity of Kurdish communities depends not on foreign powers but on the Syrian government respecting their rights and those of all Syrian citizens. For Christians and Alawites, the situation is more worrisome. Unlike the Kurds, many of them face Sunni Arab violence; they are seen as collaborators of the late regime. For years, the vast majority of Syrians have suffered humiliation and degradation at the hands of an Alawite ruling minority, whose dominance under Assad has left an indelible mark of resentment. Gruesome videos of executions of Alawites have begun to emerge, alongside reports of attacks on Christian neighborhoods.
Meanwhile, Syria’s new interim constitution makes no mention of specific ethnosectarian groups or divisions. The new government claims they didn’t want a quota system, because of how they’d seen these play out in Iraq and Lebanon. The idea behind consociationalist or confessionalist systems, as they are called, is to give each ethnic and religious group a voice in government to ensure their needs are covered. But this has led to problems in the longer term, with different groups competing for privileges. Religious or sectarian priorities are always part of politics.
“The best day after a bad Emperor is the first,” wrote the Roman historian Tacitus. The hard work will now have to follow. It remains unclear how genuinely willing the new Syrian government is to establish an inclusive democracy. But it appears that right now Syrians living under its control generally enjoy more political and personal rights than they have had since the Assads took power in 1970.
Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.