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Attacks from Gaza Were Common From 1948 to 1956; Here’s How They Were Stopped
Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip on Nov. 3, 2023, in an area from which many attempts to attack the Israeli forces through tunnel shafts and military compounds were detected. Photo: EYEPRESS via Reuters Connect
In 1949, following Israel’s War of Independence and the establishment of the borders in the armistice agreement signed between Israel and its neighbors, infiltrations from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into the State of Israel began to occur on a significant scale.
These infiltrations were not necessarily organized by terrorist groups, and in many cases, they were initiated by individuals or local groups. Nonetheless, there were instances of infiltration carried out by remnants of the Arab Liberation Army, supported by the Nazi-sympathizing, eliminationist Palestinian Mufti, Haj Muhammad Amin AL-Husseini, or by Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers.
Between 1949 and 1956, there were approximately 70,000 cases of infiltration. During the peak years of border conflict, from 1950 to 1953, there were around 16,000 infiltration incidents reported each year. Due to improved Israeli security measures, the number of infiltrations decreased to about 5,000 per year.
Dealing with this constant security challenge, known as “Bitash” (routine security measures), was one of the most difficult problems Israel had to contend with during this period. In response, the IDF established the Hagmar (territorial defense organization), created the role of the Rabash (Regional Officer for Civilian Defense), and set up the Border Guard as a law enforcement arm responsible for safeguarding the state’s borders.
Despite Israel’s extensive development of settlement defenses, infiltrators continued to penetrate settlements, either for theft or for the purposes of vengeance and harm. In his research on Israel’s border wars during these years, Benny Morris extensively describes in detail the infiltration activities that led to the loss of 317 Jewish lives due to the actions of these infiltrators, with the majority of them coming from the Gaza Strip (22 killed in 1949, 19 in 1950, 48 in 1951, 42 in 1952, 44 in 1953, 33 in 1954, and 54 in 1956).
At that time, as is the case today, the victims of infiltrations by Palestinian militants from the Gaza Strip lived in settlements near the border, such as Nahal Oz, Be’eri, Nirim, and Netiv HaAsara.
At times, the infiltrators even penetrated deeper into Israel, reaching places like Yehud, Rishon LeZion, Ashkelon, and Ashdod.
At this time, the defensive measures taken were not sufficient, and Israel turned to offensive initiatives. Unit 101 was established and operated briefly before merging into the Paratroopers Brigade, but it had a significant impact on shaping military doctrine. During this period, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip and was responsible for maintaining the border. Infiltration was considered a violation of the armistice agreement signed between Israel and Egypt. Both Jordan and Egypt struggled to adhere to the agreements requiring them to maintain the armistice lines.
On February 28, 1955, Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip in what became known as “Operation Black Arrow.” From a military perspective, this operation was a success. The IDF entered the heart of Gaza, destroyed Egyptian military headquarters, and killed 37 Egyptian soldiers and one civilian. The Israeli force lost eight soldiers, and 13 were wounded.
The operation sparked outrage in Egypt and other Arab countries. In the Gaza Strip, large-scale protests were held by local residents who called for an intifada and requested weapons to defend themselves. Palestinian historian Hussein Abu Naml describes the Palestinian demands of the Egyptian leadership, including the establishment of a Palestinian national guard in the Gaza Strip that would be authorized and trained by the army to carry out military operations inside the State of Israel.
Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, considered the Israeli action an affront to his honor and that of the Egyptian military, which had failed to protect the residents of the Gaza Strip. He believed it allowed Israel to target its bases from deep within the Gaza Strip. From Egypt’s perspective, this was one provocation too many, leading Egypt to adopt a tactic similar to what Hamas employs today: conducting large-scale incursions by militants who would infiltrate settlements in the Gaza envelope and target the civilian population.
In response to the demands of the local population, as reflected in the massive protests following the Gaza operation, the Egyptians established a defense system in the form of a Palestinian National Guard (al-Haras al-Watani). It had 500 fighters at its peak, and they were trained and equipped by the Egyptian military. Its primary purpose was to defend the Gaza Strip. Later, the organization was redefined as a Palestinian battalion within the Egyptian army.
