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A ‘Long War’ Is Not the Answer to Israel’s Security Problem — and Could Lead to Destruction (PART ONE)

An Israeli military convoy moves inside the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, as seen from Israel, June 17, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen

The October 7 disaster shattered many beliefs and concepts in Israeli society, and the war Israel has been waging since that day differs from the wars of its past.

David Ben-Gurion and Ze’ev Jabotinsky believed that rounds of war in which the enemy is smashed against an “Iron Wall” would eventually cause the countries of the region to come to terms with Israel’s existence; this would in turn cause them to change their strategy and choose the path of peace, as did Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein. Ben-Gurion’s understanding that an end to the conflict cannot be forced, and that Israel cannot develop and advance in a state of  continuous war, led him to the security concept that was in effect until October 7, 2023.

Israel’s security concept has to address a fundamental problem: that the country 1) exists within a hostile region that does not accept its existence, and 2) cannot maintain a large army on a daily basis while advancing economically and socially. The solution — until October 2023 — was to maintain a small regular army to address ongoing security challenges; try and postpone wars by deterring enemies from exercising resistance; and maintain a large and agile reserve army that is mobilized on the basis of intelligence alerts. Because the mobilization of the reserves stalls Israel’s economy, this security concept required that wars be short.

The first commandment of Israel’s security concept was that Israel would never be able to force an end to the conflict on its antagonists because it is simply too small relative to the collective Arab and Muslim world. This approach created the dynamic of cycles of short wars.

Israel was destined to mobilize for a significant clash once every few years, to beat the enemy in a short and powerful war, and thereby gain a few years of relative calm. Israel used these periods of calm, together with the assets it gained during the wars (time, territory, deterrence, strategic stability) to transform from a tiny young country into a regional military and economic power.

But the periods between the rounds of war — that is, the “routine” phase of the security concept — were never calm from a security point of view. In fact, since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, not a month has passed without a security incident in one of the conflict areas. Israel’s routine security situation is in fact a routine of limited conflict.

Throughout its short history, Israel has never been able to completely eliminate any of its enemies. Ten days after the end of the Six-Day War — Israel’s greatest victory, in which it achieved the total disintegration of the Egyptian army — Egypt renewed fire.

Israel’s strategic success in expelling the PLO from Lebanon following the Lebanon War did not eliminate Palestinian hostility from Lebanon, and it certainly did not prevent Hezbollah’s development and indeed acceleration of strength. Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, and the transition from Yasser Arafat to Abu Mazen, who changed his predecessor’s policy of support for terrorism, did not lead to the elimination of Palestinian terrorism. To this day, the IDF is required to carry out operations almost every night to fight Palestinian terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

Israel made good use of the routine periods and turned itself from a small, weak, resource-poor country into a regional power in every respect. Along with strengthening economically, Israel also strengthened militarily. It hit the enemy repeatedly, sometimes so severely that it caused them to weaken and change. But as expected, Israel has failed to force an end to the conflict on its enemies. As Ben-Gurion said, “We cannot have a final battle.”

It can be argued that if Israel is fated to go to war at intervals over and over again forever, then all the Sisyphean security activity during the routine periods is unnecessary — in other words, it fails to bring results, as war inevitably breaks out again anyway. But Israel’s ongoing defensive and offensive military effort makes it possible to postpone the next war and maintain a tolerable level of violence during the routine periods.

Why does Israel allow the other side to arm itself more than it can be expected to tolerate? Why not act before the other side is dangerously well-armed? The answer is clear. Israel uses the routine periods to build and develop. Overly frequent wars might make it more difficult for Israel’s enemies to strengthen, but they would foil the part of Israel’s strategy that depends on the periods of routine. The “addiction to peace” — as the Israeli desire to extend the routine periods is sometimes called by opponents of the Ben-Gurion security concept — is not a sign of the concept’s weakness, but a by-product of its implementation.

If Israel cannot force an end to the conflict on its enemies, and its enemies include those who wish to act against it with violence, what prevents those enemies from acting all the time and arming themselves without limit?

If Israel cannot keep its entire army mobilized and active and must be content with a small regular army, what prevents its enemies from attacking it every day that the army is not mobilized? Why hasn’t every day of Israel’s existence been an October 7?

This is where deterrence and early warning come into play.

