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Attacks from Gaza Were Common From 1948 to 1956; Here’s How They Were Stopped
Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip on Nov. 3, 2023, in an area from which many attempts to attack the Israeli forces through tunnel shafts and military compounds were detected. Photo: EYEPRESS via Reuters Connect
In 1949, following Israel’s War of Independence and the establishment of the borders in the armistice agreement signed between Israel and its neighbors, infiltrations from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into the State of Israel began to occur on a significant scale.
These infiltrations were not necessarily organized by terrorist groups, and in many cases, they were initiated by individuals or local groups. Nonetheless, there were instances of infiltration carried out by remnants of the Arab Liberation Army, supported by the Nazi-sympathizing, eliminationist Palestinian Mufti, Haj Muhammad Amin AL-Husseini, or by Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers.
Between 1949 and 1956, there were approximately 70,000 cases of infiltration. During the peak years of border conflict, from 1950 to 1953, there were around 16,000 infiltration incidents reported each year. Due to improved Israeli security measures, the number of infiltrations decreased to about 5,000 per year.
Dealing with this constant security challenge, known as “Bitash” (routine security measures), was one of the most difficult problems Israel had to contend with during this period. In response, the IDF established the Hagmar (territorial defense organization), created the role of the Rabash (Regional Officer for Civilian Defense), and set up the Border Guard as a law enforcement arm responsible for safeguarding the state’s borders.
Despite Israel’s extensive development of settlement defenses, infiltrators continued to penetrate settlements, either for theft or for the purposes of vengeance and harm. In his research on Israel’s border wars during these years, Benny Morris extensively describes in detail the infiltration activities that led to the loss of 317 Jewish lives due to the actions of these infiltrators, with the majority of them coming from the Gaza Strip (22 killed in 1949, 19 in 1950, 48 in 1951, 42 in 1952, 44 in 1953, 33 in 1954, and 54 in 1956).
At that time, as is the case today, the victims of infiltrations by Palestinian militants from the Gaza Strip lived in settlements near the border, such as Nahal Oz, Be’eri, Nirim, and Netiv HaAsara.
At times, the infiltrators even penetrated deeper into Israel, reaching places like Yehud, Rishon LeZion, Ashkelon, and Ashdod.
At this time, the defensive measures taken were not sufficient, and Israel turned to offensive initiatives. Unit 101 was established and operated briefly before merging into the Paratroopers Brigade, but it had a significant impact on shaping military doctrine. During this period, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip and was responsible for maintaining the border. Infiltration was considered a violation of the armistice agreement signed between Israel and Egypt. Both Jordan and Egypt struggled to adhere to the agreements requiring them to maintain the armistice lines.
On February 28, 1955, Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip in what became known as “Operation Black Arrow.” From a military perspective, this operation was a success. The IDF entered the heart of Gaza, destroyed Egyptian military headquarters, and killed 37 Egyptian soldiers and one civilian. The Israeli force lost eight soldiers, and 13 were wounded.
The operation sparked outrage in Egypt and other Arab countries. In the Gaza Strip, large-scale protests were held by local residents who called for an intifada and requested weapons to defend themselves. Palestinian historian Hussein Abu Naml describes the Palestinian demands of the Egyptian leadership, including the establishment of a Palestinian national guard in the Gaza Strip that would be authorized and trained by the army to carry out military operations inside the State of Israel.
Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, considered the Israeli action an affront to his honor and that of the Egyptian military, which had failed to protect the residents of the Gaza Strip. He believed it allowed Israel to target its bases from deep within the Gaza Strip. From Egypt’s perspective, this was one provocation too many, leading Egypt to adopt a tactic similar to what Hamas employs today: conducting large-scale incursions by militants who would infiltrate settlements in the Gaza envelope and target the civilian population.
