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What India’s New Security Paradigm Means for Israel

An Air India Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner plane lands at the Ben Gurion International airport in Lod, near Tel Aviv, Israel, March 22, 2018. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Indian strategic restraint was designed to prevent escalation with Pakistan. In practice, it did the opposite. Terror groups backed by Pakistan’s security agencies exploited the firebreak between terrorism and state aggression, on the assumption that India would avoid decisive retaliation or cross-border action. Limited responses produced predictable patterns, and predictability invited more violence.

India has replaced this framework with a doctrine of compellence. Major attacks are now treated as acts of war. This principle was made explicit during Operation Sindoor, when the Prime Minister announced that major terrorist attacks would be answered as acts of war rather than treated as matters for law enforcement. The government no longer waits for lengthy attribution cycles or international pressure before acting. Pre-emption is considered a sovereign right. During Operation Sindoor, India struck early and deep, using long-range fire, drone swarms, loitering munitions, and real-time fused intelligence. The operation broke the old template and signaled a permanent doctrinal change.

The end of strategic restraint

This evolution is institutional, not episodic. Indian deterrence is now pattern-based rather than event-based, signaling that retaliation is now to be expected rather than debated. Public expectations help shape policy, and citizens expect retaliation rather than investigation. The political reality, in which national strategy is tied to public sentiment, narrows the space for restraint.

The shift extends beyond military action. During the 2025 ceasefire discussions with Pakistan, Delhi rejected all external mediation. That was not a negotiating tactic. It was the expression of a new doctrine. India now treats crises with Pakistan as regionally internal and prefers direct communication between the Directors General of Military Operations, the top operational military officers on each side. Outside involvement is kept at a minimum to preserve freedom of maneuver and crisis ownership.

Treaties under conditional legitimacy

India’s approach to treaties has changed as well, reflecting the same shift toward coercive clarity. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, a 1960 agreement that divided the rivers of the Indus basin and survived multiple wars, marked the first time a resource-sharing treaty was used as coercive leverage in South Asia. The shift echoed earlier remarks by Indian leaders that blood and water cannot flow together, a formulation now reflected in policy rather than rhetoric. For decades, arrangements like this were treated as stabilizing anchors meant to insulate both countries from conflict. India no longer accepts that premise. Water, airspace, and border-management agreements now survive only if they reinforce India’s security narrative.

The same logic applies to the Shimla Agreement of 1972, which committed India and Pakistan to resolve disputes bilaterally. Once a cornerstone of India’s diplomatic posture, it now carries less weight because it places more constraints on India than on Pakistan.

India continues to declare a No First Use nuclear policy, but political leaders have introduced deliberate ambiguity about how that commitment should be interpreted in a rapidly changing threat environment. What was once a doctrine of assured retaliation is evolving toward assured punishment, a formulation that narrows the room for adversary miscalculation while maintaining rhetorical restraint. Precision conventional strikes now operate close to Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure, compressing the conventional–nuclear firebreak. New capabilities such as MIRVs (canisterized missiles kept at higher readiness) and routine SSBN patrols show that India’s deterrent is no longer merely symbolic. It is becoming a readiness-oriented system in which technology and doctrine are evolving together.

India has also redefined its counterterrorism doctrine. Proxy groups are treated as instruments of hostile state policy, not as deniable actors operating in a grey zone. Zero tolerance refers not only to the occurrence of terrorism but to the continued existence of the networks that enable it. India now views the broader ecosystem surrounding terrorist groups as a legitimate set of targets.

A final dimension is often overlooked. China is the silent second audience for India’s choices. Signals meant for Pakistan carry an implied message for Beijing. India’s interception of Chinese-origin PL-15 air-to-air missiles and successful defeat of Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defense systems during Operation Sindoor provided valuable intelligence on Chinese weapons design and vulnerabilities. India’s new deterrence logic is built for a two-front environment in which actions in one direction have consequences in the other.