Israel’s enemies are usually deterred from starting a high-intensity war against it because Israel has proven that it is stronger than they are, and that a high-intensity war would hurt them more than they are willing to suffer. Deterrence keeps wars from starting and helps Israel maintain a tolerable level of violence during the routine periods. But deterrence is not supposed to, and should not be expected to, prevent war from ever breaking out. Nor is it meant to completely prevent any violence from ever occurring during the routine periods.

Israel tries to strengthen its deterrence capacity not to prevent war but to keep war away for as long as possible, on the understanding that war will eventually break out. At the same time, Israel invests a continuous effort in defense to make it difficult for the other side to cause it harm during the routine periods. Defense cannot, and clearly does not, prevent all violence.

Israel invests a great deal of effort in intelligence, the first purpose of which is to warn of the enemy’s intention to go to war. Because early warning might fail, Israel built a routine defense system designed to stop an attack in the event of such a failure.

Defense needs to respond to both threats from the borders and terrorism that occurs during the routine periods. This dual role — protection against low-intensity violence and an “insurance policy” in the event of a failure of early warning — can create confusion about the defense mission and even the scenario for which the defense is being prepared.

This seems to be what happened on October 7. The IDF failed to recognize the potential for a major Hamas raid on the Israeli villages and towns near Gaza. The IDF is prepared to prevent infiltration, not invasion. Whether the failure was in the IDF’s understanding of the intelligence or in the degree of protection afforded by the new barrier it built around Gaza, the IDF’s preparations did not take into account the possibility of a breach of the barrier or the potentially broad dimensions of such a raid. The IDF did not prepare for this scenario and did not prepare orders or routines for such a case. The Intelligence Division did not build a warning model to protect against such a move, and therefore did not provide warning. Weak preparation, and the failure to prepare a response in case of surprise, allowed Hamas to penetrate the border and carry out the October 7 attack, with all its catastrophic consequences.

But were there elements in the Hamas attack that Israel had no ability to defend against? Had Hamas discovered operative tools against which Israel could not prepare a defensive response? Did Hamas prepare in a way that Israeli intelligence could not discover?

The tragedy is that the answer to all these questions is no.

Has anyone in Israel ever believed that Hamas is interested in peace? Was anyone surprised to learn that Hamas still opposes Israel’s very existence and believes it should be violently resisted until it is destroyed? Did anyone in Israel think the IDF could deter Hamas to the point of forcing it to end the conflict — a principle that is contrary to the first commandment of the security concept?

The horrific harm inflicted on Israeli civilians on October 7, the taking of hundreds of captives, and the appearance of the loss of Israeli power caused Israel to go to war. The object of that war is to make clear that Hamas made a grievous mistake and to renew Israel’s strategic positioning in the arena. But did the magnitude of the blow inflicted on Israel suddenly make it more capable than it ever believed itself to be before the war? Did the catastrophic failure of Israel’s defense and early warning system paradoxically make Israel so strong that it can now force its enemies to end the conflict?

Did the atrocities committed by Hamas in its attack somehow make the IDF strong enough to eliminate the threat of Hamas from Gaza, bearing in mind that Israel has never been able to eliminate any of the threats that surround it? Did the terrible damage suffered by the surrounding communities make Israel’s economy and society so strong that Israel can suddenly conduct a long and intense war?

The shock and sense of rupture caused by October 7 led many to think that the Hamas attack had irreparably broken Israel’s security concept. Israel’s deterrence and early warning both failed, and Hamas was not deterred. Hence: it is no longer true that Israel cannot have a final battle. It is possible to go to war to eliminate Hamas once and for all — to wage a final war and achieve a complete victory.

We will try to formulate this alternative “October 8” concept of security. According to this view, Israel cannot ignore threats against it. It should act decisively and continuously towards the complete elimination of its enemies and their replacement with political elements that accept Israel’s national policies and goals. Thus, the goal of the war in Gaza should be the complete elimination of the military power of Hamas and the dissolution of its civilian rule in the Strip, until it can be ensured that it no longer poses a threat to the surrounding settlements.

Let’s ignore for the moment the endless consequences of this concept when applying it to Lebanon and the other arenas. Gaza is a limited geographical space with a topography that supports maneuvering. But even if it were possible to achieve complete victory in Gaza, what would it look like? Full and lasting Israeli control over the territory, à la Judea and Samaria?

