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Did Hamas’ Innovation — or Israel’s Complacency — Lead to October 7 Massacre?
Hamas terrorists kidnapping Israeli women at the Nahal Oz base near the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023. Photo: Screenshot
Israel possesses one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence capabilities with which to obtain and provide information on its adversaries’ capabilities, intentions and actions. That intelligence serves to guide Israel’s policymakers in deciding on courses of action. Yet on October 7, Hamas was able to carry out an unprecedented attack on Israeli soil with devastating consequences.
What core intelligence challenges did Israel fail to meet in the run-up to this event?
Critically, Israeli intelligence failed to grasp the disruptive changes in Hamas’ approach to Israel — a failure that was facilitated by a related failure of organizational implementation. Explicit advance knowledge of a Hamas attack at the unit level of the intelligence apparatus was not considered valuable, so it was not translated into a competitive advantage. Drawing on public information distilled through Yakov Ben-Haim’s info-gap theory, this article analyzes these two intelligence challenges related to the October 7 attack. It also discusses a means of managing uncertainty that seeks to reduce the impact of surprises on policy outcomes.
Some elements of human affairs are fundamentally unknowable because of the vast uncertainty inherent in human behavior. Scholars of economics apply the concept of Knightian uncertainty, which addresses the difficulty of forecasting in view of the unknowability of all possible events and market innovations. But when it comes to intelligence, predictive errors can also arise from deception and denial.
If a change in the adversary’s camp is truly innovative, there is no prior experience from which probabilities can be deduced. Shackle-Popper indeterminism (SPI) is a concept in which human behavior depends on what we know. When we do not have a prior incident from which to learn and draw conclusions, undetermined elements interfere with our attempts to predict future human behavior. Since policymakers must make critical decisions in contexts that are both uncertain and limited in resources and time, intelligence is needed to reduce the uncertainty as much as possible. The question thus arises: Did Israeli intelligence fail in its core task to reduce uncertainty to the greatest extent possible in the run-up to October 7, or did we witness a disruptive terrorist “innovation” by Hamas that was almost impossible to predict?
This analysis draws on info-gap theory, which originally comes from engineering design and safety analysis. An info-gap is not simply a gap in one’s knowledge or information. It is “a gap with significant consequences for the outcome of a decision.” It describes “the disparity between what is known and what needs to be known in order to reliably and responsibly make a decision.”
Accordingly, the intelligence services’ task of reducing uncertainty has two meanings. The first is to reduce uncertainty (ignorance, ambiguity, and the potential for surprise) by increasing knowledge and understanding of situations or actors. This is the traditional understanding of intelligence. The second is to reduce vulnerability to uncertainty by managing the negative consequences of ignorance, ambiguity, or surprise on the outcome of a policy or decision.
Info-gap theory argues that uncertainty is not negative per se as long as the adverse consequences of a defined policy can be reduced. It proposes the concept of robust satisficing — a term that combines the words “satisfy” and “suffice” — which aims to enhance the robustness of policies against info-gaps with significant consequences. In such a scenario, policymakers define the minimum requirements necessary to achieve a defined goal while intelligence is tasked with constantly evaluating this policy “in terms of how large an info-gap it can tolerate and still achieve the policymaker’s stated goals.” Ideally, intelligence regularly assesses the degree to which current data, knowledge, and understanding can err or change such that a policy will continue to meet the policymaker’s defined outcome requirements. A policy is considered robust when only large surprises would have negative consequences. It has low robustness when even minor surprises affect the outcome negatively.
Concerning Hamas, Israeli policymakers’ minimum outcome requirement would have been to contain the terrorist organization in Gaza and avoid direct combat friction to the greatest extent possible to protect Israel from harm. To achieve this, Israel pursued a policy of maintaining technological and military superiority vis-à-vis Gaza concurrently with bribing Hamas to keep it “weakened and deterred.” According to the principle of robust satisficing, intelligence should have evaluated these policies against info-gaps. How much could Israel err in its understanding of Hamas’ behavior, capabilities and intentions? To what extent would Israel’s policy of technological and military superiority paired with bribing Hamas still ensure the minimum outcome requirement of containing Hamas in Gaza?
Since leaving Gaza in 2005, Israel was largely successful in mitigating the negative impact of repeated rounds of violence and rocket attacks by using Iron Dome and conducting limited military operations. We also now know that Hamas actively deceived Israel by exhibiting restraint over the years as a pretense that it was satisfied with the status quo. Thus, based on prior experience and knowledge, the policy of technological and military superiority plus bribery was considered robust. This presumably led Israeli decision-makers to tolerate info-gaps concerning unusual Hamas behavior.
