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Did Hamas’ Innovation — or Israel’s Complacency — Lead to October 7 Massacre?
Hamas terrorists kidnapping Israeli women at the Nahal Oz base near the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023. Photo: Screenshot
Israel possesses one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence capabilities with which to obtain and provide information on its adversaries’ capabilities, intentions and actions. That intelligence serves to guide Israel’s policymakers in deciding on courses of action. Yet on October 7, Hamas was able to carry out an unprecedented attack on Israeli soil with devastating consequences.
What core intelligence challenges did Israel fail to meet in the run-up to this event?
Critically, Israeli intelligence failed to grasp the disruptive changes in Hamas’ approach to Israel — a failure that was facilitated by a related failure of organizational implementation. Explicit advance knowledge of a Hamas attack at the unit level of the intelligence apparatus was not considered valuable, so it was not translated into a competitive advantage. Drawing on public information distilled through Yakov Ben-Haim’s info-gap theory, this article analyzes these two intelligence challenges related to the October 7 attack. It also discusses a means of managing uncertainty that seeks to reduce the impact of surprises on policy outcomes.
Some elements of human affairs are fundamentally unknowable because of the vast uncertainty inherent in human behavior. Scholars of economics apply the concept of Knightian uncertainty, which addresses the difficulty of forecasting in view of the unknowability of all possible events and market innovations. But when it comes to intelligence, predictive errors can also arise from deception and denial.
If a change in the adversary’s camp is truly innovative, there is no prior experience from which probabilities can be deduced. Shackle-Popper indeterminism (SPI) is a concept in which human behavior depends on what we know. When we do not have a prior incident from which to learn and draw conclusions, undetermined elements interfere with our attempts to predict future human behavior. Since policymakers must make critical decisions in contexts that are both uncertain and limited in resources and time, intelligence is needed to reduce the uncertainty as much as possible. The question thus arises: Did Israeli intelligence fail in its core task to reduce uncertainty to the greatest extent possible in the run-up to October 7, or did we witness a disruptive terrorist “innovation” by Hamas that was almost impossible to predict?
This analysis draws on info-gap theory, which originally comes from engineering design and safety analysis. An info-gap is not simply a gap in one’s knowledge or information. It is “a gap with significant consequences for the outcome of a decision.” It describes “the disparity between what is known and what needs to be known in order to reliably and responsibly make a decision.”
Accordingly, the intelligence services’ task of reducing uncertainty has two meanings. The first is to reduce uncertainty (ignorance, ambiguity, and the potential for surprise) by increasing knowledge and understanding of situations or actors. This is the traditional understanding of intelligence. The second is to reduce vulnerability to uncertainty by managing the negative consequences of ignorance, ambiguity, or surprise on the outcome of a policy or decision.
Info-gap theory argues that uncertainty is not negative per se as long as the adverse consequences of a defined policy can be reduced. It proposes the concept of robust satisficing — a term that combines the words “satisfy” and “suffice” — which aims to enhance the robustness of policies against info-gaps with significant consequences. In such a scenario, policymakers define the minimum requirements necessary to achieve a defined goal while intelligence is tasked with constantly evaluating this policy “in terms of how large an info-gap it can tolerate and still achieve the policymaker’s stated goals.” Ideally, intelligence regularly assesses the degree to which current data, knowledge, and understanding can err or change such that a policy will continue to meet the policymaker’s defined outcome requirements. A policy is considered robust when only large surprises would have negative consequences. It has low robustness when even minor surprises affect the outcome negatively.
Concerning Hamas, Israeli policymakers’ minimum outcome requirement would have been to contain the terrorist organization in Gaza and avoid direct combat friction to the greatest extent possible to protect Israel from harm. To achieve this, Israel pursued a policy of maintaining technological and military superiority vis-à-vis Gaza concurrently with bribing Hamas to keep it “weakened and deterred.” According to the principle of robust satisficing, intelligence should have evaluated these policies against info-gaps. How much could Israel err in its understanding of Hamas’ behavior, capabilities and intentions? To what extent would Israel’s policy of technological and military superiority paired with bribing Hamas still ensure the minimum outcome requirement of containing Hamas in Gaza?