From among those recruited for the National Guard, a unique commando unit of select soldiers was formed, similar to Hamas’s Nakhba, led by Lt. Col. Mustafa Hafez. At its largest, the unit contained about 400 fedayeen (self-sacrificers). The soldiers of this commando unit received training in sabotage, infiltration, and intelligence.
Egypt’s military intelligence directed two waves of infiltration into Israel, the first in August 1955 and the second in April-May 1956. Each wave consisted of approximately 200 infiltrators who entered Israel in small groups to carry out acts of terror. Their mission was to assassinate Jews and gather intelligence. The age range of these commandos was typically between 20 and 32, with most of them having families. They came from all segments of the population, including refugees and residents. Support for the Egyptian commando operations, as they were called in the Egyptian media at the time, came from all ends of the population.
The commandos sometimes operated independently without central communication or the ability of central command to bring them back. They often chose to hide with their relatives in the West Bank and didn’t return to Gaza. The fedayeen relied on operatives and former prisoners who were familiar with the area and gathered intelligence before launching attacks on kibbutzim and moshavim, especially in southern Israel.
In a speech on Eid al-Fitr in May 1956, Nasser praised their actions and said, “You have proven that your homeland can rely on you. The spirit you have brought into the enemy must hold. The world has recognized your actions, and, more importantly, the enemy has felt the strength of your intentions against him. He has learned the extent to which you can show courage and strength.”
Egyptian media celebrated the fedayeen and exaggerated their numbers significantly, even reaching tens of thousands. They were defined in Arabic media reports as Egyptian commando forces, but it’s worth recalling that these were Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip who were directed by Egypt and primarily targeted civilians. This was not reflected in Arab media coverage of their actions.
The proliferation of infiltrations and Israeli retaliatory actions escalated, leading Israel to occupy the Gaza Strip on October 29, 1956 as part of Operation Kadesh (also known as the Sinai Campaign), which involved the participation of Britain and France. A significant conflict in Gaza had become inevitable due to the escalation of border tensions, Israeli retaliatory operations in the heart of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and widespread infiltration waves by infiltrators, many of whom were directed by and inspired by Egyptian intelligence. From the Israeli perspective, the goal of Operation Kadesh was to bring peace and security to the residents of the State of Israel, particularly those in the southern settlements.
Moshe Dayan, who played a role in shaping Israeli policy during those years, understood that there was no alternative to war to put an end to the fedayeen’s activities.
The Israeli National Guard, which was organized before the war, fought fiercely against the fedayeen to defend the Gaza Strip. The fedayeen were either captured or forced to flee and go into hiding. According to Arab sources, around a thousand Palestinians were killed during the Gaza Strip’s occupation over a period of about three months. IDF reports provide lower numbers of around two hundred Palestinian causalities, while UN estimates suggest that the number of fatalities on the Palestinian side ranged from 440 to 550. At that time, there were allegations that IDF forces committed massacres during the Gaza Strip’s occupation, particularly in Khan Yunis, where there was strong resistance from Palestinian National Guard forces.
In a report to the IDF Chief of Staff’s office describing the Gaza Strip’s occupation, Lt. Col. Matti Peled, who later became a Member of Knesset and a left-wing activist, said that Israel’s policy led to the disbandment of the fedayeen unit. Some of its members were killed while others were arrested. After Israel’s withdrawal in March 1957 under strong pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, Egypt refrained from reestablishing the fedayeen unit and adhered to the terms of the ceasefire agreements to prevent violent infiltrations into Israel.
Gaza enjoyed relative peace for 11 years. While there were occasional small incidents, they did not reach the same scale as in the 1950s. The Egyptian authorities demonstrated that when there is an assertive and decisive authority effectively governing the Gaza Strip, it is possible to provide security for the residents of Israel.
In June 1967, the Gaza Strip was once again occupied by Israel, which maintained full control over it until the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s. A portion of control was transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, initially signed on May 4, 1994. Israel continued to retain control over parts of the Gaza Strip, according to interim agreements, until its disengagement in August 2005.