After 10 months of war, the IDF has occupied most of the Gaza Strip and destroyed countless buildings and terrorist and tunneling infrastructures. Hamas still exists and functions, though it is unable to launch significant military operations. But it is possible that the manner in which the IDF used its force was wrong.

Even if the IDF had acted differently, it is not clear how Hamas fighters can be eliminated when they withdraw and assimilate into the general population. How can every last Hamas fighter be eliminated when they are the ones who choose whether to fight or blend into the crowd? A similar logic applies to buildings and infrastructure. The IDF has shown no mercy to buildings and tunnels in Gaza. It has used an unprecedented quantity of aerial weapons and explosives on the ground, and the number of homes it has destroyed is enormous. Notwithstanding claims that the Americans withheld armaments from the IDF, they provided Israel with tens of thousands of bombs that it did not possess at the beginning of the war. Could yet more infrastructure have been destroyed?

Will anyone be surprised if, after the complete victory in Gaza is achieved and Hamas is defeated, there continues to be a threat of terrorism from Gaza, including the occasional rocket launch? Can this be prevented? And if not, what is the advantage of continuing the war without end?

The IDF has been at war at varying levels of intensity for 10 months now. The regular soldiers are fighting almost continuously, and the reserve forces are already in their third round of action. Is this not enough? Is there no limit to the hours the engine of the IDF machine can continue to function? And is there a correlation between the prolonging of the war in Gaza and the problematic strategic situation in the north?

Supporters of the alternative view claim that Ben-Gurion’s view no longer provides security. According to them, avoiding a complete victory stems first and foremost from weakness. But their new concept ignores the reality of the difficulty that would be involved in achieving either the means or the international support necessary to prosecute such a long war. When asked what Israel should do about the lack of armaments, their answer is often that Israel will simply have to achieve independence in the field. But how can a war be waged right now with armaments that we do not yet have? And can Israel really afford to ignore its need for American military and political assistance? Can Israel stand alone against all the threats that surround us, which are not only military but also political and economic? Can Israel survive without American support at the UN? Can it survive a global boycott?

Col. (res.) Gur Laish served as head of the campaign planning department in the Israel Air Force and as head of the security concept division at the National Security Council. He has a master’s degree in political science from the University of Haifa. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post A ‘Long War’ Is Not the Answer to Israel’s Security Problem — and Could Lead to Destruction (PART ONE) first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Battling the Amalek Within

A Torah scroll. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.

JNS.orgWhy is Amalek considered the archenemy of Israel? We’ve had no shortage of vile and murderous enemies in our time. What makes Amalek so fiendishly unique that even the Nazis were symbolically referred to as Amalekites?

In this week’s Torah reading, Ki Tetze, we find no less than 74 biblical commandments, the highest number of any parshah. It represents some 12% of the 613 commandments of the Torah in this one weekly reading.

The final item on the agenda this week is about the nation of Amalek—specifically, the obligation to remember the nefarious attack on the Israelites following their exodus from Egypt. Furthermore, we are commanded never to forget what Amalek did to us and to wipe out any memory of Amalek.

One of the interpretations as to why Amalek is so reviled is because he attacked “the stragglers, the weary and the weak” among the Israelites. It was considered diabolically devilish to start with the weak and the weary, and then eventually overwhelm all the people.

I remember hearing a talk by one of the inventors of the Iron Dome air-defense system who said that when it comes to an enemy who fires rockets at you, you know where they stand and, please God, have to do what’s necessary to defend oneself. But when the enemy sits down at a negotiating table in a pinstripe suit and professes to be “pro-peace,” we must be very careful indeed. Such an enemy is far more treacherous and dangerous. He talks peace while at the very same time celebrating terrorist atrocities and educating, nay, brainwashing his schoolchildren with venom and hate. Beware, this is Amalek incarnate.

On the spiritual level, the rabbis said of the evil inclination, “Today, he says do this, and tomorrow he says do that, until he comes and says, ‘go and serve idolatry!’ ” The downhill road to spiritual neglect is not sudden and dramatic, but rather a “slippery slope” that begins with seemingly innocuous disregard but ends with complete abandonment.

Kaddish was once sacred in Jewish life. Which son didn’t recite Kaddish regularly in the year after a parent’s death? Today? We watch in dread as a son standing at his father’s open grave struggles to read the Kaddish … in English! This didn’t happen overnight. It was a gradual decline.