What emerges is a picture of a state transforming under fire. India is not becoming reckless; it is becoming coherent. It is aligning doctrine, public expectations, defense industrial capacity, and geopolitical messaging around a single principle. Security must be achieved by India, not granted through outside mediation or constrained by outdated assumptions.

Despite these shifts, several structural constraints remain unchanged. India continues to face significant intelligence gaps, limited real-time ISR coverage along key sectors, and persistent bureaucratic friction in inter-service coordination. The political leadership remains sensitive to the costs of prolonged conflict, and the military is deeply cautious about simultaneous commitments on two fronts. These enduring limitations serve as a crucial reminder that doctrinal evolution does not eliminate operational friction.

Not all members of India’s strategic community concur with this trajectory. Several scholars argue that a posture centered on rapid retaliation and pre-emption may, in practice, erode crisis stability rather than strengthen it, particularly without sustained reforms in civil-military coordination and decision-making. Moreover, Pakistan’s domestic fragility, decentralized proxy networks, and continued reliance on nuclear signaling introduce significant uncertainty. These structural conditions suggest that India’s increasingly assertive doctrine will not necessarily yield predictable adversary behavior and may interact with Pakistani vulnerabilities in destabilizing ways.

A coherent but high-stakes doctrine

This shift is not without risks. A posture built on pre-emption and rapid retaliation compresses decision time on both sides, increasing the danger of misinterpretation or premature escalation. Pattern-based deterrence assumes intent can be accurately discerned, but intelligence failures or political pressure could easily prompt India to act on incomplete signals. The erosion of stabilizing agreements such as the Indus Waters Treaty and the weakening of the Shimla framework remove guardrails that once shaped crisis behavior. Greater strategic autonomy gives India more room to maneuver, but also narrows the margin for error in a nuclearized environment.

There is also a diplomatic cost. India’s rejection of external mediation strengthens its claim to sovereign crisis management, but reduces the number of actors capable of de-escalating a crisis once it begins. Washington’s traditional stabilizing role will become more constrained, while Beijing may interpret India’s new doctrine through its own rivalry calculus, tightening the two-front dynamic India seeks to manage. Assertiveness delivers clarity, but can also prompt counter-moves that make South Asia more volatile, not less.

Implications for Israel

These shifts matter for Israel. India’s new deterrence posture — explicitly rejecting nuclear blackmail, collapsing the line between proxy terror and state responsibility, and demonstrating a willingness to strike early and with precision — mirrors many of the principles Israel has relied on for decades. Both states face adversaries that use terrorism as a strategic tool under the umbrella of nuclear ambiguity.

India’s performance in Sindoor, especially its defeat of Chinese-origin PL-15 missiles and HQ-9/P air defenses, provides operational insights that are directly relevant to Israel, as Chinese technology expands across the Middle East. The emerging convergence is not rhetorical; it is doctrinal. India’s willingness to impose costs on an ecosystem that enables terrorism, and to do so without waiting for external validation, opens new avenues for Israel-India strategic coordination.

India has written a new playbook, and the world needs to pay attention.

Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum, a lecturer and a researcher in the Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program at Bar-Ilan University. She specializes in Indian foreign policy.

John Spencer is Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum and Executive Director of the Urban Warfare Institute. He served 25 years as an infantry soldier, including two combat tours in Iraq. He is author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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American Jews need to decide what being American means to them

A vote is a choice between finite possibilities. But with those limited choices, we are expressing something not only about what we think of the candidates, but what we think of ourselves: Who do we want for this moment in our country? Where do we want this country to go? Who and how do we want to be in it? As Jews? As Americans?

I thought of this while reading the statement by Jonathan Schulman, executive director of The Jewish Majority, that accompanied his organization’s findings about Jewish voters in Michigan. Jewish Majority found that 50 percent of Jewish voters, and 52 percent of those who voted for a senator, voted for the Democrat, Abdul El-Sayed, a significant dropoff of the Democratic vote from 2024 and compared to Jocelyn Benson, this year’s victorious Democratic gubernatorial candidate. (National polls vary; an exit poll from NBC had about a 10 point dropoff of Jews voting Democrat, while one from J Street found no change, which would itself be notable in a year when most other groups went bluer than 2024.)