In response to the demands of the local population, as reflected in the massive protests following the Gaza operation, the Egyptians established a defense system in the form of a Palestinian National Guard (al-Haras al-Watani). It had 500 fighters at its peak, and they were trained and equipped by the Egyptian military. Its primary purpose was to defend the Gaza Strip. Later, the organization was redefined as a Palestinian battalion within the Egyptian army.
From among those recruited for the National Guard, a unique commando unit of select soldiers was formed, similar to Hamas’s Nakhba, led by Lt. Col. Mustafa Hafez. At its largest, the unit contained about 400 fedayeen (self-sacrificers). The soldiers of this commando unit received training in sabotage, infiltration, and intelligence.
Egypt’s military intelligence directed two waves of infiltration into Israel, the first in August 1955 and the second in April-May 1956. Each wave consisted of approximately 200 infiltrators who entered Israel in small groups to carry out acts of terror. Their mission was to assassinate Jews and gather intelligence. The age range of these commandos was typically between 20 and 32, with most of them having families. They came from all segments of the population, including refugees and residents. Support for the Egyptian commando operations, as they were called in the Egyptian media at the time, came from all ends of the population.
The commandos sometimes operated independently without central communication or the ability of central command to bring them back. They often chose to hide with their relatives in the West Bank and didn’t return to Gaza. The fedayeen relied on operatives and former prisoners who were familiar with the area and gathered intelligence before launching attacks on kibbutzim and moshavim, especially in southern Israel.
In a speech on Eid al-Fitr in May 1956, Nasser praised their actions and said, “You have proven that your homeland can rely on you. The spirit you have brought into the enemy must hold. The world has recognized your actions, and, more importantly, the enemy has felt the strength of your intentions against him. He has learned the extent to which you can show courage and strength.”
Egyptian media celebrated the fedayeen and exaggerated their numbers significantly, even reaching tens of thousands. They were defined in Arabic media reports as Egyptian commando forces, but it’s worth recalling that these were Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip who were directed by Egypt and primarily targeted civilians. This was not reflected in Arab media coverage of their actions.
The proliferation of infiltrations and Israeli retaliatory actions escalated, leading Israel to occupy the Gaza Strip on October 29, 1956 as part of Operation Kadesh (also known as the Sinai Campaign), which involved the participation of Britain and France. A significant conflict in Gaza had become inevitable due to the escalation of border tensions, Israeli retaliatory operations in the heart of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and widespread infiltration waves by infiltrators, many of whom were directed by and inspired by Egyptian intelligence. From the Israeli perspective, the goal of Operation Kadesh was to bring peace and security to the residents of the State of Israel, particularly those in the southern settlements.
Moshe Dayan, who played a role in shaping Israeli policy during those years, understood that there was no alternative to war to put an end to the fedayeen’s activities.
The Israeli National Guard, which was organized before the war, fought fiercely against the fedayeen to defend the Gaza Strip. The fedayeen were either captured or forced to flee and go into hiding. According to Arab sources, around a thousand Palestinians were killed during the Gaza Strip’s occupation over a period of about three months. IDF reports provide lower numbers of around two hundred Palestinian causalities, while UN estimates suggest that the number of fatalities on the Palestinian side ranged from 440 to 550. At that time, there were allegations that IDF forces committed massacres during the Gaza Strip’s occupation, particularly in Khan Yunis, where there was strong resistance from Palestinian National Guard forces.
In a report to the IDF Chief of Staff’s office describing the Gaza Strip’s occupation, Lt. Col. Matti Peled, who later became a Member of Knesset and a left-wing activist, said that Israel’s policy led to the disbandment of the fedayeen unit. Some of its members were killed while others were arrested. After Israel’s withdrawal in March 1957 under strong pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, Egypt refrained from reestablishing the fedayeen unit and adhered to the terms of the ceasefire agreements to prevent violent infiltrations into Israel.
Gaza enjoyed relative peace for 11 years. While there were occasional small incidents, they did not reach the same scale as in the 1950s. The Egyptian authorities demonstrated that when there is an assertive and decisive authority effectively governing the Gaza Strip, it is possible to provide security for the residents of Israel.