Not that long ago, just the mention of the word Yizkor would send a tremor down Jewish spines. Even people who kept their shops open on Shabbat and Yom Tov would close them to go to synagogue for Yizkor. Today? “Yizkor, what’s that?”

Once upon a time, the second day of Rosh Hashanah was no different from the first. Today, it’s becoming an optional extra.

My lamented, late brother-in-law—the legendary Rabbi Moshe Kotlarsky—used to describe this phenomenon as follows: “The zayde called it the ‘holy Shabbos.’ The son referred to it as ‘Saturday.’ The grandson described it as ‘the weekend.’ And the great-grandson said it was ‘the day before Super Bowl Sunday.’”

That pretty much sums up the decline of Jewish observance in 21st-century America.

Our great spiritual teachers taught us that there is a little Amalek inside each of us who is shrewd and manipulative. He knows full well that if he told us to deny our faith completely, he’d be fighting a losing battle. Some things are non-negotiable, even for the less observant among us. Yom Kippur, a Passover seder, a brit milah and a bar mitzvah are generally not up for discussion. These are sacred and inviolate. But a second day of Yom Tov may well be negotiable. And mourning for a full year may likewise be more than many can handle. And so it goes.

Slowly, but surely, one tradition after another falls by the wayside. And then we wonder why our children don’t consider themselves very Jewish any longer.

And so, our true villain and archenemy is the devilishly shrewd, cunning and less-threatening enemy who cuts off the “stragglers”—he who starts by attacking our seemingly less important traditions. Lurking beneath is the villain who gradually destroys everything, even our most sacred pillars and principles.

In this Jewish month of Elul, as we prepare for the Days of Judgment ahead, may the Almighty help protect us from the outer Amaleks of this world. And hopefully, we will be able to help ourselves against our own inner Amalek.

The post Battling the Amalek Within first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Media Promote Bogus UN Report Claiming Hamas Has No Ties to UNRWA

View of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) building in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. Photo: Abed Rahim Khatib / Flash90.

JNS.orgNPR recently broadcast an article asserting the lie that Israel has been “spreading false information about UNRWA,” referencing the United Nations agency responsible for Palestinian “refugees.” Yet, Israel has presented voluminous evidence that UNRWA is a front for the Hamas terror group.

In fact, it’s the UN that’s lying about UNRWA, and now its lies are being covered up by NPR and other mainstream media.

Indeed, back in April, The New York Times parroted the bogus claims of an “independent” review that exonerated UNRWA of having ties to Hamas, with the headline, “Israel Hasn’t Offered Evidence Tying Many U.N. Workers to Hamas, Review Says.”

Wrong.

The State of Israel has presented extensive lists of terrorists connected to UNWRA, as well as examples of overlapping funding, governance and facilities, indicating that UNRWA has been thoroughly infiltrated by Hamas operatives and loyalists. While this evidence was presented to UNRWA High Commissioner Phillipe Lazzarini, he and the review panel simply ignored it.

The review cited by both NPR and the NYT is highly suspect, since it was commissioned by U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres, who is operationally responsible for UNRWA activities. Guterres called UNRWA a “lifeline of hope and dignity”—lofty praise for an organization that has utterly failed for 75 years to help Palestinians rise above their dependent refugee status. To the contrary, the agency has cynically fostered and perpetuated Palestinian victimhood.

Most egregiously, the panel that conducted the probe on behalf of the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) lacked the mandate to investigate the presence of Hamas among its staff—which should have been the very subject of the investigation. In fact, by the UN’s own admission, the review was only designed to ease the concerns of donors. These two facts were somehow omitted by NPR, the NYT and other media.

Furthermore, the probe was led by a former French foreign minister, Catherine Colonna, presenting another major conflict of interest, since Colonna approved French support of millions of euros for UNRWA.  Also participating in the probe were three organizations whose executives have expressed extreme animosity towards Israel, accusing it of “genocide” and “apartheid.”

Despite these major flaws, following publication of the OIOS findings, the media were quick to absolve UNRWA and turn the tables by attacking Israel. Major media ran headlines such as “Report says Israel has not provided evidence of widespread militancy among UNRWA staff” (Washington Post) and “Israel has yet to provide evidence of Unrwa [sic] staff terrorist links, Colonna report says,” (The Guardian).