Whether this poll is methodologically sound has been the matter of some debate, but what I found as interesting as the numbers was what Schulman chose to say along with it:

A Democratic Senate candidate earning just half of the Jewish vote should be a blaring alarm for every Democratic leader in the country…Democrats cannot assume Jewish voters will stay with them when their concerns are dismissed. Republicans should not assume a vote against one Democrat is a lasting endorsement of their party. This year’s Democratic wave defied recent cycles that have been decided by razor-thin margins. Officials must understand that even a modest shift in the Jewish vote can be decisive. Both parties have to earn it.

Do they? If I were the Democratic Party, I would not treat this as a blaring alarm. El-Sayed, per this poll, had a major dropoff of support from Jews — and still won by 7 points. I take Schulman’s point that it could have been closer had the election not taken place in a national wave. But on the other hand, perhaps a more pro-Israel candidate would have done less well with the Michigan’s uniquely large percentage of Arab American or Muslim voters, who swung significantly to Donald Trump in the 2024 election, but came back to the Democrats for vote for El-Sayed in 2026. Similarly, a more pro-Israel candidate may have also done less well with young men, who had a 55 point swing toward El-Sayed from their 2024 preference for Trump, and who we know, as young people, are increasingly critical of Israel.

More than Democrats or Republicans, there is another group to whom it is hugely important how Jews vote in the future: American Jews. Most Jews for the last century of American history have been liberal, often working in political coalition with other minority groups. If we are not anymore, that would do more than just mean that our communities are more right-wing; it would make American Jews more insular and more isolated from our fellow Americans. How we vote, coupled with who we choose to work with, or not; ally with, or not; stand up for, or not; determines more than whether Democrats or Republicans get our votes. What we decide could determine who we are in this country.

No party or candidate is guaranteed any minority group’s support, and of course it is reasonable for people not to vote for candidates they see as hateful toward them. This is not limited to Jews: Indian Americans not voting for a Texas railroad commissioner candidate who decided to campaign at least in part on anti-Indian racism, for example, is hardly shocking.

Part of what is at issue here is the extent to which many Jews feel targeted by comments like El-Sayed’s on the incompatibility between being a Zionist and a progressive.Over the summer, for example, he told CNN, “Every definition of a Jewish state ends up in some articulation of illiberal values, every single one.” Many saw this as not only critical of Israel, but unwelcoming to Jews in American civic life.

However, Nonnegotiable Michigan explicitly stated that “Jewish statehood in Israel is nonnegotiable. The Jewish people’s right to self-determination in our ancestral homeland is not up for debate, even when its politics are” and that “Palestinian aspirations for safety, dignity and freedom must be pursued alongside Israel, not in place of it.” Their vote against Mike Rogers was contingent not just on Jewish safety, and not on pluralistic democracy, but on the other candidate saying that he shared their vision for Israel remaining a Jewish state. Nonnegotiable voters and their allies held to this condition despite the fact that Rogers denied the results of the 2020 election, supported legislation to ban abortions on multiple occasions, opposed marriage equality, and who seemed perfectly comfortable accepting campaign help from someone who implied belief in Jesus was a prerequisite for holding office and who personally encouraged and participated in Islamophobia in the campaign against El-Sayed.

The implications of this approach stretch far beyond the Michigan Senate race. Whether American Jews are going to condition their support for Democrats — and more broadly their involvement in the U.S.’s society of liberal pluralism — on Israel seems to be an open question. Nonnegotiable, for example, plans to expand nationally, and the ADL, which has removed “civil rights” from its website, reacted to the midterms in part by issuing warnings to progressives, including one of the Israel-critical Jews who has become a new member of Congress. American Jews, individually and collectively, need to ask ourselves if we agree that we are willing to break out of our nation’s liberal democratic partnership over Israel.