Since leaving Gaza in 2005, Israel was largely successful in mitigating the negative impact of repeated rounds of violence and rocket attacks by using Iron Dome and conducting limited military operations. We also now know that Hamas actively deceived Israel by exhibiting restraint over the years as a pretense that it was satisfied with the status quo. Thus, based on prior experience and knowledge, the policy of technological and military superiority plus bribery was considered robust. This presumably led Israeli decision-makers to tolerate info-gaps concerning unusual Hamas behavior.
Recurring conflict patterns and Hamas deception over the years reinforced a common and, in retrospect, wrong understanding by Israel’s intelligence and policymaking echelons that the country’s policies to control Gaza were sound. This ultimately made them blind to the disruptive change in Hamas’ intentions and approach that a practice of robust satisficing might have helped to counteract. As a consequence, this blindness appears to have caused them to lower the level of what needed to be known to ensure the minimum outcome requirement of containing Hamas in Gaza.
Paradoxically, when you lower the level of what needs to be known, the commitment to a policy increases and the tolerance for info-gaps grows. In an illustration of this tendency, Israeli policymakers decided to shift resources away from the Hamas problem to other areas. This included, for example, reducing the military presence at the Gaza border and halting the practice of eavesdropping on hand-held radios of Hamas militants, which was considered a waste of time. Both decisions would prove to have devastating consequences on October 7.
Israel’s “blinded” understanding of Hamas rendered new intelligence on unusual activities at the Gaza border more “tolerable,” which in turn facilitated the second failure in the run-up to October 7. Israeli intelligence failed to organizationally implement new knowledge because that knowledge was not considered sufficiently valuable to be deemed worthy of translation into a competitive advantage. Reports show that at the unit level of the Southern Command of 8200, explicit information of a pending Hamas attack existed based on the previously obtained “Jericho Walls” operation plan and mounting evidence of unusual events in Gaza. However, not only was this information dismissed “top-down” by the responsible superiors, but the highly sophisticated technological tools of Israeli intelligence failed to identify the existing signs as strong.
To return to the two meanings of reducing uncertainty: The bottom-up elements of Israeli intelligence did indeed work to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity concerning a pending attack, as described by the term’s first meaning. Tragically, they were not successful at implementing this information beyond their unit for further use. That is because Israeli intelligence failed to evaluate and reduce the negative consequences of a potential surprise on policy outcomes, which is the second meaning of reducing vulnerability to uncertainty.
Some form of organizational “top-down” barriers, facilitated by a “blinded” understanding of the situation, impeded a process of robustly satisficing the existing info-gap about unusual Hamas behavior. Again, the question is whether this organizational tolerance for non-implementation of new information for further use was facilitated because policymakers and top security officials lowered the requirements of what needed to be known to ensure the minimum outcome requirement concerning Hamas in the first place.
The Israeli security establishment and policymakers came to consider their policies of technological and military superiority vis-à-vis Gaza plus bribery of Hamas as very strong, based on prior experience and understanding. This led them to tolerate larger and larger info-gaps and eventually made them blind to the disruptive change in Hamas’s intentions and capabilities. October 7 thus arrived as a catastrophic surprise — a terrorist “innovation” that disrupted existing policies.
The top-down tolerance for info-gaps concerning Hamas seemed to contribute to the second intelligence failure of organizational implementation, by which explicit and mounting knowledge about a pending Hamas attack was not acted upon. As discussed, the practice of robustly satisficing info-gaps can help manage uncertainty and surprise, including deception by adversaries, to ensure minimum policy outcomes. A robustness question in the run-up to October 7 could have been, “How much could our knowledge and understanding about our technological superiority over Gaza and Hamas’s capabilities err without altering the final assessment of the unusually aggressive military activities at the Gaza border and, more strikingly, the obtained ‘Jericho Walls’ plan?” Had the relevant policymakers and intelligence echelons regularly challenged their understanding of existing policies, the evidence of unusual Hamas activities might have been interpreted quite differently. An attack could have been identified as not only possible but even plausible.