In truth, UNRWA and Hamas are virtually indistinguishable. No wonder Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Oren Marmorstein said that “Hamas has infiltrated UNRWA so deeply that it is no longer possible to determine where UNRWA ends and where Hamas begins.”

Guterres’s “probe” hides the complicity of UNRWA with Hamas.

According to UN spokesperson Chris Gunness, the investigation’s real purpose was to “provide the donors with further cover if that’s what they need within their own internal constituencies to resume funding for UNRWA.”

Indeed, Colonna, who headed the OIOS panel, said the purpose of the review was to “enable donors” to “regain confidence . . . in the way UNRWA operates.” In other words, the panel’s goal was to prove UNRWA’s innocence. So much for revealing the truth about terrorist infiltration.

Israel presented overwhelming evidence of UNRWA’s corruption and integration with Hamas.

This evidence included a list of 100 terror operatives employed by the agency, as well as intelligence indicating that over 10% of senior UNRWA educators in Gaza were members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

Israel also revealed proof that over 30 UNRWA facilities contained terrorist infrastructure, such as tunnel shafts powered by UNRWA electricity. Hamas even operated a high-end server farm directly under—and connected to—UNRWA’s Gaza headquarters. Lazzarini—and the media and the panel and donor countries—had this information, but all chose to suppress it.

The OIOS probe was fundamentally flawed from the outset.

It was designed to avoid exposing UNRWA’s corruption and staffed by those likely to support the collaboration of UNRWA and Hamas. For starters, the investigation was led by Colonna, who herself helped establish France as UNRWA’s fourth largest donor, also a founding board member of the UN agency.

The review also included organizations whose executives expressed extreme anti-Israel bias: the Michelsen Institute, whose senior staff and board members have accused Israel of “genocide” and “apartheid;” the Raoul Wallenberg Institute, whose executive director also accused Israel of apartheid; and the Danish Institute for Human Rights, whose communications director accused Israel of “illegally occupying” Palestine for 70 years.

The media lied and covered up the Hamas-UNRWA marriage.

The Washington Post, Reuters, The Guardian, NPR and The New York Times all joined the effort to hide UNRWA corruption. Their headlines claimed Israel provided no evidence of UNRWA’s ties to Hamas, when in fact the Israeli government provided massive evidence—and reporters were able to see much of it on the ground. In parroting the OIOS report’s false claims, these media again demonstrated despicable journalistic practices and outright bias against Israel.

The Washington Post said UNRWA “has mechanisms in place to prevent its facilities from being misused for political or military purposes.” Really? Then why are UNRWA facilities being used as terrorist bases?

The Associated Press even asserted that “Israel did not express concern about [UNRWA] staff.” Seriously? In fact, for years Israel has expressed outrage about Hamas’s infiltration of UNRWA’s ranks, but the media have refused to cover it.

Indeed, the media have every interest in hiding the reality that Hamas and UNRWA are virtually inseparable. This truth would destroy their newsrooms’ false narrative that the agency is a benevolent humanitarian organization, doing its best to serve desperate, needy Palestinian victims of Israel’s aggression.

Both the U.N. and the media are disguising the truth that Hamas and UNRWA are inextricably intertwined. They simply don’t want donor nations—and the public—to know the shameful truth. If citizens of donor countries, like the U.S., were to see proof that their tax dollars are funding barbaric terrorism, they would surely insist on slashing UNRWA’s funding.

The post Media Promote Bogus UN Report Claiming Hamas Has No Ties to UNRWA first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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The Gaza War and Europe

An Israeli tank maneuvers, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, near the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, July 9, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen

JNS.orgEurope borders the Middle East, and the continent cannot insulate itself from events in this region. Its options, however, are limited: Europe is hardly a strategic actor with the political will and requisite capabilities to intervene. Moreover, the Middle East is not easily amenable to foreign intervention. Nevertheless, Europe cannot ignore developments that impact its national security, and if it concentrates its efforts it may have a modest input in ensuring that pro-stability forces gain the upper hand.

The Gaza war reflects two important features of Middle Eastern politics, as well as the ongoing competition in the global system. In large parts of the Middle East, we see failures in grappling with the challenge of state building. The Hamas Islamist militia took over Gaza in a bloody coup in 2007, as the Palestinian Authority failed to maintain a monopoly over the use of force in the territory under its control. Palestinian Islamic Jihad operated alongside Hamas in Gaza, and several clans had armed militias. Similarly, militias are vying for control in Iraq (in the wake of the American departure), in Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Libya. Hezbollah, a Shi’ite militia, has taken over Lebanon, despite the parallel existence of a national government and army. Hezbollah started a war of attrition with Israel in October 2023 without consulting the Lebanese government.

