For the sake of peace and stability in the Middle East, it is vital that the United States drastically change its relations with Qatar. Qatar has long played a double game, seeking good relations with the United States while maintaining ties — if not support — for its adversaries. That pattern appears to be repeating itself again, with competing reports about whether the leadership of the terrorist group Hamas will continue to be welcome to live in Doha.,

It is vital that the United States convince Qatar to play it straight, and cut off political and financial support for Hamas while increasing accountability.

Earlier this month, Biden administration officials claimed that Qatar was evicting Hamas from the country. But, just days later, the Qatari Foreign Ministry strongly denied those reports. Instead, Qatar said it was suspending its role as a mediator in hostage and ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas.

Yet, an Arab diplomat told The Times of Israel that last week senior Hamas officials left Qatar for Turkey, a NATO ally that also risks running afoul of Washington if it provides safe harbor to terrorists.

Amid this confusion, it is not clear what exactly is taking place: has Qatar actually expelled Hamas’ leadership, but is denying it to save face publicly? Would Doha welcome these officials back if they agree to negotiate? Which Hamas members, if any, still reside in Qatar?

Whatever is happening behind the scenes, the ambiguity of the current situation is representative of Qatar’s broader strategy to play all sides and keep everyone guessing regarding its loyalties and interests. Thus, while it hosts, and helps pay for, the largest US military base in the Middle East at al Udeid, Qatar has also provided a haven and financial support to radical groups, terrorist organizations, and American adversaries such as the Taliban, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, while maintaining good relations with Iran.

Doha portrays its refusal to choose sides as a strategic asset, not only for itself but for others as well. For example, Qatari officials have claimed that allowing Hamas officials to reside on its territory is a selfless investment in diplomacy. Qatari Defense Minister Khalid bin Mohammed al-Attiyah explained that Hamas officials would remain in Doha “not because we want Hamas to stay in Qatar, but because we want to facilitate the negotiations with the parties through the organization’s office.”

Yet, there is good reason to be skeptical of these claims of Qatari neutrality and magnanimity.

Qatar has provided Hamas officials safe harbor since the terrorist group relocated its headquarters there from Damascus, Syria, in 2012. In the following 12 years, and before Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack, there were three major conflicts between Israel and Hamas — in 2012, 2014, and 2021. Each time, the resulting ceasefire was negotiated principally by Egypt, not Qatar.

Immediately after Hamas’ October 7 attack, the Qatari Foreign Ministry issued a statement that placed all of the blame for the violence on Israel, failed to condemn Hamas, and called for restraint on both sides.

Other Qatari actions are more complicated to judge. Doha sent, and Israel allowed, billions of dollars in into Gaza, reportedly as suitcases filled with cash. The money was supposed to rebuild Gaza, improve economic conditions for Gazans, and thereby placate Hamas. In effect, however, the funds were used by Hamas to prepare for the October 7 attack, including building hundreds of miles of tunnels. Even if the intentions were good, without any accountability, Qatari generosity only strengthened Hamas.

Nor has Qatar’s tolerance of Hamas provided any results since October 7. Despite Doha hosting multiple rounds of negotiations, there has been no agreement for a ceasefire in Gaza or hostage release in nearly a year. Nor have Qatar’s previous public threats to downgrade its relations with Hamas failed to achieve results. Despite Qatari and Egyptian officials informing Hamas leaders in June that they faced arrest, sanctions ,and eviction from Doha if they did not agree to a ceasefire, the terrorist group’s then-leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar — both of whom have since been eliminated — refused President Biden’s proposal along with many other offers.

It is now past time for Doha to shift its approach and take a clear side: against Hamas. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged in June, “if you want a ceasefire, press Hamas to say yes. If you want to alleviate the terrible suffering of Palestinians in Gaza, press Hamas to say yes. If you want to get all the hostages home, press Hamas to say yes.”

The United States is right to demand not only that Qatar expel Hamas’ leaders, but that it do so clearly and publicly. Only such an unambiguous rejection of Hamas and the loss of the haven Qatar provides might pressure Hamas sufficiently to finally accept a deal.

Qatar cannot continue playing both sides. Terrorists that kill Americans should not freely reside in US-partner nations. The United States should use every play in the book to convince them. One substantive step would be for US assets currently deployed at the Al Udeid airbase to be relocated to better-aligned US partners, such as Israel, the United Arab Emirates, or other Arab nations that are not harboring Hamas and catering to our enemies.

Qatar, Turkey, and any other nation that would provide safe haven to Hamas should understand that if it cannot side with the United States against terrorism, the United States will not side with it, and the consequences will be significant.

Lieutenant General Raymond V. Mason, USA (ret.) is the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G4 Army Staff. Vice Admiral Herman A. Shelanski, USN (ret.) is the former Naval Inspector General. Both were participants on the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2019 Generals and Admirals Program.

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