Stefanie Kirchweger…Stefanie Kirchweger is a PhD student at the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, in a cotutelle agreement with the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Her research is focused on international intelligence relations and foreign policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Israel Faces Dual Attacks as Houthis and Hamas Target Major Cities, IDF Expands Ground Operations in Gaza
A Houthi fighter mans a machine gun mounted on a truck during a parade for people who attended Houthi military training as part of a mobilization campaign, in Sanaa, Yemen, Dec. 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
Millions of Israelis scrambled for shelter overnight as Iran-backed Houthi terrorists in Yemen launched a ballistic missile at Israel, setting off air-raid sirens across the center of the country and the Jerusalem area, and was followed hours later by a Hamas rocket barrage targeting Tel Aviv on Thursday afternoon.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported intercepting the missile from Yemen before it entered Israeli airspace, while the Iron Dome intercepted a further three missiles from Hamas later on, triggering sirens throughout the metropolitan area. While there were no reported casualties, shrapnel from intercepted rockets was found in Rishon Lezion. The rocket fire came as the IDF expanded its ground operations in Gaza, warning Palestinian civilians to avoid the Netzarim Corridor, a strategic seven-kilometer road that bisects the enclave.
The United States has urged Israel not to respond directly to the Houthi missile strike, according to a Hebrew-language Ynet report citing an Israeli official. US forces already carried out airstrikes against the Houthis — who have targeted American and Israeli ships in the Red Sea and disrupted global shipping through the critical trade route — in recent days and told Israel to “allow them to handle the situation,” the report said.
Eitan Shamir, a security expert, noted that, regardless, it would not be wise — and neither within its capabilities — for Israel to secure the Red Sea without help.
“Achieving this objective cannot be accomplished by Israel alone and will require the involvement of the international community,” he told The Algemeiner. “The Israeli Navy lacks the capabilities to secure Israeli shipping in the southern Red Sea independently. Politically, it is also undesirable for Israel to take on the responsibility of addressing a problem that is internationally recognized, particularly since Israel is often accused of causing it due to its attacks on Gaza.”
Nevertheless, Shamir added, Israel’s “goal for ending the conflict is to ensure complete freedom of navigation to and from its waters.”
Shamir, who is the director of Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, also underscored recent US State Department decisions against the Houthis, including reinstating its foreign terrorist designation and its $15 million reward for information on its financing. Still, he said, “the impact of these actions on the Houthis’ blockade in the southern part of the Red Sea is currently unclear.”
Shamir highlighted reports suggesting that China was providing financial protection to the Houthis to ensure its own ships remain unharmed.
The expansion of Iranian activities into the Mediterranean Sea has raised further concerns. Shamir highlighted the likelihood that Israel’s navy will need to increase its operational presence in both the Red Sea and Mediterranean, potentially requiring additional vessels to secure shipping lanes. Cooperation with the US Fifth Fleet and allied naval forces will remain crucial to maintaining stability in these waterways, he said.
Shamir warned against unilateral action, saying, “It is not in Israel’s best interest to act unilaterally to deter the Houthis.” Instead, he urged Israel to let the US take the lead, including pressuring Iran, which “undoubtedly has influence over the Houthis, to stop the attacks on Israel.”
Meanwhile, the IDF targeted key Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist operatives. Among those eliminated was Rashid Jahjouh, head of Hamas’s General Security Apparatus, who was responsible for maintaining internal security and intelligence operations, identifying and targeting “collaborators” and spreading propaganda. Also killed was Ayman Etsilah, a senior Hamas security official in Khan Yunis, and Ismail Abd al-Aal, a high-ranking figure in Islamic Jihad’s weapons smuggling network.