It’s worth noting that before the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority within the framework of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Israel did not suffer from rocket fire into its territory from the Gaza Strip. In the period leading up to the 2005 Israeli disengagement, there were sporadic rocket attacks, primarily towards the communities of Gush Katif and nearby settlements, originating from areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority and mostly carried out by Hamas.
As of 2005, the Gaza Strip was ostensibly under the control of the Palestinian Authority, which saw itself as a quasi-independent Palestinian entity.
On January 25, 2006, Hamas was elected by a significant majority to the Palestinian Legislative Council, leading to the formation of the first Hamas government led by Ismail Haniyeh. This transformed Hamas, an organization with an Islamist extremist and antisemitic ideology, into a governing authority within the Palestinian territories. In June 2007, Hamas violently evicted Fatah and took full control of the Gaza Strip, effectively turning it into an independent entity. It became a local Islamic emirate ruling over a population of around two million people, many of whom support the struggle against Israel, according to Palestinian surveys.
Ever since 2006, when Hamas assumed power, the Gaza Strip has not experienced peace. Numerous rounds of conflict erupted between Israel and Gaza, resulting in many casualties and significant economic losses. The most notable conflicts include Operations Cast Lead (2009), Pillar of Defense (2012), Protective Edge (2014), and Guardian of the Walls (2021), as well as smaller clashes involving Islamic Jihad.
The Gaza Strip has become a battleground between Israel and Iran’s proxy groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as other Palestinian organizations, many of which hold anti-Western, jihadist, and Islamist ideologies derived from the Muslim Brotherhood’s fundamentalist beliefs.
The Swords of Iron War imposed on Israel on October 7, 2023, could be an opportunity to bring security and calm to the western Negev communities and allow for their growth. The central conclusion that can be drawn from the historical account presented above is that in order to achieve security and tranquility for the residents of Israel, there is a need for a governing authority capable of enforcing its control. This can be inferred from the relative quiet that prevailed between 1956 and 1967 under Egyptian rule and the Israeli military rule that was in place from 1967 until the Oslo Accords.
Therefore, it is not enough to simply occupy the territory or weaken Hamas’ authority. One must consider the day after the end of the war. The alternatives proposed for governance in Gaza, including the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, international forces taking control, a UN police force, and more, all carry significant risks. However, the years of Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip, at least until the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987, appear to have been a historically peaceful and prosperous period in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to consider the establishment of a temporary Israeli military government in Gaza until a regional solution to the Gaza issue is implemented.
The first step, therefore, is the establishment of a full Israeli military government over the entire Gaza Strip, despite its economic drawbacks and high cost. This Israeli military government would work to maintain order and security and would enable international support for Gaza’s rehabilitation after its occupation. The establishment of this military government, initiated by Israel, should clarify from the outset that it is a temporary government aimed at ensuring peace and security until a regional solution receives international support.
The second stage, following the establishment of the military government, is for Israel to seek the integration of local and regional forces, including military forces, into the newly formed government. This would mainly include local Palestinian elements, Egyptians, and additional regional countries with an interest in maintaining security stability in the region.
Israel has a history with multinational forces in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and it is not necessarily a positive one. Therefore, in the case of Gaza, the regional force established to ensure peace and stability may also include the IDF. Israel would play a dominant role in this multinational force and would operate in collaboration with other contributing parties.
The Swords of Iron War is demonstrating that the Gaza issue is not just a localized conflict between Israel and Hamas or between Israel and the Palestinians, but rather a regional problem. Hence, the future of Gaza is embedded in a regional solution in which Israel plays an integral part and is a full participant. A regional solution for Gaza is a political and diplomatic interest for other countries in the region and the international community, particularly the United States. Israeli success at shaping a regional solution that guarantees its security would be a strategic change and a significant achievement.
Dr. (Lt. Col.) Shaul Bartal is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and a research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Lisbon. During his military service, he served in various roles in the West Bank. He has also taught in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and the Department of Political Science. A version of this article was originally published by the BESA Center.