I do not know exactly what American Jewishness will look like if the answer to that question is “yes.” And Schulman is right that Jews who don’t vote for Democrats won’t necessarily turn to Republicans; they may sit out certain elections or vote for third-party candidates. Even so, as most of American society, and in particular other minorities, move away from support for Israel, many American Jewish communities could become, if not more affirmatively conservative, then more insular, retreating into our own institutions and pulling up the drawbridges. Instead of supporting the values and policies that protect us alongside other minorities, American Jews risk becoming a Sparta, a closed community telling ourselves that that’s what it means to take care of Jews.

The stories Jews tell ourselves about our role in this country — from taking part in the Civil Rights movement to championing women’s equality to contesting ICE — were always partial and incomplete accounts. But if we withdraw from trying to work in pluralistic, liberally minded coalitions with other groups — joining with them to work against draconian executive orders, decrying not only antisemitism but other hatreds, and supporting politicians working to protect democracy — those stories will become untenable tales about who we still are in America. They will just be history.

Who are we as Americans and Jews, and can we even separate those two things is an existential question, one we can’t answer just at the ballot box. But as I read Schulman’s statement, I didn’t wonder about the future of the Democratic Party. I wondered about the future of American Jews if we decided our future lies separate and apart from it.

The post American Jews need to decide what being American means to them appeared first on The Forward.

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Trump says he’s ‘looking into’ reports about an Iranian bomb plot in Washington

(JTA) — President Donald Trump told reporters on Tuesday that he is “looking into” a report of a possible Iranian plot to detonate a dirty bomb in Washington.

Asked if there was any imminent threat to the capital, he responded, “Well, if there is, they will pay a price the likes of which no country has ever paid before.”

“I hope it’s not, but we take it very seriously because they happen to be crazy,” Trump said at a press conference in Manila, the Philippines. “This is why they can’t have a nuclear weapon, by the way.”

The president was addressing concerns related to an exclusive report by CNN, citing seven officials, that U.S. intelligence indicated that Iran is developing plans to target senior Trump administration officials with either a “dirty bomb” or a chemical weapon. CNN also reported that the White House said there were no credible threats to the homeland.

A dirty bomb, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is a kind of “radiological dispersal device” that uses a conventional explosive but also contains radioactive material. A nuclear bomb causes an explosion that is millions of times more powerful; its radiation cloud could spread across thousands of square miles, while that of a dirty bomb could extend a few blocks or miles from the explosion.

Although officials are debating whether Iran would be able to implement such a plot, sources told CNN that Iran is seeking the option rather than being ready to launch an immediate attack.

Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, meanwhile, told CNBC’s Squawk Box on Tuesday that Tehran’s threats were “aspirational” and that any such action would “cause an all-out war.”

As for the current conflict with Iran, diplomatic talks have continued on and off for months, with Trump declaring last week that the war was “effectively over” and would come to an end “fairly soon.” Low-level attacks continue in the region, with Iranian drones targeting a U.S. radar facility in Bahrain on Tuesday, and the United States continuing its blockade on Iran.

Trump is currently in the Philippines to attend meetings with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He will then travel to China to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The three men are expected to discuss global reductions in nuclear weapons and the Iran war, The New York Times reported.

This article originally appeared on JTA.org.

The post Trump says he’s ‘looking into’ reports about an Iranian bomb plot in Washington appeared first on The Forward.

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In new book, Biden says Israel went too far in Gaza, warns its strongest American defenders are disappearing

Former President Joe Biden expressed his regrets over the duration and impact of the Gaza war in a new memoir published Tuesday, and shared his belief that Israelis needed a trusted ally to help restrain their military response.

“I repeatedly sought to restrain the Israelis,” Biden writes in Promise Me, America, adding that “Israel went too far” in the war against Hamas. The former president also doesn’t shy away from harshly rebuking Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tactics. “Bibi had no qualms about making promises he had no power — or intention — to keep,” Biden writes, using Netnayahu’s nickname.