The IDF and Shin Bet confirmed that these operations were part of broader efforts to dismantle the leadership and infrastructure of terrorist groups in the enclave.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, like the Houthis, are both backed by Iran, which provides the Palestinian terrorist groups with weapons and funding.
Several other Hamas leaders have been killed since Israel resumed strikes earlier this week, including Yasser Muhammad Harb Musa, who managed Hamas’s security portfolio, and Ayssam al-Dalis, the head of Hamas’s Gaza government. Mahmoud Marzouk Ahmed Abu Watfa, responsible for Hamas’s internal security, and Ahmed Abdulla Al-hata, the group’s Minister of Justice, were also among those targeted.
The current escalation follows the collapse of a temporary ceasefire and hostage-release deal that lasted 42 days, during which the terror group released 30 living hostages and the remains of eight slain captives, while Israel freed nearly 2,000 Palestinian security prisoners.
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BBC Apologizes to Israeli Embassy for Seeking Anti-Netanyahu Guest for News Program
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at a memorial ceremony for those murdered by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, and those who fell in the “Iron Sword” war, at the Knesset, the Parliament, in Jerusalem, Oct. 28, 2024. Photo: DEBBIE HILL/Pool via REUTERS
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) issued an apology on Thursday after a producer asked the Israeli Embassy to the United Kingdom to help the BBC find a guest who would be critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“This was a serious mistake which we have looked into,” the corporation said in a statement to The Jewish Chronicle. “It clearly falls well below our standards. We apologize unreservedly to the Israeli Embassy.”
Embassy spokeswoman Orly Goldschmidt shared Thursday on X that her team at the Israeli Embassy in London received a WhatsApp message from a BBC World Service producer, who was looking for guest who would appear on the television program “Newshour.” The producer said the show’s presenter would specifically like to interview “an Israeli military voice (can be former)” who would be “critical of Netanyahu” and Israel’s new ground operation in the Gaza Strip.
“We want someone who is going to be critical of Netanyahu and the ground offense (concern about remaining hostages, stretching the IDF capacity, destruction of Gaza or any other reason). Do you think you can help with this?” the producer wrote. Goldschmidt shared a screenshot of the message on X and denounced the comments, claiming that it shows “BBC bias (yet again).”
“Today my team received this remarkable message from a @BBC producer at @bbcworldservice,” she wrote. “They don’t want to interview someone knowledgeable, nor someone relevant, just someone who fits the predetermined narrative. There is nothing balanced or impartial about this.”
BBC BIAS (yet again)
Today my team received this remarkable message from a @BBC producer at @bbcworldservice.
They don’t want to interview someone knowledgeable, nor someone relevant, just someone who fits the predetermined narrative.
There is nothing balanced or impartial… pic.twitter.com/pm0loEeUFG
— Orly Goldschmidt
(@Orlygoldschmidt) March 20, 2025
The British volunteer-led charity Campaign Against Antisemitism (CAA) said the incident is another example “of @BBC putting its thumb on the scale to report its narrative masquerading as news.”
“Another time the BBC is caught out. Another apology. For all the times the BBC is caught out, how many times is it not caught out?” CAA added. “The unrelenting bias on our televisions, from our radios and on the BBC website answers that question. How many more scandals do there need to before there is an independent investigation into the BBC?”
Others who have criticized the BBC’s most recent blunder include politicians in the UK, and international human rights activist and lawyer Arsen Ostrovsky.
The incident followed the BBC late last month pulling a documentary about Palestinian children living in the Gaza Strip during the Israel-Hamas war and apologizing for making “serious flaws” in the film after it was revealed that it was narrated by a Palestinian boy who is the son of a senior Hamas official. The BBC also acknowledged that licensing fee payments for the film “Gaza: How to Survive a Warzone” were given to the family of the Hamas official. The controversy sparked protests outside of the BBC headquarters in London, and an organization of pro-Israel lawyers in the United Kingdom reported the BBC to counter-terrorism police for possible terrorism offenses, which include allegedly funding a terrorist group.