In June 1967, the Gaza Strip was once again occupied by Israel, which maintained full control over it until the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s. A portion of control was transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, initially signed on May 4, 1994. Israel continued to retain control over parts of the Gaza Strip, according to interim agreements, until its disengagement in August 2005.
It’s worth noting that before the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority within the framework of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Israel did not suffer from rocket fire into its territory from the Gaza Strip. In the period leading up to the 2005 Israeli disengagement, there were sporadic rocket attacks, primarily towards the communities of Gush Katif and nearby settlements, originating from areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority and mostly carried out by Hamas.
As of 2005, the Gaza Strip was ostensibly under the control of the Palestinian Authority, which saw itself as a quasi-independent Palestinian entity.
On January 25, 2006, Hamas was elected by a significant majority to the Palestinian Legislative Council, leading to the formation of the first Hamas government led by Ismail Haniyeh. This transformed Hamas, an organization with an Islamist extremist and antisemitic ideology, into a governing authority within the Palestinian territories. In June 2007, Hamas violently evicted Fatah and took full control of the Gaza Strip, effectively turning it into an independent entity. It became a local Islamic emirate ruling over a population of around two million people, many of whom support the struggle against Israel, according to Palestinian surveys.
Ever since 2006, when Hamas assumed power, the Gaza Strip has not experienced peace. Numerous rounds of conflict erupted between Israel and Gaza, resulting in many casualties and significant economic losses. The most notable conflicts include Operations Cast Lead (2009), Pillar of Defense (2012), Protective Edge (2014), and Guardian of the Walls (2021), as well as smaller clashes involving Islamic Jihad.
The Gaza Strip has become a battleground between Israel and Iran’s proxy groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as other Palestinian organizations, many of which hold anti-Western, jihadist, and Islamist ideologies derived from the Muslim Brotherhood’s fundamentalist beliefs.
The Swords of Iron War imposed on Israel on October 7, 2023, could be an opportunity to bring security and calm to the western Negev communities and allow for their growth. The central conclusion that can be drawn from the historical account presented above is that in order to achieve security and tranquility for the residents of Israel, there is a need for a governing authority capable of enforcing its control. This can be inferred from the relative quiet that prevailed between 1956 and 1967 under Egyptian rule and the Israeli military rule that was in place from 1967 until the Oslo Accords.
Therefore, it is not enough to simply occupy the territory or weaken Hamas’ authority. One must consider the day after the end of the war. The alternatives proposed for governance in Gaza, including the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, international forces taking control, a UN police force, and more, all carry significant risks. However, the years of Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip, at least until the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987, appear to have been a historically peaceful and prosperous period in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to consider the establishment of a temporary Israeli military government in Gaza until a regional solution to the Gaza issue is implemented.
The first step, therefore, is the establishment of a full Israeli military government over the entire Gaza Strip, despite its economic drawbacks and high cost. This Israeli military government would work to maintain order and security and would enable international support for Gaza’s rehabilitation after its occupation. The establishment of this military government, initiated by Israel, should clarify from the outset that it is a temporary government aimed at ensuring peace and security until a regional solution receives international support.
The second stage, following the establishment of the military government, is for Israel to seek the integration of local and regional forces, including military forces, into the newly formed government. This would mainly include local Palestinian elements, Egyptians, and additional regional countries with an interest in maintaining security stability in the region.
Israel has a history with multinational forces in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and it is not necessarily a positive one. Therefore, in the case of Gaza, the regional force established to ensure peace and stability may also include the IDF. Israel would play a dominant role in this multinational force and would operate in collaboration with other contributing parties.
The Swords of Iron War is demonstrating that the Gaza issue is not just a localized conflict between Israel and Hamas or between Israel and the Palestinians, but rather a regional problem. Hence, the future of Gaza is embedded in a regional solution in which Israel plays an integral part and is a full participant. A regional solution for Gaza is a political and diplomatic interest for other countries in the region and the international community, particularly the United States. Israeli success at shaping a regional solution that guarantees its security would be a strategic change and a significant achievement.