But the book leaves unanswered why Biden did not publicly share more of his frustrations with Israel, why he waited so long to restrict weapons shipments, and whether he could have pressured Netanyahu earlier and more forcefully to mitigate the devastation in Gaza — central criticisms of his administration’s handling of the war.

Biden, who repeatedly described himself as a lifelong “Zionist,” largely defends his own policy decisions on the war and his personal support for Israel. “I will never regret standing by Israel in the wake of Oct. 7,” he writes. “It was the worst attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust. And I will never agree with those who say we should stop supplying Israel with the weapons they need to defend and protect themselves.”

Reflecting on growing divisions within the Democratic Party over U.S. support for Israel, Biden warns Israelis that they may not be able to count on the same level of support from future American leaders. “I hope Israel wakes up,” he writes. “The days of American leaders like me —passionate defenders of Israel to the core — are passing.”

Biden, who, at age 83, is battling stage 4 prostate cancer, acknowledges that he belongs to a “different generation” in his historical view of the Jewish state than many younger Americans, including the pro-Palestinian protesters who demonstrated on college campuses.

“These protests often conflated very different historical circumstances. But there was also an edge to them — many of the marchers seemed to believe that they could wish Israel out of existence, simply by chanting slogans about a Palestine that stretched ‘from the river to the sea,’ “ he wrote. “That slogan was more than a little provocative, as it glibly threatened to displace a people who had been displaced so many times in their history.”

Biden’s view of Netanyahu

Biden’s criticism of Netanyahu, the longest-serving Israeli leader, who lost his parliamentary majority in the recent elections, goes beyond his handling of the Gaza war and is strikingly harsher than the approach he took during his decades in public office.

He questions Netanyahu’s honesty, judgment and willingness to put Israel’s long-term interests ahead of his own political survival.

“Bombing Gaza from the air and leaving an ever-rising body count would obviously cause lasting harm to Israel’s reputation, as I warned Bibi many times,” Biden writes, recalling “many heated conversations” about that in the spring of 2024. “At one point, I warned Bibi that the extremists in his cabinet were out of control. I said, ‘Bibi, you promised me your hands were on the steering wheel.’ When he replied that they were, I said, ‘Well, you’re driving into a ditch!’”

Netanyahu, in his own memoir published while he was out of office between 2021 and 2022, claimed that Biden’s criticism reflected growing pressure from his party’s progressive wing.

The two men had known each other for decades. In the early 2000s, Biden signed a photograph of them, with the line: “Bibi, I don’t agree with a damn thing you had to say, but I love you.” But Biden suggests their relationship soured over the years. “There wasn’t a ton of trust,” he writes, “I was also worried about Bibi’s Trump-like tendencies. He could play fast and loose with the truth, and thought nothing of bending democratic institutions to serve his personal needs.”

Those concerns became more serious as the Gaza war continued. The disagreements eventually led Biden to pause a shipment of 200-lb bombs in May 2024, as Israel prepared a major military operation in Rafah. The decision drew criticism from Israel’s supporters, who accused Biden of undermining an ally, while critics argued that he was still doing too little to stop the suffering in Gaza.

Biden’s disappointment with Schumer

Biden’s frustration with longtime allies was not limited to Israel. In another section of the book, he describes feeling personally betrayed by Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer, who visited him at his Delaware home in July 2024 to urge him to withdraw from the presidential race.

Schumer, the highest-ranking Jewish elected official in American history, had been one of Biden’s closest allies in Washington. But following Biden’s catastrophic debate performance against Donald Trump, Schumer joined other senior Democrats who feared that keeping Biden at the top of the ticket would hurt the party’s chances in November.

Biden writes that he did not appreciate the intervention. “Loyalty matters to me,” he writes. “If I give you my word, I stick with you. If I say I’m with you, I’m with you to the end.”

Schumer is now facing a tough leadership challenge of his own, related in part to his stance on Israel, after helping Democrats win back the Senate with a historic gain of at least nine seats in the midterm elections.

The post In new book, Biden says Israel went too far in Gaza, warns its strongest American defenders are disappearing appeared first on The Forward.

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