Recurring conflict patterns and Hamas deception over the years reinforced a common and, in retrospect, wrong understanding by Israel’s intelligence and policymaking echelons that the country’s policies to control Gaza were sound. This ultimately made them blind to the disruptive change in Hamas’ intentions and approach that a practice of robust satisficing might have helped to counteract. As a consequence, this blindness appears to have caused them to lower the level of what needed to be known to ensure the minimum outcome requirement of containing Hamas in Gaza.
Paradoxically, when you lower the level of what needs to be known, the commitment to a policy increases and the tolerance for info-gaps grows. In an illustration of this tendency, Israeli policymakers decided to shift resources away from the Hamas problem to other areas. This included, for example, reducing the military presence at the Gaza border and halting the practice of eavesdropping on hand-held radios of Hamas militants, which was considered a waste of time. Both decisions would prove to have devastating consequences on October 7.
Israel’s “blinded” understanding of Hamas rendered new intelligence on unusual activities at the Gaza border more “tolerable,” which in turn facilitated the second failure in the run-up to October 7. Israeli intelligence failed to organizationally implement new knowledge because that knowledge was not considered sufficiently valuable to be deemed worthy of translation into a competitive advantage. Reports show that at the unit level of the Southern Command of 8200, explicit information of a pending Hamas attack existed based on the previously obtained “Jericho Walls” operation plan and mounting evidence of unusual events in Gaza. However, not only was this information dismissed “top-down” by the responsible superiors, but the highly sophisticated technological tools of Israeli intelligence failed to identify the existing signs as strong.
To return to the two meanings of reducing uncertainty: The bottom-up elements of Israeli intelligence did indeed work to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity concerning a pending attack, as described by the term’s first meaning. Tragically, they were not successful at implementing this information beyond their unit for further use. That is because Israeli intelligence failed to evaluate and reduce the negative consequences of a potential surprise on policy outcomes, which is the second meaning of reducing vulnerability to uncertainty.
Some form of organizational “top-down” barriers, facilitated by a “blinded” understanding of the situation, impeded a process of robustly satisficing the existing info-gap about unusual Hamas behavior. Again, the question is whether this organizational tolerance for non-implementation of new information for further use was facilitated because policymakers and top security officials lowered the requirements of what needed to be known to ensure the minimum outcome requirement concerning Hamas in the first place.
The Israeli security establishment and policymakers came to consider their policies of technological and military superiority vis-à-vis Gaza plus bribery of Hamas as very strong, based on prior experience and understanding. This led them to tolerate larger and larger info-gaps and eventually made them blind to the disruptive change in Hamas’s intentions and capabilities. October 7 thus arrived as a catastrophic surprise — a terrorist “innovation” that disrupted existing policies.
The top-down tolerance for info-gaps concerning Hamas seemed to contribute to the second intelligence failure of organizational implementation, by which explicit and mounting knowledge about a pending Hamas attack was not acted upon. As discussed, the practice of robustly satisficing info-gaps can help manage uncertainty and surprise, including deception by adversaries, to ensure minimum policy outcomes. A robustness question in the run-up to October 7 could have been, “How much could our knowledge and understanding about our technological superiority over Gaza and Hamas’s capabilities err without altering the final assessment of the unusually aggressive military activities at the Gaza border and, more strikingly, the obtained ‘Jericho Walls’ plan?” Had the relevant policymakers and intelligence echelons regularly challenged their understanding of existing policies, the evidence of unusual Hamas activities might have been interpreted quite differently. An attack could have been identified as not only possible but even plausible.
Stefanie Kirchweger…Stefanie Kirchweger is a PhD student at the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, in a cotutelle agreement with the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Her research is focused on international intelligence relations and foreign policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Trump Insists US Will ‘Take’ Gaza, Jordan’s King Stays Mum on Palestinian Relocation During White House Visit
US President Donald Trump meets with Jordan’s King Abdullah at the White House in Washington, DC, Feb. 11, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
US President Donald Trump insisted that America will “take” Gaza and that other countries in the Middle East will absorb the Palestinians currently residing in the enclave while meeting with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the White House on Tuesday.
“There’s nothing to buy. We will have Gaza. No reason to buy. There is nothing to buy,” Trump said.
The president suggested that the damage incurred by the ongoing Israel-Hamas war has corroded Gaza’s value and that the United States will simply seize the enclave. However, he did not detail how he plans to facilitate or finance the reconstruction of Gaza.