The post Attacks from Gaza Were Common From 1948 to 1956; Here’s How They Were Stopped first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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How One University Dealt with Pro-Hamas Protesters
Anti-Zionist protesters at Rutgers University, New Brunswick on December 23, 2023. Photo: Kyle Mazza via Reuters Connect
JNS.org – In the four academic semesters since Oct. 7, 2023, anti-Israel protests organized by Hamas sympathizers have overtaken some US colleges and tarnished the reputation of American academia. Ivy League schools have been particularly soiled by a combination of ignorant students, radical professors and weak administrations that coddle them.
On the contrary, the Rochester Institute of Technology in New York, where I teach, dealt with pro-Hamas, antisemitic protests differently. While many schools are destroying their brands, RIT fought back.
The RIT brand has always centered on innovative and creative uses of technology. The university prides itself on its career-driven, motivated students of engineering, imaging, and computer science, and more recently, game design, film and animation. It has US Army and Air Force ROTC programs, and various defense and military research, including funding from the Space Force.
Just as important as what RIT has is what it doesn’t; there is no Middle East Studies department and no Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapter. The absence of the former protects us from the most educated Israel haters, while the absence of the latter protects us from the least educated Israel haters.
However, nearby are the University of Rochester and Syracuse University, which have both, so we are not immune to Israel haters.
Anti-Israel, pro-Hamas demonstrations seemed ubiquitous on college campuses almost immediately after Oct. 7, though RIT was spared such ugliness for a month. On the lookout for demonstrations, I was proud of students for not aping the antics of those at other colleges in the state. Nor were there any fliers around campus commenting on the war in the Gaza Strip or announcing upcoming protests.
On Oct. 13, I saw about a dozen masked people—some sporting keffiyehs—loitering on one of the green spaces, but there were no chants or signs. If this was a protest, then these were amateurs.
A month later, on Nov. 13, the pro-Hamas infection came to RIT. The Muslim Students Association (MSA) held a demonstration during which protesters, many of them masked, openly cheered for the elimination of Israel, defended the Hamas murder-rape-decapitation massacre and called for an intifada “from New York to Palestine.” This was not the school I knew. The event was dominated by outsiders. Speakers were from the University of Rochester’s SJP chapter; the Party for Socialism and Liberation; and local, non-academic, anti-Israel organizations. The ringleader was Basem Ashkar, a local protester active in anti-Israel demonstrations since at least 2021.
Evidence of professional agit-prop organizations was visible in the protestors’ signs. Black lettering on a yellow background provided by the ANSWER Coalition proclaimed that “Resistance is justified when people are occupied.” Black lettering against a white background provided by the Party for Socialism and Liberation proclaimed that “Resistance against occupation is a human right!”
The crowd did not look like a typical gathering of the RIT students I have seen in the last 26 years. I wondered how many of those in attendance were paid professionals. One person who stood a head taller and looked decades older than most college students held a hand-written sign in Arabic that translated to “We will sacrifice ourselves for you, holy Aksa mosque. Freedom and independence for Jerusalem and Palestine.”
Shouts of Allahu Akbar (Arabic for “God is great”), the jihad battle cry, rang through the crisp November air, and sounds of ululating women reminded me of the infamous video of Palestinians in Jerusalem celebrating news of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in the United States as their loathsome leaders handed out candy to children.
At one point, protesters were led in an Arabic chant that former PLO leader Yasser Arafat used to promote suicide bombings during the Second Intifada in Israel. The translation? “With our souls and blood, we will sacrifice for Al-Aqsa. With our souls and blood, we will sacrifice for Palestine. With our souls and blood, we will sacrifice for Gaza.”
I wondered how many students, gleefully repeating what someone had instructed them to chant, knew what they were saying.
I believed that the hostile and antisemitic protest constituted a violation of RIT policy, so I initiated a complaint. I had meetings with the provost, and eventually, the president about the event.
RIT’s lawyers determined that the “river to the sea” chant was protected speech open to interpretation. And since the MSA had permission for its protest, it was determined that no policy had been violated.
What happened next was remarkable among most college campuses, as far as I can tell. Instead of inaugurating a new era of campus unrest, that November protest was the last one of the year. As the spring 2024 semester turned into the semester of tent encampments throughout North America, there were no more protests at RIT.