Dr. (Lt. Col.) Shaul Bartal is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and a research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Lisbon. During his military service, he served in various roles in the West Bank. He has also taught in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and the Department of Political Science. A version of this article was originally published by the BESA Center.
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New Poll: Majority of NYC Voters ‘Less Likely’ to Support Mamdani Over His Refusal to Condemn ‘Globalize the Intifada’
Zohran Mamdani. Photo: Ron Adar / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect
In a warning sign for the campaign of Democratic nominee for mayor of New York Zohran Mamdani, a majority of city voters in a new poll say the candidate’s hardline anti-Israel stance makes them less likely to vote for him.
In the survey of likely city voters conducted by American Pulse, 52.5 percent said Mamdani’s refusal to condemn the slogan “globalize the intifada” coupled with his backing of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement made them less likely to vote for him in November. Just 31% of city voters polled were more likely to support him because of these positions.
At the same time, a significant share of young New York City voters support Mamdani’s anti-Israel positioning, a striking sign of shifting generational views on Israel and the Palestinian cause.
Nearly half of voters aged 18 to 44 (46 percent) said the State Assembly member’s backing for BDS and “refusal to condemn the phrase ‘globalize the intifada’” made them more likely to support him.
Mamdani, a democratic socialist from Queens, has been under fire for defending “globalize the intifada,” a slogan many Jewish groups associate with incitement to violence against Israel and Jews. While critics argue it glorifies terrorism, supporters claim it’s a call for international solidarity with oppressed peoples, especially Palestinians. Mamdani has also voiced support for BDS, a movement widely condemned by mainstream Jewish organizations as antisemitic for singling out Israel.
The generational divide exposed by the poll comes amid a broader political realignment. Younger progressives across the country are increasingly critical of Israeli policies, especially in the wake of the Gaza war, and more receptive to Palestinian activism. But to many Jewish leaders, Mamdani’s rising support is alarming.
Rabbi David Wolpe, visiting scholar at Harvard University, condemned the phrase with a sarcastic analogy.
“‘Globalize the intifada’ is just a political slogan,” he said. “Like ‘The cockroaches must be exterminated’ was just a housing authority slogan in Rwanda.”
Jewish organizations have reported a surge in antisemitic incidents in New York and across the U.S. since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war last fall. The blending of anti-Zionist slogans with calls for “intifada,” historically linked to violent uprisings, has deepened fears among Jewish communities that traditional red lines are being crossed.
Whether this emerging coalition reshapes New York politics remains to be seen. However, the poll indicates that among younger voters, views that were once considered fringe are quickly moving into the mainstream.
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Report: Jews Targeted at June’s Pride Month Events
A Jewish gay pride flag. Photo: Twitter.
The research division of the Combat Antisemitism Movement (CAM) released a report on Wednesday detailing incidents of hate against Jews which took place last month during demonstrations in celebration of LGBTQ rights and identity.
Incidents reported by the group include:
- At a Pride march in Wales, the activists Cymru Queers for Palestine chose to block the path and show a sign that said “Profiting from genocide,” an attempt to link the event’s sponsors — such as Amazon — to the war in Gaza.
- A Dublin Pride march saw the participation of the Ireland-Palestine Solidarity Campaign, which labeled Israel a “genocidal entity.”
- In Toronto at a late June Pride march, demonstrators again attacked organizers with a sign declaring, “Pride partners with genocide.”
CAM also identified a recurring narrative deployed against Israel by some far-left activists: so-called “pinkwashing,” a term which the Boycott, Divest, Sanctions (BDS) movement calls “an Israeli government propaganda strategy that cynically exploits LGBTQIA+ rights to project a progressive image while concealing Israel’s occupation and apartheid policies oppressing Palestinians.”