“It’s Gaza. It’s a war-torn area. We’re going to take it. We’re going to hold it. We’re going to cherish it,” Trump added.
Nonetheless, the president vowed that the US will energize Gaza’s economy and turn the territory into a “diamond” and “tremendous asset” for the Middle East. Trump maintained that Gaza possesses the potential to become a “great economic development” for the region, touting its scenic location on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea.
However, the president lamented that seemingly “every 10 years” Gaza erupts into explosive warfare, resulting in “death and destruction” for its civilians.
Trump added that he believes “99 percent” that the United States could strike an agreement with Egypt to relocate the residents of Gaza, where the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas ruled before the war and remains the strongest faction.
When asked what he thought of Trump’s ambitions to transfer Palestinian civilians to Egypt, Abdullah revealed that Egypt and other Arab countries are planning to meet in Saudi Arabia to discuss the future of Gaza. Abdullah refused to speak extensively about Trump’s stated goal of removing Palestinians from Gaza, advising reporters to “not get ahead of ourselves” and wait for Arab countries to deliberate about the matter.
“It’s hard to make this work in a way that’s good for everybody,” Abdullah said.
Though the Jordanian king would not commit to taking in large numbers of Palestinians, he said Jordan would be willing to “take 2,000 children that are cancer children or are in [a] very ill state” while Arab countries “wait for the Egyptians to present their plan on how we can work with the president to work on Gaza challenges.”
During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the White House last week, Trump called on Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states in the region to take in Palestinians from Gaza after nearly 16 months of war between Israel and the Hamas. Arab leaders have adamantly rejected Trump’s proposal.
Last week, the US president expressed similar sentiments as he did on Tuesday, saying that the US would “take over” the Gaza Strip to build the war-torn Palestinian enclave back up. However, many members of the US Congress across both parties pushed back on Trump’s declaration, accusing him of endangering American troops, destabilizing the Middle East, and floating an ethnic cleansing campaign in Gaza. Trump has also stated that Palestinians would not have the “right to return” to Gaza after being relocated and said no US troops would be needed for his plan without elaborating.
Following his meeting with Trump, Abdullah took to social media to call for a permanent end to the war in Gaza and the creation of a Palestinian state.
“This is the unified Arab position. Rebuilding Gaza without displacing the Palestinians and addressing the dire humanitarian situation should be the priority for all,” he wrote on X/Twitter.
“Achieving just peace on the basis of the two-state solution is the way to ensure regional stability. This requires US leadership. President Trump is a man of peace. He was instrumental in securing the Gaza ceasefire. We look to US and all stakeholders in ensuring it holds,” the Jordanian king added.
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Bowdoin College Clears ‘Gaza Encampment’
Anti-Zionist Bowdoin College students storming the Smith Union administrative building on the evening of Feb. 6, 2025, to occupy it in protest of what they said are the college’s links to Israel. Photo: Screenshot
Bowdoin College in Maine has negotiated an end to an anti-Zionist group’s occupation of an administrative building without acceding to any of its demands for a boycott of Israel, The Bowdoin Orient reported on Monday.
The group Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP)had installed an encampment inside Smith Union on Thursday night in response to US President Donald Trump’s proposing that the US “take over” the Gaza Strip and transform it into a hub for tourism and economic dynamism. The roughly 50 students who resided inside the building vowed not to leave until the Bowdoin officials agree to adopt the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.
Following the action, Bowdoin officials promptly moved to deescalate the situation by counseling the students to mind the “gravity of situation” in which they placed themselves, with senior associate dean Katie Toro-Ferrari warning that their behavior “could put them on the path where they are jeopardizing their ability to remain as Bowdoin students.” No sooner had it sent this communication than it began issuing temporary suspensions to students who rejected appeals to leave Smith Union and return to normal student life.
“You will be placed on temporary suspension, effective immediately, pending a college disciplinary process,” Bowdoin vice president Jim Hoppe wrote to the protesters in a letter, copies of which were sent to their parents. “During your immediate suspension, you may not attend your Spring 2025 courses … Your family will receive a copy of this letter. This temporary status will continue until further notice.”
Facing threats of severer sanctions, SJP agreed to vacate Smith Union on Monday and shared that they had issued a plea for mercy in discussions with college officials which called for them to “understand a context of good faith for the students who have engaged in this action.” By that time, several students had already left the building, according to the Orient.