The Gaza war is also a manifestation of Iranian ambitions for hegemony in a region once part of the Persian empire. Iran’s Islamic Revolution has sought to wage perpetual and unbridled holy war against Western civilization and to take over Sunni Arab lands—it also targets Israel in this jihad. Many of the region’s militias have been trained, equipped and supported by a religiously motivated Iran. While not all are fully subservient to Tehran, they act in unison against Israel and Western interests. Iran and its proxies are the main challengers to the status quo and are actively threatening the national security of Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Sudan and Israel. Recently, Cyprus, a member state of the European Union, was added to the list of threatened states.

The Gaza war also mirrors the main struggle in the international system against American predominance, that is being conducted primarily by the quartet of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. The war in Ukraine has strengthened this alliance. For years, Iran has conducted a multi-front war against Israel, an American ally, and the only state that has the power to oppose its aspirations in its campaign to drive the United States out of the region. The quartet shares this aim.

In the absence of the capability to defeat Israel on the battlefield, Hamas implements the Iranian-inspired strategy that targets its civilian population, hoping this will leave it under duress. The premeditated atrocities perpetrated and filmed on Oct. 7, 2023, were intended to terrorize Israeli citizens, in the same way as the missile attacks that rained down on Israeli civilians. Israel had no choice but to counterattack and to its dismay discovered global sympathy for Gazans (an overwhelming majority of whom have shown support for Hamas and the evil it committed on Oct. 7), accompanied by a huge wave of antisemitic acts and statements.

Europeans initially expressed support for Israel’s right to defend itself, but much of their behavior (including their voting record at the United Nations) undermined Israel’s quest to destroy completely the military capability of Hamas and the efforts to increase pressure on the organization to secure the release of the Israeli hostages. Moreover, several European states recognized the non-existent state of Palestine, thus rewarding the dysfunctional Palestinian national movement and Hamas’s terrorist activities.

How can Europe play a more positive role in making the Middle East more peaceful? What can the Europeans do to curb the current inclinations in the region toward despotic regimes, terrorism, religious fanaticism and nuclear proliferation?

The developments in the Middle East have underscored an old truism. Outsiders have very little influence over Middle East outcomes; these are determined primarily by domestic forces and ingrained local political culture. Despite heroic efforts and vast financial investment, the United States has failed to create an Iraq in its image. Afghanistan was even more resistant to Western reform efforts. This should not be a surprise, as British and French colonial rule over several decades also did not change the way the “natives” conducted business.

Western attempts to intervene during the “Arab Spring” in Libya and Egypt ended in a similar failure. The ambitious project conducted by the European Union to create a “civil society” in the Palestinian territories has only enriched academics and cunning civilian entrepreneurs with little influence over Palestinian political culture. Political engineering by outsiders is doomed to fail in the Middle East. Therefore, an active interventionist European foreign policy to move societies into a democratic track is unlikely to produce positive results. Europeans tend to forget that it took European states centuries to adopt a democratic system.

Nevertheless, Europe or the European Union can do more to support pro-stability forces in the Middle East and weaken sources of instability. First, it should adopt a realpolitik lens and throw away its rose-tinted view of human nature. This is how Middle Easterners view the world. They often muse over European naiveté, which is occasionally despised. Similarly, the discourse about creating trust is simply nonsense in the region’s political parlance. Trust is not a currency used in Middle East politics. The employment of force and fear are more useful.

Some of the actors in the Middle East are evil, and engaging them diplomatically is rarely productive in limiting their mischief. Similarly, applying economic sanctions often has only meager results. Iran has been subject to such sanctions for over two decades without any change in its behavior. Europeans must overcome their reluctance to see military force as a useful tool in punishing and deterring destabilizing actors. Calling for restraint and fearing escalation when a bad guy is being beaten is counterproductive.

This means accepting Israel’s objective of destroying Hamas military capabilities in order to give its citizens a respite from missile attacks. Moreover, trying to save an Islamist mini-state that serves Iranian interests on the shores of the East Mediterranean is strategic folly; over-sensitivity to the human cost in eliminating it makes little strategic sense. Its location near the Suez Canal, an important choke point and sea route, as well as to offshore gas deposits, lends importance to who rules this area. The Europeans should appreciate efforts to minimize the presence on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean of Islamic radicals whose influence has already spread to Turkey, Syria, Lebanon Libya and the Sinai Peninsula.

