The intelligence landscape of Iran is often a topic of intense scrutiny and debate. Amidst the complex geopolitical chessboard where Iran finds itself, the roles and actions of its intelligence community warrant a closer examination.

Contrary to popular belief, there is a strong consensus among experts that neither Israel nor the United States has lent support to terrorist or separatist groups within Iran. Intelligence agencies in these countries, namely the CIA and Mossad, are acutely aware of the delicate balance required to foster change within Iran. They recognize that any potential shift towards regime change must be predicated on the principles of unity and integrity, rather than fractious separatism. This understanding stems from a recognition of the deeply nationalist sentiment that pervades Iranian society — a sentiment vividly expressed in nationwide protests against the regime, where the youth have notably proclaimed their willingness to sacrifice their lives for the nation.

Nationalism, it appears, stands as the most formidable adversary to the Shiite clerical regime currently in power. This is a regime that has, over the years, shown a propensity to leverage ethnic and sectarian divisions to its advantage. However, the approach taken by external intelligence communities, particularly those of the US and Israel, is markedly different. These agencies have consistently demonstrated a respect for the nationalist and patriotic elements within Iran, cognizant of the fact that supporting separatist factions could inadvertently strengthen the mullahs’ grip on power.

On the flip side, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the intelligence arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) engage in operations that many would deem nefarious.

These organizations have established connections with various Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi separatist groups, some under the guise of cooperation agreements, others operating as shadow proxies. This strategy of playing “nasty cards,” as it were, is a tactic that seems to be uniquely favored by Iran’s Shiite caliphate, rather than by external actors like the CIA or Mossad.

Iran’s hands stretch literally all across the world, and it is considered one of the leading state sponsors of terrorism. Its intelligence services are involved in the internal affairs of countries all around the world, and reap division, violence, and chaos wherever they go.

Amidst this tangled web of intrigue and alliances, the greatest fear for Iran’s ruling clerics is the burgeoning nationalist fervor among the younger generation in Iran. This demographic shift poses a significant threat to the regime’s legitimacy and longevity. Among the opposition, figures like Prince Reza Pahlavi emerge as beacons of nationalism, in stark contrast to other opposition elements that may have questionable affiliations with separatist or terrorist groups.

In conclusion, the interplay between nationalism and the strategies employed by both internal and external intelligence communities underscores the complex challenges facing Iran today. As the nation grapples with internal dissent and external pressures, the path to stability and reform remains fraught with obstacles. The international community, for its part, must navigate these waters with caution — like it has done so far — ensuring that actions taken do not inadvertently exacerbate the very tensions they aim to alleviate.

If external actors are overtly seen as stirring dissent in Iran, this could undermine the very strong internal forces that are seeking regime change in Tehran.

Erfan Fard is a counter-terrorism analyst and Middle East Studies researcher based in Washington, D.C. He focuses on Middle Eastern regional security affairs, with a particular emphasis on Iran, counter-terrorism, IRGC, MOIS, and ethnic conflicts in MENA. Erfan is a Jewish Kurd of Iran, and he is fluent in Persian, Kurdish, Arabic, and English. Follow him from this twitter account @EQFARD.

The post Beyond the Shadows: Iran’s Toxic Intelligence Tactics and the Forces of Dissent first appeared on Algemeiner.com.