In January 2024, rumors spread that the administration had rejected all subsequent petitions for protests. I wasn’t able to confirm those rumors. RIT’s provost, Prabu David, told me that a single attempt to set up an “encampment” was quickly dismantled, and the people pitching tents were immediately removed from campus.
David Munson, the university’s president, is retiring this week. I met with him in November to discuss the RIT protest and how to prevent more in the future. He told me that he believes “RIT has done a good job of navigating the area between free speech and harassment. It has been easier because of the kindness of our student body and the availability of local law enforcement.”
He discussed policy changes, such as setting a limit of six hours for any approved protest, so that RIT would not become an encampment campus. We discussed the troubles that RIT’s previous provost, Ellen Granberg, now president of George Washington University, faced during the academic year when she called the Metropolitan Police in Washington, D.C., to clear an encampment on April 26, 2024, and they refused to come. Munson told me that he knew the sheriffs in Monroe County, N.Y., would respond if he called.
The fall 2024 semester was quiet, and so, too, was this current spring semester—or it was until we returned from spring break in late March.
It started with a single person on March 21, “protesting” in a central location with a Palestinian flag and signs decrying the “genocide in Gaza,” urging RIT to “divest from death” and calling to “Free Khalil.” I called campus security, and the responding officers stopped it quickly and professionally.
On March 26, the same student, along with several others, was in the same spot with the same flag and signs. Again, I called campus security, and, again, they shut it down quickly.
On April 4, there were more protesters. One addressed me by name. When I asked why he was dressed like a jihadi on Halloween, he responded that he was protecting himself from doxxing. I called security, and for a third time, they shut it down. I have seen no evidence of any protests on campus since then.
The university’s president and provost have won the battle, but the war continues. As RIT prepares for a new administration and new president, it will have to watch for the disruptive and potentially illegal SJP front.
To complicate matters, there is now an “unofficial” chapter of SJP at RIT, using the school’s name and violating its brand. The group’s website proclaims that its goal is to “agitate, demonstrate and otherwise make our voices heard on the RIT campus.”
RIT’s struggle with pro-Hamas demonstrations shows that even when a university does what is right and necessary, it must maintain vigilance against the Jew-hatred of today’s anti-Israel demonstrators.
Like preventing dandelions from taking over a pristine lawn, keeping such protests at bay requires continual deterrence. There is no one-time, magical panacea.
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The Iran Nuclear Deal Trump Wants
Atomic symbol and USA and Iranian flags are seen in this illustration taken, September 8, 2022. Photo: REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo
JNS.org – A fourth round of talks between Tehran’s envoys and Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump’s lead negotiator, did not take place in Rome over the weekend as had been expected.
Neither Tehran’s spokesmen nor the US State Department gave a clear explanation for why, but I’ll venture a guess: Iran’s rulers want concessions in exchange for continuing to talk.
They think Trump needs negotiations more than they do. Their assessment is based on years of palaver with presidents Obama and Biden.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei hopes that, concession by concession, he can convince Trump to embrace a warmed-over version of Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, the fatally flawed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump called “a horrible one-sided deal that should never, ever have been made.”
Sunday on “Meet the Press,” President Trump reiterated what he wants: “Total dismantlement [of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program]. That’s all I would accept.”
That means no uranium enrichment or reprocessing, and a halt to the regime’s development of missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads to American cities.
Witkoff is not a career diplomat. That may prove advantageous. Too often, career diplomats are overly eager to conclude deals because doing so brings them professional plaudits.
If those deals turn out to be bummers, so what? By then, the diplomats will have been promoted or awarded a professorship at an elite university where they can hold forth on The Art of Diplomacy.
That’s how North Korea became nuclear-armed after decades of negotiations and agreements.
That’s how Syria retained a stock of chemical weapons after the Obama administration claimed a Russian-mediated dialogue had brought about the destruction of the Assad regime’s CW arsenal.
The 2015 JCPOA is an especially egregious example. As Sen. Tom Cotton observed: “The deal didn’t block Iran’s path to the bomb; it paved the path.”