Republicans in Washington, DC have said that disruptive and extremist political activity on college campuses “will no longer be tolerated in the Trump administration.” Meanwhile, the new US president has enacted a slew of policies aimed at reining in disruptive and discriminatory behavior.
Continuing work started during his first administration — when Trump issued Executive Order 13899 to ensure that civil rights law apply equally Jews — Trump’s recent “Additional Measures to Combat Antisemitism” calls for “using all appropriate legal tools to prosecute, remove, or otherwise … hold to account perpetrators of unlawful antisemitic harassment and violence.” The order also requires each government agency to write a report explaining how it can be of help in carrying out its enforcement. Another major provision of the order calls for the deportation of extremist “alien” student activists, whose support for terrorist organizations, intellectual and material, such as Hamas contributed to fostering antisemitism, violence, and property destruction.
Follow Dion J. Pierre @DionJPierre.
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Hamas Rebuffs Trump’s ‘Worthless’ Call for Israel to Resume War if Terror Group Refuses to Release Hostages
Then-US President-elect Donald Trump makes remarks at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, US, Jan. 7, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Carlos Barria
Hamas has rebuffed US President Donald Trump’s warning that he’ll “let hell break out” if the Palestinian terrorist group does not release all the Israeli hostages still being held in Gaza, saying that the American leader’s threats are “worthless and only complicate matters.”
“Trump must remember that there is an agreement that must be respected by both parties, and this is the only way to get the prisoners back,” Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhr told multiple press agencies, referring to the Gaza ceasefire and hostage-release deal between the terrorist group and Israel. “The language of threats is worthless and only complicates matters.”
On Monday, Trump advised Israel to cancel the ceasefire and said he would “let hell break out” if Hamas refused to release the remaining hostages. Trump’s comments echoed statements made by his national security adviser, Mike Waltz, last month that the White House would support Israel resuming the war in Gaza if Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement.
“As far as I’m concerned, if all of the hostages aren’t returned by Saturday at 12 o’clock … I would say, cancel it [the hostage deal] and all bets are off and let hell break out,” Trump told reporters on Monday. “I’d say they ought to be returned by 12 o’clock on Saturday, and if they’re not returned — all of them — not in dribs and drabs, not two and one and three and four and two — Saturday at 12 o’clock. And after that, I would say, all hell is going to break out.”
Trump cautioned that Israel might want to override him on the issue and said he might speak to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Trump’s comments came after Hamas announced on Monday that it would stop releasing Israeli hostages until further notice over alleged violations of the ceasefire deal. Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida claimed that Israel has prevented Palestinians from returning to northern Gaza, conducted strikes throughout the Gaza Strip, and impeded the delivery of humanitarian goods.
“The resistance leadership has closely monitored the enemy’s violations and its failure to uphold the terms of the agreement,” Obeida said.
The Israel Defense Forces has insisted that its strikes were conducted for defensive purposes, saying that its soldiers have “operated to distance suspects who posed a threat to them in different areas of the Gaza Strip.”
“The IDF is committed to fully implementing the conditions of the agreement for the return of the hostages,” the military wrote in a statement, adding that their forces are “prepared for any scenario and will continue to take any necessary actions to thwart immediate threat to IDF soldiers.”
Meanwhile, Israel said last week that 12,600 trucks of aid had arrived in Gaza since the beginning of the deal on Jan. 19.
Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists started the war in Gaza when they murdered 1,200 people and kidnapped 251 hostages during their invasion of southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Israel responded with a military campaign aimed at freeing the hostages and dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities in the neighboring enclave. The conflict raged for nearly 16 months until both sides agreed to last month’s ceasefire and hostage-release deal, the first phase of which is set to last six weeks.
Under phase one, Hamas agreed to free a total of 33 Israeli hostages, eight of whom are deceased, and in exchange, Israel would release over 1,900 Palestinian prisoners, many of whom are serving multiple life sentences for terrorist activity. Meanwhile, fighting in Gaza will stop as negotiators work on agreeing to a second phase of the agreement, which is expected to include Hamas releasing all remaining hostages held in Gaza and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the enclave.
So far, 16 of the 33 hostages in Gaza have been released within the first phase of the ceasefire.
The three latest hostages were released on Saturday. Their strikingly thin and emaciated bodies sparked international outrage about Hamas’s treatment of the hostages, with Trump comparing the captives to Holocaust survivors.
The details of the second phase of the ceasefire are still being negotiated. However, Israel has reportedly presented the White House with a plan to advance the truce with Hamas.
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