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Germany Reopens Embassy in Damascus, Establishing Official Diplomatic Ties With Syria’s New Regime
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock speaks during a press conference in Damascus, Syria, March 20, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
Germany reopened its embassy in Damascus on Thursday, 13 years since its closure during the early days of Syria’s civil war, as both countries work to strengthen their bilateral relations.
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock visited Damascus — her second trip since the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December — to mark Berlin’s establishment of official diplomatic relations with the new Syrian government.
“I am here in Syria for the second time in around 10 weeks because the country and its future are on a knife edge,” Baerbock said at a news conference. “We can’t predict what will happen in a few months or perhaps a few weeks’ time.”
As a show of support for Syria’s nascent regime, Berlin reopened its embassy in the country in an effort to improve diplomatic relations, while pledging economic assistance and sanctions relief to aid the new government and the country’s reconstruction efforts.
Of the European Union’s 27 member states, only Italy reopened its embassy last year before Assad’s fall, while Spain did so after his ouster.
In a statement, Baerbock said her trip was intended to convey the message that “a political new beginning between Europe and Syria, between Germany and Syria, is possible.”
She also said there are “clear expectations that there is freedom, security, and opportunity in Syria for all people — for women and men, for people belonging to all ethnic groups and religions.”
Earlier this month, clashes between fighters loyal to Assad and forces aligned with Syria’s new rulers sparked the worst violence since the new government seized power, leaving over 1,000 people dead. In a series of confrontations, fighters supporting the new Syrian government carried out mass executions of Alawite Muslim civilians.
According to Syria’s interior ministry, the pro-government fighters conducted “sweeping operations” to dismantle the last “remnants” of Assad’s regime, targeting primarily adult men.
However, the ensuing mass killing of Alawites, who comprise roughly 10 percent of the Syrian population, has raised concern among the international community about the safety of minority groups in the country.
Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa decried the massacres, claiming they undermined his efforts to unite the country and vowing to seek retribution for the violence.
“Syria is a state of law. The law will take its course on all,” Sharaa told Reuters. “We fought to defend the oppressed, and we won’t accept that any blood be shed unjustly, or go without punishment or accountability, even among those closest to us.”
In late January, Sharaa became Damascus’s transitional president after leading a rebel campaign that ousted Assad, whose Iran-backed rule had strained ties with the Arab world during the nearly 14-year Syrian war.
The collapse of Assad’s regime was the result of an offensive spearheaded by Sharaa’s Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, a former al-Qaeda affiliate.
During her visit on Thursday, Baerbock said the recent clashes had “massively cost confidence” among the international community. Germany’s top diplomat emphasized that the new Syrian government “must have control over the actions of the groups in its own ranks and bring those responsible to account.”
After the recent clashes, Syria’s new Islamist-led government — backed by Turkey — and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group reached a ceasefire agreement.
Under the new deal between the Kurdish-led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government, the SDF will be integrated into Damascus’s institutions. In exchange, the agreement gives the Syrian government control over SDF-held civilian and military sites in the northeast region of the country.
Baerbock praised the “historic” agreement and emphasized the importance of including other groups to ensure they feel like they are “part of a new Syria.”
Since Assad’s fall, the new Syrian government has sought to strengthen ties with Arab and Western leaders. Damascus’s new diplomatic relationships reflect a distancing from its previous allies, Iran and Russia.
The new Syrian government appears focused on reassuring the West and working to get sanctions lifted, which date back to 1979 when the US labeled Syria a state sponsor of terrorism and were significantly increased following Assad’s violent response to the anti-government protests.
The Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on opposition protests in 2011 sparked the Syrian civil war, during which Syria was suspended from the Arab League for more than a decade.
Earlier this week, European Union countries pledged to continue supporting Syria’s new leadership through both financial aid and sanctions relief, despite an outbreak of sectarian violence threatening the country’s stability.
Germany committed to providing €300 million in support for food, health, and other essential services for the Syrian population.
“As Europeans, we stand together for the people of Syria, for a free and peaceful Syria,” Baerbock said during the annual donor conference for Syria in Brussels.
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