Obama argued that no one could have achieved a better deal than he had—an unfalsifiable argument. He also said that the only alternative to his deal was war—another unfalsifiable argument.
A policy of “peace through strength”—which was not Obama’s policy but is Trump’s—implies that your adversaries are more fearful of you than you are of them because they recognize your superior might and don’t doubt your willingness to act if push comes to shove.
To be fair, 10 years ago, Tehran had what was believed to be a first-rate missile-defense system supplied by Russia, and commanded powerful terrorist proxies throughout the Middle East and beyond.
You know what happened next: In 2017, Trump became president. The next year, he withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and began to impose serious strains on Iran’s economy.
On Jan. 3, 2020, Trump terminated with extreme prejudice Qassem Soleimani, the skillful commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, responsible for killing hundreds of Americans and determined to kill hundreds more.
No war resulted and, by the end of that year, Tehran had just $4 billion in accessible foreign exchange reserves, limiting the support it could provide to Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, its Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
These effective policies came to a halt when Trump moved out of the White House and Biden moved in.
Hoping to seduce Iran’s rulers back into some version of the JCPOA, Biden gave them sanctions relief, pouring tens of billions of dollars into their coffers. He lifted the terrorist designation from the Houthi rebels.
Iran’s rulers smelled weakness, which did not mitigate their hostility toward “the Great Satan,” their determination to exterminate “the Little Satan” or their grand ambition to become the most powerful Islamic empire since the fall of the Ottomans.
Deploying thousands of advanced centrifuges, they expanded their nuclear weapons program, producing highly enriched uranium, and began the computer modeling necessary to make a nuclear warhead.
They sold oil to Beijing and drones to Russia for use in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Scores of attacks by Iran’s terrorist proxies in Iraq and Syria against American troops went unanswered by the Biden administration.
On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas, bolstered by Iranian funds, weapons and training, invaded Israel and staged the worst massacre of Jews—and anyone who happened to be Jew-adjacent—since the Holocaust.
Since then, Israel has fought on multiple fronts. Hezbollah has been decimated. Tehran’s proxy in Syria has been overthrown.
Following two missile and drone attacks on Israel directly from Iranian soil in 2024, the Israeli Air Force destroyed most of Iran’s missile defense systems and severely degraded the regime’s ballistic missile production capability.
Iran’s rulers are now weaker and more vulnerable than they’ve been since the end of its war with Iraq in the 1980s.
President Trump has stated clearly: “We will not allow a regime that chants ‘Death to America!’ access to the most deadly weapons on earth.”
Others who support “dismantlement” include presidential advisers Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, Mike Waltz and the Senate Republican Conference, along with evangelical leaders.
So, too, does Witkoff. He has Trump’s ear and trust. If his Iranian interlocutors remain intransigent, there’s no reason for him not to report that to the president. No deal is better than a bad deal.
George Shultz, one of the most skillful American diplomats of the 20th century, left us this insight: “Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table.”
Shultz had the experience and wisdom to recognize how the real world works. He understood that “peace through strength” is not just a catchy phrase. It’s a policy that must be implemented with confidence, courage and determination.
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Hamas in Talks with US About Gaza Ceasefire and Aid, Says Senior Palestinian Official
Palestinians displaced by the Israeli military offensive, shelter in tents, in Gaza City May 11, 2025. REUTERS/Dawoud Abu Alkas
Talks between Hamas and the US administration regarding a ceasefire in Gaza and the entry of humanitarian aid to the besieged enclave were underway, a senior Palestinian official familiar with the discussions told Reuters on Sunday.
US President Donald Trump recently repeated a pledge to help get food to Palestinians in Gaza. A US-backed mechanism for getting aid into Gaza should take effect soon, Washington’s envoy to Israel also said on Friday.
There was no immediate comment from the US State Department.
The US had previously conducted discussions with the Palestinian terrorist group on securing the release of US hostages held in Gaza.
Since March 2, Israel has completely cut off all supplies to the 2.3 million residents of Gaza, and food stockpiled during a ceasefire at the start of the year has all but run out.
On March 18, Israel effectively ended the January ceasefire agreement with Hamas and renewed its military campaign in Gaza.
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