A new European attitude toward the use of force also means an understanding of Israel’s need to launch a war against Hezbollah to allow its displaced citizens to return home to a normal life. A military blow to Hezbollah may also provide an opportunity for Lebanon to free itself of Islamist influence and become the tolerant and prosperous state it once was. Moreover, it signals to Iran and its proxies that their actions carry costly consequences. Exacting pain for misbehavior is the ABC of international relations.

The timidity of the United States and its European allies in dealing with the Houthis, an Iranian proxy blocking the Bab el Mandeb Strait, an international waterway, is intriguing. Forcing naval traffic to go to Europe around Africa, instead of the Suez Canal, carries financial costs and inflicts significant damage to the economy of Egypt, a pivotal pro-Western state in the Middle East. Tolerating this situation only encourages Iran to become more aggressive in its actions in the region and less fearful of Western retaliation.

Indeed, nowadays Iran is the main source of trouble in the Middle East. If Europe is serious about minimizing the dangers emanating from the Middle East, it must adopt a more confrontational posture toward the mullahs in Tehran. This has become more urgent as Iran progresses quickly toward the bomb. Europe must support all actions, including the military option, to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power whose missiles can reach the old continent as well. Everything should be done to halt a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. A nuclear multipolar Middle East would become a strategic nightmare for everybody in the region and its vicinity. An Iranian nuclear umbrella for Tehran’s proxies would further embolden them. The United States, which is geographically remote from Iran and thus has a lower threat perception, needs a more energetic Europe particularly on this matter.

Europe must realize that constraining the activities of radical Islamists does not amount to Islamophobia. For example, the absurd distinction between the political and the military arms of Hamas is still accepted by some European governments. The radical anti-Western ideology of Hamas is inextricably intertwined with its violent modus operandi. Europe should outlaw Hamas in all its forms, forbid its fundraising activities and pursue all its supporters on the continent. This of course also holds true for Hezbollah.

This should not be construed as a pro-Israeli policy, but as a policy that strengthens moderate Arab states, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan. They all abhor the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and its offshoots such as Hamas in Palestine, as well as Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a large part of his Justice and Development (AK) Party. They are all concerned about the freedom enjoyed by the followers of this movement in Europe. The MB is a larger danger for the Arab states than for Israel. Europe should be critical of Qatar, which plays a unique role in destabilizing the Middle East by funding the MB, while its Al Jazeera media network is the MB’s mouthpiece in instigating against Arab regimes. Turkey, which hosts Hamas on its soil and spreads the MB message in Europe and elsewhere deserves similar critical treatment.

Europe should announce its full support for Israel with all its means if the Jewish state is attacked by a terrorist organization. Such a statement amounts to strategic and moral clarity. Europe’s human rights nitpicking for violations during warfare in Gaza are a result of ignorance regarding what a modern battlefield looks like and the unprecedented efforts by the Israel Defense Forces to limit the loss of civilian lives.

Europe should also overcome its obsession with the two-state solution. As noted, the Palestinians have failed miserably to meet the Weberian test of statehood—monopoly over the use of force. They established weak, corrupt and fragmented polities. The Palestinian political trajectory leads toward a civil war waged by a variety of militias, similar to other Arab states, or to a Hamas-dominated entity. Moreover, all polls show that the Palestinians are still far from relinquishing their revisionist dreams and becoming peaceful neighbors of the Jewish state.

The Palestinians’ real problem is not where the border between the Palestinian state and the State of Israel lies, but the very fact that there is such a border, because so many believe that there is no legitimacy for a Jewish nation-state in the Middle East. Pushing for Palestinian statehood at this stage will only increase the chances of a deadly Israeli-Palestinian war in which both sides will suffer, but in which the Palestinian pain will certainly be greater. The status quo—not ideal—is probably the less destructive alternative.

A peaceful Middle East is not on the cards anytime soon. Limiting the power of the bad guys is a realistic objective, however. In addition to a more astute American foreign policy, a coherent and realistic E.U. strategy toward the Middle East could contribute toward attaining such a goal.

Originally published by The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

The post The Gaza War and Europe first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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