The report notes that at a Washington DC Pride event in early June Medea Benjamin, cofounder of activist group Code Pink and a regular of anti-war protests, wore a pair of goofy, oversized sunglasses and a shirt in her signature pink with the phrase “you can’t pinkwash genocide.”
Other incidents CAM recorded showed the injection of anti-Israel sentiment into Pride events.
A musical group canceled a performance at an interfaith service in Brooklyn, claiming the hosting synagogue had a “public alignment with pro-Israel political positions.” In San Francisco before the yearly Trans March, a Palestine group said in its announcement of its participation, “Stop the war on Iran and the genocide of Palestine, stop the war on immigrants and attacks on trans people.”
CAM notes that this “queers for Palestine” sentiment is not new, pointing to a 2017 event wherein “organizers of the Chicago Dyke March infamously removed participants who were waving a Pride flag adorned with a Star of David on the grounds that the symbol ‘made people feel unsafe.’”
In February, the Israel Defense Forces shared with the New York Post documents it had recovered demonstrating that Hamas had tortured and executed members it suspected of homosexuality and other moral offenses in conflict with Islamist ideology.
Amit Benjamin, who is gay and a first sergeant major in the IDF, said during a visit to New York City for Pride month that “All the ‘queers for Gaza’ need to open their eyes. Hamas kills gays … kills lesbians … queers cannot exist in Gaza.”
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IAEA pulls inspectors from Iran as standoff over access drags on
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi at the agency’s headquarters in Vienna, Austria, June 23, 2025. REUTERS/Elisabeth Mandl/File Photo
The UN nuclear watchdog said on Friday it had pulled its last remaining inspectors from Iran as a standoff over their return to the country’s nuclear facilities bombed by the United States and Israel deepens.
Israel launched its first military strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites in a 12-day war with the Islamic Republic three weeks ago. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors have not been able to inspect Iran’s facilities since then, even though IAEA chief Rafael Grossi has said that is his top priority.
Iran’s parliament has now passed a law to suspend cooperation with the IAEA until the safety of its nuclear facilities can be guaranteed. While the IAEA says Iran has not yet formally informed it of any suspension, it is unclear when the agency’s inspectors will be able to return to Iran.
“An IAEA team of inspectors today safely departed from Iran to return to the Agency headquarters in Vienna, after staying in Tehran throughout the recent military conflict,” the IAEA said on X.
Diplomats said the number of IAEA inspectors in Iran was reduced to a handful after the June 13 start of the war. Some have also expressed concern about the inspectors’ safety since the end of the conflict, given fierce criticism of the agency by Iranian officials and Iranian media.
Iran has accused the agency of effectively paving the way for the bombings by issuing a damning report on May 31 that led to a resolution by the IAEA’s 35-nation Board of Governors declaring Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations.
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi has said he stands by the report. He has denied it provided diplomatic cover for military action.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said on Thursday Iran remained committed to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
“[Grossi] reiterated the crucial importance of the IAEA discussing with Iran modalities for resuming its indispensable monitoring and verification activities in Iran as soon as possible,” the IAEA said.
The US and Israeli military strikes either destroyed or badly damaged Iran’s three uranium enrichment sites. But it was less clear what has happened to much of Iran’s nine tonnes of enriched uranium, especially the more than 400 kg enriched to up to 60% purity, a short step from weapons grade.
That is enough, if enriched further, for nine nuclear weapons, according to an IAEA yardstick. Iran says its aims are entirely peaceful, but Western powers say there is no civil justification for enriching to such a high level, and the IAEA says no country has done so without developing the atom bomb.
As a party to the NPT, Iran must account for its enriched uranium, which normally is closely monitored by the IAEA, the body that enforces the NPT and verifies countries’ declarations. But the bombing of Iran’s facilities has now muddied the waters.
“We cannot afford that … the inspection regime is interrupted,” Grossi told a press conference in Vienna last week.
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